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  1. S. Alexander (1913). Collective Willing and Truth. Mind 22 (85):14-47.
  2. Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa (forthcoming). Mixed Motives in the Equilibrium View of Joint Intention. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    We develop a theory of joint intention in contexts in which participants have mixed motives that can manifest in all-things-considered reasons to deviate from contributing to the desired project, e.g., contexts with collective action problems. Our theory is based on strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, which links the characterization of joint intention in terms of individual intentions with conditions on strategy profiles of the underlying strategic games. We use elements of equilibrium reasoning to construct a counterfactual account of joint intention (...)
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  3. Facundo M. Alonso (2009). Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations. Ethics 119 (3):444-475.
    Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a structure of attitudes of individual participants (...)
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  4. Denis G. Arnold (2006). Corporate Moral Agency. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):279–291.
    "The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).
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  5. Caroline Arruda (forthcoming). Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
    I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
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  6. Caroline T. Arruda (2015). Shared Intention and Reasons for Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.
    Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail that shared intention is possible only if (...)
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  7. Review by: Caroline T. Arruda (2014). Review: Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (1):258-262,.
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  8. Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen (2011). We Did It Again: A Reply to Livingston. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2):225-230.
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  9. Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen (2010). We Did It: From Mere Contributors to Coauthors. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1):23-32.
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  10. Nicholas Bardsley (2007). On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy. [REVIEW] Synthese 157 (2):141 - 159.
    Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of (...)
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  11. Matteo Bianchin (2015). Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.
    In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint (...)
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  12. Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
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  13. Olle Blomberg (2016). Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally \ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their \-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  14. Olle Blomberg (2015). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together By Michael Bratman. [REVIEW] Analysis 75 (2):346-348.
  15. Olle Blomberg (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
    According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exclusivity constraint, one cannot intend to perform another agent’s action, even if one might be able to intend that she performs it. For example, while one can intend that one’s guest leaves before midnight, one cannot intend to perform her act of leaving. However, Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) account of joint activity requires participants to have intentions-in-action (in John Searle’s (1983) sense) that violate this constraint. I argue (...)
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  16. Olle Blomberg (1st ed. 2015). An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour. In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer International Publishing
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  17. Michael Bratman (2009). Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149 - 165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
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  18. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. OUP Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.
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  19. Michael E. Bratman (1993). Shared Intention. Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
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  20. Stephen Butterfill (1st ed. 2015). Planning for Collective Agency. In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer International Publishing
  21. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Includes essays that challenge the need for a theory of collective intentionality as well as essays that extend and enrich existing theories of collective intentionality The essays concerning collective rationality (part II) break new ground in that they challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become (...)
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  22. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality. OUP Usa.
    Acting together requires collective intentions. The contributions to this volume seek to critically assess or to enrich theories of collective intentionality by exploring topics such as collective belief, mutual coordination, and the explanation of group behavior.
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  23. Christine Chwaszcza (2014). Intentions in Collective Agency: A Third-Person Approach. In Jörn Müller & Karl Mertens (eds.), Die Dimension des Sozialen: Neue Philosophische Zugänge Zu Fühlen, Wollen Und Handeln. De Gruyter 263-286.
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  24. Brian Epstein (2009). Ontological Individualism Reconsidered. Synthese 166 (1):187-213.
    The thesis of methodological individualism in social science is commonly divided into two different claims—explanatory individualism and ontological individualism. Ontological individualism is the thesis that facts about individuals exhaustively determine social facts. Initially taken to be a claim about the identity of groups with sets of individuals or their properties, ontological individualism has more recently been understood as a global supervenience claim. While explanatory individualism has remained controversial, ontological individualism thus understood is almost universally accepted. In this paper I argue (...)
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  25. Peter A. French (ed.) (2006). Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume of _Midwest Studies_ focuses on the currently hot topic in ethics and action theory of shared intentions and relates it to issues in collective responsibility. Each of the essays in the volume is by an internationally known scholar who has published seminal pieces on various aspects of the concepts of shared intention and collective responsibility. Features all new essays that expand the discussion and invite those interested in the topic to examine a variety of ways for understanding the (...)
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  26. Gerald Gaus (2012). Constructivist and Ecological Modeling of Group Rationality. Episteme 9 (3):245-254.
    These brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List and Pettit's constructivist analysis of group (...)
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  27. Margaret Gilbert (2009). Shared Intention and Personal Intentions. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the (...)
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  28. Margaret Gilbert (2008). Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena. Analyse & Kritik 30 (2):483-514.
    Drawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention (...)
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  29. Margaret Gilbert (2002). Considerations on Joint Commitment: Responses to Various Comments. In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag 1--73.
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  30. Margaret Gilbert (1997). Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):65-84.
    Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch a plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group (...)
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  31. Margaret P. Gilbert, Acting Together, Joint Commitment, and Obligation.
    What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how it relates (...)
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  32. Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden (2007). Collective Intentions and Team Agency. Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
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  33. Brian Gordon & Georg Theiner (forthcoming). Scaffolded Joint Action as a Micro–Foundation of Organizational Learning. In Charles B. Stone & Lucas Bietti (eds.), Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past. Psychology Press
    Organizational learning, at the broadest levels, as it has come to be understood within the organization theory and management literatures, concerns the experientially driven changes in knowledge processes, structures, and resources that enable organizations to perform skillfully in their task environments (Argote and Miron–Spektor, 2011). In this chapter, we examine routines and capabilities as an important micro–foundation for organizational learning. Adopting a micro–foundational approach in line with Barney and Felin (2013), we propose a new model for explaining how routines and (...)
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  34. Matti Heinonen (forthcoming). Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393115614533.
    I distinguish two kinds of contribution that have been made by recent minimalist accounts of joint action in philosophy and cognitive science relative to established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “complementarists” seek to analyze a functionally different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “constitutionalists” seek to expose mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, without taking a definite stance on which functional characterization (...)
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  35. Boris Hennig (2006). Social Facts Explained and Presupposed. In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. Ontos Verlag
    Attempts are often made to explain collective action in terms of the interaction of individuals. A common objection to such attempts is that they are circular: Since every interaction presupposes the existence of common practices and common practices involve collective action, no analysis of collective agency in terms of interaction can reduce collectivity away. In this essay I will argue that this does not constitute a real circularity. It is true that common practices are presupposed in every attempt to explain (...)
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  36. Kathy Hirsh-Pasek, Elizabeth Hennon, Roberta M. Golinkoff, Khara Pence, Rachel Pulverman, Jenny Sootsman, Shannon Pruden & Mandy Maguire (2001). Social Attention Need Not Equal Social Intention: From Attention to Intention in Early Word Learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1108-1109.
    Bloom's eloquent and comprehensive treatment of early word learning holds that social intention is foundational for language development. While we generally support his thesis, we call into question two of his proposals: (1) that attention to social information in the environment implies social intent, and (2) that infants are sensitive to social intent at the very beginnings of word learning.
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  37. Ghita Holmström-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela (1997). Contemporary Action Theory.
  38. Marija Jankovic (2014). Communication and Shared Information. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):489-508.
    Strawson style counterexamples to Grice’s account of communication show that a communicative intention has to be overt. Saying what overtness consists in has proven to be difficult for Gricean accounts. In this paper, I show that a common explanation of overtness, one that construes it in terms of a network of shared beliefs or knowledge, is mistaken. I offer an alternative, collectivist, model of communication. This model takes the utterer’s communicative intention to be a we-intention, a kind of (...)
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  39. Ludger Jansen (2004). Who has Got Our Group-Intentions? In Johann C. Marek & Maria E. Reicher (eds.), Erfahrung und Analyse. Beiträge des 27. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Sym­posiums. ILWG 151-153.
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  40. Todd Jones (2010). What People Believe When They Say That People Believe: Folk Sociology and the Nature of Group Intentions. Lexington Books.
    People are often unclear about what is meant by sentences such as 'Catholics don't believe in birth control.' In this book, Todd Jones explores what people are talking about when they ascribe beliefs or actions to entire groups rather than individuals. This discussion should help settle some basis questions for philosophers, social scientists, and casual conversationists.
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  41. Todd Jones (2005). How Many New Yorkers Need to Like Bagels Before You Can Say "New Yorkers Like Bagels?" Understanding Collective Ascription. Philosophical Forum 36 (3):279–306.
  42. Christian List (2012). Collective Wisdom: Lessons From the Theory of Judgment Aggregation. In Helene Landemore & Jon Elster (eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press
    Can collectives be wise? The thesis that they can has recently received a lot of attention. It has been argued that, in many judgmental or decision-making tasks, suitably organized groups can outperform their individual members. In this paper, I discuss the lessons we can learn about collective wisdom from the emerging theory of judgment aggregation, as distinct from the literature on Condorcet’s jury theorem.
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  43. Christian List (2003). Distributed Cognition: A Perspective From Social Choice Theory. In M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S. Voigt (eds.), Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy. Mohr Siebeck
    Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive system? Second, (...)
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  44. Franz Dietrich Christian List, The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to …lling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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  45. Kirk Ludwig (2015). Shared Agency in Modest Sociality. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):7-15.
    This is contribution to a symposium on Michael Bratman's book Shared Agency : A Planning Theory of Acting Together.
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  46. Kirk Ludwig (2014). Proxy Agency in Collective Action. Noûs 48 (1):75-105.
    This paper gives an account of proxy agency in the context of collective action. It takes the case of a group announcing something by way of a spokesperson as an illustration. In proxy agency, it seems that one person or subgroup's doing something counts as or constitutes or is recognized as (tantamount to) another person or group's doing something. Proxy agency is pervasive in institutional action. It has been taken to be a straightforward counterexample to an appealing deflationary view of (...)
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  47. Kirk Ludwig (2007). Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics. Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
    This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.
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  48. Kirk Ludwig (2007). Foundations of Social Reality in Collective Intentional Behavior. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology.
    This paper clarifies Searle's account of we-intentions and then argues that it is subject to counterexamples, some of which are derived from examples Searle uses against other accounts. It then offers an alternative reductive account that is not subject to the counterexamples.
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  49. Kay Mathiesen (2007). Introduction to Special Issue of Social Epistemology on "Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers". Social Epistemology 21 (3):209 – 216.
  50. Seumas Miller (2001). Social Action: A Teleological Account. Cambridge University Press.
    Social action is central to social thought. This centrality reflects the overwhelming causal significance of action for social life, the centrality of action to any account of social phenomena, and the fact that conventions and normativity are features of human activity. This book provides philosophical analyses of fundamental categories of human social action, including cooperative action, conventional action, social norm governed action, and the actions of the occupants of organizational roles. A distinctive feature of (...)
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