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Change blindness is the experimentally demonstrated phenomenon in which a subject fails to notice a distinguishing feature or change when consecutively presented with two slightly different stimuli (e.g., words, illustrations or photographs). Change blindness occurs when stimuli are changed during saccadic eye movements, when changes are introduced to a stimulus display that flickers on and off, or when the stimulus is interrupted by a 'mask', for example a blank display or a 'mudsplash', consisting of small, high-contrast shapes temporarily 'splattered' over the image. Inattentional blindness is a related experimentally demonstrated phenomenon in which subjects fail to notice stimuli in their visual field because they are engaged in a task that requires attention to a different stimulus. For example, some subjects fail to notice a stimulus presented close to fixation because they are attending to a cross at fixation to discern which of its lines is longer. Inattentional blindness also occurs with complex and dynamic stimuli. In a popular experiment subjects fail to notice a man in a gorilla suit who walks through the action in the video they are watching. Similar effects can be produced in "real-world" situations, situations in which subjects interact directly with other people and not merely with video images. These results have been taken to show that there is no explicit conscious awareness of an item without attention, and that if it seems to us that we experience many items in our visual field simultaneously or in detail we are subject to an illusion. Both of these conclusions are contested.

Key works Key works on change blindness include: Rensink et al 1997O'Regan et al 1999, and Rensink et al 2000. Key works on inattentional blindness include: Mack & Rock 1998Mack & Rock 2003Simons & Chabris 1999Most et al 2000 Key works on the grand illusion include: Noë 2002 and Mack 2002.
Introductions Good introductory works include: Mack & Rock 1998Mack & Rock 2003. For a popular introduction see Chabris and Simons (2010), The Invisible Gorilla. 
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  1. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  2. Joseph Anderson & Barbara Anderson (1993). The Myth of Persistence of Vision Revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.
  3. Bonnie L. Angelone, Daniel T. Levin & Daniel J. Simons (2003). The Relationship Between Change Detection and Recognition of Centrally Attended Objects in Motion Pictures. Perception 32 (8):947-962.
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  4. Diane Beck, Geraint Rees, Christopher D. Frith & Nilli Lavie (2001). Change Blindness and Change Awareness. Nature Neuroscience 4.
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  5. Diane Beck, Geraint Rees, Christopher D. Frith & Nilli Lavie (2001). Neural Correlates of Change Detection and Change Blindness. Nature Neuroscience 4 (6):645-650.
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  6. M. Beck, B. Angelone, D. Levin, M. Peterson & D. Varakin (2008). Implicit Learning for Probable Changes in a Visual Change Detection Task. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1192-1208.
    Previous research demonstrates that implicitly learned probability information can guide visual attention. We examined whether the probability of an object changing can be implicitly learned and then used to improve change detection performance. In a series of six experiments, participants completed 120–130 training change detection trials. In four of the experiments the object that changed color was the same shape on every trial. Participants were not explicitly aware of this change probability manipulation and change detection performance was not improved for (...)
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  7. Melissa R. Beck, Daniel T. Levin & Bonnie L. Angelone (2007). Change Blindness Blindness: Beliefs About the Roles of Intention and Scene Complexity in Change Detection. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.
    Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants’ beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants (...)
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  8. Melissa R. Beck, Daniel T. Levin & Bonnie L. Angelone (2007). Metacognitive Errors in Change Detection: Lab and Life Converge. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):58-62.
    Smilek, Eastwood, Reynolds, and Kingstone suggests that the studies reported in Beck, M. R., Levin, D. T. and Angelone, B. A. are not ecologically valid. Here, we argue that not only are change blindness and change blindness blindness studies in general ecologically valid, but that the studies we reported in Beck, Levin, and Angelone, 2007 are as well. Specifically, we suggest that many of the changes used in our study could reasonably be expected to occur in the real world. Furthermore, (...)
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  9. Susan J. Blackmore (2002). The Grand Illusion: Why Consciousness Exists Only When You Look for It. New Scientist 174 (2348):26-29.
    Like most people, I used to think of my conscious life as like a stream of experiences, passing through my mind, one after another. But now I’m starting to wonder, is consciousness really like this? Could this apparently innocent assumption be the reason we find consciousness so baffling?
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  10. Susan J. Blackmore, Gavin Brelstaff, Katherine Nelson & Tom Troscianko (1995). Is the Richness of Our Visual World an Illusion? Transsaccadic Memory for Complex Scenes. Perception 24:1075-81.
  11. Ned Block (2011). Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  12. Jochen Braun (2001). Inattentional Blindness: It's Great but Not Necessarily About Attention. Psyche 7 (6).
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  13. Bruce Bridgeman, David Hendry & L. Stark (1975). Failure to Detect Displacements of the Visual World During Saccadic Eye Movements. Vision Research 15:719-22.
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  14. Justin Broackes (2001). Experience, Attention, and Mental Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):978-979.
    O'Regan & Noë make plausible that perception involves mastery of sensory-motor dependencies. Their rejection of qualia, however, is less persuasive; as is their view that we see only what we are attending to. At times they seem to oppose “internal representation” in general; I argue that they should in fact only be rejecting crude conceptions of brain picturing.
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  15. Beverly C. Butler & Raymond Klein (2009). Inattentional Blindness for Ignored Words: Comparison of Explicit and Implicit Memory Tasks. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):811-819.
    Inattentional blindness is described as the failure to perceive a supra-threshold stimulus when attention is directed away from that stimulus. Based on performance on an explicit recognition memory test and concurrent functional imaging data Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver [Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J. . Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science, 286, 2504–2507] reported inattentional blindness for word stimuli that were fixated but ignored. The present study examined both explicit and (...)
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  16. G. Caplovitz, R. FendRich & H. HugHes (2008). Failures to See: Attentive Blank Stares Revealed by Change Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):877-886.
    Change blindness illustrates a remarkable limitation in visual processing by demonstrating that substantial changes in a visual scene can go undetected. Because these changes can ultimately be detected using top–down driven search processes, many theories assign a central role to spatial attention in overcoming change blindness. Surprisingly, it has been reported that change blindness can occur during blink-contingent changes even when observers fixate the changing location [O’Regan, J. K., Deubel, H., Clark, J. J., & Rensink, R. A. . Picture changes (...)
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  17. Jean-Pierre Changeux & Stanislas Dehaene (2005). Ongoing Spontaneous Activity Controls Access to Consciousness: A Neuronal Model for Inattentional Blindness. PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.
    1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France.
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  18. Andy Clark (2002). Is Seeing All It Seems? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:181-202.
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  19. Axel Cleeremans, Change Blindness to Gradual Changes in Facial Expressions.
    Change blindness—our inability to detect changes in a stimulus—occurs even when the change takes place gradually, without disruption (Simons et al., 2000). Such gradual changes are more difficult to detect than changes that involve a disruption. In this experiment, we extend previous findings to the domain of facial expressions of emotions occurring in the context of a realistic scene. Even with changes occurring in central, highly relevant stimuli such as faces, gradual changes still produced high levels of change blindness: Detection (...)
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  20. Jonathan Cohen (2002). The Grand Grand Illusion Illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):141-157.
    In recent years, a pair of intriguing phenomena has caused researchers working on vision and visual attention to reevaluate many of their assumptions. These phenomena, which have come to be called change blindness (CB) and inattentional blindness (IB), have led many to the conclusion that ordinary perceivers labor under a ``grand illusion'' concerning perception - an illusion that is..
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  21. Daniel C. Dennett (2002). How Could I Be Wrong? How Wrong Could I Be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):13-16.
    One of the striking, even amusing, spectacles to be enjoyed at the many workshops and conferences on consciousness these days is the breathtaking overconfidence with which laypeople hold forth about the nature of consciousness Btheir own in particular, but everybody =s by extrapolation. Everybody =s an expert on consciousness, it seems, and it doesn =t take any knowledge of experimental findings to secure the home truths these people enunciate with such conviction.
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  22. Fred Dretske (2007). What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
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  23. Fred Dretske (2004). Change Blindness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
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  24. Donelson E. Dulany (2001). Inattentional Awareness. Psyche 7 (5).
    The authors report "priming" effects for subjects they classify as "inattentionally blind" and interpret this as evidence for unconscious perception--an interpretation consistent with deeply entrenched metatheory. I question that interpretation, however, on methodological grounds. On these assessment procedures, some subjects could be classified as "inattentionally blind" despite representing the critical stimulus in conscious attention. Still others--presenting a more interesting challenge--could be so classified despite representing the stimulus literally in inattentional awareness. The study is illuminated, I believe, by seeing it in (...)
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  25. Ralph D. Ellis (2001). Implications of Inattentional Blindness for "Enactive" Theories of Consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.
    Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's (...)
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  26. Diego Fernandez-Duque, Giordana Grossi, Ian Thornton & Helen Neville (2003). Representation of Change: Separate Electrophysiological Markers of Attention, Awareness, and Implicit Processing. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (4):491-507.
    & Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in subjects were aware of, replicated those attentional effects, but the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a.
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  27. Diego Fernandez-Duque & Ian Thornton (2003). Explicit Mechanisms Do Not Account for Implicit Localization and Identification of Change: An Empirical Reply to Mitroff Et Al (2000). Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (5).
    Several recent findings support the notion that changes in the environment can be implicitly represented by the visual system. S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) challenged this view and proposed alternative interpretations based on explicit strategies. Across 4 experiments, the current study finds no empirical support for such alternative proposals. Experiment 1 shows that subjects do not rely on unchanged items when locating an unaware change. Experiments 2 and 3 show that unaware changes affect performance (...)
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  28. Diego Fernandez-Duque & Ian Thornton (2000). Change Detection Without Awareness: Do Explicit Reports Underestimate the Representation of Change in the Visual System? Visual Cognition 7 (1):323-344.
    Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on (...)
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  29. Jason Ford (2009). Saving Time: How Attention Explains the Utility of Supposedly Superfluous Representations. Cognitive Critique 1 (1):101-114.
    I contend that Alva Noë’s Enactive Approach to Perception fails to give an adequate account of the periphery of attention. Noë claims that our peripheral experience is not produced by the brain’s representation of peripheral items, but rather by our mastery of sensorimotor skills and contingencies. I offer a two-pronged assault on this account of the periphery of attention. The first challenge comes from Mack and Rock’s work on inattentional blindness, and provides robust empirical evidence for the semantic processing (and (...)
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  30. Jason Ford (2008). Attention and the New Sceptics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):59-86.
    In response to new research into the phenomena of inattentional blindness and change- blindness, several philosophers and vision researchers have proposed a novel form of scepticism: they contend that we do not have the conscious experience that we think we have. I will show that this claim is not supported by the evidence usually cited in support of it, and I expose what I believe to be the underlying error motivating this position: the belief that consciousness is either focal (what (...)
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  31. John A. Grimes (1996). On the Failure to Detect Changes in Scenes Across Saccades. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
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  32. Gary Hatfield (2004). Seeing. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):19 - 35.
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  33. Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
    According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character (...)
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  34. Mika Koivisto & Antti Revonsuo (2003). An ERP Study of Change Detection, Change Blindness, and Visual Awareness. Psychophysiology 40 (3):423-429.
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  35. Cedric Laloyaux, Christel Devue, Stephane Doyen, Elodie David & Axel Cleeremans (2008). Undetected Changes in Visible Stimuli Influence Subsequent Decisions. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):646-656.
    Change blindness—our inability to detect changes in a stimulus—occurs even when the change takes place gradually, without any disruption (Simons et al., 2000). Such gradual changes are more difficult to detect than changes that involve a disruption. Using this method, David et al. (in press) recently showed substantial blindness to changes that involve facial expressions of emotion. In this experiment, we show that people who failed to detect any change in the displays were (1) nevertheless influenced by the changing information (...)
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  36. Victor A. F. Lamme & Rogier Landman (2001). Attention Sheds No Light on the Origin of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-993.
    In O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) account for the phenomenal experience of seeing, awareness is equated to what is within the current focus of attention. They find no place for a distinction between phenomenal and access awareness. In doing so, they essentially present a dualistic solution to the mind-brain problem, and ignore that we do have phenomenal experience of what is outside the focus of attention.
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  37. Daniel T. Levin (2002). Change Blindness Blindness as Visual Metacognition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):111-30.
    Many experiments have demonstrated that people fail to detect seemingly large visual changes in their environment. Despite these failures, most people confidently predict that they would see changes that are actually almost impossible to see. Therefore, in at least some situations visual experience is demonstrably not what people think it is. This paper describes a line of research suggesting that overconfidence about change detection reflects a deeper metacognitive error founded on beliefs about attention and the role of meaning as a (...)
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  38. Daniel T. Levin, Sarah B. Drivdahl, Nausheen Momen & Melissa R. Beck (2002). False Predictions About the Detectability of Visual Changes: The Role of Beliefs About Attention, Memory, and the Continuity of Attended Objects in Causing Change Blindness Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):507-527.
    Recently, a number of experiments have emphasized the degree to which subjects fail to detect large changes in visual scenes. This finding, referred to as “change blindness,” is often considered surprising because many people have the intuition that such changes should be easy to detect. Levin, Momen, Drivdahl, and Simons documented this intuition by showing that the majority of subjects believe they would notice changes that are actually very rarely detected. Thus subjects exhibit a metacognitive error we refer to as (...)
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  39. Daniel T. Levin, Nausheen Momen, Sarah B. Drivdahl & Daniel J. Simons (2000). Change Blindness Blindness: The Metacognitive Error of Overestimating Change-Detection Ability. Visual Cognition 7 (1):397-412.
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  40. Daniel T. Levin, Daniel J. Simons, Bonnie L. Angelone & Christopher Chabris (2002). Memory for Centrally Attended Changing Objects in an Incidental Real-World Change Detection Paradigm. British Journal of Psychology 93:289-302.
  41. Daniel T. Levin & D. Alexander Varakin (2004). No Pause for a Brief Disruption: Failures of Visual Awareness During Ongoing Events. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):363-372.
    Past research has repeatedly documented the close relationship between visual attention and awareness. Most recently, research exploring change blindness, inattentional blindness, repetition blindness, and the attentional blink has converged on the conclusion that attention to one aspect of a scene or event may lead to a highly circumscribed awareness of only the specific information attended, while other information, even that which is spatially or temporally nearby can go completely unnoticed. In the present report, we extend these observations to the dynamic (...)
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  42. S. LO & S. YEH (2008). Dissociation of Processing Time and Awareness by the Inattentional Blindness Paradigm☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1169-1180.
    Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness . The inattentional blindness paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even with similar exposure duration of the (...)
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  43. S. LO & S. YEH (2008). Dissociation of Processing Time and Awareness by the Inattentional Blindness Paradigm☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1169-1180.
    Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness . The inattentional blindness paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even with similar exposure duration of the (...)
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  44. Arien Mack (2002). Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion? A Response. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):102-10.
    The question of whether the visual world is a grand illusion is addressed and answered negatively. The question only arises because of the recent work on Inattentional Blindness , Change Blindness and the Attentional Blink which establishes that attention is necessary for perception. It is argued that IB occurs only when attention is narrowly focussed and not when attention is more broadly distributed, which is the more typical attentional state. Under conditions of distributed attention we are likely to have a (...)
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  45. Arien Mack & Irvin Rock (2003). Inattentional Blindness: An Overview. Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (5):180-184.
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  46. Arien Mack & Irvin Rock (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.
  47. Michael Madary (2014). Visual Experience. In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge. 263-271.
  48. Michael Madary (2012). How Would the World Look If It Looked as If It Were Encoded as an Intertwined Set of Probability Density Distributions? Frontiers in Psychology 3:419.
    Commentary on Andy Clark's "Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science" Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2013).
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  49. G. W. McConkie & D. Zola (1979). Is Visual Information Integrated Across Successive Fixations in Reading? Perception and Psychophysics 25:221-24.
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  50. D. Memmert (2006). The Effects of Eye Movements, Age, and Expertise on Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):620-627.
    Based on various stimuli, the findings for the inattentional blindness paradigm suggest that many observers do not perceive an unexpected object in a dynamic setting. In a first experiment, inattentional blindness was combined with eye tracking data from children. Observers who did not notice the unexpected object in the basketball game test by Simons and Chabris spent on average as much time looking at the unexpected object as those subjects who did perceive it. As such, individual differences that are responsible (...)
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