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Summary This category is devoted to works exploring different emotions (e.g. fear, anger, love, jealousy) and different emotion-types (e.g. aesthetic and moral emotions, 'basic' and 'non-basic' emotions). 
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  1. Lucy Allais (2011). Introduction. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):281-287.
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  2. Macalester Bell (2005). A Woman's Scorn: Toward a Feminist Defense of Contempt as a Moral Emotion. Hypatia 20 (4):80-93.
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  3. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
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  4. Robert Brown (1987). Analyzing Love. Cambridge University Press.
    Analyzing Love is concerned with four basic and neglected problems concerning love. The first is identifying its relevant features: distinguishing it from liking and benevolence and from sexual desire; describing the objects that can be loved and the judgments and aims required by love. The second question is how we recognize the presence of love and what grounds we may have for thinking it present in any particular case. The third is that of relating it to other emotions such as (...)
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  5. C. A. Campbell (1936). Are There `Degrees' of the Moral Emotion? Mind 45 (180):492-497.
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  6. Teresa Chandler (2001). Kinds of Emotion. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):109-115.
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  7. Jason A. Clark (2010). Relations of Homology Between Higher Cognitive Emotions and Basic Emotions. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):75-94.
    In the last 10 years, several authors including Griffiths and Matthen have employed classificatory principles from biology to argue for a radical revision in the way that we individuate psychological traits. Arguing that the fundamental basis for classification of traits in biology is that of ‘homology’ (similarity due to common descent) rather than ‘analogy’, or ‘shared function’, and that psychological traits are a special case of biological traits, they maintain that psychological categories should be individuated primarily by relations of homology (...)
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  8. Tom Cochrane (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information 48 (3):379-420.
    The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. The 8 dimensions (...)
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  9. John M. Cooper (2005). The Emotional Life of the Wise. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (S1):176-218.
    The ancient Stoics notoriously argued, with thoroughness and force, that all ordinary “emotions” (passions, mental affections: in Greek, pãyh) are thoroughly bad states of mind, not to be indulged in by anyone, under any circumstances: anger, resentment, gloating; pity, sympathy, grief; delight, glee, pleasure; impassioned love (i.e. ¶rvw), agitated desires of any kind, fear; disappointment, regret, all sorts of sorrow; hatred, contempt, schadenfreude. Early on in the history of Stoicism, however, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature (...)
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  10. Wayne A. Davis (1981). A Theory of Happiness. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):111-20.
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  11. Ronald de Sousa (2001). Moral Emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...)
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  12. Ronald B. de Sousa (1978). Self-Deceptive Emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (November):684-697.
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  13. Dorothea Debus (2007). Being Emotional About the Past: On the Nature and Role of Past-Directed Emotions. Noûs 41 (4):758-779.
    We sometimes experience emotions which are directed at past events (or situations) which we witnessed at the time when they occurred (or obtained). The present paper explores the role which such "autobiographically past-directed emotions" (or "APD-emotions") play in a subject's mental life. A defender of the "Memory-Claim" holds that an APD-emotion is a memory, namely a memory of the emotion which the subject experienced at the time when the event originally occurred (or the situation obtained) towards which the APD-emotion is (...)
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  14. John Deigh (2004). Primitive Emotions. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  15. Julien A. Deonna (2007). The Structure of Empathy. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):99-116.
    If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might (...)
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  16. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2009). Taking Affective Explanations to Heart. Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.
    In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject's moods (episodes). The rationale for this (...)
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  17. John J. Drummond (2006). Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 22 (1):1-27.
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  18. Michael Fox (1976). Unconscious and Disguised Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (3):403-414.
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  19. Michael Fox (1976). Unconscious Emotions: A Reply to Professor Mullane's Unconscious and Disguised Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):412-414.
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  20. Peter Goldie (2003). Review: Justifying Emotions: Pride and Jealousy. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):551-555.
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  21. Robert M. Gordon (1978). Emotion Labelling and Cognition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (2):125–135.
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  22. Robert M. Gordon (1969). Emotions and Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):408-413.
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  23. Justin C. B. Gosling (1962). Mental Causes and Fear. Mind 71 (July):289-306.
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  24. Patricia S. Greenspan (1986). Identificatory Love. Philosophical Studies 50 (3):321 - 341.
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  25. Joshua C. Gregory (1923). Some Theories of Laughter. Mind 32 (127):328-344.
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  26. Paul E. Griffiths (2004). Is Emotion a Natural Kind? In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    In _What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psychological categories_ I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions. In this paper I restate what I mean by ?natural kind? and my argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this specific sense. In the following sections I discuss the two (...)
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  27. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
  28. Daniel M. Haybron (2001). Happiness and Pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.
  29. Yang-Ming Huang, Maria Gendron & Lisa Feldman Barrett (2009). Do Discrete Emotions Exist? Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):427-437.
    In various guises (usually referred to as the “basic emotion” or “discrete emotion” approach), scientists and philosophers have long argued that certain categories of emotion are natural kinds. In a recent paper, Colombetti (2009) proposed yet another natural kind account, and in so doing, characterized and critiqued psychological constructionist approaches to emotion, including our own Conceptual Act Model. In this commentary, we briefly address three topics raised by Columbetti. First, we correct several common misperceptions about the discrete emotion approach to (...)
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  30. Christoph Jäger & Anne Bartsch (2006). Meta-Emotions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):179-204.
    This paper explores the phenomenon of meta-emotions. Meta-emotions are emotions people have about their own emotions. We analyze the intentional structure of meta-emotions and show how psychological findings support our account. Acknowledgement of meta-emotions can elucidate a number of important issues in the philosophy of mind and, more specifically, the philosophy and psychology of emotions. Among them are (allegedly) ambivalent or paradoxical emotions, emotional communication, emotional self-regulation, privileged access failure for repressed emotions, and survivor guilt.
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  31. Kristján Kristjánsson (2005). Justice and Desert-Based Emotions. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):53 – 68.
    A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and (...)
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  32. Bernd Lahno (2001). On the Emotional Character of Trust. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):171-189.
    Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some (...)
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  33. Stephen R. Leighton (1988). On Feeling Angry and Elated. Journal of Philosophy 85 (May):253-264.
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  34. Mohan Matthen (1998). Biological Universals and the Nature of Fear. Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):105-132.
    Cognitive definitions cannot accommodate fear as it occurs in species incapable of sophisticated cognition. Some think that fear must, therefore, be noncognitive. This paper explores another option, arguably more in line with evolutionary theory: that like other "biological universals" fear admits of variation across and within species. A paradigm case of such universals is species: it is argued that they can be defined by ostension in the manner of Putnam and Kripke without implying that they must have an invariable essence. (...)
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  35. Hugo Meynell (2007). Justice and Desert-Based Emotions. By Kristjan Kristjansson. Heythrop Journal 48 (4):664–666.
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  36. María G. Navarro (2011). Review of 'Emotion and Psyche' by Marc Jackson. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (34).
    motion and Psyche is a really exciting book. In just 47 pages, Marc Jackson gets to define what is an emotion, what emotion categories can be established, when an action represents an emotional conflict, why some people tend to keep memories of certain events while others forget them, and so on. Emotion and Psyche is a reflection on the nature of emotions. But it is much more. The author does not only question the meaning of emotions in our affective life, (...)
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  37. Jerome Neu (2000). A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
    Is jealousy eliminable? If so, at what cost? What are the connections between pride the sin and the pride insisted on by identity politics? How can one question an individual's understanding of their own happiness or override a society's account of its own rituals? What is wrong with incest? These and other questions about what sustains and threatens our identity are pursued using the resources of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and other disciplines. The discussion throughout is informed and motivated by the Spinozist (...)
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  38. Joseph Newirth (2006). Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious: Humor as a Fundamental Emotional Experience. Psychoanalytic Dialogues 16 (5):557-571.
  39. Martha Nussbaum (1988). Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of Love. Ethics 98 (2):225-254.
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  40. Jesse J. Prinz (2011). Is Empathy Necessary for Morality. In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 211--229.
  41. Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Which Emotions Are Basic? In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. 69--87.
    There are two major perspectives on the origin of emotions. According to one, emotions are the products of natural selection. They are evolved adaptations, best understood using the explanatory tools of evolutionary psychology. According to the other, emotions are socially constructed, and they vary across cultural boundaries. There is evidence supporting both perspectives. In light of this, some have argued both approaches are right. The standard strategy for compromise is to say that some emotions are evolved and others are constructed. (...)
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  42. Daniel Putman (2001). The Emotions of Courage. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):463–470.
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  43. Robert C. Roberts (1988). Is Amusement an Emotion? American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):269-274.
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  44. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1998). The Political Sources of Emotions: Greed and Anger. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):21-33.
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  45. Edward B. Royzman & John Sabini (2001). Something It Takes to Be an Emotion: The Interesting Case of Disgust. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (1):29–59.
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  46. David Sander (2008). Basic Tastes and Basic Emotions: Basic Problems and Perspectives for a Nonbasic Solution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):88-88.
    Contemporary behavioral and brain scientists consider the existence of so-called basic emotions in a similar way to the one described by Erickson for so-called basic tastes. Commenting on this analogy, I argue that similar basic problems are encountered in both perspectives, and I suggest a potential nonbasic solution that is tested in emotion research (i.e., the appraisal model of emotion).
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  47. Amy Schmitter (2013). Passions and Affections. In Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century. Oxford University Press. 442-471.
  48. Amy Morgan Schmitter (2010). 17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    1. Introduction: 1.1 Difficulties of Approach; 1.2 Philosophical Background. 2. The Context of Early Modern Theories of the Passions: 2.1 Changing Vocabulary; 2.2 Taxonomies; 2.3 Philosophical Issues in Theories of the Emotions. SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS: Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Theories of the Emotions; Descartes; Hobbes; Malebranche; Spinoza; Shaftsbury; Hutcheson; Hume.
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  49. Robert A. Sharpe (1975). Seven Reasons Why Amusement is an Emotion. Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (3):201-203.
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  50. Marco Solinas (2012). Review of Elena Pulcini, Invidia. La passione triste. [REVIEW] Iride (65):200-201.
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