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  1. Jens Aagaard-Hansen (2007). The Challenges of Cross-Disciplinary Research. Social Epistemology 21 (4):425 – 438.
    During the past decades, research collaboration between researchers from different disciplines has become more frequent. However, there is a need to look into the generic modalities and challenges. The article explores a series of potential obstructions to cross-disciplinary collaboration of methodological and epistemological nature. Furthermore, a number of contextual, inhibiting factors are outlined. As means of overcoming the obstacles, the importance of mutual knowledge, allocation of adequate time and conducive research management is emphasised. New teams may benefit from tutoring by (...)
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  2. Pnina Abir-Am (1992). A Historical Ethnography of a Scientific Anniversary in Molecular Biology: The First Protein X-Ray Photograph (1984, 1934). [REVIEW] Social Epistemology 6 (4):323 – 354.
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  3. Scott F. Aikin & J. Caleb Clanton (2010). Developing Group-Deliberative Virtues. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (4):409-424.
    In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims: first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and, second, that successful deliberative groups depend on individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The development of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues contribute to the deliberative synergy of the group, not only in terms of (...)
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  4. Max Albert (2011). Methodology and Scientific Competition. Episteme 8 (2):165-183.
    Why is the average quality of research in open science so high? The answer seems obvious. Science is highly competitive, and publishing high quality research is the way to rise to the top. Thus, researchers face strong incentives to produce high quality work. However, this is only part of the answer. High quality in science, after all, is what researchers in the relevant field consider to be high quality. Why and how do competing researchers coordinate on common quality standards? I (...)
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  5. Ben Almassi (2007). Experts, Evidence, and Epistemic Independence. Spontaneous Generations 1 (1):58-66.
    Throughout his work on the rationality of epistemic dependence, John Hardwig makes the striking observation that he believes many things for which he possesses no evidence (1985, 335; 1991, 693; 1994, 83). While he could imagine collecting for himself the relevant evidence for some of his beliefs, the vastness of the world and constraints of time and individual intellect thwart his ability to gather for himself the evidence for all his beliefs. So for many things he believes what others tell (...)
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  6. Hanne Andersen (2010). Joint Acceptance and Scientific Change: A Case Study. Episteme 7 (3):248-265.
    Recently, several scholars have argued that scientists can accept scientific claims in a collective process, and that the capacity of scientific groups to form joint acceptances is linked to a functional division of labor between the group members. However, these accounts reveal little about how the cognitive content of the jointly accepted claim is formed, and how group members depend on each other in this process. In this paper, I shall therefore argue that we need to link analyses of joint (...)
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  7. Guy Axtell, (2011) Responsibilism: A Proposed Shared Research Program.
    Originally titled “Institutional, Group, and Individual Virtue,” this was my paper for an Invited Symposium on "Intersections between Social, Feminist, and Virtue Epistemologies," APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2011, San Diego. -/- Abstract: This paper examines recent research on individual, social, and institutional virtues and vices; the aim is to explore and make proposals concerning their inter-relationships, as well as to highlight central questions for future research with the study of each. More specifically, the paper will focus on how these (...)
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  8. Merja Bauters (2012). Emanuele Bardone: Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. Mind and Society 11 (2):257-264.
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  9. Endre Begby (2013). The Epistemology of Prejudice. Thought 2 (1):90-99.
    According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent (...)
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  10. Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Believing on Authority. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
    Linda Zagzebski's "Epistemic Authority" (Oxford University Press, 2012) brings together issues in social epistemology with topics in moral and political philosophy as well as philosophy of religion. In this paper I criticize her discussion of self-trust and rationality, which sets up the main argument of the book; I consider how her view of authority relates to some issues of epistemic authority in testimony; and I raise some concerns about her treatment of religious epistemology and religious authority in particular.
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  11. Jørn Bjerre (forthcoming). A New Foundation for the Social Sciences? Searle's Misreading of Durkheim. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393114525860.
    The aim of John Searle’s philosophy of society is to provide a foundation for the social sciences. Arguing that the study of social reality needs to be based on a philosophy of language, Searle claims that sociology has little to offer since no sociologist ever took language seriously. Attacking Durkheim head-on, Searle not only claims that Durkheim’s project differs from his own but also that Durkheim’s sociology has serious shortcomings. Opposing Searle, this paper argues that Durkheim’s account of social reality (...)
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  12. René ten Bos (2007). The Vitality of Stupidity. Social Epistemology 21 (2):139 – 150.
    It is argued that the focus within organization studies on wisdom is one-sided in the sense that it ignores stupidity, wisdom's little stepbrother. Too often it is simply taken for granted that an increase in wisdom will lead to a decrease in stupidity. The problem with this assumption is that it is philosophically uninformed. Stupidity and wisdom stand in a deeply paradoxical relationship, which has been studied by philosophers at least since the Stoics. Some recent contributions to this endless debate (...)
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  13. Marcel Boumans (2008). Battle in the Planning Office: Field Experts Versus Normative Statisticians. Social Epistemology 22 (4):389 – 404.
    Generally, rational decision-making is conceived as arriving at a decision by a correct application of the rules of logic and statistics. If not, the conclusions are called biased. After an impressive series of experiments and tests carried out in the last few decades, the view arose that rationality is tough for all, skilled field experts not excluded. A new type of planner's counsellor is called for: the normative statistician, the expert in reasoning with uncertainty par excellence. To unravel this view, (...)
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  14. George Bragues (2009). Prediction Markets: The Practical and Normative Possibilities for the Social Production of Knowledge. Episteme 6 (1):91-106.
    The quest to foretell the future is omnipresent in human affairs. A potential solution to this epistemological conundrum has emerged through mass collaboration. Motored by the Internet, prediction markets allow a multitude of individuals to assume a stake in a security whose value is tied to a future event. The resulting prices offer a continuously updated probability estimate of the event actually taking place. This paper gives a survey of prediction markets, their history, mechanics, uses, and theoretical foundation. We also (...)
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  15. Rachael Briggs (2012). The Normative Standing of Group Agents. Episteme 9 (3):283-291.
    Christian List and Philip Pettit (henceforth LP) argue that groups of people can be agents – beings that believe, desire and act. Their account combines a non-reductive realist view of group attitudes, on which groups literally have attitudes that cannot be analyzed in terms of the attitudes of their members, with methodological individualism, on which good explanations of group-level phenomena should not posit forces above individual attitudes and behaviors. I then discuss the main normative conclusion that LP draw from the (...)
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  16. John Brigham (1991). The Upper Courts: Scholarship and Authority. Social Epistemology 5 (1):16 – 19.
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  17. John Brigham & Christine Harrington (1991). Realism in the Authority of Law. Social Epistemology 5 (1):20 – 25.
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  18. Fabrizio Cariani (2012). Epistemology in Group Agency: Six Objections in Search of the Truth. [REVIEW] Episteme 9 (3):255-269.
    List and Pettit's Group Agency is an extremely important book, spearheading a new wave of work on the metaphysics, epistemology and ethics of group agents. In this article, I focus on the epistemological thread in their discussion. After introducing the apparatus they use in analyzing the epistemic performance of groups, I criticize some elements and point to some ways in which the very same apparatus could be redirected to address them.
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  19. J. Adam Carter (2014). Group Peer Disagreement. Ratio 27 (3).
    A popular view in mainstream social epistemology maintains that, in the face of a revealed peer disagreement over p, neither party should remain just as confident vis-a-vis p as she initially was. This ‘conciliatory’ insight has been defended with regard to individual epistemic peers. However, to the extent that (non-summativist) groups are candidates for group knowledge and beliefs, we should expect groups (no less than individuals) to be in the market for disagreements. The aim here will be to carve out (...)
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  20. Hyundeuk Cheon (2014). In What Sense Is Scientific Knowledge Collective Knowledge? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4):407-423.
    By taking the collective character of scientific research seriously, some philosophers have claimed that scientific knowledge is indeed collective knowledge. However, there is little clarity on what exactly is meant by collective knowledge. In this article, I argue that there are two notions of collective knowledge that have not been well distinguished: irreducibly collective knowledge (ICK) and jointly committed knowledge (JCK). The two notions provide different conditions under which it is justified to ascribe knowledge to a group. It is argued (...)
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  21. J. Angelo Corlett (2007). Analyzing Social Knowledge. Social Epistemology 21 (3):231 – 247.
    In the tradition of justified true belief theory, I provide an epistemic responsibility-based philosophical analysis of collective knowledge which is both coherentist and reliabilist.
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  22. Neta C. Crawford (2007). Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2):187–212.
  23. Fred D'agostino (2004). Kuhn's Risk-Spreading Argument and The Organization of Scientific Communities. Episteme 1 (3):201-209.
  24. Helen de Cruz & Johan de Smedt (2012). Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411-429.
    Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural transmission of scientific (...)
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  25. Aaron Dewitt (2012). Group Agency and Epistemic Dependency. Episteme 9 (3):235-244.
    Modern epistemic questions have largely been focused around the individual and her ability to acquire knowledge autonomously. More recently epistemologists have begun to look more broadly in providing accounts of knowledge by considering its social context, where the individual depends on others for true beliefs. Hardwig explains the effect of this shift starkly, arguing that to reject epistemic dependency is to deny certain true beliefs widely held throughout society and, more specifically, it is to deny that science and scholarship can (...)
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  26. Igor Douven (2009). Introduction: Computer Simulations in Social Epistemology. Episteme 6 (2):107-109.
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  27. Jon Elster (1985). Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action. Ethics 96 (1):136-155.
  28. Anna Estany & David Casacuberta (2012). Contributions of Socially Distributed Cognition to Social Epistemology: The Case of Testimony. Eidos 16 (16):40-68.
    El objetivo de este artículo es analizar y revisar las normas que filosóficamente asociamos al proceso de testimonio, inquiriendo hasta qué puntoson0 consistentes con los conocimientos empíricos de las ciencias cognitivas.Tradicionalmente, el problema del testimonio surgía cuando, desde una epistemología de corte individualista, se suponía, siguiendo el dictum ya marcado en la Modernidad tanto por racionalistas como por empiristas, de que el conocimiento debía ser testado personalmente. Sin embargo, disciplinas y enfoques recientes, como la Cognición Socialmente Distribuida y la Epistemología (...)
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  29. Simon J. Evnine (2005). Containing Multitudes: Reflection, Expertise and Persons as Groups. Episteme 2 (1):57-64.
    The thesis of the paper is that persons are similar to a kind of group: multiple-expert epistemic unities (MEUs). MEUs are groups in which there are multiple experts on whom other members of the group model their opinion. An example would be a group of children playing Telephone. Any child nearer the source is an 'expert' for any child further away. I argue that, with certain important qualifications, it is both rational and necessary for persons to treat their future selves (...)
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  30. Melinda Bonnie Fagan (2011). Is There Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments From Explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):247-269.
    If there is collective scientific knowledge, then at least some scientific groups have beliefs over and above the personal beliefs of their members. Gilbert's plural-subjects theory makes precise the notion of ‘over and above’ here. Some philosophers have used plural-subjects theory to argue that philosophical, historical and sociological studies of science should take account of collective beliefs of scientific groups. Their claims rest on the premise that our best explanations of scientific change include these collective beliefs. I argue that Gilbert's (...)
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  31. Don Fallis (2009). Introduction: The Epistemology of Mass Collaboration. Episteme 6 (1):1-7.
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  32. Don Fallis (2007). Collective Epistemic Goals. Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280.
    We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group - and sometimes even the group itself - to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective (...)
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  33. Don Fallis & Kay Mathiesen (2013). Veritistic Epistemology and the Epistemic Goals of Groups: A Reply to Vähämaa. Social Epistemology 27 (1):21 - 25.
    (2013). Veritistic Epistemology and the Epistemic Goals of Groups: A Reply to Vähämaa. Social Epistemology: Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 21-25. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2012.760666.
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  34. Luciano Floridi (2009). Web 2.0 Vs. The Semantic Web: A Philosophical Assessment. Episteme 6 (1):25-37.
    The paper develops some of the conclusions, reached in Floridi (2007), concerning the future developments of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and their impact on our lives. The two main theses supported in that article were that, as the information society develops, the threshold between online and offline is becoming increasingly blurred, and that once there won't be any significant difference, we shall gradually re-conceptualise ourselves not as cyborgs but rather as inforgs, i.e. socially connected, informational organisms. In this paper, (...)
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  35. Miranda Fricker (2012). Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good Informant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):249-276.
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  36. María G. Navarro (2013). How to Interpret Collective Aggregated Judgments? Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (11):26-27.
    Our digital society increasingly relies in the power of others’ aggregated judgments to make decisions. Questions as diverse as which film we will watch, what scientific news we will decide to read, which path we will follow to find a place, or what political candidate we will vote for are usually associated to a rating that influences our final decisions.
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  37. Ronald N. Giere (2007). Distributed Cognition Without Distributed Knowing. Social Epistemology 21 (3):313 – 320.
    In earlier works, I have argued that it is useful to think of much scientific activity, particularly in experimental sciences, as involving the operation of distributed cognitive systems, as these are understood in the contemporary cognitive sciences. Introducing a notion of distributed cognition, however, invites consideration of whether, or in what way, related cognitive activities, such as knowing, might also be distributed. In this paper I will argue that one can usefully introduce a notion of distributed cognition without attributing other (...)
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  38. Ronald N. Giere (2007). Distributed Cognition Without Distributed Knowing. Social Epistemology 21 (3):313-320.
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  39. Ronald N. Giere (2002). Discussion Note: Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):637-644.
    In Epistemic Cultures (1999), Karin Knorr Cetina argues that different scientific fields exhibit different epistemic cultures. She claims that in high energy physics (HEP) individual persons are displaced as epistemic subjects in favor of experiments themselves. In molecular biology (MB), by contrast, individual persons remain the primary epistemic subjects. Using Ed Hutchins' (1995) account of navigation aboard a traditional US Navy ship as a prototype, I argue that both HEP and MB exhibit forms of distributed cognition. That is, in both (...)
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  40. M. Gilbert (2002). Belief and Acceptance as Features of Groups. Protosociology 16:35-69.
  41. Margaret P. Gilbert (2006). Rationality in Collective Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.
    Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the (...)
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  42. Margaret P. Gilbert (2004). Collective Epistemology. Episteme 1 (2):95--107.
    This paper introduces the author's approach to everyday ascriptions of collective cognitive states as in such statements as we believe he is lying. Collective epistemology deals with these ascriptions attempting to understand them and the phenomena in question.
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  43. Alvin I. Goldman (2010). A Guide to Social Epistemology. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
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  44. Aditi Gowri (1997). Towards a Moral Ecology: What is the Relationship Between Collective and Human Agents? Social Epistemology 11 (1):73 – 95.
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  45. Matthias Gross (2010). The Public Proceduralization of Contingency: Bruno Latour and the Formation of Collective Experiments. Social Epistemology 24 (1):63 – 74.
    Social scientists have traditionally attempted to avoid extending strategies for acquiring experimental knowledge to the sphere of the social. Bruno Latour, however, has introduced a notion of the collective experiment, an experiment conducted by and with us all. In this short paper I seek to explore, by way of elucidating the talk of collective experiments, that Latour's notion has long since existed in the theory and practice of ecological design and restoration. Practitioners in ecological restoration projects find themselves in a (...)
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  46. Raul Hakli (2007). On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief. Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.
    Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...)
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  47. D. Wade Hands (1995). Social Epistemology Meets the Invisible Hand: Kitcher on the Advancement of Science. Dialogue 34 (03):605-.
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  48. Jason Kawall (2002). Other–Regarding Epistemic Virtues. Ratio 15 (3):257–275.
    Epistemologists often assume that an agent’s epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledge as possible for herself. Drawing on an analogy with ethics and other practices, I argue that being situated in an epistemic community introduces a range of epistemic virtues (and goals) which fall outside of those typically recognized by both individualistic and social epistemologists. Candidate virtues include such traits as honesty, integrity (including an unwillingness to misuse one’s status as an expert), patience, and creativity. We can (...)
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  49. Roger Koppl (2005). Epistemic Systems. Episteme 2 (2):91-106.
    Epistemic systems are social processes generating judgments of truth and falsity. I outline a mathematical theory of epistemic systems that applies widely. Areas of application include pure science, torture, police forensics, espionage, auditing, clinical medical testing, democratic procedure, and the market economy. I examine torture and police forensics in relative detail. This paper is an exercise in comparative institutional epistemics, which considers how the institutions of an epistemic system influence its performance as measured by such things as error rates and (...)
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  50. Roger G. Koppl, Robert Kurzban & Lawrence Kobilinsky (2008). Epistemics for Forensics. Episteme 5 (2):141-159.
    Forensic science error rates are needlessly high. Applying the perspective of veritistic social epistemology to forensic science could produce new institutional designs that would lower forensic error rates. We make such an application through experiments in the laboratory with human subjects. Redundancy is the key to error prevention, discovery, and elimination. In the “monopoly epistemics” characterizing forensics today, one privileged actor is asked to identify the truth. In “democratic epistemics,” several independent parties are asked. In an experiment contrasting them, democratic (...)
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