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  1. G. E. M. Anscombe (1971). Causality and Determinism. Cambridge University Press.
    I IT is often declared or evidently assumed that causality is some kind of necessary connexion, or alternatively, that being caused is — non-trivially ...
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  2. Tomasz Bigaj (2012). Causation Without Influence. Erkenntnis 76 (1):1-22.
    David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly (...)
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  3. Myles Brand & Marshall Swain (1976). Causation and Causal Necessity: Reply to Sanford. Philosophical Studies 29 (6):369 - 379.
    In 'on the analysis of causation' ("synthese", Volume 21, 1970), We argued that any analysis of causation entailing that "a" caused "b" only if "a" is the set of conditions necessary and sufficient for "b" yields a formal contradiction. In 'causal necessity and logical necessity' ("philosophical studies", Volume 28, 1975), David sanford objects to that argument, Concentrating his attack on the notions of causal necessity and total sets of antecedent conditions. We reply in this paper that, Although sanford's objections help (...)
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  4. Gregory Bugajak (2000). Non-Scientific Sources of the Big Bang Model and its Interpretations. In Niels Henrik Gregersen, Ulf Görman & Willem B. Drees (eds.), Studies in Science and Theology, vol. 7(1999–2000), University of Aarhus, Aarhus. 151–159.
    In considering relations between science and theology, the discussion of the Big Bang model plays a significant role. Amongst the sources of this model there are not only scientific achievements of recent decades taken as objective knowledge as seen in modern methodology, but also many non-scientific factors. The latter is connected with the quite obvious fact that the authors, as well as the recipients of the Model, are people who are guided in their activity - including obtaining their rational knowledge (...)
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  5. Grzegorz Bugajak (2011). Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics. In Adam Świeżyński (ed.), Knowledge and Values, Wyd. UKSW, Warszawa. 73–94.
    The paper revisits the old controversy over causality and determinism and argues, in the first place, that non˗deterministic theories of modern science are largely irrelevant to the philosophical issue of the causality principle. As it seems to be the ‘moral’ of the uncertainty principle, the reason why a deterministic theory cannot be applied to the description of certain physical systems is that it is impossible to capture such properties of the system, which are required by a desired theory. These properties (...)
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  6. C. Chamberlain & J. K. McDonough (2013). Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians. Philosophical Review 122 (1):125-128.
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  7. Sj Chapman, Adopt: A New Way of Thinking.
    Americans have four million babies annually, while at the same time, four million orphans are dying in the developing world every year. Using legal and philosophical principles, I argue that procreating instead of adopting is immoral because it is the "but for" cause of death of millions of parentless children.
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  8. Eduardo García-Ramírez (2012). Trans-World Causation? Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):71-83.
    According to Lewis, causal claims must be analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals, and these in turn are understood in terms of relations of comparative similarity among single concrete possible worlds. Lewis also claims that there is no trans-world causation because there is no way to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals without automatically making them come out to be false. In this paper I argue against this claim. I show how to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals in a non-trivial way (...)
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  9. Everett W. Hall (1934). Time and Causality. Philosophical Review 43 (4):333-350.
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  10. Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe (2009). Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
    Much of the philosophical literature on causation has focused on the concept of actual causation, sometimes called token causation. In particular, it is this notion of actual causation that many philosophical theories of causation have attempted to capture.2 In this paper, we address the question: what purpose does this concept serve? As we shall see in the next section, one does not need this concept for purposes of prediction or rational deliberation. What then could the purpose be? We will argue (...)
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  11. Causal Irregularity (1999). Fred I. Dretske and Aaron Snyder. In Michael Tooley (ed.), Laws of Nature, Causation, and Supervenience. Garland Pub.. 1--219.
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  12. Kevin B. Korb (1999). Probabilistic Causal Structure. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer. 265--311.
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  13. J. L. Mackie (1966). The Direction of Causation. Philosophical Review 75 (4):441-466.
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  14. Neil McDonnell, The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains.
    Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality (...)
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  15. Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2011). Spoils to the Vector - How to Model Causes If You Are a Realist About Powers. The Monist 94 (1):54-80.
    A standard way of representing causation is with neuron diagrams. This has become popular since the influential work of David Lewis. But it should not be assumed that such representations are metaphysically neutral and amenable to any theory of causation. On the contrary, this way of representing causation already makes several Humean assumptions about what causation is, and which suit Lewis’s programme of Humean Supervenience. An alternative of a vector diagram is better suited for a powers ontology. Causation should be (...)
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  16. Paul Needham (1988). Causation: Relation or Connective? Dialectica 42 (3):201-220.
    SummaryDavidson's account of singular causal statements as expressing relations between events together with his views on event identity lead to inferences involving causal statements which many of his critics find counterintuitive. These are sometimes said to be avoided on Kim's view of events, in terms of which this line of criticism is often formulated. It is argued that neither Davidson nor Kim offer a satisfactory account of events — an essential prerequisit for the relational theory — and an account of (...)
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  17. Robert Northcott (2008). Causation and Contrast Classes. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):111 - 123.
    I argue that causation is a contrastive relation: c-rather-than-C* causes e-rather-than-E*, where C* and E* are contrast classes associated respectively with actual events c and e. I explain why this is an improvement on the traditional binary view, and develop a detailed definition. It turns out that causation is only well defined in ‘uniform’ cases, where either all or none of the members of C* are related appropriately to members of E*.
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  18. John Peterson (2004). Are There Final Causes? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:161-167.
    Construing all efficient causes as beginning and ceasing with their effects invites the dilemma that a given effect or event either always occurs or neveroccurs. One escapes the dilemma by distinguishing basic and subsidiary efficient causes, according temporal priority of causes to their effects in the case of theformer. In the case of human making and doing, where the two efficient causes belong to the same subject, the two are supplemented by a final cause whichserves to link or to mediate (...)
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  19. Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.) (2012). Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language provides a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the field, charting its key ideas and movements, and addressing contemporary research and enduring questions in the philosophy of language.
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  20. Eric Swanson (forthcoming). The Language of Causation. In Delia Graff Fara & Gillian Russell (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
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  21. Max Urchs (1994). On the Logic of Event-Causation Jaśkowski-Style Systems of Causal Logic. Studia Logica 53 (4):551 - 578.
    Causality is a concept which is sometimes claimed to be easy to illustrate, but hard to explain. It is not quite clear whether the former part of this claim is as obvious as the latter one. I will not present any specific theory of causation. Our aim is much less ambitious; to investigate the formal counterparts of causal relations between events, i.e. to propose a formal framework which enables us to construct metamathematical counterparts of causal relations between singular events. This (...)
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Causal Relata
  1. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Overdetermination Underdetermined. Erkenntnis:1-24.
    Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive physicalists have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
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  2. M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (eds.) (1976). Action Theory. Reidel.
    INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITORS Gilbert Ryle, in his Concept of Mind (1949), attacked volitional theories of human actions; JL Austin, in his "If and Cans" ...
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  3. Esteban Céspedes (2011). Towards a Spatial Theory of Causation. Philosophy Pathways (162).
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  4. Donald Davidson (1967). Causal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
  5. Douglas Ehring (1997). Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation. Oxford University Press.
    Ehring shows the inadequacy of received theories of causation, and, introducing conceptual devices of his own, provides a wholly new account of causation as the persistence over time of individual properties, or "tropes.".
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  6. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1995). The Mishap at Reichenbach Fall: Singular Vs. General Causation. Philosophical Studies 78 (3):257 - 291.
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  7. Jaegwon Kim (1976). Events as Property Exemplifications. In M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. D. Reidel. 310-326.
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  8. Jaegwon Kim (1973). Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event. Journal of Philosophy 70 (8):217-236.
  9. Jaegwon Kim (1971). Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation. Journal of Philosophy 68 (14):426-441.
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  10. David Lewis (1986). Events. In Philosophical Papers Vol. II. OUP. 241-269.
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  11. David Lewis (1986). Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
  12. Martin Lin, Time, Causation, and Abstract Objects.
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  13. E. J. Lowe (2001). Event Causation and Agent Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):1-20.
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  14. Olivier Massin (2009). The Metaphysics of Forces. Dialectica 64 (4):555-589.
    This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal relations. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a (...)
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  15. Uwe Meixner (2004). Causation in a New Old Key. Studia Logica 76 (3):343 - 383.
    I argue (1) that it is not philosophically significant whether causation is linguistically represented by a predicate or by a sentence connective; (2) that there is no philosophically significant distinction between event- and states-of-affairs-causation; (3) that there is indeed a philosophically significant distinction between agent- and event-causation, and that event-causation must be regarded as an analog of agent-causation. Developing this point, I argue that event-causation's being in the image of agent-causation requires, mainly, (a) that the cause is temporally prior to (...)
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  16. D. H. Mellor (1995). The Facts of Causation. Routledge.
    The Facts of Causation grapples with one of philosophy's most enduring issues. Causation is central to all of our lives. What we see and hear causes us to believe certain facts about the world. We need that information to know how to act and how to cause the effects we desire. D. H. Mellor, a leading scholar in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, offers a comprehensive theory of causation. Many questions (...)
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  17. Peter Menzies (1989). A Unified Account of Causal Relata. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):59 – 83.
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  18. L. A. Paul (2000). Aspect Causation. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235-256.
    While skiing, Suzy falls and breaks her right wrist. The next day, she writes a philosophy paper. Her right wrist is broken, so she writes her paper using her left hand. (Assume, as seems plausible, that she isn’t dexterous enough to write it any other way, e.g., with her right foot.) She writes the paper, sends it off to a journal, and it is subsequently published. Is Suzy’s accident a cause of the publication of the paper?2 Of course not. Below, (...)
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  19. Johannes Persson (2010). Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects. Erkenntnis 72 (1):135 - 149.
    Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on (...)
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  20. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1998). Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation. Analysis 58 (3):175–181.
    Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...)
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  21. Carolina Sartorio (2006). Disjunctive Causes. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):521-538.
    There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...)
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  22. Jonathan Schaffer, The Metaphysics of Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Questions about the metaphysics of causation may be usefully divided as follows. First, there are questions about the nature of the causal relata, including (1.1) whether they are in spacetime immanence), (1.2) how fine grained they are individuation), and (1.3) how many there are adicity). Second, there are questions about the metaphysics of the causal relation, including (2.1) what is the difference between causally related and causally unrelated sequences connection), (2.2) what is the difference between sequences related as cause to (...)
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  23. Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Contrastive Causation. Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
    Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.
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  24. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2012). Against the Contrastive Account of Singular Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):115-143.
    For at least three decades, philosophers have argued that general causation and causal explanation are contrastive in nature. When we seek a causal explanation of some particular event, we are usually interested in knowing why that event happened rather than some other specified event. And general causal claims, which state that certain event types cause certain other event types, seem to make sense only if appropriate contrasts to the types of events acting as cause and effect are specified. In recent (...)
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  25. Nathanael Stein (2014). Causes and Categories. Noûs 49 (2).
    Philosophers discussing causation take on, as one of their responsibilities, the task of specifying an ontology of causation. Both standard and non-standard accounts of that ontology make two assumptions: that the ontological category of causal relata admits a unique specification (“Uniqueness”), and that cause and effect are of the same ontological type (“Uniformity”). These assumptions are rarely made explicit, but there is in fact little reason to think them true. It is argued here that, if the question has any interest, (...)
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  26. Helen Steward (1997). The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford University Press.
    Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the sorts of things there are in the mind--events, processes, and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinctions between them, and argues that the category of state has been very widely and seriously misunderstood.
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  27. Ryan Wasserman, Is Causation Extensional?
    It is widely assumed that causation is an extensional relation: if c causes e and c = d, then d causes e. Similarly, if c causes e and e = f, then c causes f. Moving to the formal mode we have: The Extensionality Thesis (ET): (i) If „c causes e‟ is true and „c‟ and „d‟ co-refer, then „d causes e‟ is true; and (ii) If „c causes e‟ is true and „e‟ and „f‟ co-refer, then „c causes f‟ (...)
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Causal Explanation
  1. Bernard Berofsky (2012). Nature's Challenge to Free Will. Oxford University Press, USA.
    Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.
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  2. Alex Broadbent (2012). Causes of Causes. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):457-476.
    When is a cause of a cause of an effect also a cause of that effect? The right answer is either Sometimes or Always . In favour of Always , transitivity is considered by some to be necessary for distinguishing causes from redundant non-causal events. Moreover transitivity may be motivated by an interest in an unselective notion of causation, untroubled by principles of invidious discrimination. And causal relations appear to add up like transitive relations, so that the obtaining of the (...)
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