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Summary The ethical implications of cognitive enhancement are an area of substantial interest and controversy in biomedical ethics and neuroethics. Unlike genetic enhancement, where the debate remains largely speculative and anticipatory, purported cognitive enhancement via pharmacological means is already widely practiced. It remains controversial whether the desired effect of enhancement is achieved by the use of drugs like modfinil and methylphenidate. Among the primary ethical controversies with cognitive enhancement are concerns about personal identity and authenticity, stemming from the central and constitutive role of the mind and cognition in the self. Other issues include: safety concerns about psychostimulant pharmaceutical use without medical need, the possibility that cognitive enhancement is "cheating" and results in competitive advantage for enhanced individuals, implicit or explicit coercion, military use (reducing fatigue and enhancing alertness in warfighters, and "erasing" memories in PTSD), and moral enhancement.
Key works The ethical issues with cognitive enhancement tend to converge around two central themes: moral enhancement and authenticity of self. Persson&Savulescu argue for moral enhancement via cognitive enhancement as a moral imperative (Persson & Savulescu 2008Persson & Savulescu 2013), while Wolfendale argues for moral responsibility in the use of enhancement in the military (Wolfendale 2008). Goodman (Goodman 2010) addresses a central conceptual distinction in the authenticity/cheating debate: whether results or process matters more, i.e. if the ends are desirable, does it matter what means are used to achieve those ends? DeGrazia considers a similar theme in his discussion of authenticity and identity (Degrazia 2005), as does Levy, who argues that the authenticity of the self might itself be enhanced through pharmacological means (Levy 2011).
Introductions Illes & Sahakian 2011 Glannon 2008 Bostrom 2009 Turner & Sahakian 2006
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  1. J. M. Appel (2008). When the Boss Turns Pusher: A Proposal for Employee Protections in the Age of Cosmetic Neurology. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (8):616-618.
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  2. Natalie Ball & Gregor Wolbring (2014). Cognitive Enhancement: Perceptions Among Parents of Children with Disabilities. Neuroethics 7 (3):345-364.
    Cognitive enhancement is an increasingly discussed topic and policy suggestions have been put forward. We present here empirical data of views of parents of children with and without cognitive disabilities. Analysis of the interviews revealed six primary overarching themes: meanings of health and treatment; the role of medicine; harm; the ‘good’ parent; normality and self-perception; and ability. Interestingly none of the parents used the term ethics and only one parent used the term moral twice.
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  3. John Basl (2010). State Neutrality and the Ethics of Human Enhancement Technologies. AJOB 1 (2):41-48.
    Robust technological enhancement of core cognitive capacities is now a realistic possibility. From the perspective of neutralism, the view that justifications for public policy should be neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good, only members of a subset of the ethical concerns serve as legitimate justifications for public policy regarding robust technological enhancement. This paper provides a framework for the legitimate use of ethical concerns in justifying public policy decisions regarding these enhancement technologies by evaluating the ethical concerns that arise (...)
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  4. Stephanie Bell, Brad Partridge, Jayne Lucke & Wayne Hall (2013). Australian University Students' Attitudes Towards the Acceptability and Regulation of Pharmaceuticals to Improve Academic Performance. Neuroethics 6 (1):197-205.
    There is currently little empirical information about attitudes towards cognitive enhancement - the use of pharmaceutical drugs to enhance normal brain functioning. It is claimed this behaviour most commonly occurs in students to aid studying. We undertook a qualitative assessment of attitudes towards cognitive enhancement by conducting 19 semi-structured interviews with Australian university students. Most students considered cognitive enhancement to be unacceptable, in part because they believed it to be unethical but there was a lack of consensus on whether it (...)
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  5. Francois Berger, Sjef Gevers, Ludwig Siep & Klaus-Michael Weltring (2008). Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Brain-Implants Using Nano-Scale Materials and Techniques. NanoEthics 2 (3):241-249.
    Nanotechnology is an important platform technology which will add new features like improved biocompatibility, smaller size, and more sophisticated electronics to neuro-implants improving their therapeutic potential. Especially in view of possible advantages for patients, research and development of nanotechnologically improved neuro implants is a moral obligation. However, the development of brain implants by itself touches many ethical, social and legal issues, which also apply in a specific way to devices enabled or improved by nanotechnology. For researchers developing nanotechnology such issues (...)
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  6. Ineke Bolt & Maartje Schermer (2009). Psychopharmaceutical Enhancers: Enhancing Identity? Neuroethics 2 (2):103-111.
    The use of psychopharmaceuticals to enhance human mental functioning such as cognition and mood has raised a debate on questions regarding identity and authenticity. While some hold that psychopharmaceutical substances can help users to ‘become who they really are’ and thus strengthen their identity and authenticity, others believe that the substances will lead to inauthenticity, normalization, and socially-enforced adaptation of behaviour and personality. In light of this debate, we studied how persons who actually have experience with the use of psychopharmaceutical (...)
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  7. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Do We Have an Obligation to Make Smarter Babies? In T. Takala, P. Herrisone-Kelly & S. Holm (eds.), Cutting Through the Surface. Philosophical Approaches to Bioethics. Rodopi.
    In this paper I consider some issues concerning cognitive enhancements and the ethics of enhancing in reproduction and parenting. I argue that there are moral reasons to enhance the cognitive capacities of the children one has, or of the children one is going to have, and that these enhancements should not be seen as an alternative to pursuing important changes in society that might also improve one’s own and one’s children’s life. It has been argued that an emphasis on enhancing (...)
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  8. Lisa Bortolotti & John Harris (2006). Disability, Enhancement and the Harm -Benefit Continuum. In John R. Spencer & Antje Du Bois-Pedain (eds.), Freedom and Responsibility in Reproductive Choice. Hart Publishers.
    Suppose that you are soon to be a parent and you learn that there are some simple measures that you can take to make sure that your child will be healthy. In particular, suppose that by following the doctor’s advice, you can prevent your child from having a disability, you can make your child immune from a number of dangerous diseases and you can even enhance its future intelligence. All that is required for this to happen is that you (or (...)
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  9. J. Bossaer, J. A. Gray, S. E. Miller, V. C. Gaddipati, R. E. Enck & G. G. Enck (2013). The Use (and Misuse) of 'Cognitive Enhancers' by Students at an Academic Health Sciences Center. Academic Medicine (7):967-971.
    Purpose Prescription stimulant use as “cognitive enhancers” has been described among undergraduate college students. However, the use of prescription stimulants among future health care professionals is not well characterized. This study was designed to determine the prevalence of prescription stimulant misuse among students at an academic health sciences center. -/- Method Electronic surveys were e-mailed to 621 medical, pharmacy, and respiratory therapy students at East Tennessee State University for four consecutive weeks in fall 2011. Completing the survey was voluntary and (...)
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  10. Nick Bostrom (forthcoming). Smart Policy: Cognitive Enhancement and the Public Interest. In Julian Savulescu, Ruud ter Muelen & Guy Kahane (eds.), Enhancing Human Capabilities. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Cognitive enhancement may be defined as the amplification or extension of core capacities of the mind through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing systems. Cognition refers to the processes an organism uses to organize information. These include acquiring information (perception), selecting (attention), representing (understanding) and retaining (memory) information, and using it to guide behavior (reasoning and coordination of motor outputs). Interventions to improve cognitive function may be directed at any of these core faculties.
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  11. Nick Bostrom (2009). Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 15 (3):311-341.
    Cognitive enhancement takes many and diverse forms. Various methods of cognitive enhancement have implications for the near future. At the same time, these technologies raise a range of ethical issues. For example, they interact with notions of authenticity, the good life, and the role of medicine in our lives. Present and anticipated methods for cognitive enhancement also create challenges for public policy and regulation.
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  12. Nick Bostrom & Toby Ord (2006). The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics. Ethics 116 (4):656-679.
    Suppose that we develop a medically safe and affordable means of enhancing human intelligence. For concreteness, we shall assume that the technology is genetic engineering (either somatic or germ line), although the argument we will present does not depend on the technological implementation. For simplicity, we shall speak of enhancing “intelligence” or “cognitive capacity,” but we do not presuppose that intelligence is best conceived of as a unitary attribute. Our considerations could be applied to specific cognitive abilities such as verbal (...)
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  13. Nick Bostrom & Toby Ord (2006). The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics. Ethics 116 (4):656-679.
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  14. Jan Christoph Bublitz & Reinhard Merkel (2009). Autonomy and Authenticity of Enhanced Personality Traits. Bioethics 23 (6):360-374.
    There is concern that the use of neuroenhancements to alter character traits undermines consumer's authenticity. But the meaning, scope and value of authenticity remain vague. However, the majority of contemporary autonomy accounts ground individual autonomy on a notion of authenticity. So if neuroenhancements diminish an agent's authenticity, they may undermine his autonomy. This paper clarifies the relation between autonomy, authenticity and possible threats by neuroenhancements. We present six neuroenhancement scenarios and analyse how autonomy accounts evaluate them. Some cases are considered (...)
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  15. Tom Buller (2013). Neurotechnology, Invasiveness and the Extended Mind. Neuroethics 6 (3):593-605.
    According to a standard view, the physical boundary of the person—the skin-and-skull boundary—matters morally because this boundary delineates between where the person begins and the world ends. On the basis of this view we make a distinction between invasive interventions that penetrate this boundary and non-invasive interventions that do not. The development of neuroprosthetics, however, raises questions about the significance of this boundary and the relationship between person and body. In particular it has been argued by appeal to the Extended (...)
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  16. Benjamin Capps (2011). Libertarianism, Legitimation, and the Problems of Regulating Cognition-Enhancing Drugs. Neuroethics 4 (2):119-128.
    Some libertarians tend to advocate the wide availability of cognition-enhancing drugs beyond their current prescription-only status. They suggest that certain kinds of drugs can be a component of a prudential conception of the ‘good life’—they enhance our opportunities and preferences; and therefore, if a person freely chooses to use them, then there is no justification for the kind of prejudicial, authoritative restrictions that are currently deployed in public policy. In particular, this libertarian idea signifies that if enhancements are a prudential (...)
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  17. J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (2014). On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson. Bioethics 28 (1).
    In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio-enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bio-enhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This article aims to show that the proposal Savulescu and Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of (...)
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  18. Jens Clausen (2013). Bonding Brains to Machines: Ethical Implications of Electroceuticals for the Human Brain. Neuroethics 6 (3):429-434.
    Novel neurotechnologies like deep brain stimulation and brain-computer interfaces promise clinical benefits for severely suffering patients. Nevertheless, such electroceuticals raise several ethical issues on different levels: while on the level of clinical neuroethics issues with direct relevance for diagnosis and treatment have to be discussed, on the level of research neuroethics questions regarding research and development of these technological devices like investigating new targets and different diseases as well as thorough inclusion criteria are dealt with. On the level of theoretical (...)
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  19. Anthony Mark Cutter & Bert Gordijn (2007). Questions of Human Enhancement: An Editorial. Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 1 (1).
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  20. John Danaher (2014). Hyperagency and the Good Life – Does Extreme Enhancement Threaten Meaning? Neuroethics 7 (2):227-242.
    According to several authors, the enhancement project incorporates a quest for hyperagency - i.e. a state of affairs in which virtually every constitutive aspect of agency (beliefs, desires, moods, dispositions and so forth) is subject to our control and manipulation. This quest, it is claimed, undermines the conditions for a meaningful and worthwhile life. Thus, the enhancement project ought to be forestalled or rejected. How credible is this objection? In this article, I argue: “not very”. I do so by evaluating (...)
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  21. Valérie De Prycker (2007). Critical Remarks on Shortcuts to Happiness: The Relevance of Effort and Pain. Philosophica 79.
    This paper discloses and questions two assumptions on happiness that are implied by medical and technological proposals for mood enhancement. The first assumption holds that happiness consists of the indiscriminate maximization of positive and minimization of negative emotions. Second, mood enhancement implies the belief that an effortless enhancement of positive emotions will increase happiness. These assumptions are questioned by investigating the validity of the common sense slogan ‘No pain, no gain’. Support for this claim is found in literature on adversity (...)
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  22. Dirk de Ridder (2007). Brain and Nerve Stimulation for Mood Enhancement. Philosophica 79:11-24.
    Enhancing brain activity and function is a very ancient practice which is usually accomplished by taking illegal drugs. Prescription medication is becoming more commonly used as a means of enhancing mood, and recently, it has become possible to modulate mood by applying magnetic (TMS) or electrical current to the brain (tDCS, implanted electrodes) or by training the brain to work at predetermined oscillations (neurofeedback). A summary of the available neuromodulation techniques will be presented associated with data from human subjects implanted (...)
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  23. Richard H. Dees (2007). Better Brains, Better Selves? The Ethics of Neuroenhancements. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 17 (4):371-395.
    : The idea of enhancing our mental functions through medical means makes many people uncomfortable. People have a vague feeling that altering our brains tinkers with the core of our personalities and the core of ourselves. It changes who we are, and doing so seems wrong, even if the exact reasons for the unease are difficult to define. Many of the standard arguments against neuroenhancements—that they are unsafe, that they violate the distinction between therapy and enhancements, that they undermine equality, (...)
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  24. D. DeGrazia (2014). Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and What We (Should) Value in Moral Behaviour. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (6):361-368.
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  25. Candice Delmas (2012). Enhancing Human Capacities – Edited by J. Savulescu, R. Ter Meulen & G. Kahane. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (2):162-165.
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  26. Joseph P. DeMarco & Paul J. Ford (2014). Neuroethics and the Ethical Parity Principle. Neuroethics 7 (3):317-325.
    Neil Levy offers the most prominent moral principles that are specifically and exclusively designed to apply to neuroethics. His two closely related principles, labeled as versions of the ethical parity principle (EPP), are intended to resolve moral concerns about neurological modification and enhancement [1]. Though EPP is appealing and potentially illuminating, we reject the first version and substantially modify the second. Since his first principle, called EPP (strong), is dependent on the contention that the mind literally extends into external props (...)
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  27. Thomas Douglas (2014). Enhancing Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth. Neuroethics 7 (1):75-91.
    It is plausible that we have moral reasons to become better at conforming to our moral reasons. However, it is not always clear what means to greater moral conformity we should adopt. John Harris has recently argued that we have reason to adopt traditional, deliberative means in preference to means that alter our affective or conative states directly—that is, without engaging our deliberative faculties. One of Harris’ concerns about direct means is that they would produce only a superficial kind of (...)
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  28. Thomas Douglas (2013). Moral Enhancement Via Direct Emotion Modulation: A Reply to John Harris. Bioethics 27 (3):160-168.
    Some argue that humans should enhance their moral capacities by adopting institutions that facilitate morally good motives and behaviour. I have defended a parallel claim: that we could permissibly use biomedical technologies to enhance our moral capacities, for example by attenuating certain counter-moral emotions. John Harris has recently responded to my argument by raising three concerns about the direct modulation of emotions as a means to moral enhancement. He argues (1) that such means will be relatively ineffective in bringing about (...)
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  29. Thomas Douglas (2008). Moral Enhancement. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):228-245.
    Opponents of biomedical enhancement often claim that, even if such enhancement would benefit the enhanced, it would harm others. But this objection looks unpersuasive when the enhancement in question is a moral enhancement — an enhancement that will expectably leave the enhanced person with morally better motives than she had previously. In this article I (1) describe one type of psychological alteration that would plausibly qualify as a moral enhancement, (2) argue that we will, in the medium-term future, probably be (...)
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  30. Martin Dresler, Anders Sandberg, Kathrin Ohla, Chris Bublitz, Carlos Trenado, Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz, Simone Kühn & Dimitris Repantis (2013). Non-Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement. Neuropharmacology 64:529-543.
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  31. Veljko Dubljević (2013). Cognitive Enhancement, Rational Choice and Justification. Neuroethics 6 (1):179-187.
    This paper examines the claims in the debate on cognitive enhancement in neuroethics that society wide pressure to enhance can be expected in the near future. The author uses rational choice modeling to test these claims and proceeds with the analysis of proposed types of solutions. The discourage use, laissez-faire and prohibition types of policy are scrutinized for effectiveness, legitimacy and associated costs. Special attention is given to the moderately liberal discourage use policy (and the gate-keeper and taxation approaches within (...)
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  32. Veljko Dubljević, Sebastian Sattler & Éric Racine (forthcoming). Cognitive Enhancement and Academic Misconduct: A Study Exploring Their Frequency and Relationship. Ethics and Behavior:131202143002003.
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  33. Hans-Joerg Ehni & Diana Aurenque (2012). On Moral Enhancement From a Habermasian Perspective. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21 (02):223-234.
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  34. Gavin Enck (2013). Pharmaceutically Enhancing Medical Professionals for Difficult Conversations. Journal of Evolution and Technology 23 (1).
    Conducting “difficult conversations” with patients and caregivers is one of the most difficult aspects of the medical profession. These conversations can involve communicating a terminal prognosis, advance care planning, or changing the goals of treatment. Although they are challenging, the need for these conversations is underwritten by the tenets of medical ethics. Unfortunately, medical professionals lack adequate training in communication skills and overestimate their abilities in conducting difficult conversations. I suggest that one way to improve that ability would be the (...)
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  35. Gavin G. Enck (2013). Ideals of Student Excellence and Enhancement. Neuroethics 6 (1):155-164.
    Discussions about the permissibility of students using enhancements in education are often framed by the question, “Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs cheating?” While the question of cheating is interesting, it is but only one question concerning the permissibility of enhancement in education. Another interesting question is, “What kinds of students do we want in our academic institutions?” I suggest that one plausible answer to this question concerns the ideals of human excellence or virtues. The students we want in (...)
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  36. Alexandre Erler (2011). Does Memory Modification Threaten Our Authenticity? Neuroethics 4 (3):235-249.
    One objection to enhancement technologies is that they might lead us to live inauthentic lives. Memory modification technologies (MMTs) raise this worry in a particularly acute manner. In this paper I describe four scenarios where the use of MMTs might be said to lead to an inauthentic life. I then undertake to justify that judgment. I review the main existing accounts of authenticity, and present my own version of what I call a “true self” account (intended as a complement, rather (...)
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  37. Colin Farrelly, Preparing for Our Enhanced Future.
    (forthcoming) Journal of Medical Licensure and Discipline. Rapid advances in human genetics raise the prospect that one day we may be able to develop genetic enhancements to promote a diverse range of phenotypes (e.g. health, intelligence, behaviour, etc.). Perhaps the biggest challenge that genetic enhancements pose for medical practitioners is that they will compel us to re-think a good deal of the conventional wisdom of the status quo. Radical enhancements are likely to have this affect for a variety of reasons. (...)
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  38. Halley S. Faust (2008). Should We Select for Genetic Moral Enhancement? A Thought Experiment Using the Moralkinder (Mk+) Haplotype. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (6):397-416.
    By using preimplantation haplotype diagnosis, prospective parents are able to select embryos to implant through in vitro fertilization. If we knew that the naturally-occurring (but theoretical) MoralKinder (MK+) haplotype would predispose individuals to a higher level of morality than average, is it permissible or obligatory to select for the MK+ haplotype? I.e., is it moral to select for morality? This paper explores the various potential issues that could arise from genetic moral enhancement.
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  39. Andrew Fenton (2009). Buddhism and Neuroethics: The Ethics of Pharmaceutical Cognitive Enhancement. Developing World Bioethics 9 (2):47-56.
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  40. Andrew Fenton (2008). Merkel, R. Et Al. 2007. Intervening in the Brain: Changing Psyche and Society. New York: Springer: A Review. Neuroethics 1 (3):213-215.
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  41. Andrew Fenton & Sheri Alpert (2008). Extending Our View on Using BCIs for Locked-in Syndrome. Neuroethics 1 (2):119-132.
    Locked-in syndrome (LIS) is a severe neurological condition that typically leaves a patient unable to move, talk and, in many cases, initiate communication. Brain Computer Interfaces (or BCIs) promise to enable individuals with conditions like LIS to re-engage with their physical and social worlds. In this paper we will use extended mind theory to offer a way of seeing the potential of BCIs when attached to, or implanted in, individuals with LIS. In particular, we will contend that functionally integrated BCIs (...)
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  42. Arianna Ferrari, Christopher Coenen & Armin Grunwald (2012). Visions and Ethics in Current Discourse on Human Enhancement. NanoEthics 6 (3):215-229.
    Since it is now broadly acknowledged that ethics should receive early consideration in discourse on emerging technologies, ethical debates tend to flourish even while new fields of technology are still in their infancy. Such debates often liberally mix existing applications with technologies in the pipeline and far-reaching visions. This paper analyses the problems associated with this use of ethics as “preparatory” research, taking discourse on human enhancement in general and on pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement in particular as an example. The paper (...)
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  43. Nicholas S. Fitz, Roland Nadler, Praveena Manogaran, Eugene W. J. Chong & Peter B. Reiner (2014). Public Attitudes Toward Cognitive Enhancement. Neuroethics 7 (2):173-188.
    Vigorous debate over the moral propriety of cognitive enhancement exists, but the views of the public have been largely absent from the discussion. To address this gap in our knowledge, four experiments were carried out with contrastive vignettes in order to obtain quantitative data on public attitudes towards cognitive enhancement. The data collected suggest that the public is sensitive to and capable of understanding the four cardinal concerns identified by neuroethicists, and tend to cautiously accept cognitive enhancement even as they (...)
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  44. Farah Focquaert (2013). Deep Brain Stimulation in Children: Parental Authority Versus Shared Decision-Making. Neuroethics 6 (3):447-455.
    This paper discusses the use of deep brain stimulation for the treatment of neurological and psychiatric disorders in children. At present, deep brain stimulation is used to treat movement disorders in children and a few cases of deep brain stimulation for psychiatric disorders in adolescents have been reported. Ethical guidelines on the use of deep brain stimulation in children are therefore urgently needed. This paper focuses on the decision-making process, and provides an ethical framework for (future) treatment decisions in pediatric (...)
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  45. Paul J. Ford (2006). Advancing From Treatment to Enhancement in Deep Brain Stimulation: A Question of Research Ethics. The Pluralist 1 (2):35 - 44.
  46. Cynthia Forlini & Eric Racine (2009). Autonomy and Coercion in Academic “Cognitive Enhancement” Using Methylphenidate: Perspectives of Key Stakeholders. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 2 (3):163-177.
    There is mounting evidence that methylphenidate (MPH; Ritalin) is being used by healthy college students to improve concentration, alertness, and academic performance. One of the key concerns associated with such use of pharmaceuticals is the degree of freedom individuals have to engage in or abstain from cognitive enhancement (CE). From a pragmatic perspective, careful examination of the ethics of acts and contexts in which they arise includes considering coercion and social pressures to enhance cognition. We were interested in understanding how (...)
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  47. Barbro Fröding (2010). Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life. Neuroethics 4 (3):1-12.
    This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements (of the kind we have access to today or in the foreseeable future) on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues (...)
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  48. Barbro Elisabeth Esmeralda Fröding (2011). Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life. Neuroethics 4 (3):223-234.
  49. Jakov Gather (2011). The Evaluation of Psychopharmacological Enhancers Beyond a Normative “Natural”–“Artificial” Dichotomy. Medicine Studies 3 (1):19-27.
    The extra-therapeutic use of psychotropic drugs to improve cognition and to enhance mood has been the subject of controversial discussion in bioethics, in medicine but also in public for many years. Concerns over a liberal dealing with pharmacological enhancers are raised not only from a biomedical–pharmacological perspective, but particularly from an ethical one. Within these ethical concerns, there is one objection about the normative differentiation between “natural” and “artificial” enhancers, which is theoretically indeed widely discredited in bioethics, which has, however, (...)
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  50. Frederic Gilbert (2011). Working While Under the Influence of Performance-Enhancing Drugs: Is One “More Responsible”? American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2 (3):57-59.
    The purpose of this commentary is to address an ethical issue introduced by Walter Glannon regarding whether responsibility can be affected by the use of performance enhancing drugs. Glannon uses the example of a surgeon taking drugs to enhance her capacities. I explore whether conducting surgeries while under the influence of performance enhancing drugs will affect the surgeon’s responsibility for performing more surgeries ‘and’ the surgeon’s responsibility for assuming the consequences of performing these surgeries. Here, the ‘and’ is cumulative: one (...)
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