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  1. Brad Abernethy (1987). Glymour on Bootstrap Confirmation of Ptolemaic Theory. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):473-479.
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  2. Peter Achinstein (1963). Confirmation Theory, Order, and Periodicity. Philosophy of Science 30 (1):17-35.
    This paper examines problems of order and periodicity which arise when the attempt is made to define a confirmation function for a language containing elementary number theory as applied to a universe in which the individuals are considered to be arranged in some fixed order. Certain plausible conditions of adequacy are stated for such a confirmation function. By the construction of certain types of predicates, it is proved, however, that these conditions of adequacy are violated by any confirmation function defined (...)
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  3. Peter Achinstein (1963). Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory. Philosophy of Science 30 (3):207-221.
    Confirmation theorists seek to define a function that will take into account the various factors relevant in determining the degree to which an hypothesis is confirmed by its evidence. Among confirmation theorists, only Rudolf Carnap has constructed a system which purports to consider factors in addition to the number of instances, viz. the variety manifested by the instances and the amount of analogy between the instances. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the problem which these additional factors (...)
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  4. Robert Ackermann (1969). Sortal Predicates and Confirmation. Philosophical Studies 20 (1-2):1 - 4.
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  5. Jonathan E. Adler (1990). Conservatism and Tacit Confirmation. Mind 99 (396):559-570.
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  6. H. G. Alexander (1959). The Paradoxes of Confirmation--A Reply to Dr Agassi. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (39):229-234.
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  7. H. G. Alexander (1958). The Paradoxes of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35):227-233.
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  8. David Atkinson (2012). Confirmation and Justification. A Commentary on Shogenji's Measure. Synthese 184 (1):49-61.
    So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds of acceptance. In contrast, Shogenji’s new measure of justification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does the trick. As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate that this general measure resolves the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of the general measure for the Conjunction Effect; in (...)
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  9. David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers, How to Confirm the Disconfirmed. On Conjunction Fallacies and Robust Confirmation.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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  10. Patricia Baillie (1973). Confirmation and the Dutch Book Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):393-397.
  11. Patricia Baillie (1971). Confirmation and Probability: A Reply to Settle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):285-286.
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  12. Patricia Baillie (1969). That Confirmation May yet Be a Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):41-51.
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  13. Sorin Bangu (2006). Underdetermination and the Argument From Indirect Confirmation. Ratio 19 (3):269–277.
    In this paper I criticize one of the most convincing recent attempts to resist the underdetermination thesis, Laudan’s argument from indirect confirmation. Laudan highlights and rejects a tacit assumption of the underdetermination theorist, namely that theories can be confirmed only by empirical evidence that follows from them. He shows that once we accept that theories can also be confirmed indirectly, by evidence not entailed by them, the skeptical conclusion does not follow. I agree that Laudan is right to reject this (...)
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  14. Y. Bar-hillel (1956). Content and Degreb of Confirmation: Further Comments on Probability and Confirmation a Rejoinder to Professor Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):245-248.
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  15. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1956). Further Comments on Probability and Confirmation: A Rejoinder to Professor Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):245-248.
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  16. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1955). Comments on 'Degree of Confirmation' by Professor K. R. Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (22):155-157.
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  17. William H. Baumer (1968). Confirmation Still Without Paradoxes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):57-63.
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  18. William H. Baumer (1964). Confirmation Without Paradoxes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15 (59):177-195.
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  19. Charles A. Baylis (1952). The Confirmation of Value Judgments. Philosophical Review 61 (1):50-58.
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  20. Michael Beaney (1999). Presuppositions and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Disputatio.
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  21. Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson (2003). Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation. Analysis 63 (277):23–31.
    We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.
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  22. Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson (2003). Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation. Analysis 63 (1):23-31.
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  23. Ingo Brigandt (2011). Critical Notice of Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science by Elliott Sober, Cambridge University of Press, 2008. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41:159–186.
    This essay discusses Elliott Sober’s Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science. Valuable to both philosophers and biologists, Sober analyzes the testing of different kinds of evolutionary hypotheses about natural selection or phylogenetic history, including a thorough critique of intelligent design. Not at least because of a discussion of different schools of hypothesis testing (Bayesianism, likelihoodism, and frequentism), with Sober favoring a pluralism where different inference methods are appropriate in different empirical contexts, the book has lessons for philosophy of (...)
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  24. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
    Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...)
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  25. B. A. Brody (1968). Confirmation and Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 65 (10):282-299.
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  26. Baruch Brody (1974). More Confirmation and Explanation. Philosophical Studies 26 (1):73 - 75.
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  27. Matthew J. Brown (2014). Values in Science Beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839.
    Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is (...)
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  28. David J. Buller (1993). Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm, or, Why Do You Think They Call It Artificial Intelligence? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-81.
    The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that (...)
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  29. Richard M. Burian (1992). Book Review:The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory Elisabeth A. Lloyd. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 59 (1):153-.
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  30. Richmond Campbell (1990). Book Review:Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation, and Reality in the Natural and Social Sciences. Richard W. Miller. [REVIEW] Ethics 100 (4):897-.
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  31. Richmond Campbell & Thomas Vinci (1983). Novel Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (4):315-341.
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  32. Rudolf Carmap (1956). Content and Degreb of Confirmation: Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):243-244.
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  33. Rudolf Carnap (1956). Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):243-244.
  34. Rudolf Carnap (1953). On the Comparative Concept of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (12):311-318.
  35. Rudolf Carnap (1949). Truth and Confirmation. In Harry Fiegl & Wilfred Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts. 119--127.
  36. Jake Chandler (2013). Contrastive Confirmation: Some Competing Accounts. Synthese 190 (1):129-138.
    I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called 'Law of Likelihood' is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.
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  37. Lin Chao-Tien (1978). Solutions to the Paradoxes of Confirmation, Goodman's Paradox, and Two New Theories of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):415-419.
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  38. Silvio Seno Chibeni (2010). Locke on the Epistemological Status of Scientific Laws. Principia 9 (1-2):19-41.
    This article aims to defend Locke against Quine’s charge, made in his famous “two dogmas” paper, that Locke’s theory of knowledge is badly flawed, not only for assuming the dogmas, but also for adopting an “intolerably restrictive” version of the dogma of reductionism. It is shown here that, in his analysis of the epistemological status of scientific laws, Locke has effectively transcended the narrow idea-empiricism which underlies this version of reductionism. First, in order to escape idealism, he introduced the notion (...)
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  39. David Christensen (1997). What is Relative Confirmation? Noûs 31 (3):370-384.
    It is commonly acknowledged that, in order to test a theoretical hypothesis, one must, in Duhem' s phrase, rely on a "theoretical scaffolding" to connect the hypothesis with something measurable. Hypothesis-confirmation, on this view, becomes a three-place relation: evidence E will confirm hypothesis H only relative to some such scaffolding B. Thus the two leading logical approaches to qualitative confirmation--the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account and Clark Glymour' s bootstrap account--analyze confirmation in relative terms. But this raises questions about the philosophical interpretation (...)
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  40. F. M. Christensen (1998). Hypothesis Confirmation is Induction by Enumeration. Philosophia 26 (1-2):79-103.
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  41. José Alberto Coffa (1970). Two Remarks on Hempel's Logic of Confirmation. Mind 79 (316):591-596.
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  42. L. Jonathan Cohen (1966). What has Confirmation to Do with Probabilities? Mind 75 (300):463-481.
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  43. H. M. Collins (1994). A Strong Confirmation of the Experimenters' Regress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (3):493-503.
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  44. Mark Colyvan (1999). Confirmation Theory and Indispensability. Philosophical Studies 96 (1):1-19.
    In this paper I examine Quine''s indispensability argument, with particular emphasis on what is meant by ''indispensable''. I show that confirmation theory plays a crucial role in answering this question and that once indispensability is understood in this light, Quine''s argument is seen to be a serious stumbling block for any scientific realist wishing to maintain an anti-realist position with regard to mathematical entities.
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  45. Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori (2008). Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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  46. Zbigniew Czerwiński (1960). Degree of Confirmation and Critical Region. Studia Logica 10 (1):119 - 122.
  47. Jared Darlington (1959). On the Confirmation of Laws. Philosophy of Science 26 (1):14-24.
    The author discusses some difficulties involved in the application of "degree of confirmation" to the confirmation of lawlike-statements. An alternative analysis is proposed, which is based on interval estimation. It is argued that this analysis is superior to the criticized method, in that it is better able to show how instantial confirmations are inductively relevant to a law, and in that it requires fewer undesirable extra-logical assumptions.
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  48. Harald Dickson (1990). Evidential Support and Undermining: Revision of Håkan Törnebohm's Theory of Confirmation. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 21 (1):163-182.
    In 1975, 'An Essay on Knowledge Formation' by H. Törnebohm was published in this Journal. Its content in revised form was included in a work in Swedish of 1983 on knowledge development. HT defines his confirmation criterion in terms of a measure of truth degree T, which is based on a measure of matching M, which is also used as a measure of the degree to which proposition p (an hypothesis) is supported or undermined by another proposition q (the evidence (...)
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  49. Tanya Ditommaso (2002). Contradiction and Confirmation. Symposium 6 (1):23-35.
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  50. Aysel Dogan (2005). Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):243 - 259.
    In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for instance, is found to be defective (...)
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