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  1. S. Alexander (1913). Collective Willing and Truth. Mind 22 (85):14-47.
  2. Facundo M. Alonso (2009). Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations. Ethics 119 (3):444-475.
    Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a structure of attitudes of individual participants (...)
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  3. Denis G. Arnold (2006). Corporate Moral Agency. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):279–291.
    "The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).
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  4. Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen (2011). We Did It Again: A Reply to Livingston. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2):225-230.
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  5. Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen (2010). We Did It: From Mere Contributors to Coauthors. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1):23-32.
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  6. Nicholas Bardsley (2007). On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy. [REVIEW] Synthese 157 (2):141 - 159.
    Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of (...)
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  7. Olle Blomberg (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
    According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exclusivity constraint, one cannot intend to perform another agent’s action, even if one might be able to intend that she performs it. For example, while one can intend that one’s guest leaves before midnight, one cannot intend to perform her act of leaving. However, Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) account of joint activity requires participants to have intentions-in-action (in John Searle’s (1983) sense) that violate this constraint. I argue (...)
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  8. Michael Bratman (2009). Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149 - 165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
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  9. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oup Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.
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  10. Michael E. Bratman (1993). Shared Intention. Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
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  11. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality. Oup Usa.
    Acting together requires collective intentions. The contributions to this volume seek to critically assess or to enrich theories of collective intentionality by exploring topics such as collective belief, mutual coordination, and the explanation of group behavior.
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  12. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Includes essays that challenge the need for a theory of collective intentionality as well as essays that extend and enrich existing theories of collective intentionality The essays concerning collective rationality (part II) break new ground in that they challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become (...)
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  13. Brian Epstein (2009). Ontological Individualism Reconsidered. Synthese 166 (1):187-213.
    The thesis of methodological individualism in social science is commonly divided into two different claims—explanatory individualism and ontological individualism. Ontological individualism is the thesis that facts about individuals exhaustively determine social facts. Initially taken to be a claim about the identity of groups with sets of individuals or their properties, ontological individualism has more recently been understood as a global supervenience claim. While explanatory individualism has remained controversial, ontological individualism thus understood is almost universally accepted. In this paper I argue (...)
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  14. Gerald Gaus (2012). Constructivist and Ecological Modeling of Group Rationality. Episteme 9 (3):245-254.
    These brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List and Pettit's constructivist analysis of group (...)
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  15. Margaret Gilbert (2008). Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena. Analyse and Kritik 30 (2).
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  16. Margaret Gilbert (2002). Considerations on Joint Commitment: Responses to Various Comments. In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag. 1--73.
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  17. Margaret Gilbert (1997). Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):65-84.
    Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch a plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group (...)
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  18. Margaret P. Gilbert, Acting Together, Joint Commitment, and Obligation.
    What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how it relates (...)
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  19. Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden (2007). Collective Intentions and Team Agency. Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
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  20. Brian Gordon & Georg Theiner (forthcoming). Scaffolded Joint Action as a Micro–Foundation of Organizational Learning. In Charles B. Stone & Lucas Bietti (eds.), Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past. Psychology Press.
    Organizational learning, at the broadest levels, as it has come to be understood within the organization theory and management literatures, concerns the experientially driven changes in knowledge processes, structures, and resources that enable organizations to perform skillfully in their task environments (Argote and Miron–Spektor, 2011). In this chapter, we examine routines and capabilities as an important micro–foundation for organizational learning. Adopting a micro–foundational approach in line with Barney and Felin (2013), we propose a new model for explaining how routines and (...)
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  21. Benj Hellie (forthcoming). How We Do. In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modals. Oxford UP.
    Anscombean action theory hits the semantics and pragmatics of practical language with some assistance from mindset semantics. Hilites: an intention is an attitude toward an action-type, implemented by another intention; the structural order of intentions is recognized in knowhow; knowhow is grasp of an 'instruction' -- a conditional with imperative antecedent and consequent; the content of an imperative is an action-type; a command involving a certain imperative manifests an intention of our collective agency regarding the content of the imperative; a (...)
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  22. Boris Hennig (2006). Social Facts Explained and Presupposed. In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. Ontos Verlag.
    Attempts are often made to explain collective action in terms of the interaction of individuals. A common objection to such attempts is that they are circular: Since every interaction presupposes the existence of common practices and common practices involve collective action, no analysis of collective agency in terms of interaction can reduce collectivity away. In this essay I will argue that this does not constitute a real circularity. It is true that common practices are presupposed in every attempt to explain (...)
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  23. Kathy Hirsh-Pasek, Elizabeth Hennon, Roberta M. Golinkoff, Khara Pence, Rachel Pulverman, Jenny Sootsman, Shannon Pruden & Mandy Maguire (2001). Social Attention Need Not Equal Social Intention: From Attention to Intention in Early Word Learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1108-1109.
    Bloom's eloquent and comprehensive treatment of early word learning holds that social intention is foundational for language development. While we generally support his thesis, we call into question two of his proposals: (1) that attention to social information in the environment implies social intent, and (2) that infants are sensitive to social intent at the very beginnings of word learning.
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  24. Marija Jankovic (2014). Communication and Shared Information. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):489-508.
    Strawson style counterexamples to Grice’s account of communication show that a communicative intention has to be overt. Saying what overtness consists in has proven to be difficult for Gricean accounts. In this paper, I show that a common explanation of overtness, one that construes it in terms of a network of shared beliefs or knowledge, is mistaken. I offer an alternative, collectivist, model of communication. This model takes the utterer’s communicative intention to be a we-intention, a kind of intention with (...)
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  25. Ludger Jansen (2004). Who has Got Our Group-Intentions? In Johann C. Marek & Maria E. Reicher (eds.), Erfahrung und Analyse. Beiträge des 27. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Sym­posiums. ILWG. 151-153.
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  26. Christian List (2003). Distributed Cognition: A Perspective From Social Choice Theory. In M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S. Voigt (eds.), Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy. Mohr Siebeck.
    Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive system? Second, (...)
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  27. Christian List, Collective Wisdom: Lessons From the Theory of Judgment Aggregation.
    Can collectives be wise? The thesis that they can has recently received a lot of attention. It has been argued that, in many judgmental or decision-making tasks, suitably organized groups can outperform their individual members. In particular, it has been suggested that groups are good at meeting what I call the correspondence challenge (as in correspondence with the facts): By pooling information that is dispersed among the individual members, a group can arrive at judgments that accurately track some independent truths (...)
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  28. Franz Dietrich Christian List, The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to …lling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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  29. Kirk Ludwig (2014). Proxy Agency in Collective Action. Noûs 48 (1):75-105.
    This paper gives an account of proxy agency in the context of collective action. It takes the case of a group announcing something by way of a spokesperson as an illustration. In proxy agency, it seems that one person or subgroup's doing something counts as or constitutes or is recognized as (tantamount to) another person or group's doing something. Proxy agency is pervasive in institutional action. It has been taken to be a straightforward counterexample to an appealing deflationary view of (...)
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  30. Kirk Ludwig (2007). Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics. Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
    This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.
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  31. Kirk Ludwig (2007). Foundations of Social Reality in Collective Intentional Behavior. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology.
    This paper clarifies Searle's account of we-intentions and then argues that it is subject to counterexamples, some of which are derived from examples Searle uses against other accounts. It then offers an alternative reductive account that is not subject to the counterexamples.
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  32. Kay Mathiesen (2007). Introduction to Special Issue of Social Epistemology on "Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers". Social Epistemology 21 (3):209 – 216.
  33. Seumas Miller (2001). Social Action: A Teleological Account. Cambridge University Press.
    Social action is central to social thought. This centrality reflects the overwhelming causal significance of action for social life, the centrality of action to any account of social phenomena, and the fact that conventions and normativity are features of human activity. This book provides philosophical analyses of fundamental categories of human social action, including cooperative action, conventional action, social norm governed action, and the actions of the occupants of organizational roles. A distinctive feature of the book is that it applies (...)
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  34. Anna Moltchanova (2013). Group Intentions and Oppression. Philosophy 88 (01):81-100.
    A reductive theory of collective intentionality would imply that the ‘official’ intentions of an oppressive political authority cannot be constructed from the intentions of individuals when they follow the authority's rules. This makes it difficult to explain the unraveling of official group plans through time in a seemingly consistent fashion, and the corresponding source of coercion. A non-reductive theory, on the other hand, cannot capture whether the actions of individuals in an oppressive society are free or coerced, so long as (...)
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  35. F. Max Müller (1876). The Original Intention of Collective and Abstract Terms. Mind 1 (3):345-351.
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  36. Lilian O'Brien (2011). Self-Evaluation in Intention: Individual and Shared. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Hans-Bernhard Schmid & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer Verlag.
  37. Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason.
    Although vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators is firmly entrenched in federal courts, no adequate theory explains how the act and intention of one conspirator can be attributed to another, simply by virtue of their criminal agreement. This Article argues that the most promising avenue for solving the Pinkerton paradox is an appeal to the collective intention of the conspiratorial group to commit the crime. Unfortunately, misplaced skepticism about the notion of a group will has prevented criminal scholars from (...)
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  38. Elisabeth Pacherie (2013). Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite. Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
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  39. Elisabeth Pacherie (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency. In Seemann Axel (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
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  40. Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
    Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to (...)
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  41. Jan-Hendrik Passoth, Birgit Maria Peuker & Michael W. J. Schillmeier (eds.) (2012). Agency Without Actors?: New Approaches to Collective Action. Routledge.
  42. Nikolaos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.) (2007). Facets of Sociality. Ontos.
    The aim of this volume is to explore new approaches to the problem of the constitution of the various aspects of sociality and to confront these with received ideas. Many of the contributions are devoted to a rather holistic and antireductionist conception of social objects, groups, joint actions, and collective knowledge. The topics that are dealt with are: (a) the question of the ontological status of social objects and their relation to physical objects; (b) collective agency; and (c) the question (...)
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  43. David T. Risser (1996). The Social Dimension of Moral Responsibility: Taking Organizations Seriously. Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (1):189-207.
    This article provides a justification for holding complex organizations morally responsible and shows how this moral dimension is implicit in the concept of power. Several objections to organizational moral responsibility are addressed, and a new view of complex organizations as agents which are morally responsible, but do not possess moral rights, is defended.
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  44. David T. Risser (1985). Corporate Collective Responsibility. Washington University.
    Doctoral dissertation (Temple) published by Washington University in 1985.
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  45. Abraham Sesshu Roth (2014). Team Reasoning and Shared Intention. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer. 279-295.
  46. Abraham Sesshu Roth (2004). Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments. Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...)
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  47. Antti Saaristo (2006). There is No Escape From Philosophy: Collective Intentionality and Empirical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66.
    This article examines two empirical research traditions—experimental economics and the social identity approach in social psychology—that may be seen as attempts to falsify and verify the theory of collective intentionality, respectively. The article argues that both approaches fail to settle the issue. However, this is not necessarily due to the alleged immaturity of the social sciences but, possibly, to the philosophical nature of intentionality and intentional action. The article shows how broadly Davidsonian action theory, including Hacking’s notion of the looping (...)
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  48. Gabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela (1995). Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise. Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
    The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions (...)
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  49. Hans Bernhard Schmid (2008). Plural Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):25-54.
    In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in (...)
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  50. John Searle (1990). Collective Intentions and Actions. In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. 401-415.
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