Critics of human cloning allege that the results of the process are likely to suffer from compromised identities making it near impossible for them to live worthwhile lives. This paper uses the account of the metaphysics of personal identity offered by Derek Parfit to investigate and support the claim of identity-compromise. The cloned person may, under certain circumstances, be seen as surviving, to some degree, in the clone. However, I argue that rather than warranting concern, the potential for survival by (...) cloning ought to help protect against the misuse of the technology. (shrink)

In Islam, the acquisition of knowledge is a form of worship. But human achievement must be exercised in conformity with God's will. Warnings against feelings of superiority often are coupled with the command to remain within the confines of God's laws and limits. Because of the fear of arrogance and disregard of the balance created by God, any new knowledge or discovery must be applied with careful consideration to maintaining balance in the creation. Knowledge must be applied to ascertain equity (...) and justice for all of humanity. Research in Islam must be linked to the broad ethical base set forth in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Whether embryonic stem cell research or cloning is ethically acceptable in Islam depends on the benefits derived from such applications. What is most important for the scholars is to adhere to the concepts of compassion, mercy, and benefit to everyone. (shrink)

In search of a potential problem with cloning, I investigate the phenomenon of telomere shortening which is caused by cell replication; clones created from somatic cells will have shortened telomeres and therefore reach a state of senescence more rapidly. While genetic intervention might fix this problem at some point in the future, I ask whether, absent technological advances, this biological phenomenon undermines the moral permissibility of cloning.

The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and wish (...) is separation. I first contend that separation is such a radical procedure as to render the post-separation person different from the pre-separation one. Therefore, it is not possible to benefit the pre-separation twin by the act of separation. The article concludes with a critical evaluation of the tendency in bioethics to regard ethical challenges as rivalry between individuals competing for scarce resources. (shrink)

The current debate on the ethics of cloning humans is both uninspired and uninspiring. In large measure this is because of mistakes that permeate the discourse, including the mistake of thinking that cloning technology is strictly a reproductive technology when it is used to create whole beings. As a result, the challenge this technology represents regarding our understanding of ourselves and the species to which we belong typically is inappropriately downplayed or exaggerated. This has meant that important (albeit disquieting) societal (...) issues and species-type concerns have not been fully explored. This paper, intended as a corrective, suggests that we take an alternate view of human cloning as both an enhancement and a reproductive technology. This proposed shift in the framework for analysis counters the current narrow framing of the issues and introduces new questions about the prospect of modifying the species. (shrink)

As we move into a new millennium fraught with terror and danger, a global postmodern cosmopolis is unfolding in the midst of rapid evolutionary and social changes co-constructed by science, technology, and the restructuring of global capital. We are quickly morphing into a new biological and social existence that is ever-more mediated and shaped by computers, mass media, and biotechnology, all driven by the logic of capital and a powerful emergent technoscience. In this global context, science is no longer merely (...) an interpretation of the natural and social worlds, rather it has become an active force in changing them and the very nature of life. In an era where life can be created and redesigned in a petri dish, and genetic codes can be edited like a digital text, the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” has become greatly complexified. The new techniques of manipulation call into question existing definitions of life and death, demand a rethinking of fundamental notions of ethics and moral value, and pose unique challenges for democracy. (shrink)

: There appears to be a consensus in the general community that reproductive cloning is an immoral technology that should be banned. It may, however, be argued, at least from the perspective of the Jewish tradition, that reproductive cloning has many positive benefits. It is thus essential that one carefully weigh the costs and the benefits before deciding on a definitive course of action.

In analysing the position adopted by the United Kingdom over therapeutic cloning, this paper will endeavour to examine the question of regulation, its necessity and extent. This will be achieved through considering different models of relevant theoretical discourse before, in applying that discourse to identified systems of regulation, the advantages and pitfalls of each system will be assessed in the hope of reaching a solution appropriate to the sensitive, yet dynamic, needs of the issue.

It will be remembered that the introductory chapter to this paper differentiated between human therapeutic cloning and embryonic stem cell research, with the former concept encapsulating the latter one. In turning to examine the current system of regulation found within the United Kingdom this has particular relevance as it is only the practice of therapeutic cloning – the creation and use of an embryo – which engages with the regulative measures adopted.

After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear transfer, also known as therapeutic cloning. The first embryo transfer for human reproductive cloning purposes was also attempted in 2006, albeit with negative results. These two events force us to think carefully about the possibility of human cloning which is now much closer to becoming a reality. In this paper we tackle this issue from two sides, first summarising what scientists have achieved so (...) far, then discussing some of the ethical arguments in favour and against human cloning which are debated in the context of policy making and public consultation. Therapeutic cloning as a means to improve and save lives has uncontroversial moral value. As to human reproductive cloning, we consider and assess some common objections and failing to see them as conclusive. We do recognise, though, that there will be problems at the level of policy and regulation that might either impair the implementation of human reproductive cloning or make its accessibility restricted in a way that could become difficult to justify on moral grounds. We suggest using the time still available before human reproductive cloning is attempted successfully to create policies and institutions that can offer clear directives on its legitimate applications on the basis of solid arguments, coherent moral principles, and extensive public consultation. (shrink)

Background The regulation of human cloning continues to be a significant national and international policy issue. Despite years of intense academic and public debate, there is little clarity as to the philosophical foundations for many of the emerging policy choices. The notion of "human dignity" is commonly used to justify cloning laws. The basis for this justification is that reproductive human cloning necessarily infringes notions of human dignity. Discussion The author critiques one of the most commonly used ethical justifications for (...) cloning laws – the idea that reproductive cloning necessarily infringes notions of human dignity. He points out that there is, in fact, little consensus on point and that the counter arguments are rarely reflected in formal policy. Rarely do domestic or international instruments provide an operational definition of human dignity and there is rarely an explanation of how, exactly, dignity is infringed in the context reproductive cloning. Summary It is the author's position that the lack of thoughtful analysis of the role of human dignity hurts the broader public debate about reproductive cloning, trivializes the value of human dignity as a normative principle and makes it nearly impossible to critique the actual justifications behind many of the proposed policies. (shrink)

The announcement of the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep evoked widespread response from the Christian Churches. These responses are identified, organized thematically, and discussed critically. The churches have viewed reproductive human cloning either with unqualified opposition or with grave suspicion. Some statements have discussed animal cloning, generally granting limited approval, and nonreproductive human cloning, either in opposition or expressing an openness to entertain specific proposals as the technology develops.

The British Parliament legalized therapeutic cloning in December 2000 despite opposition from the European Union. The watershed event in Parliament's move was the active and unprecedented government support for the generation and destruction of human embryonic life merely as a means of medical advancement. This article contends that the utilitarian analysis of this procedure is necessary to identify the real world risks of therapeutic cloning but insufficient to identify the breach of defensible ethical limits that this procedure represents. A value-oriented (...) approach to Kantian ethics demonstrates that the utilitarian endorsement of therapeutic cloning entails a contradiction of the necessity of human vulnerability and a faulty valuation of the human embryo. The concern is that a narrow utilitarian focus ultimately commodifies human embryonic life and preferences outcomes as the sole determinant of moral value. (shrink)

: In this essay, Davion argues that many arguments appealing to an "intuition" that reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is "unnatural" rely upon an underlying moral assumption that only heterosexuality is "natural," an assumption that grounds extreme homophobia in America. Therefore, critics of cloning who are in favor of gay and lesbian equality have reasons to avoid prescriptive appeals to the so-called "natural" in making their arguments. Davion then suggests anticloning arguments that do not make such appeals.

Cloning already happens by accident; not particularly often, but often enough that we all know examples. Identical twins are true clones..

Bettina Schöne-Seifert and Marco Stier present a host of detailed and intriguing arguments to the effect that potentiality arguments have to be viewed as outdated due to developments in stem cell research, in particular the possibility of re-setting the development potential of differentiated cells, such as skin cells. However, their argument leaves them without an explanation of the intuitive difference between skin cells and human beings, which seems to be based on the assumption that a skin cell is merely part (...) of a human organism, while an embryo is at some point a human organism. An appropriately designed concept of the human organism can explain the difference, but also has the potential of re-dividing the argumentative landscape along familiar lines. (shrink)

Stem cell research is very promising. The use of human embryos has been confronted with objections based on ethical and religious positions. The recent production of reprogrammed adult (induced pluripotent) cells does not – in the opinion of scientists – reduce the need to continue human embryonic stem cell research. So the debate continues.Islam always encouraged scientific research, particularly research directed toward finding cures for human disease. Based on the expectation of potential benefits, Islamic teachings permit and support human embryonic (...) stem cell research. The majority of Muslim scholars also support therapeutic cloning. This permissibility is conditional on the use of supernumerary early pre-embryos which are obtained during infertility treatment in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics. The early pre-embryos are considered in Islamic jurisprudence as worthy of respect but do not have the full sanctity offered to the embryo after implantation in the uterus and especially after ensoulment.In this paper the Islamic positions regarding human embryonic stem cell research and therapeutic cloning are reviewed in some detail, whereas positions in other religious traditions are mentioned only briefly.The status of human embryonic stem cell research and therapeutic cloning in different countries, including the USA and especially in Muslim countries, is discussed. (shrink)

: Taken at face value, pet cloning may seem at best a frivolous practice, costly both to the cloned pet's health and its owner's pocket. At worst, its critics say, it is misguided and unhealthy—a way of exploiting grief to the detriment of the animal, its owner, and perhaps even animal welfare in general. But if the great pains we are willing to take to clone Fido raise the status of companion animals in the public eye, then the practice might (...) be defensible. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to compare two reports on human cloning, one by the US President’s Council on Bioethics and one by the Italian Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica. I shall focus on those arguments against human cloning, in both reports, which are articulated in terms of (a) the development of human identity, (b) the meaning of human reproduction, and (c) the nature of family relationships. My general conclusion will be that the arguments against human cloning put forth (...) by both reports are not sound, because they are grounded on the dubious assumption that there is a “natural way” of thinking about identity, reproduction, and family relationships. (shrink)

The author, a member of the U.S.President's Council on Bioethics, discussesethical issues raised by human cloning, whetherfor purposes of bringing babies to birth or forresearch purposes. He first argues that everycloned human embryo is a new, distinct, andenduring organism, belonging to the speciesHomo sapiens, and directing its owndevelopment toward maturity. He then distinguishesbetween two types of capacities belonging toindividual organisms belonging to this species,an immediately exerciseable capacity and abasic natural capacity that develops over time. He argues that it is the (...) second type ofcapacity that is the ground for full moralrespect, and that this capacity (and itsconcomitant degree of respect) belongs tocloned human embryos no less than to adulthuman beings. He then considers and rejectscounter-arguments to his position, includingthe suggestion that the capacity of embryos isequivalent to the capacity of somatic cells,that full human rights are afforded only tohuman organisms with functioning brains, thatthe possibility of twinning diminishes themoral status of embryos, that the fact thatpeople do not typically mourn the loss of earlyembryos implies that they have a diminishedmoral status, that the fact that earlyspontaneous abortions occur frequentlydiminishes the moral status of embryos, andthat his arguments depend upon a concept ofensoulment. He concludes that if the moralstatus of cloned human embryos is equivalent tothat of adults, then public policy should bebased upon this assumption. (shrink)

Since the cloned sheep Dolly was born, reproductive cloning of humans (i.e. the cloning of complete human individuals) has seemed to be – at least in principle – achievable. The technical possibility of reproductive cloning leaves the question unanswered of whether the actual production of a clone would be morally acceptable. Considering several arguments against reproductive cloning – which claim that the moral status of a cloned individual and its clone respectively renders it morally objectionable to carry out cloning – (...) we defend the thesis that these arguments are not apodictic (i.e. relative to all ends and means of cloning humans) but are only hypothetical (i.e. relative to some ends and means of cloning humans). Although at present we think it is difficult to find a plausible aim of cloning that is not an instrumentalisation of the cloned (and, therefore, morally objectionable), it could, nevertheless, be that in the future there might be ends and means that justify reproductive cloning. We conclude by criticising the apodictic ban on reproductive cloning declared by most international resolutions and much national legislation. (shrink)

In the wake of the February 1997 announcement that Dolly the sheep had been cloned, Muslim religious scholars together with Muslim scientists held two conferences to discuss cloning from an Islamic perspective. They were organized by two influential Islamic international religioscientific institutions: the Islamic Organization of Medical Sciences (IOMS) and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA). Both institutions comprise a large number of prominent religious scholars and well-known scientists who participated in the discussions at the conferences. This article gives a (...) comprehensive analysis of these conferences, the relation between science and religion as reflected in the discussions there, and the further influence of these discussions on Muslims living in the West. Modern discussions on Islamic bioethics show that formulating an Islamic perspective on these issues is not the exclusive prerogative of religious scholars. Formulating such perspectives has become a collective process in which scientists play an essential role. Such a collective approach strengthens the religious authority of Muslim scholars and makes it more influential rather than undermining it. (shrink)

We have synthesized a 582,970-base pair Mycoplasma genitalium genome. This synthetic genome, named M. genitalium JCVI-1.0, contains all the genes of wild-type M. genitalium G37 except MG408, which was disrupted by an antibiotic marker to block pathogenicity and to allow for selection. To identify the genome as synthetic, we inserted "watermarks" at intergenic sites known to tolerate transposon insertions. Overlapping "cassettes" of 5 to 7 kilobases (kb), assembled from chemically synthesized oligonucleotides, were joined by in vitro recombination to produce intermediate (...) assemblies of approximately 24 kb, 72 kb ("1/8 genome"), and 144 kb ("1/4 genome"), which were all cloned as bacterial artificial chromosomes in Escherichia coli. Most of these intermediate clones were sequenced, and clones of all four 1/4 genomes with the correct sequence were identified. The complete synthetic genome was assembled by transformation-associated recombination cloning in the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, then isolated and sequenced. A clone with the correct sequence was identified. The methods described here will be generally useful for constructing large DNA molecules from chemically synthesized pieces and also from combinations of natural and synthetic DNA segments. 10.1126/science.1151721. (shrink)

A comment on the code of ethical practice of Genetic Savings & Clone, a companion animal cloning service.

One class of argument against cloning human beings in the contemporary literature focuses on the bad consequences that will befall the clone or “later-twin.” In this paper I consider whether this line of argumentation can be blocked by invoking Parfit’s non-identity problem. I canvass two general strategies for solving the non-identity problem: a consequentialist strategy and a non-consequentialist, rights based strategy. I argue that while each general strategy offers a plausible solution to the non-identity problem as applied to the cases (...) most frequently discussed in the non-identity problem literature, neither provides a reason for puttingaside the non-identity problem when applied to cloning. I conclude (roughly) that the non-identity problem does serve to block this class of argument against cloning. (shrink)

Cloning scares the hell out of people, because the idea of cloning people scares the hell out of people. Some of this fear is well-founded. Like any new reproductive technology, the cloning of entire human organisms can be put to good or bad effect, for good or bad reasons. But much of the fear is not well-founded. Before you could say “Hello, Dolly,” the U.S. administration moved to ban federal funding of human cloning research; and there is considerable support in (...) Congress for an outright ban on the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology for the purpose of human cloning. Why? Here is part of Clinton’s statement announcing the funding ban. (shrink)

Proponents of human reproductive cloning do not dispute that cloning may lead to violations of clones' right to self-determination, or that these violations could cause psychological harms. But they proceed with their endorsement of human reproductive cloning by dismissing these psychological harms, mainly in two ways. The first tactic is to point out that to commit the genetic fallacy is indeed a mistake; the second is to invoke Parfit's non-identity problem. The argument of this paper is that neither approach succeeds (...) in removing our moral responsibility to consider and to prevent psychological harms to cloned individuals. In fact, the same commitment to personal liberty that generates the right to reproduce by means of cloning also creates the need to limit that right appropriately. Discussion of human reproductive cloning ought to involve a careful and balanced consideration of both the relevant aspects of personal liberty – the parents' right to reproductive freedom and the cloned child's right to self-determination. (shrink)

The focus here is the question of the moral status of viable human embryos for the first few days of their existence. More precisely, my focus is the human embryo from its conception, through its becoming a mass of undifferentiated cells, to its first differentiation when the initial stem cell mass appears. Naturally, this would occur in the first week of the embryo’s existence, whether in vitro (in a laboratory) or in vivo (in the uterine tubes or uterus). With cryogenics, (...) the process can be frozen at any stage. In this essay, I identify four categories of human embryos and argue that differences between these categories support the view that embryos are not all equal in terms of their moral status, which, in turn, supports the legitimacy of some medical and research procedures that put embryos at risk. (shrink)

Wilson and Kass talked about their book, The ethics of human cloning, which is about the ethical debate over human cloning.

Someday soon (if it hasn't happened in secret already), a human will be cloned, and mankind will embark on a scientific and moral journey whose destination cannot be foretold. In Copycats: The Science and Ethics of Cloning, Arlene Judith Klotzko describes the new world of possibilities that can be glimpsed over the horizon. In a lucid and engaging narrative, she explains that the technology to create clones of living beings already exists, inaugurated in 1996 by Dolly the sheep, the first (...) mammal cloned from a single adult cell. Dolly is the culmination of a long scientific quest to understand the puzzle of our development from one cell into a complex organism--the outcome of a "fantastic experiment" envisioned six decades before her birth. Scientists have since cloned mice, cows, goats, pigs, rabbits and cats. Using the same laboratory tools and techniques, they are trying to grow an embryo, cloned from a single cell of a human being. Their goal is not to make copies of existing people, but to design therapies for currently untreatable diseases and the afflictions of old age. Our fascination with cloning is about much more than science and its extraordinary medical implications. In riveting prose, full of illusions to art, music and the cinema, Klotzko shows why the prospect of human cloning triggers our dearest hopes and especially our darkest fears, forcing us to ponder anew what it means to be human. And what it would be like to have "a clone of your own.". (shrink)

It is widely believed that reproductive human cloning is morally wrong and should be prohibited because it infringes on human uniqueness, individuality, freedom and personal identity. The philosophical and ethical discussion has, however, shown that it is far more difficult than might initially be supposed to sustain arguments against cloning on these and related grounds. More recently, a potentially viable argument, initially put forward by Hans Jonas, has regained new prominence. The argument holds that cloning is wrong because it denies (...) the clone an `open future', that is, the ability to freely shape her own personal identity, life plans, self-chosen goals, etc. After a critical exposition of the argument, I argue as follows: If one understands the Open Future Argument as an argument about the welfare of the cloned child, then it cannot show that cloning harms the child in a person-affecting sense of harming and benefiting. If, on the other hand, one understands the argument in a non-person-affecting sense, then some, but not all, reproductive cloning decisions can be shown to be wrong. The argument does not show, however, that cloning ought to be prohibited by law. While cloning, like other widely accepted reproductive decisions, will sometimes fail to minimize harm to `the child', such acts – to the extent that they do not constitute harm in a person-affecting sense – ought to be tolerated by proponents of the Open Future Argument. Attempts to prohibit reproductive choices on the basis that they are not optimal, will undermine the same set of values that the Open Future Argument seeks to uphold. (shrink)

This article challenges the view most recently expounded by Emily Jackson that ‘decisional privacy’ ought to be respected in the realm of artificial reproduction (AR). On this view, it is considered an unjust infringement of individual liberty for the state to interfere with individual or group freedom artificially to produce a child. It is our contention that a proper evaluation of AR and of the relevance of welfare will be sensitive not only to the rights of ‘commissioning parties’ to AR (...) but also to public policy considerations. We argue that AR has implications for the common good, by involving matters of human reproduction, kinship, race, parenthood and identity. In this paper we challenge presuppositions concerning decisional privacy. We examine the essential commodification of human life implicit in AR and the systematicity that makes this possible. We address the objection that it is an ethically neutral way of having children and consider the problem of ‘existential debt’. After examining objections to the thesis that AR is illegitimate for reasons of public policy and the common good, we return to the issue of decisional privacy in the light of considerations concerning the legitimate role of the state in matters affecting human reproduction. (shrink)

Some opponents of reproductive human cloning have argued that, because of its experimental nature, any attempt to create a child by way of cloning would risk serious birth defects or genetic abnormalities and would therefore be immoral. Some versions of this argument appeal to the consent of the person to be conceived in this way. In particular, they assume that if an experimental reproductive technology has not yet been shown to be safe, then, before we use it, we are morally (...) obligated to get either the actual consent or the presumed consent of the person to be conceived. In this article, I attempt to explain the appeal of such consent-based arguments as deriving from a mistaken view of personal identity. I then argue that since this view is false, such arguments are unsound. Finally, I argue that even if reproductive cloning is unsafe, it may still be morally permissible in some circumstances. (shrink)

The issues of human cloning and stem cell retrieval are inseparable in circumstances in which the rationale of self-preservation may be invoked as a negative right. I apply this rationale to a hypothetical case in which cloning is necessary to preserve the bodily integrity or life of an individual. Self-preservation as moral integrity is examined in a narrower context, i.e., as applicable to those for whom deliberate termination of embryonic life is morally-problematic. This issue is addressed through comparison with two (...) paradigms commonly used in support of clinical practice: the distinction between letting die and killing, and the permissibility of vital organ retrieval after death. Although these paradigms are questionable in their own right, they offer a rationale by which scientists and clinicians may respect the negative right to moral integrity of those with whom they disagree. (shrink)

Many bioethicists working in reproductive ethics tacitly assume some theory of diachronic personal identity. For example, Peter Singer argues that there is no identity relation between a foetus and a future individual because the former shares no robust mental connections with the latter. Consequently, abortion prevents the existence of an individual; it does not destroy an already existing individual. Singer's argument implicitly appeals to the psychological account of personal identity, which, although endorsed by many philosophers such as Derek Parfit, is (...) contentious. Singer does not attempt to defend the psychological account before applying it to the moral permissibility of abortion. Indeed, with some notable exceptions, very few bioethicists attempt antecedently to defend their chosen theory of personal identity before applying it to their ethical arguments. In this paper, I look at the issues of abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and human reproductive cloning in order to illustrate how many of the arguments made by bioethicists on these topics are, at least partly, based upon veiled metaphysical assumptions. My objective is to illustrate that progress can be made on these topics by attending to their fundamental metaphysical claims. (shrink)