Compatibilism Edited by Neil Levy (Oxford University)

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  1. John Abbruzzese (2000). Garrett on the Theological Objection to Hume's Compatibilism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):345 – 352.
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  2. Kristin Andrews (2003). Neurophilosophy of Free Will by Henrik Walter. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):166-175.
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  3. Bruce Aune (1970). Free Will, 'Can', and Ethics: A Reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30 (January):77-83.
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  4. Bruce Aune (1963). Abilities, Modalities, and Free Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (March):397-413.
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  5. A. J. Ayer (1954). Freedom and Necessity. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophical Essays. St.
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  6. A. Bain (1880). Dr. Ward on Free-Will. Mind 5 (17):116-124.
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  7. Lynne Rudder Baker, What is Human Freedom?
    After centuries of reflection, the issue of human freedom remains vital largely because of its connection to moral responsibility. When I ask—What is human freedom?—I mean to be asking what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? Questions about moral responsibility are intimately connected to questions about social policy and justice; so, the issue of moral responsibility—of desert, of whether or not anyone is ever really praiseworthy or blameworthy—has practical as well as theoretical significance.
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  8. Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
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  9. Mark Balaguer (2009). The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis). Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-24.
    It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes-for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will-except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questionsnamely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility-are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about (...)
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  10. D. Balsillie (1911). Prof. Bergson on Time and Free Will. Mind 20 (79):357-378.
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  11. Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni & Jessica L. Alquist (2011). Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries. Neuroethics 4 (1):31-34.
    Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries Content Type Journal Article Pages 31-34 DOI 10.1007/s12152-010-9067-3 Authors Roy F. Baumeister, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA A. William Crescioni, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Jessica L. Alquist, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Journal Neuroethics Online ISSN 1874-5504 Print ISSN 1874-5490 Journal Volume Volume 4 Journal Issue Volume 4, Number 1.
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  12. Donald L. M. Baxter (1989). Free Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):12-24.
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  13. Ansgar Beckermann, Would Biological Determinism Rule Outthe Possibility of Freedom?
    I shall disclose the answer to the title question straight away, and the answer is “NO, it would not”. If it turned out that we really are neurobi- ologically determined beings, this result would not necessitate any change in our idea of humanity – it would not affect the idea that we are free and responsible human beings. Or at any rate, it would not do so under certain conditions of which I am sure that, as a matter of fact, (...)
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  14. Ansgar Beckermann (2005). Free Will in a Natural Order of the World. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophie Und/Als Wissenschaft. Mentis.
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  15. Helen Beebee (2008). Smilansky's Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism. Analysis 68 (299):258–260.
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  16. Helen Beebee (2003). Local Miracle Compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2):258-277.
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  17. Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele (2002). Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.
    Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a (...)
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  18. Yemima Ben-Menahem (1986). Newcomb's Paradox and Compatibilism. Erkenntnis 25 (2):197 - 220.
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  19. Jonathan Bennett, Accountability.
    I shall present a problem about accountability, and its solution by Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Some readers of this don’t see it as a profound contribution to moral philosophy, and I want to help them. It may be helpful to follow up Strawson’s gracefully written discussion with a more staccato presentation. My treatment will also be angled somewhat differently from his, so that its lights and shadows will fall with a certain difference, which may make it serviceable even to the (...)
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  20. S. Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
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  21. S. Benson (1987). Freedom and Value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.
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  22. Sven Bernecker (2006). Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
    This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.
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  23. Mark H. Bernstein (2005). Can We Ever Be Really, Truly, Ultimately, Free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12.
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  24. Bernard Berofsky (2010). Free Will and the Mind–Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
    Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the (...)
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  25. Bernard Berofsky (2006). Global Control and Freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
    Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, (...)
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  26. Bernard Berofsky (1995). Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.
    This is the most detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy currently available. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A (...)
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  27. Preben Bertelsen (1999). Free Will in Psychology—In Search of a Geniuin Compatibilism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):41-77.
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  28. John D. Bishop (1993). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.
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  29. Robert C. Bishop (2003). Free Will in Absentia: Dennett on Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):168-183.
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  30. David C. Blumenfeld (1988). Freedom and Mind Control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):215-27.
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  31. Susanne Bobzien (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.
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  32. Hilary Bok (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press.
    Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I (...)
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  33. Anthony Robert Booth (2009). Compatibilism and Free Belief. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12.
    Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p . In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
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  34. Thomas Boysen (2004). Death of a Compatibilistic Intuition. Sats 5 (2):92-104.
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  35. Raymond Bradley, The Meaning of Life Reflections on God, Immortality, and Free Will.
    Philosophers, and other thinking people, have long pondered three grand questions about the nature of reality and our status and significance within it.
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  36. M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (1976). Action Theory. Reidel.
    INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITORS Gilbert Ryle, in his Concept of Mind (1949), attacked volitional theories of human actions; JL Austin, in his "If and Cans" ...
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  37. Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.
    It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of (...)
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  38. S. S. S. Browne (1942). Paralogisms of the Free-Will Problem. Journal of Philosophy 39 (19):513-520.
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  39. Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Compatibilism and Doxastic Control. Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.
    Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
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  40. Sarah Buss, Personal Autonomy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous agents are self-governing agents. Most of us want to be autonomous because we want to be accountable for what we do, and because it seems that if we are not the ones calling the shots, then we cannot be accountable. More importantly, perhaps, the value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration. We don't want to be alien to, or at war with, ourselves; and it seems that (...)
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  41. Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (2002). Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.
    The original essays in this book address Harry Frankfurt's influential writing on personal identity, love, value, moral responsibility, and the freedom and ...
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  42. Jeremy Byrd (2008). Kant's Compatibilism in the New Eludication of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition. Kant-Studien 99 (1):68-79.
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  43. Joseph K. Campbell (2005). Compatibilist Alternatives. Canadian Journal Of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.
    _If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in (...)
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  44. Joseph K. Campbell (1997). A Compatibilist Theory of Alternate Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):339-44.
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  45. John V. Canfield (1963). Free Will and Determinism: A Reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.
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  46. John V. Canfield (1962). The Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Review 71 (July):352-368.
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  47. John V. Canfield (1961). Determinism, Free Will and the Ace Predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416.
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  48. L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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  49. Luca Castagnoli (2011). The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ancient Philosophy 31 (1):228-235.
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  50. Hugh S. Chandler (1985). Book Review:God, Free Will, and Morality. Robert J. Richman. Ethics 95 (3):743-.
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  51. Vere Chappell, Descartes’s Compatibilism.
    Compatibilism is the doctrine that the doctrine of determinism is logically consistent with the doctrine of libertarianism. Determinism is the doctrine that every being and event is brought about by causes other than itself. Libertarianism is the doctrine that some human actions are free. Was Descartes a compatibilist? There is no doubt that he was a libertarian: his works are full of professions of freedom, human as well as divine. And though he held that God has no cause other than (...)
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  52. Randolph Clarke (2009). Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism. Mind 118 (470):323-351.
    This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points (...)
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  53. E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield (2007). Alfred Mele's Metaphysical Freedom? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
    In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument.
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  54. Claudio F. Costa (2006). Free Will and the Soft Constraints of Reason. Ratio 19 (1):1-23.
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  55. Paul Crissman (1942). Freedom in Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 39 (September):520-526.
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  56. Stefaan E. Cuypers (forthcoming). Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:-.
    In the debate on free will and moral responsibility, Saul Smilansky is a hard source-incompatibilist who objects to source-compatibilism for being morally shallow. After criticizing John Martin Fischer’s too optimistic response to this objection, this paper dissipates the charge that compatibilist accounts of ultimate origination are morally shallow by appealing to the seriousness of contingency in the framework of, what Paul Russell calls, compatibilist-fatalism. Responding to the objection from moral shallowness thus drives a wedge between optimists and fatalists within the (...)
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  57. Stefaan E. Cuypers (2006). The Trouble with Externalist Compatibilist Autonomy. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):171-196.
    In this paper, I try to show that externalist compatibilism in the debate on personal autonomy and manipulated freedom is as yet untenable. I will argue that Alfred R. Mele’s paradigmatic, history-sensitive externalism about psychological autonomy in general and autonomous deliberation in particular faces an insurmountable problem: it cannot satisfy the crucial condition of adequacy “H” for externalist theories that I formulate in the text. Specifically, I will argue that, contrary to first appearances, externalist compatibilism does not resolve the CNC (...)
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  58. Stefaan E. Cuypers (2004). The Trouble with Harry: Compatibilist Free Will Internalism and Manipulation. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):235-254.
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  59. Arthur C. Danto (1959). The Paradigm Case Argument and the Free-Will Problem. Ethics 69 (2):120-124.
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  60. Arthur C. Danto & Sidney Morgenbesser (1957). Character and Free Will. Journal of Philosophy 54 (16):493-505.
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  61. Lars Dänzer (2008). A Neglected Argument for Compatibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):211-218.
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  62. Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
  63. Wayne A. Davis (1991). The World-Shift Theory of Free Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):206-211.
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  64. Scott A. Davison (1994). Dretske on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Analysis 54 (2):115-123.
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  65. Russell Daw & Torin Alter (2001). Free Acts and Robot Cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57.
    (H1) ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..
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  66. Oisín Deery (2007). Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame. Res Publica 13 (3).
    In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that (...)
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  67. Daniel Dennett (2005). Natural Freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):449-459.
    Dearly beloved, I want to thank Brother Tim O’Connor for his candid reactions to my published sermons this Sunday morning, and I welcome you all, in the spirit of ecumenicism, to the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism. Before the collection plate is passed, let me tell you a bit more about the Church. Our symbol is of course the Darwin-fish, the four-legged evolver that echoes the ancient fish symbol of Christianity. I was wearing my Darwin-fish lapel pin at an evolutionary theory (...)
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  68. Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Natural Freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):449-458.
    Three critics of Freedom Evolves (Dennett 2003) bring out important differences in philosophical outlook and method. Mele’s thought experiments are supposed to expose the importance, for autonomy, of personal history, but they depend on the dubious invocation of mere logical or conceptual possibility. Fischer defends the Basic Argument for incompatibilism, while Taylor and I choose to sidestep it instead of disposing of it. Where does the burden of proof lie? O’Connor’s candid expression of allegiance to traditional ideas that I reject (...)
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  69. Daniel C. Dennett (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. MIT Press.
    Essays discuss reason, self-control, self-definition, time, cause and effect, accidents, and responsibility, and explain why people want free will.
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  70. Daniel C. Dennett & Christopher Taylor, Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities.
    There is no doctrine about determinism and freedom that has proved to be as resilient over the past century as that of Compatibilism. It is, of course, the doctrine that we can be both free and also subject to a real determinism. If it goes back at least to Hobbes and Hume, it was strengthened and refurbished throughout the 1900's. Part of its strength has been the extent to which it has satisfied theses that in fact seem to be the (...)
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  71. Clement Dore (1963). Is Free Will Compatible with Determinism? Philosophical Review 72 (October):500-501.
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  72. Andreas Dorschel (2002). The Authority of the Will. Philosophical Forum 33 (3-4):425-442.
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  73. Richard Double (1996). Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):847-854.
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  74. Richard Double (1988). Meta-Compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (October):323-329.
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  75. Fred Dretske (1992). The Metaphysics of Freedom. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):1-13.
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  76. Göran Duus-Otterström (2010). Betting Against Compatibilism. Res Publica 16 (4):383-396.
    Some argue that libertarianism represents the riskier incompatibilist view when it comes to the free will problem. An ethically cautious incompatibilist should bet that we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, these theorists claim, as doing so means that we no longer run the risk of holding the morally innocent responsible. In this paper, I show that the same reasoning also advises us to bet against compatibilism. Supposing that we are unsure about whether or not the (...)
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  77. Gerald B. Dworkin (1970). Acting Freely. Noûs 4 (November):367-83.
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  78. Antony Eagle, Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Hume and Frankfurt.
    Hume begins his discussion of ‘liberty and necessity’ with some philosophical methodology that it is wise to keep in mind—namely, that in philosophical discussions it is of the first importance to get clear on what the terms under discussion mean, if we are to avoid ‘obscure sophistry’ or ‘beat[ing] the air in. . . fruitless contests’ (¶1–2).1 Hume’s hope in this particular instance is that with intelligible definitions, the controversy over the compatibility of free will and determinism will dissipate. Hume, (...)
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  79. Jonathan Edwards (2009). Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, The Works of Jonathan Edward, Vol. I. Yale University Press.
    Presents an analysis of Jonathan Edwards' theological position. This book includes a study of his life and the intellectual issues in the America of his time, and examines the problem of free will in connection with Leibniz, Locke, and Hume.
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  80. Jonathan Edwards (1797/1974). A Dissertation Concerning Liberty & Necessity. New York,B. Franklin Reprints.
    A DISSERTA TION CONCERNING LIBERTY and NECESSITY; CONTAINING REMARKS VN THE ESSAYS of Dr. SAMUEL WEST, WRITINGS OF SEVERAL OTHER AUTHORS, ON THOSE SUBJECTS. ...
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  81. Richard W. Eggerman (1976). The Language of Soft Determinism. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):91-99.
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  82. Laura W. Ekstrom (1998). Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument. Synthese 115 (3):333-54.
    The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: (...)
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  83. Stephen Everson (1990). Aristotle's Compatibilism in the Nicomachean Ethics. Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):81-103.
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  84. Haskell Fain (1958). Prediction and Constraint. Mind 67 (July):366-378.
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  85. Evan Fales (1984). Davidson's Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):227-246.
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  86. Arthur E. Falk (1981). On Some Modal Confusions in Compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):141-48.
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  87. Michael Fara (2008). Masked Abilities and Compatibilism. Mind 117 (468):843 - 865.
    An object's disposition to A in circumstances C is masked if circumstances C obtain without the object Aing. This paper explores an analogous sense in which abilities can be masked, and it uses the results of this exploration to motivate an analysis of agents' abilities in terms of dispositions. This analysis is then shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to (...)
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  88. Asaf Federman (2010). What Kind of Free Will Did the Buddha Teach? Philosophy East and West 60 (1):pp. 1-19.
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  89. Yiftach J. H. Fehige (2005). Über Menschliche Freiheit. [REVIEW] Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger (58):230-239.
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  90. Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2009). Do Judgments About Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.
    Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks’ philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that identifying groups (...)
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  91. Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer (2009). Natural Compatibilism Versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.
    In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. (...)
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  92. J. M. Fischer (2008). Review: Alfred R. Mele: Free Will and Luck. Mind 117 (465):195-201.
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  93. John Martin Fischer (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..
    Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader (...)
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  94. John Martin Fischer (2005). Dennett on the Basic Argument. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):427-435.
    Christopher Taylor has greatly clarified my thinking on this topic and shown me how to launch a deeper and more radical campaign in support of my earlier claims to this effect, and our coauthored paper (Taylor and Dennett 2001) provides more technical detail than is needed here. Here I will attempt a gentler version of our argument, highlighting the main points so that non-philosophers can at least see what the points of contention are, and how we propose to settle them, (...)
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  95. John Martin Fischer (2002). Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism. In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.
    In this essay I shall begin by sketching a "Frankfurt-type example." I shall then lay out a disturbing challenge to the claim I have made above that these examples help us to make significant progress in the debates about the relationship between moral responsibility and causal determinism. I then will provide a reply to this challenge, and the reply will point toward a more refined formulation of the important contribution I believe Frankfurt has made to defending a certain sort of (...)
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  96. John Martin Fischer (1996). A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):49-66.
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  97. Antony Flew (1973). Compatibilism, Free Will and God. Philosophy 48 (185):231 - 244.
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  98. Thomas P. Flint (1991). In Defence of Theological Compatibilism. Faith and Philosophy 8 (2):237-243.
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  99. Thomas P. Flint (1987). Compatibilism and the Argument From Unavoidability. Journal of Philosophy 84 (August):423-40.
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  100. Richard Foley (1981). Compatibilism: A Reply to Shaw. Mind 90 (April):287-288.
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