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  1. Sophie R. Allen (2006). A Space Oddity: Colin McGinn on Consciousness and Space. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):61-82.
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  2. Anthony L. Brueckner & E. Beroukhim (2003). McGinn on Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Francis W. Dauer (2001). McGinn's Materialism and Epiphenomenalism. Analysis 61 (2):136-139.
    Colin McGinn urged that while a brain state P explains consciousness, a conception P is cognitively inaccessible to us. This paper argues that McGinn's argument for his form of materialism is committed to P (and consciousness which P explains) being epiphenomenal or causally inert relative to such things as the movements of our bodies. As a result, McGinn's materialism creates a duality in the brain and thereby faces the same problem of epiphenomenalism which plagues the Cartesian dualist.
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  4. W. M. Davies (1999). Sir William Mitchell and the "New Mysterianism". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):253-73.
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  5. David de Leon (1995). The Limits of Thought and the Mind-Body Problem. Lund University Cognitive Studies 42.
    This paper gives an account of Colin McGinn's essay: "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?". McGinn's answer to his own essay title is that the problem is forever beyond us due to the particular nature of our cognitive abilities.The present author offers a number of criticisms of the arguments which support this conclusion.
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  6. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). Sisyphus's Boulder: Consciousness and the Limits of the Knowable. John Benjamins.
    In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that...
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  7. Robert K. Garcia (2000). Minds Sans Miracles: Colin McGinn's Naturalized Mysterianism. Philosophia Christi 2 (2):227-242.
    In this paper, I discuss Colin McGinn’s claim that the mind is not miraculous but merely mysterious, and that this mystery is due to the limits of our cognitive faculties. To adequately present the flow and unity of McGinn’s overall argument, I offer an extended and uninterrupted précis of his case, followed by a critique. I will argue that McGinn’s argument is unsuccessful if it is intended to persuade non-naturalists, but nevertheless may be a plausible position for a naturalist, qua (...)
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  8. James Garvey (1997). What Does McGinn Think We Cannot Know? Analysis 57 (3):196-201.
    Exactly what is McGinn (1991) saying when he claims that we cannot solve the mind-body problem? Just what is cognitively closed to us? The text suggests at least four possibilities. I work through each them in some detail, and I come to two principal conclusions. First, by McGinn's own understanding of the mind-body problem, he needs to show that we are cognitively closed to how brains generate consciousness, but he argues for something else, that we are cognitively closed to the (...)
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  9. Philip P. Hanson (1993). McGinn's Cognitive Closure. Dialogue 32 (3):579-85.
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  10. Christoph Jäger, Skepticism, Information, and Closure.
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  11. Robert Kirk (1991). Why Shouldn't We Be Able to Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Analysis 51 (January):17-23.
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  12. Eric Russert Kraemer (2006). Moral Mysterianism. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):69-77.
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  13. Marc F. Krellenstein (1995). Unsolvable Problems, Visual Imagery, and Explanatory Satisfaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (3):235-54.
    It has been suggested that certain problems may be unsolvable because of the mind's cognitive structure, but we may wonder what problems, and exactly why. The ultimate origin of the universe and the mind-body problem seem to be two such problems. As to why, Colin McGinn has argued that the mind-body problem is unsolvable because any theoretical concepts about the brain will be observation-based and unable to connect to unobservable subjective experience. McGinn's argument suggests a requirement of imagability -- an (...)
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  14. Uriah Kriegel (2004). The New Mysterianism and the Thesis of Cognitive Closure. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):177-191.
    The paper discusses Colin McGinn’s mysterianist approach to the phenomenon of consciousness. According to McGinn, consciousness is, in and of itself, a fully natural phenomenon, but we humans are just cognitively closed to it, meaning that we cannot in principle understand its nature. I argue that, on a proper conception of the relation between an intellectual problem and its solution, we may well not know what the solution is to a problem we understand, or we may not understand exactly what (...)
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  15. Andr Kukla (1995). Mystery, Mind, and Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):255-64.
    McGinn claims that (1) there is nothing “inherently mysterious” about consciousness, even though (2) we will never be able to understand it. The first claim is no more than a rhetorical flourish. The second may be read either as a claim (1) that we are unable to construct an explanatory theory of consciousness, or (2) that any such theory must strike us as unintelligible, in the sense in which quantum mechanics is sometimes said to be unintelligible. On the first reading, (...)
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  16. Napoleon M. Mabaquiao (2012). Mind, Science and Computation. De La Salle University Publishing House.
    This book is about the relation among the concepts of mind, science, and computation. From the standpoint of cognitive science—the interdisciplinary scientific study of the mind—the working hypothesis for this relation is that the key to a scientific understanding of the mind is the concept of computation, which is just another way of putting the view that the way to naturalize the mind is through the computational framework. In particular, this book assesses the validity of the said hypothesis. The book (...)
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  17. Tom McClelland (2012). Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Dissertation, Sussex
    This thesis introduces the Problem of Consciousness as an antinomy between Physicalism and Primitivism about the phenomenal. I argue that Primitivism is implausible, but is supported by two conceptual gaps. The ‘–tivity gap’ holds that physical states are objective and phenomenal states are subjective, and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ holds that physical properties are extrinsic and phenomenal qualities are intrinsic, and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the (...)
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  18. Richard McDonough (1992). The Last Stand of Mechanism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 6 (3):206-25.
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  19. Colin McGinn (2003). What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):148-62.
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  20. Colin McGinn (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. Basic Books.
    One of our most original thinkers addresses the scientific world's premier question: What is the nature of consciousness?
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  21. Colin McGinn (1995). Consciousness and Space. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. 220-230.
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  22. Colin McGinn (1993). Problems in Philosophy. Blackwell.
    This advanced introductory text offers a synoptic view of philosophical inquiry, discussing such topics as consciousness, the self, meaning, free will, the a ...
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  23. Colin McGinn (1991). Consciousness and the Natural Order. In The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  24. Colin McGinn (1991). The Hidden Structure of Consciousness. In The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  25. Colin McGinn (1991). The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution. Blackwell.
    This book argues that we are not equipped to understand the workings of conciousness, despite its objective naturalness.
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  26. Colin McGinn (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66.
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  27. Jason L. Megill (2005). Locke's Mysterianism: On the Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem. Locke Studies 5:119-147.
  28. Bernard Molyneux (2011). On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.
    I show that the recursive structure of Leibniz's Law requires agents to perform infinitely many operations to psychologically identify the referents of phenomenal and physical concepts, even though the referents of ordinary concepts (e.g. Hesperus and Phosphorus) can be identified in a finite number of steps. The resulting problem resembles the hard problem of consciousness in the fact that it appears (and indeed is) unsolvable by anyone for whom it arises, and in the fact that it invites dualist and eliminativist (...)
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  29. Peter Murphy (2006). A Strategy for Assessing Closure (Epistemic Closure Principle). Erkenntnis 65 (3):365-383.
    This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument (...)
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  30. P. (2005). Mysteries and Scandals: Transcendental Naturalism and the Future of Philosophy. Critica 37 (110):35-52.
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  31. Diana I. Pérez (2005). Mysteries and Scandals. Transcendental Naturalism and the Future of Philosophy (Misterios y Escándalos. El Naturalismo Trascendental y Elfuturo de Lafilosofía). Crítica 37 (110):35 - 52.
    In this paper I shall discuss McGinn's transcendental naturalism (TN) and the reasons he gives in order to show that philosophy will always be just a cluster of mysteries without answers. I shall show that the three main arguments he gives for TN are inconclusive and that a modular architecture of the mind he presupposes is not committed to the epistemic thesis of TN, the idea that we are "cognitively closed" to answering some questions about consciousness, meaning, knowledge and the (...)
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  32. Mark Rowlands (2007). Mysterianism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 335--345.
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  33. Mark Sacks (1994). Cognitive Closure and the Limits of Understanding. Ratio 7 (1):26-42.
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  34. Basil Smith (2012). A Dialogue on Consciousness, by Torin Alter and Robert Howell. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):247-252.
  35. Charles Taliaferro (1999). Mysterious Flames in Philosophy of Mind. Philosophia Christi 1 (2):21-31.
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  36. C. H. Whitely (1990). McGinn on the Mind-Body Problem. Mind 99 (394):289.
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  37. Sara Worley (2000). What is Property P, Anyway? Analysis 60 (1):58-62.
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