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  1. Linda Alcoff (1996). Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory. Cornell University Press.
    In provocative readings of major figures in the continental tradition, Alcoff shows that the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Michel Foucault can help rectify key ...
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  2. Amalia Amaya (2013). Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof. Legal Theory 19 (1):1-43.
    The aim of this essay is to develop a coherence theory for the justification of evidentiary judgments in law. The main claim of the coherence theory proposed in this article is that a belief about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is a belief that an epistemically responsible fact finder might hold by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. The article argues that this coherentist approach to evidence and legal proof has the resources to (...)
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  3. Amalia Amaya (2008). Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding. Episteme 5 (3):pp. 306-319.
    This paper argues for a coherentist theory of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law, according to which a hypothesis about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is such that an epistemically responsible fact-finder might have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. It claims that this version of coherentism has the resources to address a main problem facing coherence theories of evidence and legal proof, namely, the problem of the (...)
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  4. Staffan Angere (2007). The Defeasible Nature of Coherentist Justification. Synthese 157 (3):321 - 335.
    The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an (...)
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  5. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2010). Crosswords and Coherence. Review of Metaphysics 63 (4):807-820.
    A common objection to coherentism is that it cannot account for truth: it gives us no reason to prefer a true theory over a false one, if both theories are equally coherent. By extending Susan Haack's crossword metaphor, the authors argue that there could be circumstances under which this objection is untenable. Although these circumstances are remote, they are in full accordance with the most ambitious modern theories in physics. Coherence may perhaps be truth conducive.
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  6. Elvio Baccarini (2009). Moral Epistemological Coherentism, Contextualism, and Consensualism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):69-89.
    The discussion regards moral epistemology as the research of a proper methodology in moral thinking. Coherentism is proposed as the appropriate methodology in the individual context of moral thinking (because of the fact that all the alternatives to coherentism, at least understood as a regulatory ideal, are opposed to rationality), while a qualified form of consensualism is proposed as the appropriate methodology in the context of communitarian or public justification of beliefs.
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  7. Thomas Bartelborth (1999). Coherence and Explanations. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):209-224.
    The article advocates a particular coherence theory of justification that emphasizes the significance of explanatory relations. It is shown that other approaches to coherence have failed because they underestimate the importance of explanatory theories in forming a system of beliefs. Additionally, a conception of explanation as a unifying substantial embedding of models is sketched that closely conforms with the proposed theory of coherence.
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  8. John W. Bender (1992). Unreckoned Misleading Truths and Lehrer's Theory of Undefeated Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:465-481.
    According to Keith Lehrer’s coherence theory, knowledge is true acceptance whose justification is undefeated by a falsehood. It has recently become clear that Lehrer’s handling of important Gettier-inspired problems depends upon his position that only falsehoods accepted by the subject can act as defeaters of knowledge. I argue against this and present an example in which an unreckoned truth---one neither believed nor believed to be false by the subject---defeats knowledge. I trace the negative implications of this matter for the coherence (...)
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  9. Laurence Bonjour (2003). 16. Foundationalism and Coherentism. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. 142.
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  10. Laurence Bonjour (1985). Paul Ziff, Epistemic Analysis: A Coherence Theory of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 5:410-412.
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  11. Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
    1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...
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  12. Yves Bouchard (ed.) (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
  13. Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (2006). An Impossibility Result for Coherence Rankings. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):77-91.
    If we receive information from multiple independent and partially reliable information sources, then whether we are justified to believe these information items is affected by how reliable the sources are, by how well the information coheres with our background beliefs and by how internally coherent the information is. We consider the following question. Is coherence a separable determinant of our degree of belief, i.e. is it the case that the more coherent the new information is, the more justified we are (...)
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  14. Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (2005). Coherence and the Role of Specificity: A Response to Meijs and Douven. Mind 114 (454):365-369.
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  15. Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (2003). Solving the Riddle of Coherence. Mind 112 (448):601-633.
    A coherent story is a story that fits together well. This notion plays a central role in the coherence theory of justification and has been proposed as a criterion for scientific theory choice. Many attempts have been made to give a probabilistic account of this notion. A proper account of coherence must not start from some partial intuitions, but should pay attention to the role that this notion is supposed to play within a particular context. Coherence is a property of (...)
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  16. Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (2003). ``Solving the Riddle of Coherence". Mind 112 (448):601-634.
    A coherent story is a story that fits together well. This notion plays a central role in the coherence theory of justification and has been proposed as a criterion for scientific theory choice. Many attempts have been made to give a probabilistic account of this notion. A proper account of coherence must not start from some partial intuitions, but should pay attention to the role that this notion is supposed to play within a particular context. Coherence is a property of (...)
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  17. Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (2000). Coherence, Belief Expansion and Bayesian Networks. In BaralC (ed.), Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, NMR'2000.
    We construct a probabilistic coherence measure for information sets which determines a partial coherence ordering. This measure is applied in constructing a criterion for expanding our beliefs in the face of new information. A number of idealizations are being made which can be relaxed by an appeal to Bayesian Networks.
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  18. Luc Bovens & EJ Olsson (2000). Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks. Mind 109 (436):685-719.
    The coherentist theory of justification provides a response to the sceptical challenge: even though the independent processes by which we gather information about the world may be of dubious quality, the internal coherence of the information provides the justification for our empirical beliefs. This central canon of the coherence theory of justification is tested within the framework of Bayesian networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. We interpret the independence of the information gathering processes (IGPs) in (...)
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  19. Richard B. Brandt (1964). Epistemic Priority and Coherence: Comments. Journal of Philosophy 61 (19):557-559.
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  20. Elke Brendel (1999). Coherence Theory of Knowledge: A Gradational Account. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):293-307.
    A satisfactory theory of knowledge in which the shortcomings of a pure externalist account are avoided and in which the Gettier problem is solved should consist in a combination of externalist and internalist components. The internalist component should guarantee that the epistemic subject has cognitive access to the justifying grounds of her belief. And the externalist component should guarantee that the justification of her belief does not depend on any false statement. Keith Lehrer's coherence theory of knowledge as undefeated justification (...)
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  21. May Brodbeck (1949). Coherence Theory Reconsidered: Professor Werkmeister on Semantics and on the Nature of Empirical Laws. Philosophy of Science 16 (1):75-85.
    Werkmeister's new book, The Basis and Structure of Knowledge is the second major attempt in recent years to defend the idealistic theory of knowledge. The first was Blanshard's Nature of Thought; and it is worth noticing that both authors, in undertaking the defense of a position long in the shadows, are well aware of contemporary developments in logic and technical philosophy. Werkmeister freely acknowledges his debt to Blanshard; yet his work differs in scope from the latter's in at least two (...)
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  22. Peter Brössel (2008). Theory Assessment and Coherence. Abstracta 4 (1):57-71.
    One of the most important questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science is: what is a good theory and when is a theory better than another theory, given some observational data? The coherentist‟s answer would be the following twofold conjecture: (i) A theory is a good theory given some observational data iff that theory coheres with the observational data and (ii) a theory is better than another theory given some observational data iff the first theory coheres more with the (...)
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  23. Anthony L. Brueckner (1988). Problems with Internalist Coherentism. Philosophical Studies 54 (1):153-160.
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  24. Terry J. Christlieb (1986). Coherence and Truth: BonJour's Metajustification. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):397-413.
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  25. William Cornwell (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Aylmer, Québec: Éditions Du Scribe.
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  26. Jonathan Dancy (1984). On Coherence Theories of Justification: Can an Empiricist Be a Coherentist? American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (4):359 - 365.
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  27. Paul Davis (1993). Drearning On: Malcolm and the Coherence Principle. Cogito 7 (2):135-140.
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  28. Wayne A. Davis & John W. Bender (1989). Technical Flaws in the Coherence Theory. Synthese 79 (2):257 - 278.
    We have argued that Lehrer's definitions of coherence and justification have serious technical defects. As a result, the definition of justification is both too weak and too strong. We have suggested solutions for some of the problems, but others seem irremediable. We would also argue more generally that if coherence is anything like what Lehrer's theory says it is, then coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. While our current objections are directed at the ‘letter’ of Lehrer's theory, other (...)
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  29. K. Daya (1960). Types of Coherence. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):193-204.
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  30. Fred Dretske (1989). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. International Studies in Philosophy 21 (3):101-102.
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  31. Jane Duran (2000). A Problem Taken From Bonjour's Coherentism. Idealistic Studies 30 (1):1-6.
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  32. Jane Duran (1993). Naturalizing Lehrer's Coherentism. Philosophical Papers 22 (3):199-213.
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  33. The Editor (1908). Immediacy, Mediacy and Coherence. Mind 17 (1):20-47.
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  34. Dieter Freundlieb (2003). The Myth of the Given, Coherentism, and the Justification of Empirical Knowledge Claims. Idealistic Studies 33 (1):39-56.
    In this paper I make some critical comments on John McDowell’s Mind and World and offer suggestions as to how it might be possible to solve John McDowell’s problem of finding a safe passage between the Scylla of the “Myth of the Given” (Sellars) and the Charybdis of a Davidsonian linguistic coherentism. McDowell’s defense of a minimal empiricism depends on the largely unargued and ultimately untenable assumption that epistemic justification can only operate at the level of conceptual or propositional entities. (...)
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  35. Peter Gärdenfors (1992). The Dynamics of Belief Systems: Foundations Versus Coherence Theories. In Cristina Bicchieri, Dalla Chiara & Maria Luisa (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge University Press. 377.
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  36. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
    Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is (...)
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  37. David H. Glass (2005). Problems with Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence. Erkenntnis 63 (3):375 - 385.
    Two of the probabilistic measures of coherence discussed in this paper take probabilistic dependence into account and so depend on prior probabilities in a fundamental way. An example is given which suggests that this prior-dependence can lead to potential problems. Another coherence measure is shown to be independent of prior probabilities in a clearly defined sense and consequently is able to avoid such problems. The issue of prior-dependence is linked to the fact that the first two measures can be understood (...)
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  38. Sanford Goldberg (2012). A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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  39. Thomas Grundmann (1999). BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
    One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the internalist regress in (...)
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  40. Sven Ove Hansson (2006). Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93 - 108.
    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...)
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  41. Sven Ove Hansson & Erik J. Olsson (1999). Providing Foundations for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):243-265.
    We prove that four theses commonly associated with coherentism are incompatible with the representation of a belief state as a logically closed set of sentences. The result is applied to the conventional coherence interpretation of the AGM theory of belief revision, which appears not to be tenable. Our argument also counts against the coherentistic acceptability of a certain form of propositional holism. We argue that the problems arise as an effect of ignoring the distinction between derived and non-derived beliefs, and (...)
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  42. Stephan Hartmann & L. Bovens (2001). A Probabilistic Theory of the Coherence of an Information Set. In BeckermannAnsgar (ed.), Argument & Analysis: Proceedings of the 4th International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy. Bielefeld.
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  43. Stephan Hartmann & Luc Bovens (2005). Why There Cannot Be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence. Erkenntnis 63 (3):361-374.
    Bayesian Coherence Theory of Justification or, for short, Bayesian Coherentism, is characterized by two theses, viz. (i) that our degree of confidence in the content of a set of propositions is positively affected by the coherence of the set, and (ii) that coherence can be characterized in probabilistic terms. There has been a longstanding question of how to construct a measure of coherence. We will show that Bayesian Coherentism cannot rest on a single measure of coherence, but requires a vector (...)
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  44. Stephan Hartmann & Luc Bovens (2003). Solving the Riddle of Coherence. Mind 112 (448):601-634.
    A coherent story is a story that fits together well. This notion plays a central role in the coherence theory of justification and has been proposed as a criterion for scientific theory choice. Many attempts have been made to give a probabilistic account of this notion. A proper account of coherence must not start from some partial intuitions, but should pay attention to the role that this notion is supposed to play within a particular context. Coherence is a property of (...)
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  45. David K. Henderson (1995). One Naturalized Epistemological Argument Against Coherentist Accounts of Empirical Knowledge. Erkenntnis 43 (2):199 - 227.
    The argument I present here is an example of the manner in which naturalizing epistemology can help address fairly traditional epistemological issues. I develop one argument against coherentist epistemologies of empirical knowledge. In doing so, I draw on BonJour (1985), for that account seems to me to indicate the direction in which any plausible coherentist account would need to be developed, at least insofar as such accounts are to conceive of justification in terms of an agent (minimally) possessing articul able (...)
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  46. David K. Henderson (1994). Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism is Not Just the Poor Person's Coherentism. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
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  47. Frederik Herzberg (2014). The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence. Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
    This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification (...)
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  48. Michael Huemer (2011). Does Probability Theory Refute Coherentism? Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):35-54.
    Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on the coherence theory of justification, allegedly showing that coherence cannot produce justification for beliefs in the absence of foundational justification, and that there can be no measure of coherence on which coherence is generally truth-conducive. I argue that the coherentist can reject some of the assumptions on which these theorems depend. Coherence can then be held to produce justification on its own, and truth-conducive measures of coherence can be constructed.
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  49. Michael Huemer (2007). Weak Bayesian Coherentism. Synthese 157 (3):337 - 346.
    Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.
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  50. Christoph Jäger (2007). Is Coherentism Coherent? Analysis 67 (4):341 - 344.
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