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  1. Lilian Alweiss (2003). Collective Guilt and Responsibility Some Reflections. European Journal of Political Theory 2 (3):307-318.
    Does our responsibility extend to deeds that have been performed in our name? Is our modern understanding of responsibility in need of revision? Arendt holds that it is not necessary to revise our conception of responsibility since there are two forms of responsibility: a moral and a political one. Margalit, in turn, argues that our conception of responsibility is too narrow. We are not only morally responsible for the deeds we have performed or neglected to perform but also for the (...)
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  2. Guy Axtell, (2011) Responsibilism: A Proposed Shared Research Program.
    Originally titled “Institutional, Group, and Individual Virtue,” this was my paper for an Invited Symposium on "Intersections between Social, Feminist, and Virtue Epistemologies," APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2011, San Diego. -/- Abstract: This paper examines recent research on individual, social, and institutional virtues and vices; the aim is to explore and make proposals concerning their inter-relationships, as well as to highlight central questions for future research with the study of each. More specifically, the paper will focus on how these (...)
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  3. Alison Bailey (2001). Taking Responsibility for Community Violence. In Peggy DesAutels & JoAnne Waugh (eds.), FEMINISTS DOING ETHICS.
    This article examines the responses of two communities to hate crimes in their cities. In particular it explores how community understandings of responsibility shape collective responses to hate crimes. I use the case of Bridesberg, Pennsylvania to explore how anti-racist work is restricted by backward-looking conceptions of moral responsibility (e.g. being responsible). Using recent writings in feminist ethics.(1) I argue for a forward-looking notion that advocates an active view: taking responsibility for attitudes and behaviors that foster climates in which hate (...)
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  4. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Individual Responsibility for Carbon Emissions: Is There Anything Wrong with Overdetermining Harm? In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise stress (...)
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  5. Martin Benjamin (1998). Why Blame the Organization? A Pragmatic Analysis of Collective Moral Responsibility. Teaching Philosophy 21 (2):201-204.
  6. Martin Benjamin (1976). Can Moral Responsibility Be Collective and Nondistributive? Social Theory and Practice 4 (1):93-106.
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  7. Gunnar Björnsson (2014). Essentially Shared Obligations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
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  8. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Joint Responsibility Without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis. In Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel & Nicole Vincent (eds.), Compatibilist Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Springer.
    This paper introduces a new family of cases where agents are jointly morally responsible for outcomes over which they have no individual control, a family that resists standard ways of understanding outcome responsibility. First, the agents in these cases do not individually facilitate the outcomes and would not seem individually responsible for them if the other agents were replaced by non-agential causes. This undermines attempts to understand joint responsibility as overlapping individual responsibility; the responsibility in question is essentially joint. Second, (...)
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  9. Thom Brooks (2002). Cosmopolitanism and Distributing Responsibilities. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5 (3):92-97.
    David Miller raises a number of interesting concerns with both weak and strong variants of cosmopolitanism. As an alternative, he defends a connection theory to address remedial responsibilities amongst states. This connection theory is problematic as it endorses a position where states that are causally and morally responsible for deprivation and suffering in other states may not be held remedially responsible for their actions. In addition, there is no international mechanism to ensure either that remedially responsible states offer assistance to (...)
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  10. Richard Child (2009). Should We Hold Nations Responsible? Res Publica 15 (2):195-202.
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  11. Zac Cogley (2012). Tamler Sommers: Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  12. Stephanie Collins (2013). Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
    Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss (...)
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  13. J. Angelo Corlett (2001). Collective Moral Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):573–584.
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  14. Neta C. Crawford (2007). Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2):187–212.
  15. Maksymilian Del Mar (2011). Concerted Practices and the Presence of Obligations: Joint Action in Competition Law and Social Philosophy. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 30 (1):105-140.
    This paper considers whether, and if so how, the modelling of joint action in social philosophy – principally in the work of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman – might assist in understanding and applying the concept of concerted practices in European competition law. More specifically, the paper focuses on a well-known difficulty in the application of that concept, namely, distinguishing between concerted practice and rational or intelligent adaptation in oligopolistic markets. The paper argues that although Bratman’s model of joint action (...)
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  16. H. C. Dowdall (1926). The Application of Ward's Psychology to the Legal Problem of Corporate Entity. The Monist 36 (1):111-135.
    The unity of the group mind is a psychoplastic unity. In the group mind subjects are integrated through an object and not objects through a subject. It follows, among many much more important consequences, that a scientific analysis and arrangement of the law relating to corporations should proceed in the manner practically indicated in the Law of Limited Companies, Corporations Sole, Trusts, Bankruptcy, Local Government, and so forth, that is to say, by the estatificatian of interests and not by the (...)
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  17. R. S. Downie (1982). Collective Responsibility in Health Care. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 7 (1):43-56.
    There is a widespread assumption that responsibility in health care is vested in the last resort in the individual doctor who is caring for a given patient. In the first section of this article I shall try to bring out the plausibility of this assumption, and examine the concept of collective responsibility which it allows. In the second and third sections I shall try to show the fatal weaknesses of the assumption in its unmodified form, and shall argue that if (...)
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  18. Wim Dubbink & Jeffery Smith (2011). A Political Account of Corporate Moral Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):223-246.
    Should we conceive of corporations as entities to which moral responsibility can be attributed? This contribution presents what we will call a political account of corporate moral responsibility. We argue that in modern, liberal democratic societies, there is an underlying political need to attribute greater levels of moral responsibility to corporations. Corporate moral responsibility is essential to the maintenance of social coordination that both advances social welfare and protects citizens’ moral entitlements. This political account posits a special capacity of self-governance (...)
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  19. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (1999). Social Structure and Responsibility. Loyola Poverty Law Journal 5:1-26.
    We now live in a world with unprecedented possibilities. Technology is quickly reaching the point at which it will be within our grasp to cure any ailment: medical, psychological, or social. Yet we are already falling behind in the curative use of our newfound abilities. With our new technologies we have it within our means to feed the world and to eradicate sicknesses common only in developing countries. However, the use of these *2 abilities is governed by a social system (...)
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  20. David Evans (2001). Book Review. Moral Responsibility in the Holocaust: A Study in the Ethics of Character David H. Jones. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):485-488.
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  21. Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist (2009). Moral Responsibility for Environmental Problems—Individual or Institutional? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (2):109-124.
    The actions performed by individuals, as consumers and citizens, have aggregate negative consequences for the environment. The question asked in this paper is to what extent it is reasonable to hold individuals and institutions responsible for environmental problems. A distinction is made between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. Previously, individuals were not seen as being responsible for environmental problems, but an idea that is now sometimes implicitly or explicitly embraced in the public debate on environmental problems is that individuals are appropriate (...)
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  22. Peter A. French (1984). The Principle of Responsive Adjustment in Corporate Moral Responsibility: The Crash on Mount Erebus. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 3 (2):101 - 111.
    The tragic crash of Air New Zealand's flight TE-901 into Mt. Erebus in Antarctica provides a fascinating case for the exploration of the notion of corporate moral responsibility. A principle of accountability that has Aristotelian roots and is significantly different from the usual strict intentional action principles is examined and defined. That principle maintains that a person can be held morally accountable for previous non-intentional behavior that has harmful effects if the person does not take corrective measures to adjust his (...)
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  23. Peter A. French, Jeffrey Nesteruk & David T. Risser (1992). Corporations in the Moral Community. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.
  24. Jan Edward Garrett (1989). Unredistributable Corporate Moral Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 8 (7):535 - 545.
    Certain cases of corporate action seem especially resistant to a shared moral evaluation. Conservatives may argue that if bad intentions cannot be demonstrated, corporations and their managers are not blame-worthy, while liberals may insist that the results of corporate actions were predictable and so somebody must be to blame. Against this background, the theory that sometimes a corporation's moral responsibility cannot be redistributed, even in principle, to the individuals involved, seems quite attractive.This doctrine of unredistributable corporate moral responsibility (UCMR) is, (...)
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  25. Jennifer L. Geddes (2009). Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility. By Peg Birmingham. Hypatia 24 (1):208-211.
  26. Margaret Gilbert (2006). Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):94–114.
  27. John Martin Gillroy (1992). Public Policy and Environmental Risk: Political Theory, Human Agency, and the Imprisoned Rider. Environmental Ethics 14 (3):217-237.
    In this essay, I argue that environmental risk is a strategic situation that places the individual citizen in the position of an imprisoned rider who is being exploited without his or her knowledge by the preferences of others. I contend that what is at stake in policy decisions regarding environmental risk is not numerical probabilities or consistent, complete, transitive preferences for individual welfare, but rather respect for the human agency of the individual. Human agency is a prerequisite to one’s utility (...)
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  28. Elsa González (2002). Defining a Post-Conventional Corporate Moral Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 39 (1-2):101 - 108.
    The stakeholder approach offers the opportunity to consider corporate responsibility in a wider sense than that afforded by the stockholder or shareholder approaches. Having said that, this article aims to show that this theory does not offer a normative corporate responsibility concept that can be our response to two basic questions. On the one hand, for what is the company morally responsible and, on the other hand, why is the corporation morally responsible in terms of conventional and post-conventional perspectives? The (...)
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  29. Keith Graham (2006). Imposing and Embracing Collective Responsibility: Why the Moral Difference? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):256–268.
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  30. Keith Graham (2001). The Moral Significance of Collective Entities. Inquiry 44 (1):21 – 41.
    The claim is that some collective entities can be thought of as part of the moral realm by virtue of their status as objects of moral concern. Collectivities are defined in terms of irreducibly corporate action and distinctive conditions of persisting identity. Their lack of sentience does not preclude moral concern, and their raison d'être may render moral concern for them appropriate. Recent attempts by Pettit, McMahon, and Broome to limit the moral realm to individuals are considered. They are rebutted (...)
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  31. Ken Hanly (1991). The Moral Responsibility of Corporations. Dialogue 30 (04):555-.
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  32. F. Allan Hanson (2008). The Anachronism of Moral Individualism and the Responsibility of Extended Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):415-424.
    Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism’s explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections (...)
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  33. Virginia Held (2002). Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Ethics 6 (2):157-178.
    When a group of persons such as a nation orcorporation has a relatively clear structureand set of decision procedures, it is capableof acting and should, it can well be argued, beconsidered morally as well as legallyresponsible. This is not because it is afull-fledged moral person, but becauseassigning responsibility is a human practice,and we have good moral reasons to adopt thepractice of considering such groupsresponsible. From such judgments, however,little follows about the responsibility ofindividual members of such groups; much moreneeds to be (...)
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  34. Tracy Isaacs (2006). Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective Intention. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):59–73.
  35. Tracy Lynn Isaacs (2011). Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Oxford University Press.
    Intentional collective action -- Collective moral responsibility -- Collective guilt -- Individual responsibility for (and in) collective wrongs -- Collective obligation, individual obligation, and individual moral responsibility -- Individual moral responsibility in wrongful social practice.
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  36. Robert Jubb (2014). Participation in and Responsibility for State Injustices. Social Theory and Practice 40 (1):51-72.
    This paper discusses the criteria for acceptably holding citizens partly responsible for wrongs their state or its agents commit. Some proposed criteria are not, it argues, appropriately sensitive to the particular coercive relation between state and citizen. Others, which are, conceive of it wrongly and fail to match our judgments about a range of cases. Alternative criteria of breadth and joint authorship, built around Christopher Kutz's account of participation, better match these considered judgments as well as linking them to a (...)
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  37. Robert Jubb (2012). Contribution to Collective Harms and Responsibility. Ethical Perspectives 19 (4):733-764.
    In this paper, I discuss the claim, endorsed by a number of authors, that contributing to a collective harm is the ground for special responsibilities to the victims of that harm. Contributors should, between them, cover the costs of the harms they have inflicted, at least if those harms would otherwise be rights-violating. I raise some doubts about the generality of this principle before moving on to sketch a framework for thinking about liability for the costs of harms in general. (...)
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  38. Neil Levy (2003). Cultural Membership and Moral Responsibility. The Monist 86 (2):145-163.
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  39. Chieh-Peng Lin, Shwu-Chuan Chen, Chou-Kang Chiu & Wan-Yu Lee (2011). Understanding Purchase Intention During Product-Harm Crises: Moderating Effects of Perceived Corporate Ability and Corporate Social Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 102 (3):455-471.
    A company’s product-harm crises often lead to negative publicity which substantially affects purchase intention. This study attempts to examine the purchase intention and its antecedents (e.g., perceived negative publicity) during product-harm crises by simultaneously including perceived corporate ability (CA) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) as moderators. In the study’s proposed model, purchase intention is indirectly affected by perceived CA, negative publicity, and CSR via the mediation of trust and affective identification. At the same time, the influences of perceived negative publicity (...)
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  40. Christian List & Pettit (2012). Episteme Symposium on Group Agency: Replies to Gaus, Cariani, Sylvan, and Briggs. Episteme 9 (3):293-309.
    Discussion Christian List, Philip Pettit, Episteme , FirstView Article.
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  41. Kirk Ludwig (2007). The Argument From Normative Autonomy for Collective Agents. Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (3):410–427.
  42. Alice Maclachlan (forthcoming). Book Symposium / Tribune du Livre Isaacs, Tracy. Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts New York: Oxford University Press, 2011 Collective Roles, Responsibilities, and Relatings. Dialogue:1-10.
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  43. Alice MacLachlan (forthcoming). Beyond the Ideal Political Apology. In Mihaela Mihai & Mathias Thaler (eds.), The Uses and Abuses of Apology. Palgrave MacMillan.
    As official apologies by political, corporate, and religious leaders becoming increasingly commonplace – offered in response to everything from personal wrongdoing to historical oppression and genocide – providing a plausible account of what such apologies can and cannot accomplish is of paramount importance. Yet reigning theories of apology typically conceive of them primarily as moral and not political phenomena, often modeling official apologies after interpersonal ones. This risks distorting the meaning and function of political apologies, while holding them to an (...)
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  44. Alice MacLachlan (2012). The Philosophical Controversy Over Political Forgiveness. In Paul van Tongeren, Neelke Doorn & Bas van Stokkom (eds.), Public Forgiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts. Intersentia. 37-64.
    The question of forgiveness in politics has attained a certain cachet. Indeed, in the fifty years since Arendt commented on the notable absence of forgiveness in the political tradition, a vast and multidisciplinary literature on the politics of apology, reparation, and reconciliation has emerged. To a novice scouring the relevant literatures, it might appear that the only discordant note in this new veritable symphony of writings on political forgiveness has been sounded by philosophers. There is a more-than-healthy cynicism directed at (...)
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  45. Pekka Mäkelä (2007). Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (3):456–468.
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  46. Martin Hees Matthew Brahavanm (forthcoming). Responsibility Voids. Philosophical Quarterly.
    We present evidence for the existence of 'responsibility voids' in committee decision-making, that is, the existence of situations where no member of a committee can individually be held morally responsible for the outcome. We analyse three types of reasons (causal, normative and epistemic) for the emergence of responsibility voids, and show that each of them can occur in committees. But the conditions for these voids are so restrictive as to reduce the philosophical or institutional significance they might be thought to (...)
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  47. Larry May (2005). Collective Responsibility, Honor, and the Rules of War. Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (3):289–304.
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  48. Jeff McMahan (2006). Liability and Collective Identity: A Response to Walzer. Philosophia 34 (1):13-17.
    There is much to admire in Michael Walzer’s discussion of terrorism and just war. I particularly applaud his insistence that liability to attack is a matter of action rather than membership or collective identity. “It is,” he writes, “the extension of violence or the threat..
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  49. Gregory Mellema (2006). Collective Responsibility and Contributing to an Outcome. Criminal Justice Ethics 25 (2):17-22.
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  50. David Miller (2004). Holding Nations Responsible. Ethics 114 (2):240-268.
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