Computability and Logic has become a classic because of its accessibility to students without a mathematical background and because it covers not simply the staple topics of an intermediate logic course, such as Godel’s incompleteness theorems, but also a large number of optional topics, from Turing’s theory of computability to Ramsey’s theorem. Including a selection of exercises, adjusted for this edition, at the end of each chapter, it offers a new and simpler treatment of the representability of recursive functions, a (...) traditional stumbling block for students on the way to the Godel incompleteness theorems. (shrink)

The theme of this book is formed by a pair of concepts: the concept of formal language as carrier of the precise expression of meaning, facts and problems, and the concept of algorithm or calculus, i.e. a formally operating procedure for the solution of precisely described questions and problems. The book is a unified introduction to the modern theory of these concepts, to the way in which they developed first in mathematical logic and computability theory and later in automata theory, (...) and to the theory of formal languages and complexity theory. Apart from considering the fundamental themes and classical aspects of these areas, the subject matter has been selected to give priority throughout to the new aspects of traditional questions, results and methods which have developed from the needs or knowledge of computer science and particularly of complexity theory. It is both a textbook for introductory courses in the above-mentioned disciplines as well as a monograph in which further results of new research are systematically presented and where an attempt is made to make explicit the connections and analogies between a variety of concepts and constructions. (shrink)

The fundamental ideas concerning computation and recursion naturally find their place at the interface between logic and theoretical computer science. The contributions in this book, by leaders in the field, provide a picture of current ideas and methods in the ongoing investigations into the pure mathematical foundations of computability theory. The topics range over computable functions, enumerable sets, degree structures, complexity, subrecursiveness, domains and inductive inference. A number of the articles contain introductory and background material which it is hoped will (...) make this volume an invaluable resource for specialists and non-specialists alike. (shrink)

Together, Models and Computability and its sister volume Sets and Proofs will provide readers with a comprehensive guide to the current state of mathematical logic. All the authors are leaders in their fields and are drawn from the invited speakers at 'Logic Colloquium '97' (the major international meeting of the Association of Symbolic Logic). It is expected that the breadth and timeliness of these two volumes will prove an invaluable and unique resource for specialists, post-graduate researchers, and the informed and (...) interested nonspecialist. (shrink)

Classic text considersgeneral theory of computability, computable functions, operations on computable functions, Turing machines self-applied, unsolvable decision problems, applications of general theory, mathematical logic, Kleene hierarchy, computable functionals, classification of unsolvable decision problems and more.

In recent years it has been convincingly argued that the Church-Turing thesis concerns the bounds of human computability: The thesis was presented and justified as formally delineating the class of functions that can be computed by a human carrying out an algorithm. Thus the Thesis needs to be distinguished from the so-called Physical Church-Turing thesis (or Thesis M), according to which all physically computable functions are Turing computable. The latter is often claimed to be false, or, if true, contingently so. (...) On all accounts, though, thesis M is not easy to give counterexamples to, but it is never asked why—how come that a thesis that transfers a notion from the strictly human domain to the general physical domain just happens to be so difficult to falsify (or even to be true). In this paper I articulate this question and consider several tentative answers to it. (shrink)

The chapters of this volume all have their own level of presentation. The topics have been chosen based on the active research interest associated with them. Since the interest in some topics is older than that in others, some presentations contain fundamental definitions and basic results while others relate very little of the elementary theory behind them and aim directly toward an exposition of advanced results. Presentations of the latter sort are in some cases restricted to a short survey of (...) recent results (due to the complexity of the methods and proofs themselves). Hence the variation in level of presentation from chapter to chapter only reflects the conceptual situation itself. One example of this is the collective efforts to develop an acceptable theory of computation on the real numbers. The last two decades has seen at least two new definitions of effective operations on the real numbers. (shrink)

It is well understood and appreciated that Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems apply to sufficiently strong, formal deductive systems. In particular, the theorems apply to systems which are adequate for conventional number theory. Less well known is that there exist algorithms which can be applied to such a system to generate a gödel-sentence for that system. Although the generation of a sentence is not equivalent to proving its truth, the present paper argues that the existence of these algorithms, when conjoined with Gödel’s (...) results and accepted theorems of recursion theory, does provide the basis for an apparent paradox. The difficulty arises when such an algorithm is embedded within a computer program of sufficient arithmetic power. The required computer program (an AI system) is described herein, and the paradox is derived. A solution to the paradox is proposed, which, it is argued, illuminates the truth status of axioms in formal models of programs and Turing machines. (shrink)

The ability to reason and think in a logical manner forms the basis of learning for most mathematics, computer science, philosophy and logic students. Based on the author's teaching notes at the University of Maryland and aimed at a broad audience, this text covers the fundamental topics in classical logic in an extremely clear, thorough and accurate style that is accessible to all the above. Covering propositional logic, first-order logic, and second-order logic, as well as proof theory, computability theory, and (...) model theory, the text also contains numerous carefully graded exercises and is ideal for a first or refresher course. (shrink)

It has been argued that neural networks and other forms of analog computation may transcend the limits of Turing-machine computation; proofs have been offered on both sides, subject to differing assumptions. In this article I argue that the important comparisons between the two models of computation are not so much mathematical as epistemological. The Turing-machine model makes assumptions about information representation and processing that are badly matched to the realities of natural computation (information representation and processing in or inspired by (...) natural systems). This points to the need for new models of computation addressing issues orthogonal to those that have occupied the traditional theory of computation. (shrink)

Church's thesis asserts that a number-theoretic function is intuitively computable if and only if it is recursive. A related thesis asserts that Turing's work yields a conceptual analysis of the intuitive notion of numerical computability. I endorse Church's thesis, but I argue against the related thesis. I argue that purported conceptual analyses based upon Turing's work involve a subtle but persistent circularity. Turing machines manipulate syntactic entities. To specify which number-theoretic function a Turing machine computes, we must correlate these syntactic (...) entities with numbers. I argue that, in providing this correlation, we must demand that the correlation itself be computable. Otherwise, the Turing machine will compute uncomputable functions. But if we presuppose the intuitive notion of a computable relation between syntactic entities and numbers, then our analysis of computability is circular. (shrink)

criticism defend the idea that an individual reader's understanding of a text can be a factor in determining the meaning of what is written in that text, and hence must play a part in determining the very identity conditions of works of literary art. We examine some accounts that have been given of the type of readerly ‘competence’ that a reader must have in order for her responses to a text to play this sort of constitutive role. We argue that (...) the analogy drawn by Stanley Fish and Jonathan Culler between literary and linguistic competence is philosophically flawed and explanatorily unfruitful, and that a better way of understanding the notion of literary competence can be constructed by appeal to some limitation results in formal logic and computability theory. (shrink)