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  1. David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers (2009). How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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  2. Greg Bamford (1989). Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction. Analysis 49 (4):203 - 205..
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-Inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, Say, Counter-Corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-Corroborationist alternative is beside the point, However, As whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we (...)
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  3. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.) (forthcoming). Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
  4. Gregor Betz (2013). Revamping Hypothetico-Deductivism: A Dialectic Account of Confirmation. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 78 (5):991-1009.
    We use recently developed approaches in argumentation theory in order to revamp the hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation, thus alleviating the well-known paradoxes the H-D account faces. More specifically, we introduce the concept of dialectic confirmation on the background of the so-called theory of dialectical structures (Betz 2010, 2012b). Dialectic confirmation generalises hypothetico-deductive confirmation and mitigates the raven paradox, the grue paradox, the tacking paradox, the paradox from conceptual difference, and the problem of surprising evidence.
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  5. Gregor Betz (2010). Besprechung von ‘Zum methodologischen Wert von Vorhersagen’ von Cornelis Menke. [REVIEW] DZPhil 58:329-332.
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  6. Peter Brössel (forthcoming). Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited. Erkenntnis:1-33.
    Probabilistic dependence and independence are among the key concepts of Bayesian epistemology. This paper focuses on the study of one specific quantitative notion of probabilistic dependence. More specifically, section 1 introduces Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and shows how it is related to pivotal aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, the explanatory and unificatory power of theories, and the diversity of evidence. The intimate connection between Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and scientific reasoning raises the question of how Keynes’s coefficient (...)
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  7. Peter Brössel (2013). The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
    Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews the ramifications that this "strengthened problem of measure (...)
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  8. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa, A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox. VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  9. David Christensen (1999). Measuring Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.
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  10. David Christensen (1990). The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping. Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
    The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to (...)
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  11. David Christensen (1983). Glymour on Evidential Relevance. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
    Glymour's "bootstrap" account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence, however, the "bootstrap" condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain why neither can give a satisfactory analysis of evidential relevance.
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  12. Christopher Clarke (2014). Neuroeconomics and Confirmation Theory. Philosophy of Science 81 (2):195-215.
    Neuroeconomics is a research programme founded on the thesis that cognitive and neurobiological data constitute evidence for answering economic questions. I employ confirmation theory in order to reject arguments both for and against neuroeconomics. I also emphasize that some arguments for neuroeconomics will not convince the skeptics because these arguments make a contentious assumption: economics aims for predictions and deep explanations of choices in general. I then argue for neuroeconomics by appealing to a much more restrictive (and thereby skeptic-friendly) characterization (...)
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  13. Nevin Climenhaga (2013). A Problem for the Alternative Difference Measure of Confirmation. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.
    Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) − P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the (...)
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  14. Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Carlo Buttasi (2010). Toward a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation. In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Redéi (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the a European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. 73--93.
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  15. Franz Dietrich & Luca Moretti (2005). On Coherent Sets and the Transmission of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 72 (3):403-424.
    In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-defined sense in which the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as usually, on the probability but on the confirmation of a coherent set and its members. We show that, if evidence confirms a hypothesis, confirmation is "transmitted" to any hypotheses that are sufficiently coherent with the former hypothesis, according to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s measure. Our findings have (...)
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  16. Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) (2010). The Place of Probability in Science. Springer.
    To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers ...
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  17. Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne (2010). How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens. In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. 247--275.
    The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts (...)
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  18. James Hawthorne (2011). Bayesian Confirmation Theory. In S. French & J. Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum Press.
    Scientifi c theories and hypotheses make claims that go well beyond what we can immediately observe. How can we come to know whether such claims are true? The obvious approach is to see what a hypothesis says about the observationally accessible parts of the world. If it gets that wrong, then it must be false; if it gets that right, then it may have some claim to being true. Any sensible a empt to construct a logic that captures how we (...)
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  19. James Hawthorne (2011). Confirmation Theory. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
    Confirmation theory is the study of the logic by which scientific hypotheses may be confirmed or disconfirmed, or even refuted by evidence. A specific theory of confirmation is a proposal for such a logic. Presumably the epistemic evaluation of scientific hypotheses should largely depend on their empirical content – on what they say the evidentially accessible parts of the world are like, and on the extent to which they turn out to be right about that. Thus, all theories of confirmation (...)
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  20. James Hawthorne, Inductive Logic. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sections 1 through 3 present all of the main ideas behind the probabilistic logic of evidential support. For most readers these three sections will suffice to provide an adequate understanding of the subject. Those readers who want to know more about how the logic applies when the implications of hypotheses about evidence claims (called likelihoods) are vague or imprecise may, after reading sections 1-3, skip to section 6. Sections 4 and 5 are for the more advanced reader who wants a (...)
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  21. James Hawthorne (1994). On the Nature of Bayesian Convergence. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:241 - 249.
    The objectivity of Bayesian induction relies on the ability of evidence to produce a convergence to agreement among agents who initially disagree about the plausibilities of hypotheses. I will describe three sorts of Bayesian convergence. The first reduces the objectivity of inductions about simple "occurrent events" to the objectivity of posterior probabilities for theoretical hypotheses. The second reveals that evidence will generally induce converge to agreement among agents on the posterior probabilities of theories only if the convergence is 0 or (...)
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  22. James Hawthorne (1993). Bayesian Induction IS Eliminative Induction. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):99-138.
    Eliminative induction is a method for finding the truth by using evidence to eliminate false competitors. It is often characterized as "induction by means of deduction"; the accumulating evidence eliminates false hypotheses by logically contradicting them, while the true hypothesis logically entails the evidence, or at least remains logically consistent with it. If enough evidence is available to eliminate all but the most implausible competitors of a hypothesis, then (and only then) will the hypothesis become highly confirmed. I will argue (...)
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  23. James Hawthorne (1989). Giving Up Judgment Empiricism: The Bayesian Epistemology of Bertrand Russell and Grover Maxwell. In C. Wade Savage & C. Anthony Anderson (eds.), ReReading Russell: Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology; Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 12. University of Minnesota Press.
    This essay is an attempt to gain better insight into Russell's positive account of inductive inference. I contend that Russell's postulates play only a supporting role in his overall account. At the center of Russell's positive view is a probabilistic, Bayesian model of inductive inference. Indeed, Russell and Maxwell actually held very similar Bayesian views. But the Bayesian component of Russell's view in Human Knowledge is sparse and easily overlooked. Maxwell was not aware of it when he developed his own (...)
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  24. James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson, An Even Better Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.
    Think of confirmation in the context of the Ravens Paradox this way. The likelihood ratio measure of incremental confirmation gives us, for an observed Black Raven and for an observed non-Black non-Raven, respectively, the following “full” likelihood ratios.
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  25. James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson (2004). Discussion: Re‐Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence. Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514.
    Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X—even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account that overcomes the problem of (...)
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  26. Nicholaos Jones (2009). General Relativity and the Standard Model: Why Evidence for One Does Not Disconfirm the Other. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (2):124-132.
    General Relativity and the Standard Model often are touted as the most rigorously and extensively confirmed scientific hypotheses of all time. Nonetheless, these theories appear to have consequences that are inconsistent with evidence about phenomena for which, respectively, quantum effects and gravity matter. This paper suggests an explanation for why the theories are not disconfirmed by such evidence. The key to this explanation is an approach to scientific hypotheses that allows their actual content to differ from their apparent content. This (...)
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  27. Teru Miyake (2013). Essay Review: Isaac Newton's Scientific Method. Philosophy of Science 80 (2):310-316.
  28. Luca Moretti (2007). Ways in Which Coherence is Confirmation Conducive. Synthese 157 (3):309 - 319.
    Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti (Philosophy of science 72(3): 403–424, 2005) have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive—that is, of how the (...)
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  29. Luca Moretti (2006). The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism Versus Hypothetico-Deductivism. Erkenntnis 64 (1):115-138.
    Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.
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  30. Luca Moretti (2004). Grimes on the Tacking by Disjunction Problem. Disputatio 1 (17):16-20.
    In this paper, I focus on the so-called "tacking by disjunction problem". Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis H is confirmed by a statement E, H is confirmed by the disjunction E v F, for whatever statement F. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.
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  31. Luca Moretti (2003). Why the Converse Consequence Condition Cannot Be Accepted. Analysis 63 (4):297–300.
    Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.
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  32. Luca Moretti (2002). For a Bayesian Account of Indirect Confirmation. Dialectica 56 (2):153–173.
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  33. Ilho Park (2014). Confirmation Measures and Collaborative Belief Updating. Synthese 191 (16):3955-3975.
    There are some candidates that have been thought to measure the degree to which evidence incrementally confirms a hypothesis. This paper provides an argument for one candidate—the log-likelihood ratio measure. For this purpose, I will suggest a plausible requirement that I call the Requirement of Collaboration. And then, it will be shown that, of various candidates, only the log-likelihood ratio measure \(l\) satisfies this requirement. Using this result, Jeffrey conditionalization will be reformulated so as to disclose explicitly what determines new (...)
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  34. Reed Richter, American Science and its Anti-Evolutionist Critics: It's the Evidence Stupid.
    This is an unpublished talk written for a meeting of French philosophers. The paper describes the evolution versus creationism/intelligent design controversy in the U.S. A number of philosophers and scientists try to resolve this issue by sharply distinguishing the realm of science versus any talk of the supernatural. These pro-evolutionists often appeal to science's essential commitment to "methodological naturalism," the view that scientific methodology is essentially committed to naturalism and cannot meaningfully entertain hypotheses concerning the supernatural. I criticize methodological naturalism, (...)
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  35. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Popper's Measure of Corroboration and P(H|B). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs029.
    This article shows that Popper’s measure of corroboration is inapplicable if, as Popper argued, the logical probability of synthetic universal statements is zero relative to any evidence that we might possess. It goes on to show that Popper’s definition of degree of testability, in terms of degree of logical content, suffers from a similar problem. 1 The Corroboration Function and P(h|b) 2 Degrees of Testability and P(h|b).
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  36. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). Intersubjective Corroboration. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
    How are we to understand the use of probability in corroboration functions? Popper says logically, but does not show we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. This makes the logical interpretation untenable, as Ramsey and van Fraassen have argued. -/- If corroboration functions only make sense when the probabilities employed therein are subjective, however, then what counts as impressive evidence for a theory might be a matter of convention, or even whim. So isn’t (...)
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  37. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). The Big Test of Corroboration. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):293 – 302.
    This paper presents a new 'discontinuous' view of Popper's theory of corroboration, where theories cease to have corroboration values when new severe tests are devised which have not yet been performed, on the basis of a passage from The Logic of Scientific Discovery . Through subsequent analysis and discussion, a novel problem for Popper's account of corroboration, which holds also for the standard ('continuous') view, emerges. This is the problem of the Big Test: that the severest test of (...)
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  38. C. Wade Savage & C. Anthony Anderson (eds.) (1989). ReReading Russell: Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology; Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 12. University of Minnesota Press.
  39. Michael Schippers (2014). Probabilistic Measures of Coherence: From Adequacy Constraints Towards Pluralism. Synthese 191 (16):3821-3845.
    The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence flourishes for about 15 years now. Initiated by papers that have been published around the turn of the millennium, many different proposals have since then been put forward. This contribution is partly devoted to a reassessment of extant coherence measures. Focusing on a small number of reasonable adequacy constraints I show that (i) there can be no coherence measure that satisfies all constraints, and that (ii) subsets of these adequacy constraints motivate two different (...)
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  40. Maximillian Schlosshauer & Gregory Wheeler (2011). Focused Correlation, Confirmation, and the Jigsaw Puzzle of Variable Evidence. Philosophy of Science 78 (3):376-92.
    Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true. A difference between the confirmation lent to a hypothesis by one evidence set and the confirmation lent to that hypothesis by another evidence set is robustly tracked by a difference in focused correlations of those evidence sets on that hypothesis, provided that all the individual pieces of evidence are equally, positively relevant to that hypothesis. (...)
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  41. Alfred Schramm (2014). Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue. Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  42. Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.
    Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr( h 1 & h 2 | e ) > Pr( h 1 | e ). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h 1 alone. Consequently, they suggest (...)
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  43. Jonah N. Schupbach (2011). Studies in the Logic of Explanatory Power. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Human reasoning often involves explanation. In everyday affairs, people reason to hypotheses based on the explanatory power these hypotheses afford; I might, for example, surmise that my toddler has been playing in my office because I judge that this hypothesis delivers a good explanation of the disarranged state of the books on my shelves. But such explanatory reasoning also has relevance far beyond the commonplace. Indeed, explanatory reasoning plays an important role in such varied fields as the sciences, philosophy, theology, (...)
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  44. Michael J. Shaffer & Patricia Turrisi (2008). Theories of Violence and the Explanation of Ultra-Violent Behavior. In T. Levin (ed.), Violence: Mercurial Gestalt.
    Theorists in various scientific disciplines offer radically different accounts of the origin of violent behavior in humans, but it is not clear how the study of violence is to be scientifically grounded. This problem is made more complicated because both what sorts of acts constitute violence and what needs to be appealed to in explaining violence differs according to social scientists, biologists, anthropologists and neurophysiologists, and this generates serious problems with respect to even attempting to ascertain the differential bona fides (...)
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  45. Jacob Stegenga (2013). An Impossibility Theorem for Amalgamating Evidence. Synthese 190 (12):2391-2411.
    Amalgamating evidence of different kinds for the same hypothesis into an overall confirmation is analogous, I argue, to amalgamating individuals’ preferences into a group preference. The latter faces well-known impossibility theorems, most famously “Arrow’s Theorem”. Once the analogy between amalgamating evidence and amalgamating preferences is tight, it is obvious that amalgamating evidence might face a theorem similar to Arrow’s. I prove that this is so, and end by discussing the plausibility of the axioms required for the theorem.
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  46. R. G. Swinburne (1974). Meaningfulness Without Confirmability: A Reply. Analysis 35 (1):22 - 27.
    IN THE COURSE OF "CONFIRMABILITY AND FACTUAL MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 33) I ARGUED THAT THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION STATEMENT OR CONFIRMABLE BY OBSERVATION STATEMENTS. MY ARGUMENT CONSISTED IN PRODUCING EXAMPLES OF FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS WHICH FAIL TO SATISFY THE PRINCIPLE. IN "CONFIRMABILITY AND MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 34) R I SIKORA ARGUED THAT MY EXAMPLES DO NOT SUPPORT MY CONCLUSION. HERE I REPHRASE (...)
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  47. R. G. Swinburne (1973). Confirmability and Factual Meaningfulness. Analysis 33 (3):71 - 76.
    THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE, THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION-STATEMENT, OR THERE ARE OBSERVATION STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONFIRM OR DISCONFIRM IT. THIS PRINCIPLE IS THE FINAL WEAK CLAIM OF VERIFICATIONISM. EVEN IF TRUE, IT WOULD NOT BE OF GREAT USE IN SORTING OUT THE MEANINGFUL FROM THE MEANINGFULNESS, BUT IT IS SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY TO BE FALSE. A CLAIM THAT THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT MEN WILL EVER (...)
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  48. R. G. Swinburne (1971). The Paradoxes of Confirmation - a Survey. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):318 - 330.
    THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION ARE CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRADICTIONS ARISING FROM THE CONJUNCTION OF THREE PRINCIPLES OF CONFIRMATION - NICOD’S CRITERION, THE EQUIVALENCE CONDITION, AND WHAT THE PAPER CALLS THE SCIENTIFIC LAWS CONDITION. THE PAPER DISCUSSES IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY ABANDONING ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES. IN THE END IT FINDS NICOD’S CRITERION FALSE, BUT FINDS THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY H.G. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS OF WHY NICOD’S CRITERION IS FALSE THEMSELVES UNSATISFACTORY. IT THEN PROVIDES A MORE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT (...)
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  49. Richard Swinburne (1973). An Introduction to Confirmation Theory. Methuen.
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  50. Peter Urbach & Colin Howson (1993). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. Open Court.
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