This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
58 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 58
  1. Rani Lill Anjum, Johan Arnt Myrstad & Stephen Mumford, Conditional Probability From an Ontological Point of View.
    This paper argues that the technical notion of conditional probability, as given by the ratio analysis, is unsuitable for dealing with our pretheoretical and intuitive understanding of both conditionality and probability. This is an ontological account of conditionals that include an irreducible dispositional connection between the antecedent and consequent conditions and where the conditional has to be treated as an indivisible whole rather than compositional. The relevant type of conditionality is found in some well-defined group of conditional statements. As an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Rohit Parikh, Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference.
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, 97-119, 2005.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Andrew Bacon, In Defence of a Naïve Conditional Epistemology.
    Numerous triviality results have been directed at a collection of views that tie the probability of a conditional sentence to the conditional probability of the consequent on its antecedent. -/- In this paper I argue that this identification makes little sense if conditional sentences are context sensitive. The best alternative, I argue, is a version of the thesis which states that if your total evidence is E then the evidential probability of a conditional evaluated in a context where E is (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (2008). Probabilistic Dynamic Belief Revision. Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.
    We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Donald Bamber (2000). Entailment with Near Surety of Scaled Assertions of High Conditional Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):1-74.
    An assertion of high conditional probability or, more briefly, an HCP assertion is a statement of the type: The conditional probability of B given A is close to one. The goal of this paper is to construct logics of HCP assertions whose conclusions are highly likely to be correct rather than certain to be correct. Such logics would allow useful conclusions to be drawn when the premises are not strong enough to allow conclusions to be reached with certainty. This goal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Paul Bartha & Christopher Hitchcock (1999). The Shooting-Room Paradox and Conditionalizing on Measurably Challenged Sets. Synthese 118 (3):403-437.
    We provide a solution to the well-known “Shooting-Room” paradox, developed by John Leslie in connection with his Doomsday Argument. In the “Shooting-Room” paradox, the death of an individual is contingent upon an event that has a 1/36 chance of occurring, yet the relative frequency of death in the relevant population is 0.9. There are two intuitively plausible arguments, one concluding that the appropriate subjective probability of death is 1/36, the other that this probability is 0.9. How are these two values (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Darren Bradley (2012). Weisberg on Design: What Fine-Tuning's Got to Do with It. Erkenntnis 77 (3):435-438.
    Jonathan Weisberg (2010 ) argues that, given that life exists, the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for life does not confirm the design hypothesis. And if the fact that life exists confirms the design hypothesis, fine-tuning is irrelevant. So either way, fine-tuning has nothing to do with it. I will defend a design argument that survives Weisberg’s critique — the fact that life exists supports the design hypothesis, but it only does so given fine-tuning.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jeffrey Bub (1982). Quantum Logic, Conditional Probability, and Interference. Philosophy of Science 49 (3):402-421.
    Friedman and Putnam have argued (Friedman and Putnam 1978) that the quantum logical interpretation of quantum mechanics gives us an explanation of interference that the Copenhagen interpretation cannot supply without invoking an additional ad hoc principle, the projection postulate. I show that it is possible to define a notion of equivalence of experimental arrangements relative to a pure state φ , or (correspondingly) equivalence of Boolean subalgebras in the partial Boolean algebra of projection operators of a system, which plays a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Giulianella Coletti & Barbara Vantaggi (2006). Representability of Ordinal Relations on a Set of Conditional Events. Theory and Decision 60 (2-3):137-174.
  10. Roger M. Cooke (1983). A Result in Renyi's Conditional Probability Theory with Application to Subjective Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (1):19 - 32.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Horacio Arló Costa & Rohit Parikh (2005). Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.
    We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey-Adams test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of nonmonotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics of expectations (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Gärdenfors, 1993).'Expectation' is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Charles B. Cross (2000). A Characterization of Imaging in Terms of Popper Functions. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):316-338.
    Despite the results of David Lewis, Peter Gärdenfors, and others, showing that imaging and classical conditionalization coincide only in the most trivial probabilistic models of belief revision, it turns out that imaging on a proposition A can always be described via Popper function conditionalization on a proposition that entails A. This result generalizes to any method of belief revision meeting certain minimal requirements. The proof is illustrated by an application of imaging in the context of the Monty Hall Problem.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. A. I. Dale (1974). On a Problem in Conditional Probability. Philosophy of Science 41 (2):204-206.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Frank Doring (2000). Conditional Probability and Dutch Books. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):391 - 409.
    There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Frank Döring (2000). Conditional Probability and Dutch Books. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):391-409.
    There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Kenny Easwaran (2014). Regularity and Hyperreal Credences. Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.
    Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they are both represented by credence 0, which violates a principle known as “regularity.” Following Skyrms 1980 and Lewis 1980, they recommend that we should instead use a much richer set of numbers, called the “hyperreals.” This essay argues that this popular (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Kenny Easwaran (2011). Varieties of Conditional Probability. In Prasanta Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook for Philosophy of Statistics. North Holland.
    I consider the notions of logical probability, degree of belief, and objective chance, and argue that a different formalism for conditional probability is appropriate for each.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Dorothy Edgington (1996). Lowe on Conditional Probability. Mind 105 (420):617-630.
  19. Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a 'state of the art' collection of essays on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides new negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up new areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams' (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Bas C. Fraassen (1983). Shafer on Conditional Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (4):467 - 470.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer & B. Mayerhofer (2011). Probabilistic Theories of Reasoning Need Pragmatics Too: Modulating Relevance in Uncertain Conditionals. Journal of Pragmatics 43:2034–2042.
    According to probabilistic theories of reasoning in psychology, people's degree of belief in an indicative conditional `if A, then B' is given by the conditional probability, P(B|A). The role of language pragmatics is relatively unexplored in the new probabilistic paradigm. We investigated how consequent relevance a ects participants' degrees of belief in conditionals about a randomly chosen card. The set of events referred to by the consequent was either a strict superset or a strict subset of the set of events referred (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Philippe Gagnon (2010). L'exigence de l'Explication En Biologie au Regard d'Une Philosophie de la Morphogenèse. Eikasia. Revista de Filosofía 35 (November):123-180.
    In a first part I present the results of the philosophy of scientific explanation with an attempt to apply them to the case of the theory of evolution. Then I observe that the requirements of modelization of phenomena with the help of inductive logic do not capture efficiently the pertinent factors and fail just as much to exclude those which end up being neutral as explanatory premises. I then query in the direction of confirmation theory, and show that probabilistic reasoning (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Angelo Gilio (2005). Probabilistic Logic Under Coherence, Conditional Interpretations, and Default Reasoning. Synthese 146 (1-2):139 - 152.
    We study a probabilistic logic based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and a related notion of generalized coherence (g-coherence). We examine probabilistic conditional knowledge bases associated with imprecise probability assessments defined on arbitrary families of conditional events. We introduce a notion of conditional interpretation defined directly in terms of precise probability assessments. We also examine a property of strong satisfiability which is related to the notion of toleration well known in default reasoning. In our framework we give more (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Angelo Gilio & Giuseppe Sanfilippo (2013). Conjunction, Disjunction and Iterated Conditioning of Conditional Events. In R. Kruse (ed.), Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer.
    Starting from a recent paper by S. Kaufmann, we introduce a notion of conjunction of two conditional events and then we analyze it in the setting of coherence. We give a representation of the conjoined conditional and we show that this new object is a conditional random quantity, whose set of possible values normally contains the probabilities assessed for the two conditional events. We examine some cases of logical dependencies, where the conjunction is a conditional event; moreover, we give the (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Samuel Goldberg (1976). Copi's Conditional Probability Problem. Philosophy of Science 43 (2):286-289.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Alan H'ajek (2003). What Conditional Probability Could Not Be. Synthese 137:273-323.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Alan Hájek (2003). Conditional Probability Is the Very Guide of Life. In Kyburg Jr, E. Henry & Mariam Thalos (eds.), Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance. Open Court. 183--203.
    in Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance, eds. Henry Kyburg, Jr. and Mariam Thalos, Open Court. Abridged version in Proceedings of the International Society for Bayesian Analysis 2002.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Alan Hájek (2003). What Conditional Probability Could Not Be. Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
    Kolmogorov''s axiomatization of probability includes the familiarratio formula for conditional probability: 0).$$ " align="middle" border="0">.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. James Hawthorne (2007). Nonmonotonic Conditionals That Behave Like Conditional Probabilities Above a Threshold. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):625-637.
    I’ll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I’ll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds lower than 1, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. James Hawthorne (1998). On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities: Predicate Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (1):1-34.
    In a previous paper I described a range of nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probability functions at various levels of probabilistic support. These conditionals were defined as semantic relations on an object language for sentential logic. In this paper I extend the most prominent family of these conditionals to a language for predicate logic. My approach to quantifiers is closely related to Hartry Field's probabilistic semantics. Along the way I will show how Field's semantics differs from a substitutional interpretation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. James Hawthorne (1996). On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):185-218.
    I will describe the logics of a range of conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities at various levels of probabilistic support. Families of these conditionals will be characterized in terms of the rules that their members obey. I will show that for each conditional, →, in a given family, there is a probabilistic support level r and a conditional probability function P such that, for all sentences C and B, 'C → B' holds just in case P[B | C] ≥ (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. James Hawthorne & David Makinson (2007). The Quantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference. Studia Logica 86 (2):247-297.
    We chart the ways in which closure properties of consequence relations for uncertain inference take on different forms according to whether the relations are generated in a quantitative or a qualitative manner. Among the main themes are: the identification of watershed conditions between probabilistically and qualitatively sound rules; failsafe and classicality transforms of qualitatively sound rules; non-Horn conditions satisfied by probabilistic consequence; representation and completeness problems; and threshold-sensitive conditions such as ‘preface’ and ‘lottery’ rules.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Joachim Horvath (2009). Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):115-120.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the standard objections to reliabilism. If one assumes, as reliabilism does, that truth is the only non-instrumental epistemic value, then the worry is that the additional value of knowledge over true belief cannot be adequately explained, for reliability only has instrumental value relative to the non-instrumental value of truth. Goldman and Olsson reply to this objection that reliabilist knowledge raises the objective probability of future true beliefs and is thus more valuable than mere true (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. James Joyce (1999). The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press.
  35. Hugues Leblanc (1960). On Requirements for Conditional Probability Functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (3):238-242.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. E. J. Lowe (2008). What is 'Conditional Probability'? Analysis 68 (299):218–223.
  37. E. J. Lowe (1996). Conditional Probability and Conditional Beliefs. Mind 105 (420):603-615.
  38. Laura Macchi & Maria Bagassi (2007). The Underinformative Formulation of Conditional Probability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):274-275.
    The formulation of the conditional probability in classical tasks does not guarantee the effective transmission of the independence of the hit rate from the base rate. In these kinds of tasks, data are all available, but subjects are able to understand them in the specific meanings proper to a specialized language only if these are adequately transmitted. From this perspective, the partitive formulation should not be considered a facilitation, but rather, a way of effectively transmitting the conditional probability.Consider the following (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Vann McGee (1994). Learning the Impossible. In Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press. 179-199.
  40. A. Millar & A. Haddock, Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the standard objections to reliabilism. If one assumes, as reliabilism does, that truth is the only non instrumental epistemic value, then the worry is that the additional value of knowledge over true belief cannot be adequately explained, for reliability only has instrumental value relative to the non instrumental value of truth. Goldman and Olsson reply to this objection that reliabilist knowledge raises the objective probability of future true beliefs and is thus more valuable than (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Charles G. Morgan (1999). Conditionals, Comparative Probability, and Triviality: The Conditional of Conditional Probability Cannot Be Represented in the Object Language. Topoi 18 (2):97-116.
    In this paper we examine the thesis that the probability of the conditional is the conditional probability. Previous work by a number of authors has shown that in standard numerical probability theories, the addition of the thesis leads to triviality. We introduce very weak, comparative conditional probability structures and discuss some extremely simple constraints. We show that even in such a minimal context, if one adds the thesis that the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability, then one trivializes (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2003). Conditional Probability and the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning. Mind and Language 18 (4):359–379.
  43. Eyvind Ohm & Valerie A. Thompson (2006). Conditional Probability and Pragmatic Conditionals: Dissociating Truth and Effectiveness. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (3):257 – 280.
    Recent research (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004) has provided support for the hypothesis that people evaluate the probability of conditional statements of the form if p then q as the conditional probability of q given p , P( q / p ). The present paper extends this approach to pragmatic conditionals in the form of inducements (i.e., promises and threats) and advice (i.e., tips and warnings). In so doing, we demonstrate a distinction between the truth status of these conditionals and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Erik J. Olsson (2009). In Defense of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):93-114.
    Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Many authors contend, however, that reliabilism is incompatible with this item of common sense. If a belief is true, adding that it was reliably produced doesn't seem to make it more valuable. The value of reliability is swamped by the value of truth. In Goldman and Olsson (2009), two independent solutions to the problem were suggested. According to the conditional probability solution, reliabilist knowledge is more valuable in virtue of being a stronger (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Rohit Parikh (2005). Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.
    We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey-Adams test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of nonmonotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics of expectations (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Gärdenfors, 1993).'Expectation' is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Niki Pfeifer (2013). The New Psychology of Reasoning: A Mental Probability Logical Perspective. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):329-345.
  47. Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2006). Inference in Conditional Probability Logic. Kybernetika 42 (2):391--404.
    An important field of probability logic is the investigation of inference rules that propagate point probabilities or, more generally, interval probabilities from premises to conclusions. Conditional probability logic (CPL) interprets the common sense expressions of the form “if . . . , then . . . ” by conditional probabilities and not by the probability of the material implication. An inference rule is probabilistically informative if the coherent probability interval of its conclusion is not necessarily equal to the unit interval (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2003). Nonmonotonicity and Human Probabilistic Reasoning. In Proceedings of the 6 T H Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. 221--234.
    Nonmonotonic logics allow—contrary to classical (monotone) logics— for withdrawing conclusions in the light of new evidence. Nonmonotonic reasoning is often claimed to mimic human common sense reasoning. Only a few studies, though, have investigated this claim empirically. system p is a central, broadly accepted nonmonotonic reasoning system that proposes basic rationality postulates. We previously investigated empirically a probabilistic interpretation of three selected rules of system p. We found a relatively good agreement of human reasoning and principles of nonmonotonic reasoning according (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak (2012). Probabilistic Belief Contraction. Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.
    Probabilistic belief contraction has been a much neglected topic in the field of probabilistic reasoning. This is due to the difficulty in establishing a reasonable reversal of the effect of Bayesian conditionalization on a probabilistic distribution. We show that indifferent contraction, a solution proposed by Ramer to this problem through a judicious use of the principle of maximum entropy, is a probabilistic version of a full meet contraction. We then propose variations of indifferent contraction, using both the Shannon entropy measure (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Daniel Rothschild (2014). Capturing the Relationship Between Conditionals and Conditional Probability with a Trivalent Semantics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):144-152.
1 — 50 / 58