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  1. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz, Democracy and Argument: Tracking Truth in Complex Social Decisions.
    Suppose a committee has to take a stand on a complex issue, where the decision presupposes answering a number of sub-questions. There is an agreement within the committee which sub-questions should be posed. All questions are of the ”yes or no?”-type and the main question is to be given the yes-answer if and only if each sub-question is answered with “yes”. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one procedure, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting (...)
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  2. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2008). Voti e altri buchi elettorali. Rivista di Estetica 48 (37):169-194.
    A philosophical dialogue on the functioning, the limits, and the paradoxes of our electoral practices, dealing with such basic questions as: What is a vote? How do we count votes? And do votes really count?
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  3. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2007). Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby (...)
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  4. John S. Dryzek & Christian List (2004). Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy : A Response to Aldred. British Journal of Political Science 34 (4):752-758.
    Jonathan Aldred shares our desire to promote a reconciliation between social choice theory and deliberative democracy in the interests of a more comprehensive and compelling account of democracy.1 His comments on some details of our analysis – specifically, our use of Arrow’s conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives – give us an opportunity to clarify our position. His discussion of the independence condition in particular identifies some ambiguity in our exposition, and as such is useful. We are (...)
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  5. William V. Gehrlein (2002). Condorcet's Paradox and the Likelihood of its Occurrence: Different Perspectives on Balanced Preferences. Theory and Decision 52 (2):171-199.
    Many studies have considered the probability that a pairwise majority rule (PMR) winner exists for three candidate elections. The absence of a PMR winner indicates an occurrence of Condorcet's Paradox for three candidate elections. This paper summarizes work that has been done in this area with the assumptions of: Impartial Culture, Impartial Anonymous Culture, Maximal Culture, Dual Culture and Uniform Culture. Results are included for the likelihood that there is a strong winner by PMR, a weak winner by PMR, and (...)
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  6. Christian List (2011). The Logical Space of Democracy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (3):262-297.
    April 2011 Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism”, “basic majoritarianism”, and “collective rationality”. For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these three requirements at once; (...)
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  7. Christian List, Some Remarks on the Probability of Cycles.
    Although the pairwise Condorcet winner criterion may seem an attractive democratic decision procedure, it is famously threatened by Condorcet's paradox: pairwise majority voting may lead to cyclical collective preferences. But how probable is the occurrence of cycles?
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  8. Christian List, Two Concepts of Agreement.
    A central problem of democracy is the aggregation of divergent individual inputs into overall collective decisions. Social-choice-theoretic impossibility results famously demonstrate the intractability of a large class of such aggregation problems. This paper develops a taxonomy of two concepts of agreement, agreement at a substantive level and agreement at a meta-level, and discusses the escape-routes these concepts open up from the impossibility problems of social choice. Specifically, two contexts of democratic aggregation are addressed: first, the familiar context of preferences, and (...)
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  9. Christian List, The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions.
    Many groups make decisions over multiple interconnected propositions. The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting can generate inconsistent collective sets of judgments, even when individual sets of judgments are all consistent. I develop a simple model for determining the probability of the paradox, given various assumptions about the probability distribution of individual sets of judgments, including impartial culture and impartial <span class='Hi'>anonymous</span> culture assumptions. I prove several convergence results, identifying when the probability of the paradox converges (...)
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  10. Christian List & Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation with Consistency Alone.
  11. Christian List & Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules: Majority Voting Generalized.
    Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(4) (in press).
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  12. Christian List & Franz Dietrich (2007). Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation. Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300.
    Economics and Philosophy 23(3) (in press).
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  13. Christian List & John Dryzek (2003). Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation. British Journal of Political Science 33 (1):1-28.
    The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can promote (...)
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  14. Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin & Iain McLean (2013). Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence From Deliberative Polls. Journal of Politics 75 (1):80–95.
    Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningfulness of democracy. But deliberation can prevent majority cycles – not by inducing unanimity, which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are greater for lower versus higher salience issues and for individuals who seem to have (...)
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  15. Christian List & Ben Polak (2010). Introduction to Judgment Aggregation. Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):441-466.
    This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts and conditions leading to analogous (...)
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  16. Christian List & Clemens Puppe (2009). Judgment Aggregation: A Survey. In Christian List & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
    Our aim in this survey article is to provide an accessible overview of some key results and questions in the theory of judgment aggregation. We omit proofs and technical details, focusing instead on concepts and underlying ideas.
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  17. Michael Morreau (2014). Arrow's Theorem. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: N/A.
    Kenneth Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem—or “general possibility” theorem, as he called it—answers a very basic question in the theory of collective decision-making. Say there are some alternatives to choose among. They could be policies, public projects, candidates in an election, distributions of income and labour requirements among the members of a society, or just about anything else. There are some people whose preferences will inform this choice, and the question is: which procedures are there for deriving, from what is known or (...)
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