This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
34 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
Material to categorize
  1. Richard Corry (2009). How is Scientific Analysis Possible? In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
    One of the most powerful tools in science is the analytic method, whereby we seek to understand complex systems by studying simpler sub-systems from which the complex is composed. If this method is to be successful, something about the sub-systems must remain invariant as we move from the relatively isolated conditions in which we study them, to the complex conditions in which we want to put our knowledge to use. This paper asks what this invariant could be. The paper shows (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Troy Cross (2013). Review of Groff and Greco, Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  3. Toby Handfield (ed.) (2009). Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press.
    In recent decades, the analysis of causal relations has become a topic of central importance in analytic philosophy. More recently, dispositional properties have also become objects of intense study. Both of these phenomena appear to be intimately related to counterfactual conditionals and other modal phenomena such as objective chance, but little work has been done to directly relate them. This collection contains ten essays by scholars working in both metaphysics and in philosophy of science, examining the relation between dispositional and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Carl Hoefer, Humean Effective Strategies.
    In a now-classic paper, Nancy Cartwright argued that the Humean conception of causation as mere regular co-occurrence is too weak to make sense of our everyday and scientific practices. Specifically she claimed that in order to understand our reasoning about, and uses of, effective strategies, we need a metaphysically stronger notion of causation and causal laws than Humeanism allows. Cartwright’s arguments were formulated in the framework of probabilistic causation, and it is precisely in the domain of (objective) probabilities that I (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. J. L. Mackie (1977). Dispositions, Grounds, and Causes. Synthese 34 (4):361 - 369.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Shannon Nason (2012). &Quot;contingency, Necessity, and Causation in Kierkegaard's Theory of Change&Quot;. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (1):141-162.
    In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain of his claims about causation. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. L. A. Paul (2010). A New Role for Experimental Work in Metaphysics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):461-476.
    Recent work in philosophy could benefit from paying greater attention to empirical results from cognitive science involving judgments about the nature of our ordinary experience. This paper describes the way that experimental and theoretical results about the nature of ordinary judgments could—and should—inform certain sorts of enquiries in contemporary philosophy, using metaphysics as an exemplar, and hence defines a new way for experimental philosophy and cognitive science to contribute to traditional philosophical debates.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Rebecca Roache (2009). Bilking the Bilking Argument. Analysis 69 (4):605-611.
  9. Markus Schrenk (2009). Can Physics Ever Be Complete If There is No Fundamental Level in Nature? Dialectica 63 (2):205-208.
    In their recent book Every Thing Must Go Ladyman and Ross (Ladyman et al. 2007) claim: (1) Physics is analytically complete since it is the only science that cannot be left incomplete (cf. Ladyman et al. 2007, 283). (2) There might not be an ontologically fundamental level (cf. Ladyman et al. 2007, 178). (3) We should not admit anything into our ontology unless it has explanatory and predictive utility (cf. Ladyman et al. 2007, 179). In this discussion note I aim (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Markus Schrenk (2003). Real Ceteris Paribus Laws. In R. Bluhm & C. Nimtz (eds.), Proceedings of GAP.5, Bielefeld 2003. mentis.
    Although there is an ongoing controversy in philosophy of science about so called ceteris paribus laws that is, roughly, about laws with exceptionsóa fundamental question about those laws has been neglected (ß2). This is due to the fact that this question becomes apparent only if two different readings of ceteris paribus clauses in laws have been separated. The first reading of ceteris paribus clauses, which I will call the epistemic reading, covers applications of laws: predictions, for example, might go wrong (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Causation, Laws, Etc, Misc
  1. Sara Bernstein (2014). A Closer Look at Trumping. Acta Analytica:1-22.
    This paper argues that so-called “trumping preemption” is in fact overdetermination or early preemption, and is thus not a distinctive form of redundant causation. I draw a novel lesson from cases thought to be trumping: that the boundary between preemption and overdetermination should be reconsidered.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Alex Broadbent (2009). Fact and Law in the Causal Inquiry. Legal Theory 15 (3):173-191.
    This paper takes it as a premise that a distinction between matters of fact and of law is important in the causal inquiry. But it argues that separating factual and legal causation as different elements of liability is not the best way to implement the fact/law distinction. What counts as a cause-in-fact is partly a legal question; and certain liability-limiting doctrines under the umbrella of “legal causation” depend on the application of factual-causal concepts. The contrastive account of factual causation proposed (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Isabelle Drouet (2012). Causal Reasoning, Causal Probabilities, and Conceptions of Causation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):761-768.
  4. Heather Dyke (2004). Review of Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 45:359-361.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Sharon R. Ford (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 13 (2):195-215.
    Sydney Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar’s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of objects if they are to be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Danny Frederick (2010). Popper and Free Will. Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.
    Determinism seems incompatible with free will. However, even indeterminism seems incompatible with free will, since it seems to make free actions random. Popper contends that free agents are not bound by physical laws, even indeterministic ones, and that undetermined actions are not random if they are influenced by abstract entities. I argue that Popper could strengthen his account by drawing upon his theories of propensities and of limited rationality; but that even then his account would not fully explain why free (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Sophie Gibb (2010). Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. Dialectica 64 (3):363-384.
    The conservation laws do not establish the central premise within the argument from causal overdetermination – the causal completeness of the physical domain. Contrary to David Papineau (2000 and 2002), this is true even if there is no non-physical energy. The combination of the conservation laws with the claim that there is no non-physical energy would establish the causal completeness principle only if, at the very least, two further causal claims were accepted. First, the claim that the only way that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Graham Harman (2007). On Vicarious Causation. Collapse:171-205.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.) (2011). Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press.
    How are causal judgements such as 'The ice on the road caused the traffic accident' connected with counterfactual judgements such as 'If there had not been any ice on the road, the traffic accident would not have happened'? This volume throws new light on this question by uniting, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches to causation and counterfactuals. Traditionally, philosophers have primarily been interested in connections between causal and counterfactual claims on the level of meaning or truth-conditions. More (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Andreas Hüttemann (2013). New Work in Metaphysics of Science. Metascience 22 (2):275-282.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Andreas Hüttemann (2007). Causation, Laws and Dispositions. In Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate.
    In this paper I take a look at what I take to be the best argument for dispositions. According to this argument we need dispositions in order to understand certain features of scientific practice. I point out that these dispositions have to be continuously manifestable. Furthermore I will argue that dispositions are not the causes of their manifestations. However, dispositions and causation are closely connected. What it is to be a cause can best be understood in terms of counterfactuals that (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Andreas Hüttemann & Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Against the Statistical Account of Special Science Laws. In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems. The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings. Springer.
    John Earman and John T. Roberts advocate a challenging and radical claim regarding the semantics of laws in the special sciences: the statistical account. According to this account, a typical special science law “asserts a certain precisely defined statistical relation among well-defined variables” (Earman and Roberts 1999) and this statistical relation does not require being hedged by ceteris paribus conditions. In this paper, we raise two objections against the attempt to cash out the content of special science generalizations in statistical (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Wilhelm Krampf (1936). Studien zur philosophie und methodologie Des kausalprinzips. Kant-Studien 41 (1):38-93.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Heinrich Lange (1965). Die frage nach der kausalität im physikalischen weltbild. Kant-Studien 56 (1):5-15.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Henri Lauener (1968). Das problem der kausalität bei Salomon Maimon. Kant-Studien 59 (1-4):199-211.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Dustin Locke (2012). Quidditism Without Quiddities. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):345-363.
    Structuralism and quidditism are competing views of the metaphysics of property individuation: structuralists claim that properties are individuated by their nomological roles; quidditists claim that they are individuated by something else. This paper (1) refutes what many see as the best reason to accept structuralism over quidditism and (2) offers a methodological argument in favor of a quidditism. The standard charge against quidditism is that it commits us to something ontologically otiose: intrinsic aspects of properties, so-called ‘quiddities’. Here I grant (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Laureano Luna (forthcoming). No Successful Infinite Regress. Logic and Logical Philosophy.
    We model infinite regress structures -not arguments- by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Laureano Luna (2014). No Successfull Infinite Regress. Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (2).
    We model infinite regress structures -not arguments- by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Duncan Macintosh (1994). Could God Have Made the Big Bang? (On Theistic Counterfactuals). Dialogue 33 (01):3-20.
    Quentin Smith argues that if God exists, He had a duty to ensure life's existence; and He couldn't rationally have done so and made a big bang unless a counter-factual like "If God had made a big bang, there would have been life," was true pre-creation. But such counter-factuals are not true pre-creation. I argue that God could have made a big bang without irrationality; and that He could have ensured life without making big bangs non-random. Further, a proper understanding (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Markus Schrenk (2014). Die Erfahrung der Widerständigkeit der Welt als Wahrnehmung kausaler Kraft. In Anne Sophie Spann & Daniel Wehinger (eds.), Vermögen und Handlung. mentis. 23-62.
    Hume glaubte, die Kausalverknüpfung sei eine „secret connection“, also eine Verknüpfung, die mindestens unerkennbar, wenn nicht sogar inexis- tent ist. Einige moderne Gegner Humes halten dem entgegen, dass apos- teriorisch entdeckte, metaphysische Notwendigkeit, wie wir sie bei- spielsweise von Kripke und Putnam kennen, diejenige objektiv-reale Verknüpfung in der Welt ist, die auch die Rolle einer kausalen Verknüp- fung in der Welt spielen kann. Ich hinterfrage diese anti-Hume’sche Identifizierung kausaler mit me- taphysischer Notwendigkeit, zeige aber auch einen anderen Weg auf, kausale (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Roger Stanev (2009). Epidemiologic Causation: Jerome Cornfield’s Argument for a Causal Connection Between Smoking and Lung Cancer. Humana.Mente 9:59-66.
    A central issue confronting both philosophers and practitioners in formulating an analysis of causation is the question of what constitutes evidence for a causal association. From the 1950s onward, the biostatistician Jerome Cornfield put himself at the center of a controversial debate over whether cigarette smoking was a causative factor in the incidence of lung cancer. Despite criticisms from distinguished statisticians such as Fisher, Berkson and Neyman, Cornfield argued that a review of the scientific evidence supported the conclusion of a (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Gabriel Vacariu (2011). Being and the Hyperverse. Bucharest University Press.
    It is about the pure theoretical system of EDWs (almost without applications to any particular sciences - cognitive science, physics or biology). I constructed the conditions of the possibility for any EDWs (that exist or possible to exist) given by 13 propositions that represent the axiomatic-hyperontological framework in 13 parts. In general, these propositions refer to the abstract entities andtheir interactions. Being is the only entity that is an epistemological world. In this short book, I deal with the hyperontology of (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Christopher Weaver (2012). What Could Be Caused Must Actually Be Caused. Synthese 184 (3):299-317.
    I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused, are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Pruss’s Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies inconsistency with Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Roger Wertheimer (1968). Conditions. Journal of Philosophy 65 (12):355-364.
    Critique of prevailing textbook conception of sufficient conditions and necessary conditions as a truth functional relation of material implication (p->q)/(~q->~p). Explanation of common sense conception of condition as correlative of consequence, involving dependence. Utility of this conception exhibited in resolving puzzles regarding ontology, truth, and fatalism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation