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  1. G. E. M. Anscombe (1971). Causality and Determinism. Cambridge University Press.
    I IT is often declared or evidently assumed that causality is some kind of necessary connexion, or alternatively, that being caused is — non-trivially ...
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  2. Tomasz Bigaj (2012). Causation Without Influence. Erkenntnis 76 (1):1-22.
    David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly (...)
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  3. Myles Brand & Marshall Swain (1976). Causation and Causal Necessity: Reply to Sanford. Philosophical Studies 29 (6):369 - 379.
    In 'on the analysis of causation' ("synthese", Volume 21, 1970), We argued that any analysis of causation entailing that "a" caused "b" only if "a" is the set of conditions necessary and sufficient for "b" yields a formal contradiction. In 'causal necessity and logical necessity' ("philosophical studies", Volume 28, 1975), David sanford objects to that argument, Concentrating his attack on the notions of causal necessity and total sets of antecedent conditions. We reply in this paper that, Although sanford's objections help (...)
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  4. Gordon G. Brittan Jr (ed.) (1991). Causality, Method and Modality. Kluwer.
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  5. Grzegorz Bugajak (2011). Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics. In Adam Świeżyński (ed.), Knowledge and Values, Wyd. UKSW, Warszawa. 73–94.
    The paper revisits the old controversy over causality and determinism and argues, in the first place, that non˗deterministic theories of modern science are largely irrelevant to the philosophical issue of the causality principle. As it seems to be the ‘moral’ of the uncertainty principle, the reason why a deterministic theory cannot be applied to the description of certain physical systems is that it is impossible to capture such properties of the system, which are required by a desired theory. These properties (...)
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  6. C. Chamberlain & J. K. McDonough (2013). Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians. Philosophical Review 122 (1):125-128.
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  7. Daihyun Chung (forthcoming). Can Reference Be Naturalized? -Notes Toward an Integrational Causality. Philosophy Study 6 (5).
    As physicalisms of various kinds have faced difficulties in recent years, the time has come to explore possible alternatives, one of which is yinyang ontology. A yinyang theorist is expected to provide a plausible account of causation to replace the traditional notion of causation. The present paper is critical of the Humean tradition, which understands the relata of causal relations in terms of passive materiality so that humans use referential terms to describe causal relations constructively. But an alternative notion of (...)
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  8. Eduardo García-Ramírez (2012). Trans-World Causation? Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):71-83.
    According to Lewis, causal claims must be analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals, and these in turn are understood in terms of relations of comparative similarity among single concrete possible worlds. Lewis also claims that there is no trans-world causation because there is no way to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals without automatically making them come out to be false. In this paper I argue against this claim. I show how to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals in a non-trivial way (...)
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  9. Everett W. Hall (1934). Time and Causality. Philosophical Review 43 (4):333-350.
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  10. Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe (2009). Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
    Much of the philosophical literature on causation has focused on the concept of actual causation, sometimes called token causation. In particular, it is this notion of actual causation that many philosophical theories of causation have attempted to capture.2 In this paper, we address the question: what purpose does this concept serve? As we shall see in the next section, one does not need this concept for purposes of prediction or rational deliberation. What then could the purpose be? We will argue (...)
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  11. Causal Irregularity (1999). Fred I. Dretske and Aaron Snyder. In Michael Tooley (ed.), Laws of Nature, Causation, and Supervenience. Garland Pub. 1--219.
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  12. Kevin B. Korb (1999). Probabilistic Causal Structure. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 265--311.
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  13. J. L. Mackie (1966). The Direction of Causation. Philosophical Review 75 (4):441-466.
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  14. Neil McDonnell (2015). The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
    Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality (...)
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  15. Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2011). Spoils to the Vector - How to Model Causes If You Are a Realist About Powers. The Monist 94 (1):54-80.
    A standard way of representing causation is with neuron diagrams. This has become popular since the influential work of David Lewis. But it should not be assumed that such representations are metaphysically neutral and amenable to any theory of causation. On the contrary, this way of representing causation already makes several Humean assumptions about what causation is, and which suit Lewis’s programme of Humean Supervenience. An alternative of a vector diagram is better suited for a powers ontology. Causation should be (...)
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  16. Paul Needham (1988). Causation: Relation or Connective? Dialectica 42 (3):201-220.
    SummaryDavidson's account of singular causal statements as expressing relations between events together with his views on event identity lead to inferences involving causal statements which many of his critics find counterintuitive. These are sometimes said to be avoided on Kim's view of events, in terms of which this line of criticism is often formulated. It is argued that neither Davidson nor Kim offer a satisfactory account of events — an essential prerequisit for the relational theory — and an account of (...)
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  17. Robert Northcott (2008). Causation and Contrast Classes. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):111 - 123.
    I argue that causation is a contrastive relation: c-rather-than-C* causes e-rather-than-E*, where C* and E* are contrast classes associated respectively with actual events c and e. I explain why this is an improvement on the traditional binary view, and develop a detailed definition. It turns out that causation is only well defined in ‘uniform’ cases, where either all or none of the members of C* are related appropriately to members of E*.
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  18. John Peterson (2004). Are There Final Causes? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:161-167.
    Construing all efficient causes as beginning and ceasing with their effects invites the dilemma that a given effect or event either always occurs or neveroccurs. One escapes the dilemma by distinguishing basic and subsidiary efficient causes, according temporal priority of causes to their effects in the case of theformer. In the case of human making and doing, where the two efficient causes belong to the same subject, the two are supplemented by a final cause whichserves to link or to mediate (...)
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  19. Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.) (2012). Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    Philosophy of language is the branch of philosophy that examines the nature of meaning, the relationship of language to reality, and the ways in which we use, learn, and understand language. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language provides a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the field, charting its key ideas and movements, and addressing contemporary research and enduring questions in the philosophy of language. Unique to this Companion is clear coverage of research from the related disciplines of formal logic (...)
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  20. Eric Swanson (forthcoming). The Language of Causation. In Delia Graff Fara & Gillian Russell (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge
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  21. Jose Tomas Alvarado (2009). A Causal Theory of Modality. Ideas Y Valores 140:173-196.
    This work presents a causal conception of metaphysical modality in which a state of affairs is metaphysically possible if and only if it can be caused (in the past, the present or the future) by current entities. The conception is contrasted with what is called the "combinatorial" conception of modality, in which everything can coexist with anything else. This work explains how the notion of 'causality' should be construed in the causal theory, what difference exists between modalities thus defined from (...)
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  22. Max Urchs (1994). On the Logic of Event-Causation Jaśkowski-Style Systems of Causal Logic. Studia Logica 53 (4):551 - 578.
    Causality is a concept which is sometimes claimed to be easy to illustrate, but hard to explain. It is not quite clear whether the former part of this claim is as obvious as the latter one. I will not present any specific theory of causation. Our aim is much less ambitious; to investigate the formal counterparts of causal relations between events, i.e. to propose a formal framework which enables us to construct metamathematical counterparts of causal relations between singular events. This (...)
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Causal Relata
  1. Sara Bernstein (2016). Overdetermination Underdetermined. Erkenntnis 81 (1):17-40.
    Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
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  2. M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (eds.) (1976). Action Theory. Reidel.
    INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITORS Gilbert Ryle, in his Concept of Mind (1949), attacked volitional theories of human actions; JL Austin, in his "If and Cans" ...
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  3. Esteban Céspedes (2011). Towards a Spatial Theory of Causation. Philosophy Pathways (162).
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  4. Donald Davidson (1967). Causal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
  5. Douglas Ehring (1997). Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation. Oxford University Press.
    Ehring shows the inadequacy of received theories of causation, and, introducing conceptual devices of his own, provides a wholly new account of causation as the persistence over time of individual properties, or "tropes.".
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  6. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1995). The Mishap at Reichenbach Fall: Singular Vs. General Causation. Philosophical Studies 78 (3):257 - 291.
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  7. Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (2007). Is There a Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance? SATS 8 (1).
    It has been claimed that the only way to avoid action at a temporal distance in a temporal continuum is if effects occur simultaneously with their causes, and that in fact Newton’s second law of motion illustrates that they truly are simultaneous. Firstly, I point out that this interpretation of Newton’s second law is problematic because in classical mechanics ‘acceleration’ denotes a vector quantity. It is controversial whether vectors themselves are changes as opposed to properties of a change, and therefore (...)
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  8. Alex Kaiserman (forthcoming). Causes and Counterparts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    It follows from David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality and his counterfactual theory of causation that causal claims are relativized to a set of counterpart relations. Call this Shlewis's view. I show how Shlewis's view can provide attractively unified solutions to similar modal and causal puzzles. I then argue that Shlewis's view is better motivated, by his own lights, than the view Lewis actually held, and also better motivated than a similar approach which relativizes causal claims to sets of ‘contrast (...)
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  9. Geert Keil (2014). Wie fängt (man) eine Handlung an? In Anne-Sophie Spann & Daniel Wehinger (eds.), Vermögen und Handung. Der dispositionale Realismus und unser Selbstverständnis als Handelnde. Mentis 135-157.
    Das Verb „anfangen“ lässt sich sowohl mit einem Akteur an Subjektstelle als auch subjektlos verwenden. Sogenannte subjektlose Sätze wie „Es fängt zu regnen an“ haben freilich ein grammatisches Subjekt, aber auf die Rückfrage „Wer oder was fängt zu regnen an?“ ist die einzig mögliche Antwort „Es“ unbefriedigend. Das grammatische Subjekt fungiert in solchen Sätzen lediglich als synkategorematischer Ausdruck. Menschliche Akteure können in gehaltvollerem Sinn etwas anfangen, zum Beispiel Streit, oder, wie es bei Kant heißt, „eine Reihe von Begebenheiten“. Mit dem (...)
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  10. Geert Keil (2013). Making Causal Counterfactuals More Singular, and More Appropriate for Use in Law. In Benedikt Kahmen Markus Stepanians (ed.), Causation and Responsibility: Critical Essays. De Gruyter 157-189.
    Unlike any other monograph on legal liability, Michael S. Moore’s book CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY contains a well-informed and in-depth discussion of the metaphysics of causation. Moore does not share the widespread view that legal scholars should not enter into metaphysical debates about causation. He shows respect for the subtleties of philosophical debates on causal relata, identity conditions for events, the ontological distinctions between events, states of affairs, facts and tropes, and the counterfactual analysis of event causation, and he considers all (...)
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  11. Geert Keil (2004). Kausalität zwischen Physik und deskriptiver Metaphysik. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 29 (3):287-294.
    The short paper continues a debate on free will, causation and laws of nature between the author and the German philosopher Peter Rohs (opened in a previous issue of the same journal). Both Keil and Rohs are libertarians, but they disagree on a number of metaphysical issues. Keil maintains that causation is a relation between changes, i.e. time-consuming events, not between instantaneous states. Against Davidson’s “principle of the nomological character of causality”, Keil holds that no exceptionless laws subsuming cause-effect pairs (...)
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  12. Geert Keil (2003). Kausalitat und Freiheit -- Antwort auf Peter Rohs. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 28 (3):261-272.
    The short paper is a reply to a review of the author’s book HANDELN UND VERURSACHEN (Frankfurt am Main 2000). The reviewer, Peter Rohs, has focused upon the issues of causation, laws of nature and free will. Both Rohs and the author are libertarians, but they disagree on a number of metaphysical issues. The author maintains that causation is a relation between changes, i. e. time-consuming events, not between instantaneous states. Against Davidson’s “principle of the nomological character of causality”, he (...)
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  13. Geert Keil & Max Kistler (2006). La cause d'un événement éléments d'une métaphysique descriptive de la causalité entre événements. Philosophie 89 (1):21.
    La philosophie contemporaine connaît une demi-douzaine de théories de la causalité. À l'époque de Kant et de Hume leur nombre a été moindre, à l'avenir on peut s'attendre à ce que leur nombre continue d'augmenter. Parmi les affirmations faites par ces théories sur la nature de la causalité, certaines sont compatibles entre elles, mais beaucoup ne le sont pas. Par conséquent, ou bien quelques-unes de ces théories sont fausses, ou bien elles ne portent pas sur le même objet. Dans ce (...)
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  14. Jaegwon Kim (1976). Events as Property Exemplifications. In M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. D. Reidel 310-326.
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  15. Jaegwon Kim (1973). Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event. Journal of Philosophy 70 (8):217-236.
  16. Jaegwon Kim (1971). Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation. Journal of Philosophy 68 (14):426-441.
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  17. Ken Levy (2000). Hume, the New Hume, and Causal Connections. Hume Studies 26 (1):41-75.
    In this article, I weigh in on the debate between "Humeans" and "New Humeans" concerning David Hume's stance on the existence of causal connections in "the objects." According to New Humeans, Hume believes in causal connections; according to Humeans, he does not. -/- My argument against New Humeans is that it is too difficult to reconcile Hume's repeated claims that causal connections are inconceivable with any belief that they these inconceivable somethings still exist. Specifically, Hume either assumes or does not (...)
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  18. David Lewis (1986). Events. In Philosophical Papers Vol. II. OUP 241-269.
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  19. David Lewis (1986). Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
  20. Martin Lin, Time, Causation, and Abstract Objects.
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  21. E. J. Lowe (2001). Event Causation and Agent Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):1-20.
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  22. Olivier Massin (2009). The Metaphysics of Forces. Dialectica 64 (4):555-589.
    This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal relations. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a (...)
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  23. Uwe Meixner (2004). Causation in a New Old Key. Studia Logica 76 (3):343 - 383.
    I argue (1) that it is not philosophically significant whether causation is linguistically represented by a predicate or by a sentence connective; (2) that there is no philosophically significant distinction between event- and states-of-affairs-causation; (3) that there is indeed a philosophically significant distinction between agent- and event-causation, and that event-causation must be regarded as an analog of agent-causation. Developing this point, I argue that event-causation's being in the image of agent-causation requires, mainly, (a) that the cause is temporally prior to (...)
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  24. D. H. Mellor (1995). The Facts of Causation. Routledge.
    The Facts of Causation grapples with one of philosophy's most enduring issues. Causation is central to all of our lives. What we see and hear causes us to believe certain facts about the world. We need that information to know how to act and how to cause the effects we desire. D. H. Mellor, a leading scholar in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, offers a comprehensive theory of causation. Many questions about causation remain unsettled. In (...)
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  25. Peter Menzies (1989). A Unified Account of Causal Relata. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):59 – 83.
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  26. L. A. Paul (2000). Aspect Causation. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235-256.
    While skiing, Suzy falls and breaks her right wrist. The next day, she writes a philosophy paper. Her right wrist is broken, so she writes her paper using her left hand. (Assume, as seems plausible, that she isn’t dexterous enough to write it any other way, e.g., with her right foot.) She writes the paper, sends it off to a journal, and it is subsequently published. Is Suzy’s accident a cause of the publication of the paper?2 Of course not. Below, (...)
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  27. Johannes Persson (2010). Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects. Erkenntnis 72 (1):135 - 149.
    Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on (...)
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  28. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1998). Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation. Analysis 58 (3):175–181.
    Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...)
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