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  1. Nancy Bauer (2007). The Second Feminism. Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy.
  2. Nancy Bauer (2006). Beauvoir's Heideggerian Ontology. In Margaret A. Simons (ed.), The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Critical Essays. Indiana University Press.
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  3. Brian D. Earp (2012). The Extinction of Masculine Generics. Journal for Communication and Culture 2 (1):4-19.
    In English, as in many other languages, male-gendered pronouns are sometimes used to refer not only to men, but to individuals whose gender is unknown or unspecified, to human beings in general (as in ―mankind‖) and sometimes even to females (as when the casual ―Hey guys‖ is spoken to a group of women). These so-called he/man or masculine generics have come under fire in recent decades for being sexist, even archaic, and positively harmful to women and girls; and advocates of (...)
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  4. Marilyn Frye (2011). Metaphors of Being a Phi. In Charlotte Witt (ed.), Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in the Ontology of Gender and the Self. Springer. 85--95.
  5. Peter Higgins (2012). Review of Witt, Charlotte: The Metaphysics of Gender (Oxford University Press, 2011). [REVIEW] Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 12 (1):19-21.
  6. Alice MacLachlan & Susanne Sreedhar (2012). Complicating Out: The Case of Queer Femmes. In Kelby Harrison & Dennis Cooley (eds.), Passing/Out: Sexual Identity Veiled and Revealed. Ashgate. 43-74.
    We take up questions of passing/outing as they arise for those with queer femme identities. We argue that for persons with female-identified bodies and queer, feminine (‘femme’) gender identities, the possibilities above may not exist as distinct options: for example, what it means to ‘pass’ or ‘cover’ is not always distinguishable – conceptually or in practice – from living authentically and resisting heteronormative identification: i.e. the conditions of being ‘out’. In some ways, these conflations privilege queer femmes; in others, femmes (...)
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  7. Mari Mikkola, Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Feminism is the movement to end women’s oppression. One possible way to understand ‘woman’ in this claim is to take it as a sex term: ‘woman’ picks out human females and being a human female depends on various anatomical features (like genitalia). Historically many feminists have understood ‘woman’ differently: not as a sex term, but as a gender term that depends on social and cultural factors (like social position). In so doing, they distinguished sex (being female or male) from gender (...)
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  8. Nancy Tuana (1986). A Reply to Laura Purdy. Hypatia 1 (1):175 - 178.
    This essay is a response to the comments and critique of Laura Purdy to my earlier paper "Re-Fusing Nature/Nurture" (1983, 621-632). In it I re-emphasize that the traditional nature/nurture dichotomy is based upon an unacceptable ontology and briefly note the type of metaphysic that would serve as a more appropriate basis.
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  9. Charlotte Witt (ed.) (2011). Feminist Metaphysics. Springer Verlag.
    Feminist Metaphysics is the first collection of articles addressing metaphysical issues from a feminist perspective.
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