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  1. Katalin Balog (2001). Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):645–652.
  2. Simon Blackburn (2000). Critical Notice of Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):119 – 124.
    (2000). Critical notice of Frank Jackson, from metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 119-124. doi: 10.1080/00048400012349401.
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  3. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested (...)
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  4. Paul Bloomfield (2005). Let's Be Realistic About Serious Metaphysics. Synthese 144 (1):69-90.
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  5. Richard Brown (2012). Editorial: Standing on the Verge: Lessons and Limits From the Empirical Study of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):597-599.
    The papers in this special issue are all descended from papers presented at the second Online Consciousness Conference. I founded the Online Consciousness Conference at Consciousness Online (http://consciousnessonline.wordpress.com) in 2008 mostly because no one else would. Being inspired by the Online Philosophy Conference, I mentioned to several people that it would be great if we had something like that in Consciousness Studies. People I talked to were very enthusiastic but no one seemed like they wanted to initiate the process. I (...)
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  6. Alex Byrne (1999). Cosmic Hermeneutics. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):347--84.
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  7. Peter Carruthers (2004). Reductive Explanation and the "Explanatory Gap". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.
    Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an.
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  8. David Chalmers (forthcoming). Frontloading and Fregean Sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeter, and Stanley. Analysis.
    A reply to Ram Neta, Laura Schroeter, and Jason Stanley, for a symposium in Analysis on Constructing the World.
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  9. David Chalmers (2012). Constructing the World. Oxford University Press.
    Uncorrected proofs for Constructing the World (contents, introduction, chapter 1, and first excursus).
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  10. David J. Chalmers (2014). Intensions and Indeterminacy: Reply to Soames, Turner, and Wilson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):249-269.
  11. David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999).
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  12. Tim Crane (2010). Cosmic Hermeneutics Vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oup Oxford.
    This paper is a defence of Terence Horgan’s claim that any genuinely physicalist position must distinguish itself from (what has been traditionally known as) emergentism. I argue that physicalism is necessarily reductive in character -- it must either give a reductive account of apparently non-physical entities, or a reductive explanation of why there are non-physical entities. I argue that many recent ‘nonreductive’ physicalists do not do this, and that because of this they cannot adequately distinguish their view from emergentism. The (...)
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  13. E. Diaz-Leon (2011). Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
    In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the paper I (...)
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  14. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). A Priori Entailment and Conceptual Analysis: Making Room for Type-C Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111.
    One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here I avoid this well-trodden ground and argue instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual analysis and a (...)
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  15. Janice Dowell, Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Explanatory Reductions.
  16. Andreas Elpidorou (2014). Blocking the A Priori Passage. Acta Analytica 29 (3):285-307.
    I defend the claim that physicalism is not committed to the view that non-phenomenal macrophysical truths are a priori entailed by the conjunction of microphysical truths (P), basic indexical facts (I), and a 'that's all' claim (T). I do so by showing that Chalmers and Jackson's most popular and influential argument in support of the claim that PIT ⊃ M is a priori, where 'M' stands for any ordinary, non-phenomenal, macroscopic truth, falls short of establishing its conclusion. My objection to (...)
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  17. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly. Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  18. Brie Gertler (2002). Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments About the Mind. Noûs 36 (1):22-49.
    My aim here is threefold: (a) to show that conceptual facts play a more significant role in justifying explanatory reductions than most of the contributors to the current debate realize; (b) to furnish an account of that role, and (c) to trace the consequences of this account for conceivability arguments about the mind.
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  19. Jennifer Hornsby (2009). Physicalism, Conceptual Analysis, and Acts of Faith. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson and the author each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind that it is extremely difficult to sustain. This chapter tries to say something about how that can be. It seeks to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson's opponents and the fragility of his own position than to hold out for the truth of any particular doctrine. It wants to bring to the surface an assumption in ontology, which is seen as a crucial part of (...)
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  20. Frank Jackson (2007). A Priori Physicalism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  21. Frank Jackson (2006). On Ensuring That Physicalism is Not a Dual Attribute Theory in Sheep's Clothing. Philsophical Studies 131 (1):227-249.
    Physicalists are committed to the determination without remainder of the psychological by the physical, but are they committed to this determination being a priori? This paper distinguishes this question understood de dicto from this question understood de re, argues that understood de re the answer is yes in a way that leaves open the answer to the question understood de dicto.
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  22. Frank Jackson (2005). The Case for a Priori Physicalism. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophy-Science -Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of Gap 5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy. Mentis.
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  23. Frank Jackson (2003). From H2O to Water: The Relevance to A Priori Passage. In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge. 84-97.
  24. Frank Jackson (2001). Responses. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):653-664.
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  25. Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...)
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  26. Frank Jackson (1994). Finding the Mind in the Natural World. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. 227-49.
  27. Robert Kirk (2006). Physicalism and Strict Implication. Synthese 151 (3):523-536.
    Suppose P is the conjunction of all truths statable in the austere vocabulary of an ideal physics. Then phsicalists are likely to accept that any truths not included in P are different ways of talking about the reality specified by P. This ‘redescription thesis’ can be made clearer by means of the ‘strict implication thesis’, according to which inconsistency or incoherence are involved in denying the implication from P to interesting truths not included in it, such as truths about phenomenal (...)
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  28. Janet Levin (2002). Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.
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  29. William G. Lycan (2009). Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
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  30. Ausonio Marras (2005). Consciousness and Reduction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):335-361.
    among them Joseph Levine, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson and Jaegwon Kim?have claimed that there are conceptual grounds sufficient for ruling out the possibility of a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Their claim assumes a functional model of reduction (regarded by Kim as an alternative to the traditional Nagelian model) which requires an a priori entailment from the facts in the reduction base to the phenomena to be explained. The aim of this paper is to show that this is an unreasonable (...)
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  31. Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  32. T. Parent, An Objection to the Laplacean Chalmers.
    I discuss David Chalmers’ “scrutability thesis,” roughly that a Laplacean intellect could know every truth about the universe from a “compact class” of basic truths. It is argued that despite Chalmers’ remarks to the contrary, the thesis is problematic owing to quantum indeterminacy. Chalmers attempts to “frontload” various principles into the compact class to help out. But though frontloading may succeed in principle, Chalmers does not frontload enough to avoid the problem.
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  33. Thomas W. Polger (2008). H2O, 'Water', and Transparent Reduction. Erkenntnis 69 (1):109 - 130.
    Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers.
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  34. Panu Raatikainen (2014). Chalmers' Blueprint of the World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):113-128.
    A critical notice of David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World (Oxford University Press,2012).
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  35. Laura Schroeter (2006). Against A Priori Reductions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):562-586.
    From Plato down to the logical empiricists, philosophers assumed that all empirical knowledge must rest on apriori semantic foundations. According to this philosophical tradition, empirical knowledge is possible only if the subject has an implicit apriori understanding of what it is her words and concepts refer to. You can.
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  36. Justin Tiehen (2013). Constructing the World. By David Chalmers. Oxford University Press, 2012, Pp. 528, £30. ISBN: 978-0-19-960857-7. [REVIEW] Philosophy 88 (4):630-635.
    A review of Constructing the World, by David Chalmers.
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  37. D. Gene Witmer (2006). How to Be a (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.
    What has come to be known as “a priori physicalism” is the thesis, roughly, that the non-physical truths in the actual world can be deduced a priori from a complete physical description of the actual world. To many contemporary philosophers, a priori physicalism seems extremely implausible. In this paper I distinguish two kinds of a priori physicalism. One sort – strict a priori physicalism – I reject as both unmotivated and implausible. The other sort – liberal a priori physicalism – (...)
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  38. D. Gene Witmer (2001). Conceptual Analysis, Circularity, and the Commitments of Physicalism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):119-133.