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  1. Roberto G. Aldunate, Feniosky Pena‐Mora & Gene E. Robinson (2005). Collaborative Distributed Decision Making for Large Scale Disaster Relief Operations: Drawing Analogies From Robust Natural Systems. Complexity 11 (2):28-38.
  2. S. Alexander (1913). Collective Willing and Truth. Mind 22 (85):14-47.
  3. Michael Anderson, Evolution, Embodiment and the Nature of the Mind.
    In: B. Hardy-Vallee & N. Payette, eds. Beyond the brain: embodied, situated & distributed cognition. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar’s Press), in press. Abstract: In this article, I do three main things: 1. First, I introduce an approach to the mind motivated primarily by evolutionary considerations. I do that by laying out four principles for the study of the mind from an evolutionary perspective, and four predictions that they suggest. This evolutionary perspective is completely compatible with, although broader than, the embodied cognition (...)
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  4. Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2013). Scaffolded Memory and Metacognitive Feelings. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):135-152.
    Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, (...)
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  5. Ulrich Baltzer (2003). Social Action In Large Groups. Protosociology 18.
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  6. Adrian P. Banks & Lynne J. Millward (2009). Distributed Mental Models: Mental Models in Distributed Cognitive Systems. Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (4):249-266.
    The function of groups as information processors is increasingly being recognised in a number of theories of group cognition. A theme of many of these is an emphasis on sharing cognition. This paper extends current conceptualisations of groups by critiquing the focus on shared cognition and emphasising the distribution of cognition in groups. In particular, it develops an account of the distribution of one cognitive construct, mental models. Mental models have been chosen as a focus because they are used in (...)
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  7. Jeffrey Barash (2011). At the Threshold of Memory: Collective Memory Between Personal Experience and Political Identity. Meta 3 (2):249-267.
    Collective memory is thought to be something “more” than a conglomeration of personal memories which compose it. Yet, each of us, each individual in every society, remembers from a personal point of view. And if there is memory beyond personal experience through which collective identities are configured, in what “place” might one legitimately situate it? In addressing this question, this article examines the political significance of the distinction between two levels of what are often lumped together under the term of (...)
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  8. Jeffrey Andrew Barash (2006). Qu'est-ce que la mémoire collective ? Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (2):185-195.
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  9. Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess (2016). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1).
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what (...)
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  10. Olle Blomberg (2011). Conceptions of Cognition for Cognitive Engineering. International Journal of Aviation Psychology 21 (1):85-104.
    Cognitive processes, cognitive psychology tells us, unfold in our heads. In contrast, several approaches in cognitive engineering argue for a shift of unit of analysis from what is going on in the heads of operators to the workings of whole socio-technical systems. This shift is sometimes presented as part of the development of a new understanding of what cognition is and where the boundaries of cognitive systems are. Cognition, it is claimed, is not just situated or embedded, but extended and (...)
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  11. Olle Blomberg, Do Socio-Technical Systems Cognise? Proceedings of the 2nd AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy.
    The view that an agent’s cognitive processes sometimes include proper parts found outside the skin and skull of the agent is gaining increasing acceptance in philosophy of mind. One main empirical touchstone for this so-called active externalism is Edwin Hutchins’ theory of distributed cognition (DCog). However, the connection between DCog and active externalism is far from clear. While active externalism is one component of DCog, the theory also incorporates other related claims, which active externalists may not want to take on (...)
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  12. B. Bosanquet (1921). McDOUGALL, W. - The Group Mind. [REVIEW] Mind 30:63.
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  13. D. H. M. Brooks (1986). Group Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (December):456-70.
  14. G. Button (2008). Against `Distributed Cognition'. Theory, Culture and Society 25 (2):87-104.
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  15. Jaime F. Cárdenas-García (2013). Distributed Cognition: An Ectoderm-Centric Perspective. [REVIEW] Biosemiotics 6 (3):337-350.
    Distributed cognition is widely recognized as an approach to the study of all cognition. It identifies the distribution of cognitive processes between persons and technology, among people, and across time in the development of the social and material contexts for thinking. This paper suggests an ectoderm-centric perspective as the basis for distributed cognition, and in so doing redefines distributed cognition as the ability of an organism to interact with its environment for the purpose of satisfying its most basic physiological (internal (...)
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  16. Maria Ellen Chiaia (1997). Imagination in Dialogue: A Collaborative Method of Self-Inquiry. Dissertation, California Institute of Integral Studies
    This dissertation describes and reflects upon the research and development of a method of collaborative imaginal inquiry. In this project, my co-researcher, Ian Grand and I, explored a collaborative, dyadic approach to sandplay work, an imaginal process usually done individually in a clinical setting. It was then broadened to include other forms of collaborative imaginal work and to speculatively explore aspects of self-in-group and self-in-collaboration that have not been previously well documented or reflected upon in the literature. The dissertation is (...)
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  17. Markus Christen & Peter Brugger (2014). Mapping Collective Behavior – Beware of Looping. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):80-81.
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  18. Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction : brainbound versus extended -- From embodiment to cognitive extension -- The active body -- The negotiable body -- Material symbols -- World, Incorporated -- Boundary disputes -- Mind re-bound -- The cure for cognitive hiccups (HEMC, HEC, HEMC ...) -- Rediscovering the brain -- The limits of embodiment -- Painting, planning, and perceiving -- Disentangling embodiment -- Conclusions : mind-sized bites.
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  19. J. I. Cohen (1939). Collective Behaviour. The Eugenics Review 30 (4):297.
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  20. Jonas Cohn (1926). McDougall, William, The Group Mind. A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology. [REVIEW] Société Française de Philosophie, Bulletin 31:601.
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  21. Nils Dahlbäck, Mattias Kristiansson & Fredrik Stjernberg (2013). Distributed Remembering Through Active Structuring of Activities and Environments. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):153-165.
    In this paper, we consider a few actual cases of mnemonic strategies among older subjects (older than 65). The cases are taken from an ethnographic study, examining how elderly adults cope with cognitive decline. We believe that these cases illustrate that the process of remembering in many cases involve a complex distributed web of processes involving both internal or intracranial and external sources. Our cases illustrate that the nature of distributed remembering is shaped by and subordinated to the dynamic characteristics (...)
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  22. Mike Dama & Kevin Dunbar (1996). Distributed Reasoning: An Analysis of Where Social and Cognitive Worlds Fuse. In Garrison W. Cottrell (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum 166--170.
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  23. Guillaume Deffuant & Sylvie Huet (2009). Collective Increase of First Impression Bias. Complexity 15 (5):NA-NA.
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  24. Rebecca DeWinter (2001). The Anti-Sweatshop Movement: Constructing Corporate Moral Agency in the Global Apparel Industry. Ethics and International Affairs 15 (2):99–115.
    Through the use of rhetoric linking private economic transactions and international labor and human rights standards, the movement has successfully challenged corporate practices that were previously considered unremarkable.
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  25. Merlin Donald (2012). The Slow Process : A Hypothetical Cognitive Adaptation for Distributed Cognitive Networks. In Jay Schulkin (ed.), New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Adaptation and Cephalic Expression. Palgrave Macmillan
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  26. H. C. Dowdall (1926). The Application of Ward's Psychology to the Legal Problem of Corporate Entity. The Monist 36 (1):111-135.
    The unity of the group mind is a psychoplastic unity. In the group mind subjects are integrated through an object and not objects through a subject. It follows, among many much more important consequences, that a scientific analysis and arrangement of the law relating to corporations should proceed in the manner practically indicated in the Law of Limited Companies, Corporations Sole, Trusts, Bankruptcy, Local Government, and so forth, that is to say, by the estatificatian of interests and not by the (...)
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  27. Jon Dron (2006). The Teacher, the Learner and the Collective Mind. AI and Society 21 (1-2):200-216.
    This paper deals with techniques for tapping processes of self-organisation in adult learning. It looks at systems that make use of evolution and stigmergy (communication through signs left in the environment) to generate a kind of group mind, which both influences and is influenced by the actions of its constituents. Such systems exhibit both high structure and high dialogue, constraining choice and providing freedom at the same time. This makes them very interesting educationally as theory suggests that such opposites cannot (...)
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  28. B. Dupriez (1985). An Experiment on the Collective Pragmatic Competence. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 39 (155):434-441.
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  29. Beatrice Edgell (1920). W. McDougall, The Group Mind. [REVIEW] Hibbert Journal 19:165.
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  30. Seba Eldridge (1944). Development of Collective Enterprise. Philosophical Review 53 (2):216-216.
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  31. Anna Estany & David Casacuberta (2012). Contributions of Socially Distributed Cognition to Social Epistemology: The Case of Testimony. Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 16 (16):40-68.
    El objetivo de este artículo es analizar y revisar las normas que filosóficamente asociamos al proceso de testimonio, inquiriendo hasta qué puntoson0 consistentes con los conocimientos empíricos de las ciencias cognitivas.Tradicionalmente, el problema del testimonio surgía cuando, desde una epistemología de corte individualista, se suponía, siguiendo el dictum ya marcado en la Modernidad tanto por racionalistas como por empiristas, de que el conocimiento debía ser testado personalmente. Sin embargo, disciplinas y enfoques recientes, como la Cognición Socialmente Distribuida y la Epistemología (...)
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  32. Martin M. Fagin, Jeremy K. Yamashiro & William C. Hirst (2013). The Adaptive Function of Distributed Remembering: Contributions to the Formation of Collective Memory. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):91-106.
    Empirical research has increasingly turned its attention to distributed cognition. Acts of remembering are embedded in a social, interactional context; cognitive labor is divided between a rememberer and external sources. The present article examines the benefits and costs associated with distributed, collaborative, conversational remembering. Further, we examine the consequences of joint acts of remembering on subsequent individual acts of remembering. Here, we focus on influences on memory through social contagion and socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting. Extending beyond a single social interaction, (...)
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  33. Moira Gatens & Genevieve Lloyd (2000). Collective Imaginings. Mind 109 (436):904-907.
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  34. Ronald Giere, Models as Parts of Distributed Cognitive Systems.
    Recent work on the role of models in science has revealed a great many kinds of models performing many different roles. In this paper I suggest that one can find much unity among all this diversity by thinking of many models as being components of distributed cognitive systems. I begin by distinguishing the relevant notion of a distributed cognitive system and then give examples of different kinds of models that can be thought of as functioning as components of such systems. (...)
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  35. Ronald Giere (2002). 15 Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press 285.
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  36. Ronald N. Giere, Computation and Agency in Scientific Cognition.
    I begin with a representative example of a contemporary scientific activity, observations using the Hubble Space Telescope, and ask what approaches within the cognitive sciences seem most fruitful as aids in developing an overall account of this sort of scientific activity. After presenting the Hubble Space Telescope System and a recent result, I consider applying a standard computational paradigm to this system. I find difficulties in identifying an appropriate cognitive agent and in making a suitable place for the instrumentation that (...)
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  37. Ronald N. Giere (2011). Distributed Cognition as Human Centered Although Not Human Bound: Reply to Vaesen 1. Social Epistemology 25 (4):393 - 399.
    At issue is the usefulness of a concept of distributed cognition for the philosophy of science. I have argued for the desirability of regarding scientific systems such as the Hubble Space Telescope as distributed cognitive systems. But I disagree with those who would ascribe cognitive states, such as knowledge, to such systems as a whole, and insist that cognitive states are ascribable only to the human components of such systems. Vaesen, appealing to a well-known ?parity principle,? insists that if there (...)
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  38. Ronald N. Giere (2007). Distributed Cognition Without Distributed Knowing. Social Epistemology 21 (3):313-320.
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  39. Ronald N. Giere (2002). Discussion Note: Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):637-644.
    In Epistemic Cultures (1999), Karin Knorr Cetina argues that different scientific fields exhibit different epistemic cultures. She claims that in high energy physics (HEP) individual persons are displaced as epistemic subjects in favor of experiments themselves. In molecular biology (MB), by contrast, individual persons remain the primary epistemic subjects. Using Ed Hutchins' (1995) account of navigation aboard a traditional US Navy ship as a prototype, I argue that both HEP and MB exhibit forms of distributed cognition. That is, in both (...)
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  40. Ronald N. Giere (2002). Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):637--644.
  41. Ronald N. Giere & B. Moffatt (2003). Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge. Social Studies of Science 33:301--310.
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  42. Ronald N. Giere (2006). The Role of Agency in Distributed Cognitive Systems. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):710-719.
    In previous publications I have argued that much scientific activity should be thought of as involving the operation of distributed cognitive systems. Since these contributions to the cognitive study of science appear in venues not necessarily frequented by philosophers of science, I begin with a brief introduction to the notion of a distributed cognitive system. I then describe what I take to be an exemplary case of a scientific distributed cognitive system, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). I do not here (...)
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  43. M. Gilbert (2002). Belief and Acceptance as Features of Groups. Protosociology 16:35-69.
    In everyday discourse groups or collectives are often said to believe this or that. The author has previously developed an account of the phenomenon to which such collective belief statements refer. According to this account, in terms that are explained, a group believes that p if its members are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. Those who fulfill these conditions are referred to here as collectively believing* that p. Some philosophers – here labeled rejectionists – have argued (...)
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  44. Margaret Gilbert (2006). Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):94–114.
  45. Olav Gjelsvik (2008). Review of Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid, G. Lynn Stephens (Eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Cognition and Social Context. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
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  46. Natalie Gold & Daniel Harbour (2012). Cognitive Primitives of Collective Intentions: Linguistic Evidence of Our Mental Ontology. Mind and Language 27 (2):109-134.
    Theories of collective intentions must distinguish genuinely collective intentions from coincidentally harmonized ones. Two apparently equally apt ways of doing so are the ‘neo-reductionism’ of Bacharach (2006) and Gold and Sugden (2007a) and the ‘non-reductionism’ of Searle (1990, 1995). Here, we present findings from theoretical linguistics that show that we is not a cognitive primitive, but is composed of notions of I and grouphood. The ramifications of this finding on the structure both of grammatical and lexical systems suggests that an (...)
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  47. Rob Goldstone & Georg Theiner (forthcoming). The Multiple, Interacting Levels of Cognitive Systems (MILCS) Perspective on Group Cognition. Philosophical Psychology.
    In approaching the question of whether groups of people can have cognitive capacities that are fundamentally different than the cognitive capacities of the individuals within the group, we lay out a Multiple, Interactive Levels of Cognitive Systems (MILCS) framework. The goal of MILCS is to explain the kinds of cognitive processes typically studied by cognitive scientists, such as perception, attention, memory, categorization, decision making, problem solving, and judgment. Rather than focusing on high-level constructs such as modules in an information processing (...)
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  48. Brian Gordon & Georg Theiner (2015). Scaffolded Joint Action as a Micro–Foundation of Organizational Learning. In Charles B. Stone & Lucas Bietti (eds.), Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past. Psychology Press 154-186.
    Organizational learning, at the broadest levels, as it has come to be understood within the organization theory and management literatures, concerns the experientially driven changes in knowledge processes, structures, and resources that enable organizations to perform skillfully in their task environments (Argote and Miron–Spektor, 2011). In this chapter, we examine routines and capabilities as an important micro–foundation for organizational learning. Adopting a micro–foundational approach in line with Barney and Felin (2013), we propose a new model for explaining how routines and (...)
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  49. Ian J. Grand (1999). Collaboration and Creativity: An Interdisciplinary Study. Dissertation, The Union Institute
    This dissertation describes research concerning the use of imaginal processes in collaborative settings. ;In this project, my co-researcher, Maria Ellen Chiaia, and I first developed a dyadic approach to Sandplay work. Sandplay is an imaginal exploration of the psyche usually done in a clinical setting and focusing upon an individual client. Clients pick figurines from a display that includes figures of gods and goddesses, heroes and heroines, animals and trees and arrange them in a tray. Aspects of the psyche of (...)
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  50. Adam Green (2014). Evaluating Distributed Cognition. Synthese 191 (1):79-95.
    Human beings are promiscuously social creatures, and contemporary epistemologists are increasingly becoming aware that this shapes the ways in which humans process information. This awareness has tended to restrict itself, however, to testimony amongst isolated dyads. As scientific practice ably illustrates, information-processing can be spread over a vast social network. In this essay, a credit theory of knowledge is adapted to account for the normative features of strongly distributed cognition. A typical credit theory analyzes knowledge as an instance of obtaining (...)
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