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  1. Arash Abizadeh (2010). Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller. Political Theory 38 (1):121-130.
  2. Arash Abizadeh (2008). Border Coercion and Democratic Legitimacy: Freedom of Association, Territorial Dominion, and Self-Defence. Political Theory 35 (1):37-65.
  3. Lawrence A. Alexander (1983). Zimmerman on Coercive Wage Offers. Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (2):160-164.
  4. Scott Anderson, Coercion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5. Corey Brettschneider (2010). When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? The Dilemmas of Freedom of Expression and Democratic Persuasion. Perspectives on Politics 8 (4):1005-1019.
    Hate groups are often thought to reveal a paradox in liberal thinking. On the one hand, such groups challenge the very foundations of liberal thought, including core values of equality and freedom. On the other hand, these same values underlie the rights such as freedom of expression and association that protect hate groups. Thus a liberal democratic state that extends those protections to such groups in the name of value neutrality and freedom of expression may be thought to be undermining (...)
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  6. Daniel Brudney (2005). On Noncoercive Establishment. Political Theory 33 (6):812 - 839.
    In this essay, I raise the question of whether some degree of noncoercive state support for religious conceptions (broadly understood) should be left to the majoritarian branch ofgovernment. I argue that the reason not to do so is that such state support would alienate many citizens. However to take this as a sufficient reason to constrain the majoritarian branch is to accept the thesis that not being alienated from one's polity is a significant part of the human good. Those who (...)
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  7. Michael Clark (2000). Review of Torborn Tännjö, Coercive Care. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy 17.
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  8. Elizabeth Cripps (2011). Climate Change, Collective Harm and Legitimate Coercion. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (2):171-193.
    Liberalism faces a tension between its commitment to minimal interference with individual liberty and the urgent need for strong collective action on global climate change. This paper attempts to resolve that tension. It does so on the one hand by defending an expanded model of collective moral responsibility, according to which a set of individuals can be responsible, qua ?putative group?, for harm resulting from the predictable aggregation of their individual acts. On the other, it defends a collectivized version of (...)
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  9. Carolin Emcke (2000). Between Choice and Coercion: Identities, Injuries, and Different Forms of Recognition. Constellations 7 (4):483-495.
  10. M. Evans (2013). The Meaning of Agency. In Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips & Kalpana Wilson (eds.), Gender, Agency, and Coercion. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  11. R. Gill & N. Donaghue (2013). As If Postfeminism Had Come True: The Turn to Agency in Cultural Studies of 'Sexualisation'. In Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips & Kalpana Wilson (eds.), Gender, Agency, and Coercion. Palgrave Macmillan.
  12. E. A. Goerner & Walter J. Thompson (1996). Politics and Coercion. Political Theory 24 (4):620-652.
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  13. Kalle Grill (2007). The Legalization of Drugs. [REVIEW] Theoria 73 (4):248-255.
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  14. Vinit Haksar (1976). Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Gandhi]. Political Theory 4 (1):65-79.
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  15. Robert Higgs (1995). Coercion is Not a Societal Constant: Reply to Samuels. Critical Review 9 (3):431-436.
    Warren Samuels maintains that every society has a constant amount of coercion and order, which vary only in terms of who gains and who loses, because every society has a government that establishes property rights. In making these arguments, Samuels exaggerates the extent to which governmental decisions predetermine the workings of a market society, and he fails to recognize that, with regard to the attainment of specific socioeconomic outcomes, governmental stipulation of private property rights differs fundamentally from governmental (...)
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  16. Richard Holton (2007). Freedom, Coercion and Discursive Control. In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford. 104.
    If moral and political philosophy is to be of any use, it had better be concerned with real people. The focus need not be exclusively on people as they are; but it should surely not extend beyond how they would be under laws as they might be. It is one of the strengths of Philip Pettit’s work that it is concerned with real people and the ways that they think: with the commonplace mind. In this paper I examine Pettit’s recent (...)
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  17. Michael Huemer, On the Need for Social Coercion.
    The problem I am concerned with is very general: Why do we need a coercive institution in our society to control our behavior? This question is a little different from "Why do we need a government?" in two ways: First, because "coercive institution" is a broader term than "government"; probably not every coercive institution that controlled people's behavior would be called a government, though every government is a coercive institution (that is, an institution exercising coercion as one of its main (...)
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  18. Dan Lyons (1986). Coercion as Temptation. Journal of Social Philosophy 17 (3):35-41.
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  19. Peter Margulies (2006). Commentary: The Military Commissions Act, Coerced Confessions, and the Role of the Courts. Criminal Justice Ethics 25 (2):2-56.
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  20. Thaddeus Metz (2010). Human Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights. Journal of Human Rights 9 (1):81-99.
    In this article I spell out a conception of dignity grounded in African moral thinking that provides a plausible philosophical foundation for human rights, focusing on the particular human right not to be executed by the state. I first demonstrate that the South African Constitutional Court’s sub-Saharan explanations of why the death penalty is degrading all counterintuitively entail that using deadly force against aggressors is degrading as well. Then, I draw on one major strand of Afro-communitarian thought to develop a (...)
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  21. David Miller (2010). Why Immigration Controls Are Not Coercive: A Reply to Arash Abizadeh. Political Theory 38 (1):111 - 120.
    Abizadeh has argued that because border controls coerce would-be immigrants and invade their autonomy, they are entitled to participate in the democratic institutions that impose those controls. In reply, the author distinguishes between coercion and prevention, shows that prevention need not undermine autonomy, and concludes that although border controls may restrict freedom, they do not give rise to democratic entitlements.
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  22. Fabienne Peter (2004). Choice, Consent, and the Legitimacy of Market Transactions. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):1-18.
    According to an often repeated definition, economics is the science of individual choices and their consequences. The emphasis on choice is often used – implicitly or explicitly – to mark a contrast between markets and the state: While the price mechanism in well-functioning markets preserves freedom of choice and still efficiently coordinates individual actions, the state has to rely to some degree on coercion to coordinate individual actions. Since coercion should not be used arbitrarily, coordination by the state needs to (...)
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  23. Arthur Ripstein (2004). Authority and Coercion. Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (1):2–35.
    I am grateful to Donald Ainslie, Lisa Austin, Michael Blake, Abraham Drassinower, David Dyzenhaus, George Fletcher, Robert Gibbs, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Sari Kisilevsky, Dennis Klimchuk, Christopher Morris, Scott Shapiro, Horacio Spector, Sergio Tenenbaum, Malcolm Thorburn, Ernest Weinrib, Karen Weisman, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for comments, and audiences in the UCLA Philosophy Department and Columbia Law School for their questions.
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  24. Andrea Sangiovanni (2012). The Irrelevance of Coercion, Imposition, and Framing to Distributive Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (2):79-110.
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  25. James R. Shaw (2012). The Morality of Blackmail. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):165-196.
    Blackmail raises a pair of parallel legal and moral problems, sometimes referred to as the "paradox of blackmail". It is sometimes legal and morally permissible to ask someone for money, or to threaten to release harmful information about them, while it is illegal and morally impermissible to do these actions jointly. I address the moral version of this paradox by bringing instances of blackmail under a general account of wrongful coercion. According to this account, and contrary to the appearances which (...)
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  26. M. Sleat (2013). Coercing Non-Liberal Persons: Considerations on a More Realistic Liberalism. European Journal of Political Theory 12 (4):347-367.
    The central contention of this article is that contemporary liberal theory is without an account of what legitimates coercing those who reject liberalism that is consistent with its own stipulations of the conditions of political legitimacy. After exploring the nature of the liberal principle of legitimacy, and in particular how it is intended to function as a way of protecting individuals from domination and oppression by reconciling freedom and public law, the article considers four different possible accounts of what might (...)
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  27. Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.) (2007). Common Minds. Oxford.
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  28. Gabriel Wollner (2011). Equality and the Significance of Coercion. Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (4):363-381.
    Some political philosophers believe that equality emerges as a moral concern where and because people coerce each other. I shall argue that they are wrong. The idea of coercion as a trigger of equality is neither as plausible nor as powerful as it may initially appear. Those who rely on the idea that coercion is among the conditions that give rise to equality as a moral demand face a threefold challenge. They will have to succeed in jointly (a) offering a (...)
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