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  1. Ernest Adams (1981). Truth, Proof and Conditionals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (4):323.
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  2. Ernest W. Adams (1993). On the Rightness of Certain Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):1-10.
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  3. Ernest W. Adams (1970). Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals. Foundations of Language 6 (1):89-94.
    The purpose of this note is to dispute Michael Ayers' claim that "there is no special problem of subjunctive conditionals".
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  4. Peter Alexander & Mary Hesse (1962). Subjunctive Conditionals. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 36 (1):185-214.
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  5. A. Appiah (1983). Lewis on the Material Conditional. International Logic Review 27:28.
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  6. Anthony Appiah (1991). Conditionals. International Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):124-125.
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  7. Javier Arias (1998). Natural Language Conditionals. Logica Trianguli 2:135-154.
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  8. H. Arló Costa (1996). Iterated Epistemic Conditionals. In Krister Segerberg (ed.), The Parikh Project. Seven Papers in Honour of Rohit. Uppsala Prints & Preprints in Philosophy
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  9. Ana Arregui (2010). Detaching If-Clauses From Should. Natural Language Semantics 18 (3):241-293.
    This paper investigates some aspects of the semantics of deontic should-conditionals. The main objective is to understand which actual world facts make deontic statements true. The starting point for the investigation is a famous puzzle known as Chisholm’s Paradox. It is important because making sense of the data in Chisholm-style examples involves arriving at some conclusion regarding the interaction between what we consider ideal and what is actually true. I give an account of how facts affect the evaluation of should (...)
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  10. Ana Arregui (2007). When Aspect Matters: The Case of Would-Conditionals. [REVIEW] Natural Language Semantics 15 (3):221-264.
    Differences in the interpretation of would-conditionals with simple (perfective) and perfect antecedent clauses are marked enough to discourage a unified view. However, this paper presents a unified, Lewis–Stalnaker style semantics for the modal in such constructions. Differences in the interpretation of the conditionals are derived from the interaction between the interpretation of different types of aspect and the modal. The paper makes a distinction between perfective and perfect aspect in terms of whether they make reference to or quantify over Lewis-style (...)
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  11. L. K. B. (1958). Modus Operandi. Review of Metaphysics 11 (3):516-516.
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  12. J. Baratgin, D. Over & G. Politzer (2014). New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti Tables. Mind and Language 29 (1):73-84.
    The new Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning aims to integrate the study of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality. It is supported by two findings. One, most people judge the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then B), to be the conditional probability, P(B|A), as implied by the Ramsey test. Two, they judge if A then B to be void when A is false. Their three-valued response table used to be called ‘defective’, but should be termed the (...)
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  13. Jean Baratgin, G. Politzer & D. P. Over, The Psychology of Indicative Conditionals and Conditional Bets.
    There is a new Bayesian, or probabilistic, paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with new psychological accounts of the indicative conditional of natural language. In psychological experiments in this new paradigm, people judge that the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then C), is the conditional probability of C given A, P(C | A). In other experiments, participants respond with what has been called the 'de- fective' truth table: they judge that if A then C is true when A (...)
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  14. Stephen J. Barker (1994). The Consequent-Entailment Problem Foreven If. Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (3):249 - 260.
    A comprehensive theory ofeven if needs to account for consequent ‘entailing’even ifs and in particular those of theif-focused variety. This is where the theory ofeven if ceases to be neutral between conditional theories. I have argued thatif-focusedeven ifs,especially if andonly if can only be accounted for through the suppositional theory ofif. Furthermore, a particular interpretation of this theory — the conditional assertion theory — is needed to account foronly if and a type of metalinguistic negation ofQ if P. We therefore (...)
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  15. Jonathan Bennett (2001). Conditionals and Explanations Jonathan Bennett. In Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker & Ralph Wedgwood (eds.), Fact and Value. MIT Press 1.
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  16. Johan Benthem (1984). Foundations of Conditional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (3):303 - 349.
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  17. A. Blum (1986). [Symbol]' AND 'If... then.. Logique Et Analyse 29 (13):111.
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  18. William Boardman, Nomic Dependencies & Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals.
    Consider Dretske's measles example (from page 74 in his Knowldege and the Flow of Information (MIT/Bradford: 1981) ): since the question of whether Alice's being one of Herman's children carries the information that she has the measles is a question about conditional probabilities, we must be careful about our specification of the condition, the antecedent. Although we are to suppose that it is a true generalization that all of Herman's children have the measles, since that is a coincidence, we can (...)
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  19. James Richard Bode (1973). A Logic for Conditional Statements. Dissertation, The Ohio State University
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  20. Julian Boyd (1986). Subjunctive-Equivalent. Semiotics:217-223.
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  21. Julian Boyd (1986). Subjunctive-Equivalent "Should" and Interpretation. Semiotics:217-223.
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  22. Richard Bradley (1998). A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory with Conditionals. Synthese 116 (2):187-229.
    This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability representations of the agent’s degrees of belief (...)
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  23. Martin D. S. Braine (1979). On Some Claims Aboutif-Then. Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1):35 - 47.
    The paper has sought to show two things. One is that the apparent variety of Stalnaker and Lewis's counterexamples is misleading. Several of their examples are quite unsatisfactory because they depend on unguarded language behavior. There is in fact only one type of counterexample that is worth serious discussion, and that has the form of Barense's.For Barense's example, I try to show that it fails as a counterexample to transitivity because one of the premisses is false within the context of (...)
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  24. Andrew Brennan (2008). Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Describes the received theory of necessary and sufficient conditions, explains some standard objections to it, and lays out alternative ways of thinking about conditions and conditionals.
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  25. Bryson Brown (1992). Struggling With Conditionals. Dialogue 31 (02):327-.
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  26. Christopher Bryant (1981). Conditional Murderers. Analysis 41 (4):209 - 215.
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  27. J. Bryant (1977). Dale on the transitivity of "if-then". Logique Et Analyse 20 (79):348.
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  28. Richard A. Burns & Frances A. Nesbitt (1990). A Test for S-S Associations in a Conditional Counting Task. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 28 (5):441-444.
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  29. David Owen Butcher (1978). Subjunctive Conditional Modal Logic. Dissertation, Stanford University
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  30. Ruth Mj Byrne, Philip N. Johnson-Laird, M. Oaksford & N. Chater (2010). Conditionals and Possibilities. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thought. Oxford University Press
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  31. Philip G. Calabrese (2005). Toward a More Natural Expression of Quantum Logic with Boolean Fractions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (4):363 - 401.
    This paper uses a non-distributive system of Boolean fractions (a|b), where a and b are 2-valued propositions or events, to express uncertain conditional propositions and conditional events. These Boolean fractions, 'a if b' or 'a given b', ordered pairs of events, which did not exist for the founders of quantum logic, can better represent uncertain conditional information just as integer fractions can better represent partial distances on a number line. Since the indeterminacy of some pairs of quantum events is due (...)
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  32. Philip G. Calabrese (2003). Operating on Functions with Variable Domains. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):1-18.
    The sum, difference, product and quotient of two functions with different domains are usually defined only on their common domain. This paper extends these definitions so that the sum and other operations are essentially defined anywhere that at least one of the components is defined. This idea is applied to propositions and events, expressed as indicator functions, to define conditional propositions and conditional events as three-valued indicator functions that are undefined when their condition is false. Extended operations of "and", "or", (...)
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  33. Peter Carruthers & Anthony Appiah (1986). Assertion and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (145):566.
    This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a (...)
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  34. Nancy Cartwright (2007). 10 Counterfactuals in Economics: A Commentary. In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press 4--191.
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  35. Hector Neri Castaneda (1958). Are Conditionals Principles of Inference? Analysis 18 (4):77 - 82.
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  36. Chhanda Chakrabort (2001). Conditionals, Frank Jackson, and the Assertibility Thesis. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):105-117.
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  37. C. Chakraborti (1998). Some Remarks On Ernest Adams' Theory Of Indicative Conditionals. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4):495-510.
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  38. Timothy Chambers (1994). Note on a Contentious Conditional. Lyceum 6:50-54.
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  39. O. Chateaubriand (2004). Counterfactuals: Reply to Claudio Pizzi. Manuscrito 27 (1):65-77.
    After some preliminary remarks in §1, I argue in §2 that Claudio’s considerations about my treatment of Quine’s Bizet-Verdi counterfactuals do not constitute a difficulty for the structural analysis of such counterfactuals. I discuss some of his other examples and argue that counterfactuals are ambiguous both structurally and contextually. I conclude with an examination of the principle of transitivity for counterfactuals.
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  40. Mike Oaksford & Chater & Nick (2010). Cognition and Conditionals: An Introduction. In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. OUP Oxford
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  41. Brian F. Chellas (1975). Basic Conditional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):133 - 153.
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  42. Emmanuel Chemla (2011). Expressible Semantics for Expressible Counterfactuals. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (1):63-80.
    Lewis (1981) showed the equivalence between two dominant semantic frameworks for counterfactuals: ordering semantics, which relies on orders between possible worlds, and premise semantics, which relies on sets of propositions (so-called ordering sources). I define a natural, restricted version of premise semantics, expressible premise semantics, which is based on ordering sources containing only expressible propositions. First, I extend Lewis’ (1981) equivalence result to expressible premise semantics and some corresponding expressible version of ordering semantics. Second, I show that expressible semantics are (...)
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  43. Roderick M. Chisholm (1955). Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference. Analysis 15 (5):97 - 105.
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  44. Joseph T. Clark (1952). Debates on the Conditional. Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 3:28-31.
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  45. Romane Clark (1991). David H. Sanford, If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 11 (2):131-133.
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  46. Charles K. Cobb (1967). Legal Statements as Conditional Directives. Mind 76 (304):493 - 512.
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  47. Daniel Harry Cohen (1983). The Logic of Conditional Assertions. Dissertation, Indiana University
    It has been suggested that to say something of the form 'if P, then Q' is less an affirmation of a conditional than a conditional affirmation of the consequent, Q. If the condition of assertion, P, is true, then Q has been asserted. If the condition of assertion turns out to have been false, it is as if there had been no assertion. Such conditionals have come to be called "conditional assertions." This dissertation is a study of the logic conditionals, (...)
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  48. Horacio Luis Arlo Costa (1997). Belief Change and Suppositional Reasoning: Knowledge Representation, Defeasibility and Conditionals. Dissertation, Columbia University
    Many distinguished researchers have recently suggested that the generation of a theory of defeasible reasoning is a condition of possibility for the serious development of disciplines like Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. For example Henry Kyburg concluded that what AI and Cognitive Science need is " ... an account of defeasible reasoning--that is a kind of reasoning that will give us practical certainties, but that is nonmonotonic. It will be a kind of reasoning that allows us to change our minds (...)
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  49. G. Crocco, Luis Fariänas del Cerro & Andreas Herzig (1995). Conditionals From Philosophy to Computer Science. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  50. Benjamin L. Curtis (2008). Barely True Subjunctive Conditionals and Anti-Realism. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 7.
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