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  1. H. A. Abramson (ed.) (1953). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fourth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.
  2. Igor L. Aleksander (2007). Why Axiomatic Models of Being Conscious? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):15-27.
    This paper looks closely at previously enunciated axioms that specifically include phenomenology as the sense of a self in a perceptual world. This, we suggest, is an appropriate way of doing science on a first-person phenomenon. The axioms break consciousness down into five key components: presence, imagination, attention, volition and emotions. The paper examines anew the mechanism of each and how they interact to give a single sensation. An abstract architecture, the Kernel Architecture, is introduced as a starting point for (...)
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  3. Igor Aleksander & Helen Morton (2007). Depictive Architectures for Synthetic Phenomenology. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic. 67-81.
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  4. H. B., R. D. & J. M. (2003). Part-List Reexposure and Release of Retrieval Inhibition. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):354-375.
    In list-method directed forgetting, reexposure to forgotten List 1 items has been shown to reduce directed forgetting. proposed that reexposure to a few List 1 items only during a direct test of memory reinstates the entire List 1 episode. In the present experiments, part-list reexposure in the context of indirect as well as direct memory tests reduced directed forgetting. Directed forgetting was reduced when 50% or more of the items were reexposed, and was intact when only 25% were reexposed. Furthermore, (...)
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  5. Bernard J. Baars (2007). The Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 236--246.
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  6. Bernard J. Baars (2006). Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Experience? In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
  7. Bernard J. Baars (2002). The Conscious Access Hypothesis: Origins and Recent Evidence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):47-52.
  8. Bernard J. Baars (1998). Metaphors of Consciousness and Attention in the Brain. Trends in Neurosciences 21:58-62.
  9. Bernard J. Baars (1997). In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. Oxford University Press.
    The study of conscious experience has seen remarkable strides in the last ten years, reflecting important technological breakthroughs and the enormous efforts of researchers in disciplines as varied as neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy. Although still embroiled in debate, scientists are now beginning to find common ground in their understanding of consciousness, which may pave the way for a unified explanation of how and why we experience and understand the world around us. Written by eminent psychologist Bernard J. Baars, Inside (...)
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  10. Bernard J. Baars (1997). In the Theatre of Consciousness: Global Workspace Theory, a Rigorous Scientific Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):292-309.
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  11. Bernard J. Baars (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as (...)
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  12. Bernard J. Baars (1983). Conscious Contents Provide the Nervous System with Coherent, Global Information. In Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Plenum. 41--79.
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  13. Bernard J. Baars, M. R. Fehling, M. LaPolla & Katharine A. McGovern (1997). Consciousness Creates Access: Conscious Goal Images Recruit Unconscious Action Routines, but Goal Competition Serves to "Liberate" Such Routines, Causing Predictable Slips. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.
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  14. Bernard J. Baars, Thomas Zoega Ramsoy & Steven Laureys (2003). Brain, Conscious Experience, and the Observing Self. Trends in Neurosciences 26 (12):671-5.
    Conscious perception, like the sight of a coffee cup, seems to involve the brain identifying a stimulus. But conscious input activates more brain regions than are needed to identify coffee cups and faces. It spreads beyond sensory cortex to frontoparietal association areas, which do not serve stimulus identification as such. What is the role of those regions? Parietal cortex support the ‘first person perspective’ on the visual world, unconsciously framing the visual object stream. Some prefrontal areas select and interpret conscious (...)
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  15. William P. Banks (1996). Introduction: Implicit Memory, Part 2. Consciousness and Cognition 5 (1-2):1-.
  16. John Barresi & John R. Christie (2002). Consciousness and Information Processing: A Reply to Durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.
    Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which (...)
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  17. William P. Bechtel (1995). Consciousness: Perspectives From Symbolic and Connectionist AI. Neuropsychologia.
    For many people, consciousness is one of the defining characteristics of mental states. Thus, it is quite surprising that consciousness has, until quite recently, had very little role to play in the cognitive sciences. Three very popular multi-authored overviews of cognitive science, Stillings et al. [33], Posner [26], and Osherson et al. [25], do not have a single reference to consciousness in their indexes. One reason this seems surprising is that the cognitive revolution was, in large part, a repudiation of (...)
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  18. Ned Block (forthcoming). Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual Clarity. In Gary Marcus & Jeremy Freeman (eds.), in The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists. Princeton University Press.
  19. R. A. Brown (1997). Consciousness in a Self-Learning, Memory-Controlled, Compound Machine. Neural Networks 10:1333-85.
  20. C. Browne, Robert W. Evans, N. Sales & Igor L. Aleksander (1997). Consciousness and Neural Cognizers: A Review of Some Recent Approaches. [REVIEW] Neural Networks 10:1303-1316.
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  21. Arthur W. Burks (1986). An Architectural Theory of Functional Consciousness. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Current Issues in Teleology. University Press of America.
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  22. M. V. Butz (2008). How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self. Constructivist Foundations 4 (1):1-37.
    Purpose: Constructivism postulates that the perceived reality is a complex construct formed during development. Depending on the particular school, these inner constructs take on different forms and structures and affect cognition in different ways. The purpose of this article is to address the questions of how and, even more importantly, why we form such inner constructs. Approach: This article proposes that brain development is controlled by an inherent anticipatory drive, which biases learning towards the formation of forward predictive structures and (...)
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  23. M. Cabanac (1996). On the Origin of Consciousness, a Postulate, and its Corollary. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 20:33-40.
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  24. William H. Calvin (1998). Competing for Consciousness: A Darwinian Mechanism at an Appropriate Level of Explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):389-404.
    Treating consciousness as awareness or attention greatly underestimates it, ignoring the temporary levels of organization associated with higher intellectual function (syntax, planning, logic, music). The tasks that require consciousness tend to be the ones that demand a lot of resources. Routine tasks can be handled on the back burner but dealing with ambiguity, groping around offline, generating creative choices, and performing precision movements may temporarily require substantial allocations of neocortex. Here I will attempt to clarify the appropriate levels of explanation (...)
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  25. Philip Cam (1989). Notes Toward a Faculty Theory of Cognitive Consciousness. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer. 167--191.
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  26. Maurizio Cardaci, Antonella D'Amico & Barbara Caci (2007). The Social Cognitive Theory: A New Framework for Implementing Artificial Consciousness. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic. 116-123.
  27. T. H. Carr (1979). Consciousness in Models of Human Information Processing: Primary Memory, Executive Control, and Input Regulation. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 1. Academic Press.
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  28. Glenn Carruthers (2013). Toward a Cognitive Model of the Sense of Embodiment in a (Rubber) Hand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3 - 4.
    The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the experience of touch coming from that artificial body part. An explanation of this illusion would take significant steps towards explaining the experience of embodiment in one’s own body. I present a new cognitive model to explain the RHI. I argue that the sense of embodiment arises when an on-line representation of the candidate body part is represented as matching an (...)
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  29. Fu Chang, A Theory of Consciousness.
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  30. Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (2007). Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
  31. Morten H. Christiansen, Christopher M. Conway & Michelle R. Ellefson (2002). Raising the Bar for Connectionist Modeling of Cognitive Developmental Disorders. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):752-753.
    Cognitive developmental disorders cannot be properly understood without due attention to the developmental process, and we commend the authors’simulations in this regard. We note the contribution of these simulations to the nascent field of connectionist modeling of developmental disorders and outline a set of criteria for assessing individual models in the hope of furthering future modeling efforts.
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  32. Guy Claxton (1996). Structure, Strategy and Self in the Fabrication of Conscious Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (2):98-111.
  33. Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.) (1997). Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  34. N. D. Cook (1999). Simulating Consciousness in a Bilateral Neural Network: ''Nuclear'' and ''Fringe'' Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):62-93.
    A technique for the bilateral activation of neural nets that leads to a functional asymmetry of two simulated ''cerebral hemispheres'' is described. The simulation is designed to perform object recognition, while exhibiting characteristics typical of human consciousness-specifically, the unitary nature of conscious attention, together with a dual awareness corresponding to the ''nucleus'' and ''fringe'' described by William James (1890). Sensory neural nets self-organize on the basis of five sensory features. The system is then taught arbitrary symbolic labels for a small (...)
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  35. Roberto Cordeschi, Guglielmo Tamburrini & Giuseppe Trautteur (1999). The Notion of Loop in the Study of Consciousness. In Proceedings of the International School of Biocybernetics. World Scientific.
    The notion of loop seems to be ubiquitous in the study of organisms, the human mind and symbolic systems. With the possible exception of quantum-mechanical approaches, the treatments of consciousness we are acquainted with crucially appeal to the concept of loop. The uses of loops in this context fall within two broad classes. In the first one, loops are used to express the control of the organism’s interaction with the environment; in the second one, they are used to express self-reference. (...)
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  36. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (1997). Navigation, Consciousness and the Body/Mind "Problem". Psyke and Logos 18:337-341.
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  37. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (1997). On the Mechanism of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):231-48.
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  38. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (1996). Prediction and Internal Feedback in Conscious Perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):245-66.
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  39. L. Andrew Coward & Ron Sun (2004). Criteria for an Effective Theory of Consciousness and Some Preliminary Attempts. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):268-301.
    In the physical sciences a rigorous theory is a hierarchy of descriptions in which causal relationships between many general types of entity at a phenomenological level can be derived from causal relationships between smaller numbers of simpler entities at more detailed levels. The hierarchy of descriptions resembles the modular hierarchy created in electronic systems in order to be able to modify a complex functionality without excessive side effects. Such a hierarchy would make it possible to establish a rigorous scientific theory (...)
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  40. L. Andrew Coward & Ron Sun (2002). Explaining Consciousness at Multiple Levels. In Serge P. Shohov (ed.), Advances in Psychology Research. Nova Science Publishers. 37-71.
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  41. Géry D'Ydewalle (2000). The Case Against a Single Consciousness Center: Much Ado About Nothing? European Psychologist 5 (1):12-13.
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  42. Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.) (1983). Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Plenum.
  43. Helena De Preester & Manos Tsakiris (2009). Body-Extension Versus Body-Incorporation: Is There a Need for a Body-Model? [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):307-319.
    This paper investigates the role of a pre-existing body-model that is an enabling constraint for the incorporation of objects into the body. This body-model is also a basis for the distinction between body extensions (e.g., in the case of tool-use) and incorporation (e.g., in the case of successful prosthesis use). It is argued that, in the case of incorporation, changes in the sense of body-ownership involve a reorganization of the body-model, whereas extension of the body with tools does not involve (...)
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  44. Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2001). A Neuronal Model of a Global Workspace in Effortful Cognitive Tasks. Pnas 95 (24):14529-14534.
  45. D. C. Dennett & C. F. Westbury (1999). Stability is Not Intrinsic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):153-154.
    A pure vehicle theory of the contents of consciousness is not possible. While it is true that hard-wired tacit representations are insufficient as content-vehicles, not all tacit representations are hard-wired. The definition of stability offered for patterns of neural activation is not well-motivated, and too simplistic. We disagree in particular with the assumption that stability within a network is purely intrinsic to that network. Many complex forms of stability within a network are apparent only when interpreted by something external to (...)
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  46. José-Luis Díaz (1997). A Patterned Process Approach to Brain, Consciousness, and Behavior. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):179-195.
    The architecture of brain, consciousness, and behavioral processes is shown to be formally similar in that all three may be conceived and depicted as Petri net patterned processes structured by a series of elements occurring or becoming active in stochastic succession, in parallel, with different rhythms of temporal iteration, and with a distinct qualitative manifestation in the spatiotemporal domain. A patterned process theory is derived from the isomorphic features of the models and contrasted with connectionist, dynamic system notions. This empirically (...)
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  47. Philip Dorrell, Computation Vs. Feelings and the Production/Judgment Model.
    Functional versus Subjective Consciousness The Example of Pain Dieting and Free Will The Production/Judgement Model Judgement is not Reward Feelings are Judgements Low-Bandwidth Channels Candidate Neural Control Channels Timing of Intention and Action Conclusion References Abstract.
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  48. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in resting condition quantitatively (...)
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  49. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2013). Prognostic Value of Resting-State EEG Structure in Disentangling Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: A Preliminary Study. Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair 27 (4):345-354.
    Background: Patients in a vegetative state pose problems in diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. Currently, no prognostic markers predict the chance of recovery, which has serious consequences, especially in end-of-life decision-making. -/- Objective: We aimed to assess an objective measurement of prognosis using advanced electroencephalography (EEG). -/- Methods: EEG data (19 channels) were collected in 14 patients who were diagnosed to be persistently vegetative based on repeated clinical evaluations at 3 months following brain damage. EEG structure parameters (amplitude, duration and variability (...)
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  50. Stan Franklin, Conscious Software: A Computational View of Mind.
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