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Summary This is a category for debates about chance that do not easily fit into other categories. 
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  1. Marshall Abrams (2012). Mechanistic Probability. Synthese 187 (2):343-375.
    I describe a realist, ontologically objective interpretation of probability, "far-flung frequency (FFF) mechanistic probability". FFF mechanistic probability is defined in terms of facts about the causal structure of devices and certain sets of frequencies in the actual world. Though defined partly in terms of frequencies, FFF mechanistic probability avoids many drawbacks of well-known frequency theories and helps causally explain stable frequencies, which will usually be close to the values of mechanistic probabilities. I also argue that it's a virtue rather than (...)
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  2. David Albert (2010). Probability in the Everett Picture. In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, & Reality. Oup Oxford.
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  3. David Albert (2010). Review of Gerhard Ernst, Andreas Hüttemann (Eds.), Time, Chance, and Reduction: Philosophical Aspects of Statistical Mechanics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (9).
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  4. Michael J. Almeida (2010). Discussion Note: Chance, Epistemic Probability and Saving Lives: Reply to Bradley. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2010:1-1.
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  5. Tudor M. Baetu (2014). Chance, Experimental Reproducibility, and Mechanistic Regularity. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):253-271.
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  6. John Beatty (2006). Chance Variation: Darwin on Orchids. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):629-641.
    I am concerned here with the implications of what Darwin called “chance” or “accidental” variation. In particular, how, according to Darwin, does chance variation affect evolutionary outcomes? To address this question, I will focus on his 1866 book.
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  7. J. Berkovitz (2001). On Chance in Causal Loops. Mind 110 (437):1-23.
    A common line of argument for the impossibility of closed causal loops is that they would involve causal paradoxes. The usual reply is that such loops impose heavy consistency constraints on the nature of causal connections in them; constraints that are overlooked by the impossibility arguments. Hugh Mellor has maintained that arguments for the possibility of causal loops also overlook some constraints, which are related to the chances (single-case, objective probabilities) that causes give to their effects. And he argues that (...)
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  8. David Bohm (1957/1999). Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. University of Pennsylvania Press.
    CHAPTER ONE Causality and Chance in Natural Law. INTRODUCTION IN nature nothing remains constant. Everything is in a perpetual state of transformation, ...
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  9. Darren Bradley (forthcoming). Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axt042.
    In Bradley ([2011b]), I offered an analysis of Sleeping Beauty and the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics (EQM). I argued that one can avoid a kind of easy confirmation of EQM by paying attention to observation selection effects, that halfers are right about Sleeping Beauty, and that thirders cannot avoid easy confirmation for the truth of EQM. Wilson ([forthcoming]) agrees with my analysis of observation selection effects in EQM, but goes on to, first, defend Elga’s ([2000]) thirder argument on Sleeping (...)
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  10. Grzegorz Bugajak (2008). On The Notion of Chance and Its Application in Natural Sciences. In Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy. 7-15.
    The notion of chance plays an important role in some philosophical analyses and interpretations of scientific theories. The most obvious examples of that are the theories of evolution and quantum mechanics. This notion, however seems to be notoriously vague. Its application in such analyses, more often than not refers to its common-sense understanding, which, by definition, cannot be sufficient when it comes to sound philosophical interpretations of scientific achievements. The paper attempts at formulating a ‘typology of chance’. It distinguishes eight (...)
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  11. Horacio Arlo Costa & Jeffrey Helzner, Iterated Random Selection as Intermediate Between Risk and Uncertainty. ISIPTA'09 ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS.
  12. David Deutsch (1999). Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London:3129--37.
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  13. John Dudley (2012). Aristotle's Concept of Chance: Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and Determinism. State University of New York Press.
    The first exhaustive study of Aristotle's concept of chance.
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  14. Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Probability and Randomness. In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  15. Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Is the Past a Matter of Chance? In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford University Press.
  16. Antony Eagle (2011). Deterministic Chance. Noûs 45 (2):269 - 299.
    I sketch a new constraint on chance, which connects chance ascriptions closely with ascriptions of ability, and more specifically with 'CAN'-claims. This connection between chance and ability has some claim to be a platitude; moreover, it exposes the debate over deterministic chance to the extensive literature on (in)compatibilism about free will. The upshot is that a prima facie case for the tenability of deterministic chance can be made. But the main thrust of the paper is to draw attention to the (...)
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  17. F. Y. Edgeworth (1922). The Philosophy of Chance. Mind 31 (123):257-283.
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  18. F. Y. Edgeworth (1884). The Philosophy of Chance. Mind 9 (34):223-235.
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  19. Dorothy Edgington (1997). Mellor on Chance and Causation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):411-433.
    Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also (...)
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  20. Manfred Eigen (1981/1983). Laws of the Game: How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance. Harper & Row.
    Using game theory and examples of actual games people play, Nobel laureate Manfred Eigen and Ruthild Winkler show how the elements of chance and rules underlie ...
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  21. David Ellerman, On Classical Finite Probability Theory as a Quantum Probability Calculus.
    This paper shows how the classical finite probability theory (with equiprobable outcomes) can be reinterpreted and recast as the quantum probability calculus of a pedagogical or "toy" model of quantum mechanics over sets (QM/sets). There are two parts. The notion of an "event" is reinterpreted from being an epistemological state of indefiniteness to being an objective state of indefiniteness. And the mathematical framework of finite probability theory is recast as the quantum probability calculus for QM/sets. The point is not to (...)
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  22. J. Franklin (1990). The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life Gerd Gigerenzer, Zeno Swijtink, Theodore Porter, Lorraine Daston, John Beatty and Lorenz Krüger, Ideas in Context Series (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), Xvii + 340 Pp., £30.00, $44.50. [REVIEW] History of European Ideas 12 (4):572-573.
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  23. James Franklin (1990). The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life. History of European Ideas 12 (4):572-573.
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  24. Itzhak Gilboa, Offer Lieberman & David Schmeidler (2010). On the Definition of Objective Probabilities by Empirical Similarity. Synthese 172 (1):79 - 95.
    We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to delineate the scope of situations in which objective probabilities can be used.
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  25. Carl Ginet (1963). Book Review. Choice and Chance. KW Rankin. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 72.
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  26. Clark Glymour, Essay Review: Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof, Eds., Routledge, 2004.
    For most of the contributions to this volume, the project is this: Fill out “Event X is a cause of event Y if and only if……” where the dots on the right are to be filled in by a claims formulated in terms using any of (1) descriptions of possible worlds and their relations; (2) a special predicate, “is a law;” (3) “chances;” and (4) anything else one thinks one needs. The form of analysis is roughly the same as that (...)
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  27. Ian Hacking (1990). The Taming of Chance. Cambridge University Press.
    In this important new study Ian Hacking continues the enquiry into the origins and development of certain characteristic modes of contemporary thought undertaken in such previous works as his best selling Emergence of Probability. Professor Hacking shows how by the late nineteenth century it became possible to think of statistical patterns as explanatory in themselves, and to regard the world as not necessarily deterministic in character. Combining detailed scientific historical research with characteristic philosophic breath and verve, The Taming of Chance (...)
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  28. Alan Hájek (2010). Probability. In Graham Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing.
    The philosophy of probability has been alive and well for several decades in Australia and New Zealand. Some distinctive lines of thought have emerged, resonating with broader themes that have come to be associated with Australasian philosophers: realist/objectivist accounts of various theoretical entities; an ongoing concern with logic, including the development of non­classical logics; and enthusiasm for conceptual analysis, rooted in commonsense but informed by science. In this article I concentrate on work by philosophers on the interpretation of probability, its (...)
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  29. Ned Hall (2004). Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
    David Lewis's influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle--the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability--in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival non-reductionist position that, unlike reductionism, (...)
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  30. Toby Handfield, Genealogical Explanations of Chance and Morals.
    Objective chance and morality are rarely discussed together. In this paper, I argue that there is a surprising similarity in the epistemic standing of our beliefs about both objective chance and objective morality. The key similarity is that both of these sorts of belief are undermined -- in a limited, but important way -- by plausible genealogical accounts of the concepts that feature in these beliefs. The paper presents a brief account of Richard Joyce's evolutionary hypothesis of the genealogy of (...)
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  31. Toby Handfield (2012). Toby Handfield Leaves Nothing To Chance. The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59):125-126.
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  32. Toby Handfield & Alastair Wilson (2014). Chance and Context. In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford University Press.
    The most familiar philosophical conception of objective chance renders determinism incompatible with non-trivial chances. This conception – associated in particular with the work of David Lewis – is not a good fit with our use of the word ‘chance’ and its cognates in ordinary discourse. In this paper we show how a generalized framework for chance can reconcile determinism with non-trivial chances, and provide for a more charitable interpretation of ordinary chance-talk. According to our proposal, variation in an admissible ‘evidence (...)
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  33. C. Haufe (2013). From Necessary Chances to Biological Laws. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):279-295.
    In this article, I propose a new way of thinking about natural necessity and a new way of thinking about biological laws. I suggest that much of the lack of progress in making a positive case for distinctively biological laws is that we’ve been looking for necessity in the wrong place. The trend has been to look for exceptionlessness at the level of the outcomes of biological processes and to build one’s claims about necessity off of that. However, as Beatty (...)
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  34. Eric Hiddleston, Humean Supervenience, Chance, and Magic.
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  35. Carl Hoefer & Alan Hájek (2006). Chance. In Donald Borchert (ed.), Macmillan's Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
    Much is asked of the concept of chance. It has been thought to play various roles, some in tension with or even incompatible with others. Chance has been characterized negatively, as the absence of causation; yet also positively—the ancient Greek τυχη´ reifies it—as a cause of events that are not governed by laws of nature, or as a feature of the laws themselves. Chance events have been understood epistemically as those whose causes are unknown; yet also objectively as a distinct (...)
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  36. Thomas Hofweber (2014). Infinitesimal Chances. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (2).
    It is natural to think that questions in the metaphysics of chance are independent of the mathematical representation of chance in probability theory. After all, chance is a feature of events that comes in degrees and the mathematical representation of chance concerns these degrees but leaves the nature of chance open. The mathematical representation of chance could thus, un-controversially, be taken to be what it is commonly taken to be: a probability measure satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms. The metaphysical questions about chance (...)
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  37. Daniel Hunter (1992). Book Review:Causation, Chance, and Credence: Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation, Volume 1 Brian Skyrms, William L. Harper; Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics: Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation, Volume 2 William L. Harper, Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 59 (3):512-.
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  38. Bärbel Inhelder (1977). The Development of the Concepts of Chance and Probability in Children. In Willis F. Overton & Jeanette McCarthy Gallagher (eds.), Knowledge and Development. Plenum Press. 43--57.
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  39. J. Ismael (2011). A Modest Proposal About Chance. Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):416-442.
    First para: Before the 17th century, there was not much discussion, and little uniformity in conception, of natural laws. The rise of science in 17th century, Newton’s mathematization of physics, and the provision of strict, deterministic laws that applied equally to the heavens and to the terrestrial realm had a profound impact in transforming the philosophical imagination. A philosophical conception of physical law built on the example of Newtonian Mechanics became quickly entrenched. Between the 17th and 20th centuries, there was (...)
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  40. Richard Johns, An Epistemic Theory of Objective Chance.
    A theory of objective, single-case chances is presented and defended. The theory states that the chance of an event E is its epistemic probability, given maximal knowledge of the possible causes of E. This theory is uniquely successful in entailing all the known properties of chance, but involves heavy metaphysical commitment. It requires an objective rationality that determines proper degrees of belief in some contexts.
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  41. Eric A. Johnson (2010). Is the Idea of Objective Probability Incoherent? Law and Philosophy 29 (4):419-432.
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  42. Berna Kilinc (2011). Kant on Chance and Explanation. In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. Springer. 453--463.
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  43. B. Kment (2012). Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals. Philosophical Review 121 (4):573-609.
    Antihaecceitists believe that all facts about specific individuals—such as the fact that Fred exists, or that Katie is tall—globally supervene on purely qualitative facts. Haecceitists deny that. The issue is not only of interest in itself, but receives additional importance from its intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them. Those who think that all fundamental (...)
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  44. Filip Kobiela (2014). Kinds of Chance in Games and Sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 8 (1):65-76.
    While talking about sports (and games) we use such expressions as ?random victory?, ?winning by accident?, ?skill against luck?, ?chance (fortune) favours the better player?, etc. Unfortunately, chance-related notions that occur in these expressions are not well defined?their meaning is vague and it is not clear whether they refer to one or many different phenomena. Because such phenomena play an important role in sport, from the viewpoint of the philosophy of sport it is necessary to give a systematic account of (...)
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  45. David Lewis (1994). Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind 103 (412):473-490.
    Tn this paper I explore and to an extent defend HS. The main philosophical challenges to HS come from philosophical views that say that nomic concepts-laws, chance, and causation-denote features of the world that fail to supervene on non-nomic features. Lewis rejects these views and has labored mightily to construct HS accounts of nomic concepts. His account of laws is fundamental to his program, since his accounts of the other nomic notions rely on it. Recently, a number of philosophers have (...)
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  46. David Lewis (1989). The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1):53-67.
  47. Christian List & Marcus Pivato, Emergent Chance.
    We offer a new argument for the claim that there can be non-degenerate objective chance (“true randomness”) in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, we show how objective chance at a higher level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, our argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties (...)
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  48. Joshua Luczak (2013). On Chance. Metascience 22 (1):85-87.
  49. Aidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
    Some have argued that chance and determinism are compatible in order to account for the objectivity of probabilities in theories that are compatible with determinism, like Classical Statistical Mechanics (CSM) and Evolutionary Theory (ET). Contrarily, some have argued that chance and determinism are incompatible, and so such probabilities are subjective. In this paper, I argue that both of these positions are unsatisfactory. I argue that the probabilities of theories like CSM and ET are not chances, but also that they are (...)
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  50. Patrick Maher (1984). Book Review:The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance Isaac Levi. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 51 (4):690-.
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