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Color Experience

Edited by Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)
Assistant editor: Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
About this topic
Summary What is the relationship between colors and our experiences of colors? Are the properties presented to us in color experience colors, or properties related to colors in some way other than identity? What do color experiences reveal to us about colors? Do color experiences suggest that things in the world are colored? Do they suggest that mental items are colored? Do they suggest that anything is colored? Is it possible for two subjects to have identical color experience that represent different color properties, or different color experiences that represent the same color? If so, must one of the experiences be in error? Can two color experiences differ phenomenally without differing in their representational features?
Key works In the 1990's, philosophers discussed general issues about perception by focusing on color. A good sample of key papers from this period is in Byrne & Hilbert 1997. Byrne and Hilbert's introduction is a useful overview of the issues. Johnston 1992 focuses on what color experience reveals about color properties, and spurred debate about whether any close cousins of the notion of acquaintance discussed by Russell 1912 characterize color experience.  Shoemaker 1982 discusses a thought experiment from Locke 1979 in which the same color looks different to two perceivers, focusing initially on whether this is possible, and if so whether it would involve any illusion.  The status of this thought experiment spurred debate about all of the central issues in the philosophy of perception.
Introductions Byrne & Hilbert 1997; Johnston 1992; Campbell 1997.
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  1. Edward Averill (2012). The Phenomenological Character of Color Perception. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):27-45.
    When an object looks red to an observer, the visual experience of the observer has two important features. The experience visually represents the object as having a property—being red. And the experience has a phenomenological character; that is, there is something that it is like to have an experience of seeing an object as red. Let qualia be the properties that give our sensory and perceptual experiences their phenomenological character. This essay takes up two related problem for a nonreductive account (...)
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  2. Thomas Baldwin (1992). The Projective Theory of Sensory Content. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
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  3. Laura Berchielli (1995). Bilder Im Geiste. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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  4. Laura Berchielli (1995). Representing Color: Discussions and Problems. In Bilder Im Geiste. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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  5. Vincent A. Billock & Brian H. Tsou (2004). Color, Qualia, and Psychophysical Constraints on Equivalence of Color Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):164-165.
    It has been suggested that difficult-to-quantify differences in visual processing may prevent researchers from equating the color experience of different observers. However, spectral locations of unique hues are remarkably invariant with respect to everything other than gross differences in preretinal and photoreceptor absorptions. This suggests a stereotyping of neural color processing and leads us to posit that minor differences in observer neurophysiology may be irrelevant to color experience.
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  6. Berit Brogaard (2009). Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth. Philosophical Books 50 (4):213-226.
    I will begin with a brief presentation of C & H’s arguments against nonindexical contextualism, temporalism, and relativism. I will then offer a general argument against the monadic truth package. Finally, I will offer arguments in favor of nonindexical contextualism and temporalism.
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  7. Berit Brogaard, Simo Vanni & Juha Silvanto (forthcoming). Seeing Mathematics: Perception and Brain Activity in a Case of Acquired Synesthesia. Neurocase.
    We studied the patient JP who has exceptional abilities to draw complex geometrical images by hand and a form of acquired synesthesia for mathematical formulas and objects, which he perceives as geometrical figures. JP sees all smooth curvatures as discrete lines, similarly regardless of scale. We carried out two preliminary investigations to establish the perceptual nature of synesthetic experience and to investigate the neural basis of this phenomenon. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, image-inducing formulas produced larger fMRI (...)
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  8. Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  9. John Campbell (2005). Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
    What knowledge of the colors does perception of the colors provide? My first aim in this essay is to characterize the way in which color experience seems to provide knowledge of colors. This in turn tells us something about what it takes for there to be colors. Color experience provides knowledge of the aspect of the world that is being acted on when we, or some external force, act on the color of an object and thus make a difference to (...)
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  10. David J. Chalmers (2006). Perception and the Fall From Eden. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 49--125.
    In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory.
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  11. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
    The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...)
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  12. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Color Relationalism and Color Phenomenology. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 13.
    Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between subjects and objects. The most historically important form of color relationalism is the classic dispositionalist view according to which, for example red is the disposition to look red to standard observers in standard conditions (mutatis mutandis for other colors).1 However, it has become increasingly apparent in recent years that a commitment to the relationality of colors bears interest that goes beyond dispositionalism (Cohen, 2004; Matthen, 1999, 2001, (...)
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  13. Jonathan Cohen (2009/2011). The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford.
    The space of options -- The argument from perceptual variation -- Variation revisited : objections and responses -- Relationism defended : linguistic and mental representation of color -- Relationism defended : ontology -- Relationism defended : phenomenology -- A role functionalist theory of color -- Role functionalism and its relationalist rivals.
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  14. Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.) (2010). Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.
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  15. Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). The Truth About 'the Truth About True Blue'. Analysis 67 (294):162–166.
    It can happen that a single surface S, viewed in normal conditions, looks pure blue (“true blue”) to observer John but looks blue tinged with green to a second observer, Jane, even though both are normal in the sense that they pass the standard psychophysical tests for color vision. Tye (2006a) finds this situation prima facie puzzling, and then offers two different “solutions” to the puzzle.1 The first is that at least one observer misrepresents S’s color because, though normal in (...)
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  16. Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (2010). Introduction. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.
    The Introduction discusses determinables and similarity spaces and ties together the contributions to Color Ontology and Color Science.
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  17. Kevin Connolly (2011). Does Perception Outstrip Our Concepts in Fineness of Grain? Ratio 24 (3):243-258.
    We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first suggested by (...)
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  18. Steven Davis (ed.) (2000). Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Color has been studied for centuries, but has never been completely understood. Digital technology has recently sparked a burgeoning interdisciplinary interest in color. The fact that color is a quality of perception rather than a physical quality brings up a host of interesting questions of interest to both artists and scholars. This volume--the ninth in the Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science series--brings together chapters by psychologists, philosophers, computer scientists, and artists to explore the nature of human color perception with the (...)
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  19. Lieven Decock & Igor Douven (2013). Qualia Compression. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):129-150.
    Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for the fundamental unknowability of other persons’ color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualia may go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion—termed ‘‘color qualia compression’’—and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia (...)
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  20. Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin (2013). The Structure of Color Experience and the Existence of Surface Colors. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.
    Color experience is structured. Some ?unique? colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as ?pure,? or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as ?binary colors.? According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on these assumptions to argue (...)
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  21. Frances Egan (2008). The Content of Color Experience. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):407–414.
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  22. Mark Eli Kalderon, The Multiply Qualitative.
    What is the relation between colors and our experience of them? A na?ve thought is this?the phenomenal character of color experience is determined by the qualitative character of the perceived color. When Norm perceives a red tomato, the qualitative character of his color experience is determined by the qualitative character of the color manifest in his experience of the tomato. If however, colors are mind- independent qualities of material objects, as they seem, pre-philosophically to be, then this can seem to (...)
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  23. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab, Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different from (...)
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  24. Justin C. Fisher, Color Representations as Hash Values.
    The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: When we have mental states that represent certain things as being colored, what properties are our mental states representing these things as having?
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  25. Robert J. Fogelin (1984). Hume and the Missing Shade of Blue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):263-272.
  26. Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
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  27. Ute Guzzoni (2005). Wasser: Das Meer Und Die Brunnen, Die Flüsse Und der Regen. Parerga.
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  28. C. L. Hardin (2000). Red and Yellow, Green and Blue, Warm and Cool: Explaining Color Appearance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):113-122.
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  29. Gilbert Harman (1996). Explaining Objective Color in Terms of Subjective Reactions. Philosophical Issues 7:1-17.
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  30. Gilbert Harman (1996). Qualia and Color Concepts. Philosophical Issues 7:75-79.
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  31. Benj Hellie (2005). Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability. Mind 114 (455):481-508.
    Perception represents colours inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.
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  32. David R. Hilbert (2005). Color Constancy and the Complexity of Color. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):141-158.
    We can start with a definition. “[C]olour constancy is the constancy of the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in the intensity and spectral composition of the illumination.” (Foster et al. 1997) Given the definition we can now ask a question: Does human color vision exhibit color constancy?1 The answer to the question depends in part on how we interpret it. If the question is understood as asking whether human color vision displays constancy for every possible scene across every possible (...)
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  33. David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2010). How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind? In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 259.
    forthcoming in Color Ontology and Color Science, ed. J. Cohen and M. Matthen (MIT).
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  34. Emmett L. Holman (2002). Color Eliminativism and Color Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quareterly 83 (1):38-56.
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  35. Mariann Hudak, Zoltan Jakab & Ilona Kovacs (2013). Phenomenal Qualities and the Development of Perceptual Integration. In Liliana Albertazzi (ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology; Visual Perception of Shape, Space and Appearance. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this chapter, data concerning the development of principal aspects of vision is reviewed. First, the development of colour vision and luminance perception is discussed. Relevant data accumulated so far indicates that perception of colour and luminance is present by 6-9 months of age. The presence of typical color illusions at this age suggests that the phenomenal character of color experience is comparable to that of adults well before the first birthday. Thus it seems plausible that color perception develops on (...)
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  36. Zoltan Jakab (2006). Revelation and Normativity in Visual Experience. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):25-56.
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  37. Zoltán Jakab (2005). Opponent Processing, Linear Models, and the Veridicality of Color Perception. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 336--378.
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  38. Zoltan Jakab (2003). Phenomenal Projection. Psyche 9 (4).
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  39. Mark Eli Kalderon (forthcoming). Color and the Problem of Perceptual Presence. Dialectica.
    Very often, objects in the scene before us are somehow perceived to be constant or uniform or unchanging in color, shape, size, or position, even while their appearance with respect to these features somehow changes. This is a familiar and pervasive fact about perception, even if it is notoriously difficult to describe accurately let alone adequately account for. These difficulties are not unrelated—how we are inclined to describ the phenomenology of perceptual constancy will affect how we are inclined to accoun (...)
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  40. Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). The Multiply Qualitative. Mind 120 (478):239-262.
    Shoemaker argues that one could not hold both that the qualitative character of colour experience is inherited from the qualitative character of the experienced colour and that there are faultless forms of variation in colour perception. In this paper, I explain what is meant by inheritance and discuss in detail the problematic cases of perceptual variation. In so doing I argue that these claims are in fact consistent, and that the appearance to the contrary is due to an optional and (...)
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  41. Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Color Illusion. Noûs 45 (4):751-775.
    As standardly conceived, an illusion is an experience of an object o appearing F where o is not in fact F. Paradigm examples of color illusion, however, do not fit this pattern. A diagnosis of this uncovers different sense of appearance talk that is the basis of a dilemma for the standard conception. The dilemma is only a challenge. But if the challenge cannot be met, then any conception of experience, such as representationalism, that is committed to the standard conception (...)
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  42. Mark Eli Kalderon (2008). Metamerism, Constancy, and Knowing Which. Mind 117 (468):549-585.
    When Norm perceives a red tomato in his garden, Norm perceives the tomato and its sensible qualities.
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  43. Andreas Kemmerling (2007). &Quot;the Property of Being Red&Quot;: On Frank Jackson's Opacity Puzzle and His New Theory of the Content of Colour Experience. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):187 - 202.
    Frank Jackson has a new objectivist and representationalist account of the content of colour-experience. I raise several objections both against the account itself and, primarily, against how he tries to support it. He argues that the new account enables us to see what is wrong with the so-called Opacity Puzzle. This alleged puzzle is an argument in which a seemingly implausible conclusion is derived from three premises of which seem plausible to an representationalist. Jackson.
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  44. Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.
    I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners ofpresentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. (...)
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  45. Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.
    I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs (...)
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  46. Richard Krivin (2004). The What and How of Color Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):165-166.
    Palmer (1999) and the commentators examine whether qualia are produced by the relational processes of functionalism. This is an exploration of how qualia are produced. The wealth of data provided by the target article and the commentaries also provide information about what qualia are. The present commentary further explores this topic.
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  47. Joseph Levine (2006). Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing. Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
    In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: (i) physicalism about the non-mental world, (ii) consistency with what is known from color science, and (iii) transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral re?ectance, subjectivism, dispositional- ism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet (...)
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  48. Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies (...)
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  49. Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist (...)
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  50. Fiona Macpherson (2003). Novel Colours and the Content of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
    I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of (...)
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