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Summary Compatibilist views of free will hold that free will is compatible with causal determinism. Classical compatibilists argued that determinism does not entail that agents lack alternative possibilities. They often advanced conditional accounts of alternatives (eg, the agent can do otherwise if, were she to want to do otherwise, she would). In more recent times, compatibilists have often denied that we need a power to do otherwise for freedom. Most contemporary compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with but does not require determinism. So-called Hobartian compatibilists hold that determinism is required for free will.
Key works Compatibilism was influentially defended by Hume 2009 and Hobbes 1651. Hume defended the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise. Hobart 1934 argued that free will actually requires determinism to be true. Non-traditional compatibilist accounts stem fromFrankfurt 1969, which argues that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility (and, presumably, freedom). In Frankfurt 1971, an influential hierarchical account of free will is defended. Strawson 1962 develops an account of free will on which agents' reactive attitudes towards others is central. Very recently, there has been a rival of something like a conditional analysis of freedom, inspired by Lewisian work on dispositions; Vihvelin 2004 is an excellent defence of the view.
Introductions As usual, the entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - McKenna 2008 - is excellent. Though he is not (quite) a compatibilist himself, Fischer 2007 is a thorough articulation and defence, as is Haji 2002.
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  1. John Abbruzzese (2000). Garrett on the Theological Objection to Hume's Compatibilism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):345 – 352.
  2. Patrick Proctor Alexander (1866/1975). Mill and Carlyle: An Examination of Mr. John Stuart Mill's Doctrine of Causation in Relation to Moral Freedom with an Occasional Discourse on Sauerteig by Smelfungus [I.E. P. P. Alexander]. [REVIEW] Norwood Editions.
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  3. Henry E. Allison (1996). Review of Kant's Compatibilism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 105 (1).
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  4. Kristin Andrews (2003). Neurophilosophy of Free Will by Henrik Walter. Philo 6 (1):166-175.
  5. G. E. M. Anscombe (1976). 'Soft' Determinism. In Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Oriel Press.
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  6. Bruce Aune (1970). Free Will, 'Can', and Ethics: A Reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30 (January):77-83.
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  7. Bruce Aune (1963). Abilities, Modalities, and Free Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (March):397-413.
  8. A. J. Ayer (1991). Free-Will and Determinism. In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.
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  9. A. J. Ayer (1991). Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.
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  10. A. J. Ayer (1980). Free Will and Rationality. In Z. van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects. Oxford University Press.
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  11. A. J. Ayer (1954). Freedom and Necessity. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophical Essays. St.
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  12. John Baer (2008). 16 Free Will Requires Determinism. In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. 304.
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  13. Archie J. Bahm (1965). The Freedom-Determinism Controversy. Pakistan Philosophical Journal 9 (January):48-55.
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  14. A. Bain (1880). Dr. Ward on Free-Will. Mind 5 (17):116-124.
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  15. Lynne Rudder Baker, What is Human Freedom?
    After centuries of reflection, the issue of human freedom remains vital largely because of its connection to moral responsibility. When I ask—What is human freedom?—I mean to be asking what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? Questions about moral responsibility are intimately connected to questions about social policy and justice; so, the issue of moral responsibility—of desert, of whether or not anyone is ever really praiseworthy or blameworthy—has practical as well as theoretical significance.
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  16. Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
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  17. Mark Balaguer (2009). The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis). Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-24.
    It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about (...)
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  18. D. Balsillie (1911). Prof. Bergson on Time and Free Will. Mind 20 (79):357-378.
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  19. Steven Barbone (1994). Compatibilism In the First Critique. Idealistic Studies 24 (2):111-122.
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  20. J. E. Barnhart (1977). Theodicy and the Free Will Defence: Response to Plantinga and Flew. Religious Studies 13 (4):439 - 453.
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  21. Bruce Bassoff (1964). Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Existentialism 4:259-262.
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  22. Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni & Jessica L. Alquist (2011). Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries. Neuroethics 4 (1):31-34.
    Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries Content Type Journal Article Pages 31-34 DOI 10.1007/s12152-010-9067-3 Authors Roy F. Baumeister, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA A. William Crescioni, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Jessica L. Alquist, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Journal Neuroethics Online ISSN 1874-5504 Print ISSN 1874-5490 Journal Volume Volume 4 Journal Issue Volume 4, Number 1.
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  23. Donald L. M. Baxter (1989). Free Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):12-24.
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  24. Benjamin Bayer, The Elusiveness of Doxastic Compatibilism.
    While many have explored the question of whether the concept moral responsibility can be made compatible with the prospect of determinism, few have applied compatibilist proposals to the concept of epistemic responsibility and its associated notion of doxastic freedom. This paper evaluates a few recent proposals for doxastic compatibilism that have emerged in recent years, and attempts to refine them for the sake of further evaluation. In particular I evaluate a version of Fischer and Ravizza's moderate reasons-responsiveness compatibilism as applied (...)
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  25. Ansgar Beckermann (2005). Free Will in a Natural Order of the World. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophie Und/Als Wissenschaft. Mentis.
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  26. Ansgar Beckermann (2003). Would Biological Determinism Rule Out the Possibility of Freedom? In Andreas Hüttemann (ed.), Determinism in Physics and Biology. Mentis. 136--149.
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  27. Helen Beebee (2008). Smilansky's Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism. Analysis 68 (299):258–260.
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  28. Helen Beebee (2003). Local Miracle Compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2):258-277.
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  29. Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele (2002). Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.
    Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a (...)
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  30. Yemima Ben-Menahem (1986). Newcomb's Paradox and Compatibilism. Erkenntnis 25 (2):197 - 220.
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  31. Jonathan Bennett, Accountability.
    I shall present a problem about accountability, and its solution by Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Some readers of this don’t see it as a profound contribution to moral philosophy, and I want to help them. It may be helpful to follow up Strawson’s gracefully written discussion with a more staccato presentation. My treatment will also be angled somewhat differently from his, so that its lights and shadows will fall with a certain difference, which may make it serviceable even to the (...)
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  32. Paul Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
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  33. S. Benson (1987). Freedom and Value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.
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  34. Frithjof Bergmann (1977). On Being Free. University of Notre Dame Press.
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  35. Sven Bernecker (2006). Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
    This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.
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  36. Mark H. Bernstein (2005). Can We Ever Be Really, Truly, Ultimately, Free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12.
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  37. Bernard Berofsky (2012). Nature's Challenge to Free Will. Oxford University Press, USA.
    Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly.Nature's Challenge to Free Willoffers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism.
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  38. Bernard Berofsky (2011). Compatibilism Without Frankfurt: Dispositional Analyses of Free Will. In Robert Kane (ed.), Handbook of Free Will, 2nd Ed.
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  39. Bernard Berofsky (2010). Free Will and the Mind–Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
    Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the (...)
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  40. Bernard Berofsky (2006). Global Control and Freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
    Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, (...)
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  41. Bernard Berofsky (2004). Autonomy and Free Will. In J. S. Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contermporary Philosophy. Cambridge.
    If the incompatibilist is right, determinism annuls free will, but not necessarily autonomy. The possibly deterministic origin of values and beliefs that are objectively grounded does not undermine the autonomy of agents who maintain these for the right reasons. Nonobjective perspectives—preferences about lifestyle, profession, choice of mate— cannot anyway be entirely removed even for an unlimited being. Moreover, if one were lucky to have inherited contingencies that mesh perfectly with the world one happened to inhabit even if it is deterministic, (...)
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  42. Bernard Berofsky (2003). Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet. In Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 107.
  43. Bernard Berofsky (2002). Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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  44. Bernard Berofsky (2000). Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.
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  45. Bernard Berofsky (1999). The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View, by Morton White. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):142-143.
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  46. Bernard Berofsky (1995). Liberation From Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.
    This is the most detailed, sophisticated and comprehensive treatment of autonomy currently available. Moreover it argues for a quite different conception of autonomy from that found in the philosophical literature. Professor Berofsky claims that the idea of autonomy originating in the self is a seductive but ultimately illusory one. The only serious way of approaching the subject is to pay due attention to psychology, and to view autonomy as the liberation from the disabling effects of physiological and psychological afflictions. A (...)
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  47. Preben Bertelsen (1999). Free Will in Psychology—In Search of a Geniuin Compatibilism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):41-77.
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  48. John D. Bishop (1993). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.
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  49. Robert C. Bishop (2003). Free Will in Absentia: Dennett on Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):168-183.
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  50. David C. Blumenfeld (1988). Freedom and Mind Control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):215-27.
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