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  1. Robert P. Abelson & Mansur Lalljee (1988). Knowledge Structures and Causal Explanation. In Denis J. Hilton (ed.), Contemporary Science and Natural Explanation: Commonsense Conceptions of Causality. New York University Press.
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  2. K. Abt (1987). Probability Models in the Life Sciences: What Do They Really Stand For? Erkenntnis 26 (3):423 - 427.
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  3. Peter Achinstein (1997). On Evidence: A Reply to McGrew. Analysis 57 (1):81–83.
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  4. Peter Achinstein (1994). Explanation V. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:156 - 164.
    Do predictions of novel facts provide stronger evidence for a theory than explanations of old ones? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Which obtains has nothing to do with whether the evidence is predicted or explained, but only with the selection procedure used to generate the evidence. This is demonstrated by reference to a series of hypothetical drug cases and to Heinrich Hertz's 1883 cathode ray experiments.
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  5. Peter Achinstein (1993). Explanation and "Old Evidence. Philosophica 51 (1):125-137.
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  6. Peter Achinstein (1992). Waves and Scientific Method. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:193 - 204.
    Laudan and Cantor maintain that there exists a methodological gulf between 19th century wave theorists of light, who employed a method of hypothesis, and 18th and 19th century particle theorists, who were inductivists. This paper examines how in fact wave theorists typically argued for their theory, in order to see to what extent their reasoning corresponds to the method of hypothesis or to inductivism in sophisticated versions of these doctrines offered by Whewell and Mill. It also examines how, given the (...)
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  7. Peter Achinstein (1977). What Is an Explanation? American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1):1 - 15.
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  8. Ernest W. Adams & Roger D. Rosenkrantz (1980). Applying the Jeffrey Decision Model to Rational Betting and Information Acquisition. Theory and Decision 12 (1):1-20.
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  9. Leonard M. Adleman & M. Blum (1991). Inductive Inference and Unsolvability. Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (3):891-900.
    It is shown that many different problems have the same degree of unsolvability. Among these problems are: THE INDUCTIVE INFERENCE PROBLEM. Infer in the limit an index for a recursive function f presented as f(0), f(1), f(2),.... THE RECURSIVE INDEX PROBLEM. Decide in the limit if i is the index of a total recursive function. THE ZERO NONVARIANT PROBLEM. Decide in the limit if a recursive function f presented as f(0), f(1), f(2),... has value unequal to zero for infinitely many (...)
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  10. Joseph Agassi (1974). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Philosophia 4 (1):163-201.
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  11. Johan Åkerman (1940). The Meaning of Induction in Social Science. Theoria 6 (3):171-190.
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  12. F. Michael Akeroyd (2002). Philosophy of Science and History3 of Science: A Non Troubling Interaction. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (1):159-162.
    Cassandra Pinnick and George Gale (Journal for General Phisophy of Science 31, 109–125) examined the post-Lakatos period of historical cum philosophical case studies and concluded that a new methodology is required. Lakatos' proposed ‘history2’ (the theory- and value-laden reconstruction of history1, the set of historical events) was criticised. Recently a group of scholars have been pursuing a methodology which could be described as history 3, a history1 account of the interaction between the significant scientific papers published during the time period (...)
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  13. F. Michael Akeroyd (1993). Laudan's Problem Solving Model. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):785-788.
    A historical example is considered which conflicts with Laudan's Problem Solving Model [1981]. In the period 1840–85 chemists preferred a theory with 3 major conceptual problems (the Liebig Theory of Acids) to Lavoisier's which had only one major conceptual problem (why are the halogen hydrides acids?). The overall conceptual merits of Lavoisier's scheme have been revived in the modern Lux-Flood classification of Acids. Larry Laudan [1977], [1981] proposed a problem solving model of scientific rationality which not only applied to global (...)
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  14. Max Albert (1992). Die Falsifikation Statistischer Hypothesen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 23 (1):1 - 32.
    The Falsification of Statistical Hypotheses. It is widely held that falsification of statistical hypotheses is impossible. This view is supported by an analysis of the most important theories of statistical testing: these theories are not compatible with falsificationism. On the other hand, falsificationism yields a basically viable solution to the problems of explanation, prediction and theory testing in a deterministic context. The present paper shows how to introduce the falsificationist solution into the realm of statistics. This is done mainly by (...)
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  15. Max Albert (1992). Die Falsifikation Statistischer HypothesenThe Falsification of Statistical Hypotheses. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 23 (1):1-32.
    It is widely held that falsification of statistical hypotheses is impossible. This view is supported by an analysis of the most important theories of statistical testing: these theories are not compatible with falsificationism. On the other hand, falsificationism yields a basically viable solution to the problems of explanation, prediction and theory testing in a deterministic context. The present paper shows how to introduce the falsificationist solution into the realm of statistics. This is done mainly by applying the concept of empirical (...)
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  16. Carlos E. Alchourrón & David Makinson (1986). Maps Between Some Different Kinds of Contraction Function: The Finite Case. Studia Logica 45 (2):187 - 198.
    In some recent papers, the authors and Peter Gärdenfors have defined and studied two different kinds of formal operation, conceived as possible representations of the intuitive process of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition. These are partial meet contraction (including as limiting cases full meet contraction and maxichoice contraction) and safe contraction. It is known, via the representation theorem for the former, that every safe contraction operation over a theory is a partial meet contraction over that theory. The purpose (...)
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  17. S. Alexander (1921). Some Explanations. Mind 30 (120):409-428.
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  18. Robert F. Almeder (1973). Science and Idealism. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):242-254.
    In this essay it is argued that (1) if the process of scientific inquiry were to continue foreever, then science would ultimately terminate in the acceptance of a single theoretical framework better than all conceivable others, and (2) there is some evidence in favor of the view that science will continue unto eternity but no evidence in favor of the contrary view. In arguing for claim (1) it is claimed that if we are to understand the sense in which science (...)
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  19. Amalia Amaya (2008). Inference to the Best Legal Explanation. In Hendrik Kaptein (ed.), Legal Evidence and Proof: Statistics, Stories, Logic. Ashgate.
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  20. Alice Ambrose (1947). The Problem of Justifying Inductive Inference. Journal of Philosophy 44 (10):253-272.
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  21. F. J. Anscombe (1951). Mr. Kneale on Probability and Induction. Mind 60 (239):299-309.
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  22. F. J. Anscombe (1951). Mr. Kneale on Probability and Induction I. Mind 60 (239):299-309.
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  23. Horacio Arló-Costa (2006). Rationally Choosing Beliefs: Some Open Questions. Análisis Filosófico 26 (1):93-114.
    Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson published in 1985 a seminal article on belief change in the Journal of Symbolic Logic . Researchers from various disciplines, from computer science to mathematical economics to philosophical logic, have continued the work first presented in this seminal paper during the last two decades. This paper explores some salient foundational trends that interpret the act of changing view as a decision. We will argue that some of these foundational trends are already present, although (...)
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  24. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Qualitative and Probabilistic Models of Full Belief.
    Let L be a language containing the modal operator B - for full belief. An information model is a set E of stable L-theories. A sentence is valid if it is accepted in all theories of every model.
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  25. Horacio Arló-Costa & Isaac Levi (2006). Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and Entrenchment. Synthese 152 (1):129 - 154.
    We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure prominently among the basic intuitions in (...)
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  26. Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond H. Thomason (2001). Iterative Probability Kinematics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.
    Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...)
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  27. David Malet Armstrong (1991). What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue 30 (04):503-11.
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  28. Review author[S.]: D. M. Armstrong (1993). The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):421-422.
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  29. Jerrold L. Aronson (1991). Scientific Reasoning. International Studies in Philosophy 23 (3):120-121.
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  30. Jerrold L. Aronson (1969). Explanations Without Laws. Journal of Philosophy 66 (17):541-557.
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  31. Henri Arzeliès (1966). Relativistic Kinematics. New York, Pergamon Press.
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  32. Dana Ashkenazi & Zvi Lotker (2014). The Quasicrystals Discovery as a Resonance of the Non-Euclidean Geometry Revolution: Historical and Philosophical Perspective. Philosophia 42 (1):25-40.
    In this paper, we review the history of quasicrystals from their sensational discovery in 1982, initially “forbidden” by the rules of classical crystallography, to 2011 when Dan Shechtman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. We then discuss the discovery of quasicrystals in philosophical terms of anomalies behavior that led to a paradigm shift as offered by philosopher and historian of science Thomas Kuhn in ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’. This discovery, which found expression in the redefinition of the concept (...)
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  33. Denis Asselin (1989). La dynamique de la science Larry Laudan Traduit de l'anglais par Philip Miller Bruxelles: Pierre Mardaga éditeur, 1987. 262 p. 240 FF. [REVIEW] Dialogue 28 (03):509-.
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  34. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2013). Transitivity and Partial Screening Off. Theoria 79 (4):294-308.
    The notion of probabilistic support is beset by well-known problems. In this paper we add a new one to the list: the problem of transitivity. Tomoji Shogenji has shown that positive probabilistic support, or confirmation, is transitive under the condition of screening off. However, under that same condition negative probabilistic support, or disconfirmation, is intransitive. Since there are many situations in which disconfirmation is transitive, this illustrates, but now in a different way, that the screening-off condition is too restrictive. We (...)
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  35. Richard C. Atkinson (1956). An Analysis of the Effect of Nonreinforced Trials in Terms of Statistical Learning Theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 52 (1):28.
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  36. Audun (1962). Some Problems of Counter-Inductive Policy as Opposed to Inductive. Inquiry 5 (1-4):267 – 283.
  37. D. Baird (2004). The End of Pure Science: Science Policy From Bayh-Dole to the NNI. In Baird D. (ed.), Discovering the Nanoscale. Ios. 217.
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  38. Alan Baker (2003). Quantitative Parsimony and Explanatory Power. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):245-259.
    The desire to minimize the number of individual new entities postulated is often referred to as quantitative parsimony. Its influence on the default hypotheses formulated by scientists seems undeniable. I argue that there is a wide class of cases for which the preference for quantitatively parsimonious hypotheses is demonstrably rational. The justification, in a nutshell, is that such hypotheses have greater explanatory power than less parsimonious alternatives. My analysis is restricted to a class of cases I shall refer to as (...)
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  39. Johannes Balthasar (1981). Revolutions in Science and Society. Philosophy and History 14 (1):27-29.
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  40. Maya Bar-Hillel, David Budescu & Yigal Attali (2005). Scoring and Keying Multiple Choice Tests: A Case Study in Irrationality. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 4 (1):3-12.
    We offer a case-study in irrationality, showing that even in a high stakes context, intelligent and well trained professionals may adopt dominated practices. In multiple-choice tests one cannot distinguish lucky guesses from answers based on knowledge. Test-makers have dealt with this problem by lowering the incentive to guess, through penalizing errors (called formula scoring), and by eliminating various cues for outperforming random guessing (e.g., a preponderance of correct answers in middle positions), through key balancing. These policies, though widespread and intuitively (...)
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  41. S. F. Barker (1961). On Simplicity in Empirical Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 28 (2):162-171.
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  42. Stephen Barker (1988). Hume's Causal Explanation of Causal Thinking. Southwest Philosophical Studies 10 (3):21-28.
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  43. Stephen J. Barker (1998). Predetermination and Tense Probabilism. Analysis 58 (4):290–296.
  44. G. A. Barnard (1972). Two Points in the Theory of Statistical Inference. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):329-331.
  45. Eric Barnes (1995). Inference to the Loveliest Explanation. Synthese 103 (2):251 - 277.
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  46. Eric Barnes (1995). Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):215-226.
    D. Miller's demonstrations of the language dependence of truthlikeness raise a profound problem for the claim that scientific progress is objective. In two recent papers (Barnes 1990, 1991) I argue that the objectivity of progress may be grounded on the claim that the aim of science is not merely truth but knowledge; progress thus construed is objective in an epistemic sense. In this paper I construct a new solution to Miller's problem grounded on the notion of "approximate causal explanation" which (...)
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  47. Eric Barnes (1992). Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):558-571.
    Philip Kitcher has proposed a theory of explanation based on the notion of unification. Despite the genuine interest and power of the theory, I argue here that the theory suffers from a fatal deficiency: It is intrinsically unable to account for the asymmetric structure of explanation, and thus ultimately falls prey to a problem similar to the one which beset Hempel's D-N model. I conclude that Kitcher is wrong to claim that one can settle the issue of an argument's explanatory (...)
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  48. Eric Barnes (1990). The Language Dependence of Accuracy. Synthese 84 (1):59 - 95.
    David Miller has demonstrated to the satisfaction of a variety of philosophers that the accuracy of false quantitative theories is language dependent (cf. Miller 1975). This demonstration renders the accuracy-based mode of comparison for such theories obsolete. The purpose of this essay is to supply an alternate basis for theory comparison which in this paper is deemed the knowledge-based mode of quantitative theory comparison. It is argued that the status of a quantitative theory as knowledge depends primarily on the soundness (...)
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  49. Eric Christian Barnes (1998). Probabilities and Epistemic Pluralism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):31-47.
    A pluralistic scientific method is one that incorporates a variety of points of view in scientific inquiry. This paper investigates one example of pluralistic method: the use of weighted averaging in probability estimation. I consider two methods of weight determination, one based on disjoint evidence possession and the other on track record. I argue that weighted averaging provides a rational procedure for probability estimation under certain conditions. I consider a strategy for calculating ‘mixed weights’ which incorporate mixed information about agent (...)
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  50. Giovanni Barosi, Lorenzo Magnani & Mario Stefanelli (1993). Medical Diagnostic Reasoning: Epistemological Modeling as a Strategy for Design of Computer-Based Consultation Programs. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (1).
    The complexity of cognitive emulation of human diagnostic reasoning is the major challenge in the implementation of computer-based programs for diagnostic advice in medicine. We here present an epistemological model of diagnosis with the ultimate goal of defining a high-level language for cognitive and computational primitives. The diagnostic task proceeds through three different phases: hypotheses generation, hypotheses testing and hypotheses closure. Hypotheses generation has the inferential form of abduction (from findings to hypotheses) constrained under the criterion of plausibility. Hypotheses testing (...)
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