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  1. Ana Arregui (2010). Detaching If-Clauses From Should. Natural Language Semantics 18 (3):241-293.
    This paper investigates some aspects of the semantics of deontic should-conditionals. The main objective is to understand which actual world facts make deontic statements true. The starting point for the investigation is a famous puzzle known as Chisholm’s Paradox. It is important because making sense of the data in Chisholm-style examples involves arriving at some conclusion regarding the interaction between what we consider ideal and what is actually true. I give an account of how facts affect the evaluation of should (...)
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  2. Ana Arregui (2007). When Aspect Matters: The Case of Would-Conditionals. [REVIEW] Natural Language Semantics 15 (3):221-264.
    Differences in the interpretation of would-conditionals with simple (perfective) and perfect antecedent clauses are marked enough to discourage a unified view. However, this paper presents a unified, Lewis–Stalnaker style semantics for the modal in such constructions. Differences in the interpretation of the conditionals are derived from the interaction between the interpretation of different types of aspect and the modal. The paper makes a distinction between perfective and perfect aspect in terms of whether they make reference to or quantify over Lewis-style (...)
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  3. Jean Baratgin, G. Politzer & D. P. Over, The Psychology of Indicative Conditionals and Conditional Bets.
    There is a new Bayesian, or probabilistic, paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with new psychological accounts of the indicative conditional of natural language. In psychological experiments in this new paradigm, people judge that the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then C), is the conditional probability of C given A, P(C | A). In other experiments, participants respond with what has been called the 'de- fective' truth table: they judge that if A then C is true when A (...)
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  4. William Boardman, Nomic Dependencies & Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals.
    Consider Dretske's measles example (from page 74 in his Knowldege and the Flow of Information (MIT/Bradford: 1981) ): since the question of whether Alice's being one of Herman's children carries the information that she has the measles is a question about conditional probabilities, we must be careful about our specification of the condition, the antecedent. Although we are to suppose that it is a true generalization that all of Herman's children have the measles, since that is a coincidence, we can (...)
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  5. Richard Bradley (1998). A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory with Conditionals. Synthese 116 (2):187-229.
    This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability representations of the agent’s degrees of belief (...)
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  6. Bryson Brown (1992). Struggling With Conditionals. Dialogue 31 (02):327-.
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  7. O. Chateaubriand (2004). Counterfactuals: Reply to Claudio Pizzi. Manuscrito 27 (1).
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  8. Mauro Nasti De Vincentis (2004). From Aristotle's Syllogistic to Stoic Conditionals: Holzwege or Detectable Paths? Topoi 23 (1):113-137.
    This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's metasyllogistic equimodality condition (as stated at APr. I 24, 41b27–31) and truth-conditions for third type (Chrysippean) conditionals (as they can be inferred from, say, S.E. P. II 111 and 189). In fact, as is shown in §1, Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his (propositional) metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-conditions of (...)
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  9. J. Hilton Denis, L. McClure John & R. Slugoski Ben (2005). The Course of Events: Counterfactuals, Causal Sequences and Explanation. In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.
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  10. Josh Dever, David Sosa & Daniel Bonevac, Unconditionals.
    Conditionality is a modal feature (in only the trivial sense, in the case of the material conditional). For φ to be conditioned on ψ is for the appearance of φ and ψ to be connected in some way over some region of modal space.
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  11. Austin Duncan-Jones (1962). Defective and Surprising Conditionals. Philosophical Review 71 (3):383-386.
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  12. Dorothy Edgington (2000). General Conditional Statements: A Response to Kölbel. Mind 109 (433):109-116.
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  13. Beate Elsner (1998). Conditionals. Erkenntnis 49 (2):233-236.
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  14. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (1998). Matching Bias in Conditional Reasoning: Do We Understand It After 25 Years? Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):45 – 110.
    The phenomenon known as matching bias consists of a tendency to see cases as relevant in logical reasoning tasks when the lexical content of a case matches that of a propositional rule, normally a conditional, which applies to that case. Matching is demonstrated by use of the negations paradigm that is by using conditionals in which the presence and absence of negative components is systematically varied. The phenomenon was first published in 1972 and the present paper reviews the history of (...)
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  15. Henry Albert Finch (1958). An Explication of Counterfactuals by Probability Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18 (3):368-378.
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  16. William T. Fontaine (1951). Avoidability and the Contrary-to-Fact Conditional in C. L. Stevenson and C. I. Lewis. Journal of Philosophy 48 (25):783-788.
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  17. Gregg Franzwa (1980). Supported Counterfactuals in Non-Causal Contexts. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):97-103.
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  18. Dov M. Gabbay & Andrzej Szałas (2007). Second-Order Quantifier Elimination in Higher-Order Contexts with Applications to the Semantical Analysis of Conditionals. Studia Logica 87 (1):37 - 50.
    Second-order quantifier elimination in the context of classical logic emerged as a powerful technique in many applications, including the correspondence theory, relational databases, deductive and knowledge databases, knowledge representation, commonsense reasoning and approximate reasoning. In the current paper we first generalize the result of Nonnengart and Szałas [17] by allowing second-order variables to appear within higher-order contexts. Then we focus on a semantical analysis of conditionals, using the introduced technique and Gabbay’s semantics provided in [10] and substantially using a third-order (...)
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  19. Roy Gardner (2000). Book Review:Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms; Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice Jordan Howard Sobel; The Dynamics of Norms Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffery, Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 67 (3):553-.
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  20. Bart Geurts, On an Ambiguity in Quantified Conditionals.
    Conditional sentences with quantifying expressions are systematically ambigous. In one reading, the if -clause restricts the domain of the overt quantifier; in the other, the if -clause restricts the domain of a covert quantifier, which defaults to epistemic necessity. Although the ambiguity follows directly from the Lewis- Kratzer line on if, it is not generally acknowledged, which has led to pseudoproblems and spurious arguments.
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  21. Anastasia Giannakidou, Giannakidou, Zwarts.
    We explore this question in three domains: subjunctive in Greek relative clauses, progressives, and nonveridical verbs like prospatho ‘try’. We find that: • Existence fully depends on (i.e. follows from) the truth of the proposition in the case of mood choice in the relative clause: if a sentence is true in a doxastic model (set of worlds), existence of the event participants will be guaranteed in the model . We call this existentiality.
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  22. Allan Gibbard (1981). Two Recent Theories of Conditionals. In William Harper, Robert C. Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Reidel. 211-247.
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  23. Allan Gibbard & William Harper (1978). Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility. In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. 125-162.
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  24. George Goe (1967). Laws and Counterfactuals in Nagel: A Reply to Krimerman. Philosophical Studies 18 (1-2):24 - 27.
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  25. W. J. Goodrich (1917). On the Prospective Use of the Latin Imperfect Subjunctive in Relative Clauses. The Classical Review 31 (3-4):83-86.
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  26. Andrea Gualmini, Acquisition of Disjunction in Conditional Sentences.
    This study is concerned with the properties of the disjunction operator, or, and the acquisition of these properties by English-speaking children. Previous research has concluded that adult truth conditions for logical connectives are acquired relatively late in the course of language development. With particular reference to disjunction, the results of several studies have led to two claims. First, it has been argued that the full range of truth-conditions associated with inclusive-or is not initially available to children; instead, children are supposed (...)
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  27. Politzer Guy & Bonnefon Jean-Francois (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock’s (1987) distinction between ‘rebutting’ and ‘undercutting’ defeaters. ‘Inferential’ conditionals are shown to come in two varieties, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as the (...)
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  28. James Hawthorne (2007). Nonmonotonic Conditionals That Behave Like Conditional Probabilities Above a Threshold. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):625-637.
    I’ll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I’ll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds lower than 1, and (...)
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  29. M. Heller (1991). Indication and What Might Have Been. Analysis 51 (October):187-91.
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  30. Noel Hendrickson (2012). Counterfactual Reasoning and the Problem of Selecting Antecedent Scenarios. Synthese 185 (3):365-386.
    A recent group of social scientists have argued that counterfactual questions play an essential role in their disciplines, and that it is possible to have rigorous methods to investigate them. Unfortunately, there has been little (if any) interaction between these social scientists and the philosophers who have long held that rigorous counterfactual reasoning is possible. In this paper, I hope to encourage some fresh thinking on both sides by creating new connections between them. I describe what I term "problem of (...)
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  31. Risto Hilpinen (2008). Conditionals and Possible Worlds : On C.S. Peirce's Conception of Conditionals and Modalities. In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press.
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  32. Geoffrey Hunter (1993). The Meaning of `If' in Conditional Propositions. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):279-297.
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  33. Sabine Iatridou (1993). On the Contribution of Conditionalthen. Natural Language Semantics 2 (3):171-199.
    This paper addresses the question of whether the appearance ofthen in a conditional construction has any effect on the meaning of the sentence as a whole. It will be suggested thatthen does make a contribution by way of a particular presupposition associated with it. This also results inthen sometimes conflicting with the intended meaning of the sentence; in such cases its appearance is precluded. Certain aspects of the syntax ofthen will be discussed in parallel.
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  34. Richard C. Jeffrey (1963). On Indeterminate Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 14 (3):37 - 43.
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  35. Richard C. Jeffrey (1959). A Note on Finch's "an Explication of Counterfactuals by Probability Theory". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1):116.
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  36. Richard Jeffrey & Dorothy Edgington (1991). Matter-of-Fact Conditionals. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 65:161 - 209.
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  37. Evan K. Jobe (1985). Explanation, Causality, and Counterfactuals. Philosophy of Science 52 (3):357-389.
    The aim of this paper is to develop an adequate version of the D-N theory of explanation for particular events and to show how the resulting D-N model can be used as a tool in articulating a regularity theory of causation and an analysis of the truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals. Starting with a basic model that is largely the product of other workers in this field, two new restrictions are formulated in order to construct a version of D-N explanation (...)
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  38. Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Vittorio Girotto (2009). The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer. Topoi 28 (1):75-80.
    This paper replies to Politzer’s ( 2007 ) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.
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  39. Hans Kamp (1988). Conditionals in Dr Theory. In Jakob Hoepelman (ed.), Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Stuttgart Conference Workshop on Discourse Representation, Dialogue Tableaux, and Logic Programming. M. Niemeyer Verlag.
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  40. R. E. Kastner (1999). Time-Symmetrised Quantum Theory, Counterfactuals and 'Advanced Action'. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 30 (2):237-259.
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  41. Ruth E. Kastner (2008). The Transactional Interpretation, Counterfactuals, and Weak Values in Quantum Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (4):806-818.
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  42. Stefan Kaufmann (2009). Conditionals Right and Left: Probabilities for the Whole Family. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (1):1 - 53.
    The fact that the standard probabilistic calculus does not define probabilities for sentences with embedded conditionals is a fundamental problem for the probabilistic theory of conditionals. Several authors have explored ways to assign probabilities to such sentences, but those proposals have come under criticism for making counterintuitive predictions. This paper examines the source of the problematic predictions and proposes an amendment which corrects them in a principled way. The account brings intuitions about counterfactual conditionals to bear on the interpretation of (...)
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  43. Paul A. Klaczynski & David B. Daniel (2005). Individual Differences in Conditional Reasoning: A Dual-Process Account. Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):305 – 325.
    Dual-process theories of conditional reasoning predict that relationships among four basic logical forms, and to intellectual ability and thinking predictions, are most evident when conflict arises between experiential and analytic processing (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000). To test these predictions, 210 undergraduates were presented with conditionals for which the consequents were either weakly or strongly associated with alternative antecedents (i.e., WA and SA problems, respectively). Consistent with predictions, modus ponens inferences were not related to inferences on the uncertain forms (affirmation (...)
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  44. M. Kolbel (2000). Edgington on Compounds of Conditionals. Mind 109 (433):97 - 108.
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  45. Angelika Kratzer (1981). Blurred Conditionals. In W. Klein & W. Levelt (eds.), Crossing the Boundaries in Linguistics. Reidel. 201--209.
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  46. Scott Labarge (2002). Stoic Conditionals, Necessity and Explanation. History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (4):241-252.
    An examination of a particular passage in Cicero's De fato?Fat. 13?17?is crucial to our understanding of the Stoic theory of the truth-conditions of conditional propositions, for it has been uniquely important in the debate concerning the kind of connection the antecedent and consequent of a Stoic conditional should have to one another. Frede has argued that the passage proves that the connection is one of logical necessity, while Sorabji has argued that positive Stoic attitudes toward empirical inferences elsewhere suggest that (...)
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  47. Mark Lance (1991). Probabilistic Dependence Among Conditionals. Philosophical Review 100 (2):269-276.
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  48. Youngjoo Lee (2005). Exhaustivity as Agreement: The Case of Korean Man 'Only'. Natural Language Semantics 13 (2):169-200.
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  49. Scott Lehmann (1979). A General Propositional Logic of Conditionals. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (1):77-83.
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  50. Hannes Leitgeb (2013). A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).
    We will present a new lottery-style paradox on counterfactuals and chance. The upshot will be: combining natural assumptions on (i) the truth values of ordinary counterfactuals, (ii) the conditional chances of possible but non-actual events, (iii) the manner in which (i) and (ii) relate to each other, and (iv) a fragment of the logic of counterfactuals leads to disaster. In contrast with the usual lottery-style paradoxes, logical closure under conjunction—that is, in this case, the rule of Agglomeration of (consequents of) (...)
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