This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
543 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 543
Material to categorize
  1. Brad Abernethy (1987). Glymour on Bootstrap Confirmation of Ptolemaic Theory. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):473-479.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Peter Achinstein (1997). On Evidence: A Reply to McGrew. Analysis 57 (1):81–83.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Peter Achinstein (1992). The Evidence Against Kronz. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):169-175.
  4. Robert Ackermann (1969). Sortal Predicates and Confirmation. Philosophical Studies 20 (1-2):1 - 4.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jonathan E. Adler (1990). Conservatism and Tacit Confirmation. Mind 99 (396):559-570.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ken Akiba (2000). Shogenji's Probabilistic Measure of Coherence is Incoherent. Analysis 60 (4):356–359.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. H. G. Alexander (1959). The Paradoxes of Confirmation--A Reply to Dr Agassi. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (39):229-234.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. H. G. Alexander (1958). The Paradoxes of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35):227-233.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. H. G. Alexander (1956). DUHEM, P. -The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. [REVIEW] Mind 65:572.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Staffan Angere (2008). Coherence as a Heuristic. Mind 117 (465):1-26.
    The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) call into question the strength of the connection between coherence and truth. As part of the inquiry into this alleged link, I define a notion of degree of truth-conduciveness, relevant for measuring the usefulness of coherence measures as rules-of-thumb for assigning probabilities in situations of partial knowledge. I use the concept to compare the viability of some of the measures of coherence that have been suggested so far under different (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Staffan Angere (2007). The Defeasible Nature of Coherentist Justification. Synthese 157 (3):321 - 335.
    The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Michael Aristidou (2013). Irrationality Re-Examined: A Few Comments on the Conjunction Fallacy. Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):329-336.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. G. Arnold (2001). Kluge. Systematic Biology 50 (3):322-330.
    Sir Karl Popper is well known for explicating science in falsificationist terms, for which his degree of corroboration formalism, C(h,e,b), has become little more than a symbol. For example, de Queiroz and Poe in this issue argue that C(h,e,b) reduces to a single relative (conditional) probability, p(e,hb), the likelihood of evidence e, given both hypothesis h and background knowledge b, and in reaching that conclusion, without stating or expressing it, they render Popper a verificationist. The contradiction they impose is easily (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. David Atkinson (2012). Confirmation and Justification. A Commentary on Shogenji's Measure. Synthese 184 (1):49-61.
    So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds of acceptance. In contrast, Shogenji’s new measure of justification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does the trick. As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate that this general measure resolves the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of the general measure for the Conjunction Effect; in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers, How to Confirm the Disconfirmed. On Conjunction Fallacies and Robust Confirmation.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Patricia Baillie (1973). Confirmation and the Dutch Book Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):393-397.
  17. Patricia Baillie (1971). Confirmation and Probability: A Reply to Settle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):285-286.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Davis Baird (1984). Tests of Significance Violate the Rule of Implication. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:81 - 92.
    The rule of implication, (+) If hypothesis H implies hypothesis I, then evidence sufficient to warrant the rejection of I, in turn warrants the rejection of H, is a very plausible principle of inductive inference. It is shown that significance tests violate this principle. Two ways to account for this violation are considered; neither account is fully satisfactory. First, a distinction might be made between the absolute degree of confirmation and the change in the degree of confirmation due to a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Sorin Bangu (2006). Underdetermination and the Argument From Indirect Confirmation. Ratio 19 (3):269–277.
    In this paper I criticize one of the most convincing recent attempts to resist the underdetermination thesis, Laudan’s argument from indirect confirmation. Laudan highlights and rejects a tacit assumption of the underdetermination theorist, namely that theories can be confirmed only by empirical evidence that follows from them. He shows that once we accept that theories can also be confirmed indirectly, by evidence not entailed by them, the skeptical conclusion does not follow. I agree that Laudan is right to reject this (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Jerusalem Bar-Hillel (1955). Comments on `Degree of Confirmation' by Professor K. R. Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (22):155.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Y. Bar-hillel (1956). Content and Degreb of Confirmation: Further Comments on Probability and Confirmation a Rejoinder to Professor Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):245-248.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1956). Further Comments on Probability and Confirmation: A Rejoinder to Professor Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):245-248.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1955). Comments on 'Degree of Confirmation' by Professor K. R. Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (22):155-157.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Thomas Bartelborth (2004). Wofür Sprechen Die Daten? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35 (1):13-40.
    What Do the Data Tell Us? Justification of scientific theories is a three-place relation between data, theories, and background knowledge. Though this should be a commonplace, many methodologies in science neglect it. The article will elucidate the significance and function of our background knowledge in epistemic justification and their consequences for different scientific methodologies. It is argued that there is no simple and at the same time acceptable statistical algorithm that justifies a given theory merely on the basis of certain (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. M. S. Bartlett (1949). Probability in Logic, Mathematics and Science. Dialectica 3 (1‐2):104-113.
    Historically the emergence of a precise technical meaning for probability, as distinct from its vague popular useage, has taken time; and confusion still arises from the concept of probability having different meanings in different flelds of discourse. Its technical meaning and appropriate rules are surveyed in the flelds of logic , mathematics , and science , and the relation between these three aspects of probability theory discussed. ‐. M. S. B.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Diderik Batens (1971). The Paradoxes of Confirmation. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 25 (95/96):101-117.
    A distinction is made between the internal paradox (inconsistency of our intuitions) and the external one (no explicatum captures all our intuitions). seemingly counterintuitive aspects of carnap's inductive logic (external paradox) are shown to be sound. considering the purpose of formulating an hypothesis, and its intended competitors, it is explained why nicod's criterion seems plausible (internal paradox). incidentally baumer's theory (bjps, 15) is proved to violate the equivalence condition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. William H. Baumer (1968). Confirmation Still Without Paradoxes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):57-63.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. William H. Baumer (1964). Confirmation Without Paradoxes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15 (59):177-195.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Charles A. Baylis (1952). The Confirmation of Value Judgments. Philosophical Review 61 (1):50-58.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Michael Beaney (1999). Presuppositions and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Disputatio:28-34.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. N. Bonini, K. Tentori & D. Osherson (forthcoming). A New Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Language.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson (2003). Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation. Analysis 63 (277):23–31.
    We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson (2003). Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation. Analysis 63 (1):23-31.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Ingo Brigandt (2011). Critical Notice of Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science by Elliott Sober, Cambridge University of Press, 2008. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):159–186.
    This essay discusses Elliott Sober’s Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science. Valuable to both philosophers and biologists, Sober analyzes the testing of different kinds of evolutionary hypotheses about natural selection or phylogenetic history, including a thorough critique of intelligent design. Not at least because of a discussion of different schools of hypothesis testing (Bayesianism, likelihoodism, and frequentism), with Sober favoring a pluralism where different inference methods are appropriate in different empirical contexts, the book has lessons for philosophy of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
    Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Baruch Brody (1974). More Confirmation and Explanation. Philosophical Studies 26 (1):73 - 75.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Peter Brössel (2008). Theory Assessment and Coherence. Abstracta 4 (1):57-71.
    One of the most important questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science is: what is a good theory and when is a theory better than another theory, given some observational data? The coherentist‟s answer would be the following twofold conjecture: (i) A theory is a good theory given some observational data iff that theory coheres with the observational data and (ii) a theory is better than another theory given some observational data iff the first theory coheres more with the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Matthew J. Brown (2014). Values in Science Beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839.
    Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. David J. Buller (1993). Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm, or, Why Do You Think They Call It Artificial Intelligence? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-81.
    The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Richard M. Burian (1992). Book Review:The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory Elisabeth A. Lloyd. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 59 (1):153-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. R. Butts (1999). Hypothetico-Deductive Method. In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Richmond Campbell (1990). Book Review:Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation, and Reality in the Natural and Social Sciences. Richard W. Miller. [REVIEW] Ethics 100 (4):897-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Rudolf Carmap (1956). Content and Degreb of Confirmation: Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):243-244.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Rudolf Carnap (1956). Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree of Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):243-244.
  45. Rudolf Carnap (1949). Truth and Confirmation. In Harry Fiegl & Wilfred Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts. 119--127.
  46. Christopher D. Carroll, Patricia W. Cheng & Hongjing Lu (2010). Uncertainty in Causal Inference: The Case of Retrospective Revaluation. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jake Chandler (2013). Contrastive Confirmation: Some Competing Accounts. Synthese 190 (1):129-138.
    I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called 'Law of Likelihood' is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. J. R. N. Chiappin (2014). The Dynamical Theory of Knowledge in Duhem: A Middle Way Between the Classical Conception of Science and the Conventionalist/Pragmatist Conception. Trans/Form/Ação 37 (2):57-90.
    O objetivo é propor uma reconstrução racional da concepção da ciência de Duhem, por meio do recurso da metodologia da teoria da ciência, como uma teoria normativa da dinâmica do conhecimento. Essa reconstrução ajuda a estabelecer que Duhem não pode ser classificado como um convencionalista/pragmatista, como sugere a interpretação-padrão, e, além disso, que Duhem almeja construir uma concepção que seja um termo médio entre a concepção metafísica clássica e a concepção do convencionalismo/pragmatismo. A estratégia metodológica para construir esse termo médio (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Silvio Seno Chibeni (2010). Locke on the Epistemological Status of Scientific Laws. Principia 9 (1-2):19-41.
    This article aims to defend Locke against Quine’s charge, made in his famous “two dogmas” paper, that Locke’s theory of knowledge is badly flawed, not only for assuming the dogmas, but also for adopting an “intolerably restrictive” version of the dogma of reductionism. It is shown here that, in his analysis of the epistemological status of scientific laws, Locke has effectively transcended the narrow idea-empiricism which underlies this version of reductionism. First, in order to escape idealism, he introduced the notion (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. David Christensen (1997). What is Relative Confirmation? Noûs 31 (3):370-384.
    It is commonly acknowledged that, in order to test a theoretical hypothesis, one must, in Duhem' s phrase, rely on a "theoretical scaffolding" to connect the hypothesis with something measurable. Hypothesis-confirmation, on this view, becomes a three-place relation: evidence E will confirm hypothesis H only relative to some such scaffolding B. Thus the two leading logical approaches to qualitative confirmation--the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account and Clark Glymour' s bootstrap account--analyze confirmation in relative terms. But this raises questions about the philosophical interpretation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 543