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  1. Lilian Alweiss (2003). Collective Guilt and Responsibility Some Reflections. European Journal of Political Theory 2 (3):307-318.
    Does our responsibility extend to deeds that have been performed in our name? Is our modern understanding of responsibility in need of revision? Arendt holds that it is not necessary to revise our conception of responsibility since there are two forms of responsibility: a moral and a political one. Margalit, in turn, argues that our conception of responsibility is too narrow. We are not only morally responsible for the deeds we have performed or neglected to perform but also for the (...)
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  2. Karl-Otto Apel (1993). How to Ground a Universalistic Ethics of Co-Responsibility for the Effects of Collective Actions and Activities? Philosophica 52:9-29.
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  3. Denis G. Arnold (2006). Corporate Moral Agency. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):279–291.
    "The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).
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  4. Ian Ashman & Diana Winstanley (2007). For or Against Corporate Identity? Personification and the Problem of Moral Agency. Journal of Business Ethics 76 (1):83 - 95.
    This article explores the concept of corporate identity from a moral perspective. In it we argue that the reification and personification involved in attributing an identity to an organization has moral repercussions. Through a discussion of 'intentionality' we suggest that it is philosophically problematic to treat an abstraction of the corporation as possessing identity or acting as a conscious moral agent. The article moves to consider practical and ethical issues in the areas of organizational commitment, of health and safety, and (...)
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  5. Robin Attfield (1971). Collective Responsibility. Analysis 32 (1):31 - 32.
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  6. Guy Axtell, Responsibilism: A Proposed Shared Research Program.
    Originally titled “Institutional, Group, and Individual Virtue,” this was my paper for an Invited Symposium on "Intersections between Social, Feminist, and Virtue Epistemologies," APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2011, San Diego. -/- Abstract: This paper examines recent research on individual, social, and institutional virtues and vices; the aim is to explore and make proposals concerning their inter-relationships, as well as to highlight central questions for future research with the study of each. More specifically, the paper will focus on how these (...)
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  7. Alison Bailey (2001). Taking Responsibility for Community Violence. In Peggy DesAutels & JoAnne Waugh (eds.), FEMINISTS DOING ETHICS.
    This article examines the responses of two communities to hate crimes in their cities. In particular it explores how community understandings of responsibility shape collective responses to hate crimes. I use the case of Bridesberg, Pennsylvania to explore how anti-racist work is restricted by backward-looking conceptions of moral responsibility (e.g. being responsible). Using recent writings in feminist ethics.(1) I argue for a forward-looking notion that advocates an active view: taking responsibility for attitudes and behaviors that foster climates in which hate (...)
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  8. Isabelle Baker (2011). To What Extent Can We Overcome the „Bystander Effects‟ of Collective Responsibility in Matters of Global Injustice? Emergent Australasian Philosophers 4 (1).
    Where do we draw the line between individual and collective responsibilities? Can collectives be „morally responsible‟ in the same way that individuals can? This paper explores the Bystander Effect – how an individual‟s sense of personal responsibility can become „diffused‟ when they become part of a collective. This is compared to the issue of the collective responsibility of the „developed world‟ to aid the „Third World‟ that ethicists, such Peter Singer and Iris Marion Young believe to be true. I consider (...)
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  9. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Individual Responsibility for Carbon Emissions: Is There Anything Wrong with Overdetermining Harm? In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise stress (...)
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  10. Saba Bazargan, Individual Responsibility for Collectively Committed Harms.
    I develop an account that addresses the moral permissibility of and responsibility for participating in cooperative ventures in which each member contributes marginally to a substantial, aggregate harm. I argue that a basis for assessing the morally permissibility of and responsibility for participation in such collectives should not be limited to the intentions and the causal contributions of the participant, but should also include the purpose – what I call the ‘functional role’ of the individual in the collective venture. This (...)
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  11. Martin Benjamin (1998). Why Blame the Organization? A Pragmatic Analysis of Collective Moral Responsibility. Teaching Philosophy 21 (2):201-204.
  12. Martin Benjamin (1976). Can Moral Responsibility Be Collective and Nondistributive? Social Theory and Practice 4 (1):93-106.
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  13. Petersson Björn (forthcoming). Collective Omissions and Responsibility. Philosophical Papers.
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  14. Gunnar Björnsson (2014). Essentially Shared Obligations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
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  15. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Joint Responsibility Without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis. In Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel & Nicole Vincent (eds.), Moral Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Springer.
    This paper introduces a new family of cases where agents are jointly morally responsible for outcomes over which they have no individual control, a family that resists standard ways of understanding outcome responsibility. First, the agents in these cases do not individually facilitate the outcomes and would not seem individually responsible for them if the other agents were replaced by non-agential causes. This undermines attempts to understand joint responsibility as overlapping individual responsibility; the responsibility in question is essentially joint. Second, (...)
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  16. Gunnar Björnsson & Bengt Brülde (forthcoming). Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources. In Kristien Hens, Dorothee Horstkötter & Daniela Cutas (eds.), Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics. Springer.
    Attributions of what we shall call normative responsibilities play a central role in everyday moral thinking. It is commonly thought, for example, that parents are responsible for the wellbeing of their children, and that this has important normative consequences. Depending on context, it might mean that parents are morally required to bring their children to the doctor, feed them well, attend to their emotional needs, or to see to it that someone else does. Similarly, it is sometimes argued that countries (...)
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  17. T. Boyer, C. Mayo-Wilson & M. Weisberg (eds.) (forthcoming). Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge.
  18. Thom Brooks (2002). Cosmopolitanism and Distributing Responsibilities. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5 (3):92-97.
    David Miller raises a number of interesting concerns with both weak and strong variants of cosmopolitanism. As an alternative, he defends a connection theory to address remedial responsibilities amongst states. This connection theory is problematic as it endorses a position where states that are causally and morally responsible for deprivation and suffering in other states may not be held remedially responsible for their actions. In addition, there is no international mechanism to ensure either that remedially responsible states offer assistance to (...)
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  19. Richard Child (2009). Should We Hold Nations Responsible? Res Publica 15 (2):195-202.
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  20. Chris Chulos (2010). The Collective and the Individual in Russia. The European Legacy 6 (4):513-516.
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  21. P. L. Cochran & D. Nigh (forthcoming). ÔIllegal Corporate Behavior and the Question of Moral Agency: An Empirical ExaminationÕ. Empirical Studies of Business Ethics and Values, V.(Jai Press, Greenwich, Ct).
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  22. Zac Cogley (2012). Tamler Sommers: Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  23. Stephanie Collins (2013). Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
    Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss (...)
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  24. D. E. Cooper (1968). Collective Responsibility. Philosophy 43 (165):258 - 268.
    Philosophers constantly discuss Responsibility. Yet in every discussion of which I am aware, a rather obvious point is ignored. The obvious point is that responsibility is ascribed to collectives, as well as to individual persons. Blaming attitudes are held towards collectives as well as towards individuals. Responsibility is often ascribed to nations, towns, clubs, groups, teams, and married couples. ‘Germany was responsible for the Second World War’; ‘The club as a whole is to blame for being relegated’. Such statements are (...)
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  25. David E. Cooper (1969). Collective Responsibility: Again. Philosophy 44 (168):153 - 155.
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  26. David E. Cooper (1969). Collective Responsibility—Again: PHILOSOPHY. Philosophy 44 (168):153-155.
    I shall not try to deal with all of the interesting points Mr. R. S. Downie raises against my paper, Collective Responsibility . I shall deal with a matter of clarification, one of the lesser issues between us, and the major issue between us. . On one point, surely, Downie has simply misunderstood what I said. He claims that my criticisms do not work against the common view that Responsibility is analytically tied to blameworthiness; but only apainst the claim that (...)
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  27. David Copp (2012). The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis: Reply to Ludwig and Miller. Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (1):78-95.
  28. J. Angelo Corlett (2001). Collective Moral Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):573–584.
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  29. Neta C. Crawford (2007). Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2):187–212.
  30. John R. Danley (1980). Corporate Moral Agency. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:140-149.
  31. Paul Davis (1994). Collective Responsibility and the Subjective Standpoint. Cogito 8 (2):155-158.
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  32. Maksymilian Del Mar (2011). Concerted Practices and the Presence of Obligations: Joint Action in Competition Law and Social Philosophy. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 30 (1):105-140.
    This paper considers whether, and if so how, the modelling of joint action in social philosophy – principally in the work of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman – might assist in understanding and applying the concept of concerted practices in European competition law. More specifically, the paper focuses on a well-known difficulty in the application of that concept, namely, distinguishing between concerted practice and rational or intelligent adaptation in oligopolistic markets. The paper argues that although Bratman’s model of joint action (...)
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  33. Rebecca DeWinter (2001). The Anti-Sweatshop Movement: Constructing Corporate Moral Agency in the Global Apparel Industry. Ethics and International Affairs 15 (2):99–115.
    Through the use of rhetoric linking private economic transactions and international labor and human rights standards, the movement has successfully challenged corporate practices that were previously considered unremarkable.
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  34. H. C. Dowdall (1926). The Application of Ward's Psychology to the Legal Problem of Corporate Entity. The Monist 36 (1):111-135.
    The unity of the group mind is a psychoplastic unity. In the group mind subjects are integrated through an object and not objects through a subject. It follows, among many much more important consequences, that a scientific analysis and arrangement of the law relating to corporations should proceed in the manner practically indicated in the Law of Limited Companies, Corporations Sole, Trusts, Bankruptcy, Local Government, and so forth, that is to say, by the estatificatian of interests and not by the (...)
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  35. R. S. Downie (1982). Collective Responsibility in Health Care. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 7 (1):43-56.
    There is a widespread assumption that responsibility in health care is vested in the last resort in the individual doctor who is caring for a given patient. In the first section of this article I shall try to bring out the plausibility of this assumption, and examine the concept of collective responsibility which it allows. In the second and third sections I shall try to show the fatal weaknesses of the assumption in its unmodified form, and shall argue that if (...)
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  36. R. S. Downie (1969). Collective Responsibility. Philosophy 44 (167):66 - 69.
    In his paper ‘Collective Responsibility’ Mr. D. E. Cooper argues for the thesis that collectives can be held responsible in a sense not reducible to the individual responsibility of the members of the collective. And he uses this conclusion to support views of individual responsibility and of blame and punishment which he wishes to assert independently. Is hall argue that although there is a sense in which the actions and responsibility of a collective cannot be analysed in terms of the (...)
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  37. Wim Dubbink & Jeffery Smith (2011). A Political Account of Corporate Moral Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):223-246.
    Should we conceive of corporations as entities to which moral responsibility can be attributed? This contribution presents what we will call a political account of corporate moral responsibility. We argue that in modern, liberal democratic societies, there is an underlying political need to attribute greater levels of moral responsibility to corporations. Corporate moral responsibility is essential to the maintenance of social coordination that both advances social welfare and protects citizens’ moral entitlements. This political account posits a special capacity of self-governance (...)
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  38. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (1999). Social Structure and Responsibility. Loyola Poverty Law Journal 5:1-26.
    We now live in a world with unprecedented possibilities. Technology is quickly reaching the point at which it will be within our grasp to cure any ailment: medical, psychological, or social. Yet we are already falling behind in the curative use of our newfound abilities. With our new technologies we have it within our means to feed the world and to eradicate sicknesses common only in developing countries. However, the use of these *2 abilities is governed by a social system (...)
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  39. David Evans (2001). Book Review. Moral Responsibility in the Holocaust: A Study in the Ethics of Character David H. Jones. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):485-488.
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  40. Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist (2009). Moral Responsibility for Environmental Problems—Individual or Institutional? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (2):109-124.
    The actions performed by individuals, as consumers and citizens, have aggregate negative consequences for the environment. The question asked in this paper is to what extent it is reasonable to hold individuals and institutions responsible for environmental problems. A distinction is made between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. Previously, individuals were not seen as being responsible for environmental problems, but an idea that is now sometimes implicitly or explicitly embraced in the public debate on environmental problems is that individuals are appropriate (...)
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  41. Joel Feinberg (1968). Collective Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 65 (21):674-688.
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  42. Black Feminism (2006). Combahee River Collective. In Elizabeth Hackett & Sally Anne Haslanger (eds.), Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader. Oxford University Press. 412.
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  43. Albert Flores & Deborah G. Johnson (1983). Collective Responsibility and Professional Roles. Ethics 93 (3):537-545.
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  44. Peter Forrest (1998). Collective Responsibility and Restitution. Philosophical Papers 27 (2):79-91.
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  45. Peter A. French (1984). The Principle of Responsive Adjustment in Corporate Moral Responsibility: The Crash on Mount Erebus. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 3 (2):101 - 111.
    The tragic crash of Air New Zealand's flight TE-901 into Mt. Erebus in Antarctica provides a fascinating case for the exploration of the notion of corporate moral responsibility. A principle of accountability that has Aristotelian roots and is significantly different from the usual strict intentional action principles is examined and defined. That principle maintains that a person can be held morally accountable for previous non-intentional behavior that has harmful effects if the person does not take corrective measures to adjust his (...)
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  46. Peter A. French, Jeffrey Nesteruk & David T. Risser (1992). Corporations in the Moral Community. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.
  47. Jan Edward Garrett (1989). Unredistributable Corporate Moral Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 8 (7):535 - 545.
    Certain cases of corporate action seem especially resistant to a shared moral evaluation. Conservatives may argue that if bad intentions cannot be demonstrated, corporations and their managers are not blame-worthy, while liberals may insist that the results of corporate actions were predictable and so somebody must be to blame. Against this background, the theory that sometimes a corporation's moral responsibility cannot be redistributed, even in principle, to the individuals involved, seems quite attractive.This doctrine of unredistributable corporate moral responsibility (UCMR) is, (...)
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  48. Jennifer L. Geddes (2009). Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility. By Peg Birmingham. Hypatia 24 (1):208-211.
  49. Margaret Gilbert (2006). Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):94–114.
  50. Margaret Gilbert (1997). Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):65-84.
    Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch a plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group (...)
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