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  1. Kenneth Aizawa (2003). The Systematicity Arguments. Kluwer.
    The Systematicity Arguments is the only book-length treatment of the systematicity and productivity arguments.
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  2. Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Explaining Systematicity. Mind and Language 12 (2):115-36.
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  3. Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Exhibiting Verses Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Hadley and Hayward. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (1):39-55.
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  4. Kenneth Aizawa (1997). The Role of the Systematicity Argument in Classicism and Connectionism. In S. O'Nuallain (ed.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.
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  5. Michael V. Antony (1991). Fodor and Pylyshyn on Connectionism. Minds and Machines 1 (3):321-41.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) have argued that the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. Their argument takes the following form: (1) the cognitive architecture is Classical; (2) Classicalism and Connectionism are incompatible; (3) therefore the cognitive architecture is not Connectionist. In this essay I argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's defenses of (1) and (2) are inadequate. Their argument for (1), based on their claim that Classicalism best explains the systematicity of cognitive capacities, is an invalid instance of inference to the best (...)
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  6. Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  7. Murat Aydede (1997). Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution. Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not (...)
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  8. E. Bizzi, P. Calissano & V. Volterra (eds.) (2001). Frontiers of Life, Vol III: The Intelligent Systems, Part One: The Brain of Homo Sapiens. Academic Press.
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  9. Keith Butler (1995). Compositionality in Cognitive Models: The Real Issue. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 78 (2):153-62.
  10. Keith Butler (1993). On Clark on Systematicity and Connectionism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):37-44.
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  11. Keith Butler (1993). Connectionism, Classical Cognitivism, and the Relation Between Cognitive and Implementational Levels of Analysis. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):321-33.
    This paper discusses the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. Chalmers (1990, 1993) argues that a connectionist implementation of a classical cognitive architecture possesses a compositional semantics, and therefore undercuts Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) argument that connectionist networks cannot possess a compositional semantics. I argue that Chalmers argument misconstrues the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. This paper clarifies the distinction, and shows that while Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument survives Chalmers' critique, it cannot be used to (...)
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  12. Keith Butler (1991). Towards a Connectionist Cognitive Architecture. Mind and Language 6 (3):252-72.
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  13. David J. Chalmers (1993). Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):305-319.
    This paper offers both a theoretical and an experimental perspective on the relationship between connectionist and Classical (symbol-processing) models. Firstly, a serious flaw in Fodor and Pylyshyn’s argument against connectionism is pointed out: if, in fact, a part of their argument is valid, then it establishes a conclusion quite different from that which they intend, a conclusion which is demonstrably false. The source of this flaw is traced to an underestimation of the differences between localist and distributed representation. It has (...)
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  14. David J. Chalmers, Deep Systematicity and Connectionist Representation.
    1. I think that by emphasizing theoretical spaces of representations, Andy has put his finger on an issue that is key to connectionism's success, and whose investigation will be a key determinant of the field's further progress. I also think that if we look at representational spaces in the right way, we can see that they are deeply related to classical phenomenon of systematicity in representation. I want to argue that the key to understanding representational spaces, and in particular their (...)
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  15. David J. Chalmers (1990). Syntactic Transformations on Distributed Representations. Connection Science 2:53-62.
    There has been much interest in the possibility of connectionist models whose representations can be endowed with compositional structure, and a variety of such models have been proposed. These models typically use distributed representations that arise from the functional composition of constituent parts. Functional composition and decomposition alone, however, yield only an implementation of classical symbolic theories. This paper explores the possibility of moving beyond implementation by exploiting holistic structure-sensitive operations on distributed representations. An experiment is performed using Pollack’s Recursive (...)
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  16. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (1990). Autonomy, Implementation and Cognitive Architecture: A Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition 34 (1):93-107.
  17. M. H. Christiansen & Nick Chater (1994). Generalization and Connectionist Language Learning. Mind and Language 9 (3):273-87.
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  18. A. Clark & Ronald Lutz (eds.) (1992). Connectionism in Context. Springer-Verlag.
  19. Robert C. Cummins (1996). Systematicity. Journal of Philosophy 93 (12):591-614.
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  20. S. Davis (ed.) (1991). Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. Oup.
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  21. Wayne A. Davis (2005). On Begging the Systematicity Question. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404.
    Robert Cummins has argued that Jerry Fodor’s well-known systematicity argument begs the question. I show that the systematicity argument for thought structure does not beg the question, nor run in either explanatory nor inferential circles, nor illegitimately project sentence structure onto thoughts. Because the evidence does not presuppose that thought has structure, connectionist explanations of the same interconnections between thoughts are at least possibilities. Butthey are likely to be ad hoc.
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  22. James H. Fetzer (1992). Connectionism and Cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Are Wrong. In A. Clark & Ronald Lutz (eds.), Connectionism in Context. Springer-Verlag. 305-319.
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  23. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2012). “Machine” Consciousness and “Artificial” Thought: An Operational Architectonics Model Guided Approach. Brain Research 1428:80-92.
    Instead of using low-level neurophysiology mimicking and exploratory programming methods commonly used in the machine consciousness field, the hierarchical Operational Architectonics (OA) framework of brain and mind functioning proposes an alternative conceptual-theoretical framework as a new direction in the area of model-driven machine (robot) consciousness engineering. The unified brain-mind theoretical OA model explicitly captures (though in an informal way) the basic essence of brain functional architecture, which indeed constitutes a theory of consciousness. The OA describes the neurophysiological basis of the (...)
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  24. Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work. Cognition 62 (1):109-19.
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  25. Jerry A. Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin (1990). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work. Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
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  26. Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
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  27. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1996). Two Spurious Varieties of Compositionality. Minds and Machines 6 (2):159-72.
    The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two varieties of compositionality): concatenative compositionality vs. functional compositionality. The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way from the official one given by Van Gelder (but one suggested by some of his (...)
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  28. Jay L. Garfield (1997). Mentalese Not Spoken Here: Computation, Cognition, and Causation. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):413-35.
    Classical computational modellers of mind urge that the mind is something like a von Neumann computer operating over a system of symbols constituting a language of thought. Such an architecture, they argue, presents us with the best explanation of the compositionality, systematicity and productivity of thought. The language of thought hypothesis is supported by additional independent arguments made popular by Jerry Fodor. Paul Smolensky has developed a connectionist architecture he claims adequately explains compositionality, systematicity and productivity without positing any language (...)
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  29. Antoni Gomila, David Travieso & Lorena Lobo (2012). Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic? Minds and Machines 22 (2):101-115.
    The “systematicity argument” has been used to argue for a classical cognitive architecture (Fodor in The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, London, 1975, Why there still has to be a language of thought? In Psychosemantics, appendix. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 135–154, 1987; Fodor and Pylyshyn in Cognition 28:3–71, 1988; Aizawa in The systematicity arguments. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 2003). From the premises that cognition is systematic and that the best/only explanation of systematicity is compositional structure, it concludes that cognition is (...)
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  30. Marcello Guarini (1996). Tensor Products and Split-Level Architecture: Foundational Issues in the Classicism-Connectionism Debate. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S239-S247.
    This paper responds to criticisms levelled by Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin against connectionism. Specifically, I will rebut the charge that connectionists cannot account for representational systematicity without implementing a classical architecture. This will be accomplished by drawing on Paul Smolensky's Tensor Product model of representation and on his insights about split-level architectures.
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  31. Robert F. Hadley (1997). Cognition, Systematicity, and Nomic Necessity. Mind and Language 12 (2):137-53.
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  32. Robert F. Hadley (1997). Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Kenneth Aizawa. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 12 (4):571-79.
    In his discussion of results which I (with Michael Hayward) recently reported in this journal, Kenneth Aizawa takes issue with two of our conclusions, which are: (a) that our connectionist model provides a basis for explaining systematicity within the realm of sentence comprehension, and subject to a limited range of syntax (b) that the model does not employ structure-sensitive processing, and that this is clearly true in the early stages of the network''s training. Ultimately, Aizawa rejects both (a) and (b) (...)
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  33. Robert F. Hadley (1994). Systematicity in Connectionist Language Learning. Mind and Language 9 (3):247-72.
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  34. Robert F. Hadley (1994). Systematicity Revisited. Mind and Language 9 (4):431-44.
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  35. Robert F. Hadley & M. B. Hayward (1997). Strong Semantic Systematicity From Hebbian Connectionist Learning. Minds and Machines 7 (1):1-55.
    Fodor's and Pylyshyn's stand on systematicity in thought and language has been debated and criticized. Van Gelder and Niklasson, among others, have argued that Fodor and Pylyshyn offer no precise definition of systematicity. However, our concern here is with a learning based formulation of that concept. In particular, Hadley has proposed that a network exhibits strong semantic systematicity when, as a result of training, it can assign appropriate meaning representations to novel sentences (both simple and embedded) which contain words in (...)
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  36. W. F. G. Haselager & J. F. H. Van Rappard (1998). Connectionism, Systematicity, and the Frame Problem. Minds and Machines 8 (2):161-179.
    This paper investigates connectionism's potential to solve the frame problem. The frame problem arises in the context of modelling the human ability to see the relevant consequences of events in a situation. It has been claimed to be unsolvable for classical cognitive science, but easily manageable for connectionism. We will focus on a representational approach to the frame problem which advocates the use of intrinsic representations. We argue that although connectionism's distributed representations may look promising from this perspective, doubts can (...)
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  37. John Hawthorne (1989). On the Compatibility of Connectionist and Classical Models. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):5-16.
    This paper presents considerations in favour of the view that traditional (classical) architectures can be seen as emergent features of connectionist networks with distributed representation. A recent paper by William Bechtel (1988) which argues for a similar conclusion is unsatisfactory in that it fails to consider whether the compositional syntax and semantics attributed to mental representations by classical models can emerge within a connectionist network. The compatibility of the two paradigms hinges largely, I suggest, on how this question is answered. (...)
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  38. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1991). Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. Oup.
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  39. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Classicism Vs. Connectionism. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
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  40. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1995). Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
  41. Robert J. Matthews (1997). Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity? Mind and Language 12 (2):154-77.
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  42. Robert J. Matthews (1994). Three-Concept Monte: Explanation, Implementation, and Systematicity. Synthese 101 (3):347-63.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) and McLaughlin (1993) challenge connectionists to explain systematicity without simply implementing a classical architecture. In this paper I argue that what makes the challenge difficult for connectionists to meet has less to do with what is to be explained than with what is to count as an explanation. Fodor et al. are prepared to admit as explanatory, accounts of a sort that only classical models can provide. If connectionists are to meet the (...)
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  43. Brian P. McLaughlin (1993). The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls. Philosophical Studies 71 (2):163-190.
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  44. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences 34:217-234.
    Smolensky's (1995) proposal for a connectionist explanation of systematicity doesn't work.
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  45. L. F. Niklasson & Tim van Gelder (1994). On Being Systematically Connectionist. Mind and Language 9 (3):288-302.
    In 1988 Fodor and Pylyshyn issued a challenge to the newly-popular connectionism: explain the systematicity of cognition without merely implementing a so-called classical architecture. Since that time quite a number of connectionist models have been put forward, either by their designers or by others, as in some measure demonstrating that the challenge can be met (e.g., Pollack, 1988, 1990; Smolensky, 1990; Chalmers, 1990; Niklasson and Sharkey, 1992; Brousse, 1993). Unfortu- nately, it has generally been unclear whether these models actually do (...)
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  46. S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.) (1997). Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.
  47. Steven E. Petersen & Adina L. Roskies (2001). Visualizing Human Brain Function. In E. Bizzi, P. Calissano & V. Volterra (eds.), Frontiers of Life, Vol Iii: The Intelligent Systems, Part One: The Brain of Homo Sapiens. Academic Press.
    Running head: Functional neuroimaging Abstract Several recently developed techniques enable the investigation of the neural basis of cognitive function in the human brain. Two of these, PET and fMRI, yield whole-brain images reflecting regional neural activity associated with the performance of specific tasks. This article explores the spatial and temporal capabilities and limitations of these techniques, and discusses technical, biological, and cognitive issues relevant to understanding the goals and methods of neuroimaging studies. The types of advances in understanding cognitive and (...)
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  48. Stephen H. Phillips (2002). Does Classicism Explain Universality? Minds and Machines 12 (3):423-434.
    One of the hallmarks of human cognition is the capacity to generalize over arbitrary constituents. Recently, Marcus (1998, 1998a, b; Cognition 66, p. 153; Cognitive Psychology 37, p. 243) argued that this capacity, called universal generalization (universality), is not supported by Connectionist models. Instead, universality is best explained by Classical symbol systems, with Connectionism as its implementation. Here it is argued that universality is also a problem for Classicism in that the syntax-sensitive rules that are supposed to provide causal explanations (...)
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  49. Jordan B. Pollack (1990). Recursive Distributed Representations. Artificial Intelligence 46:77-105.
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  50. Mark Rowlands (1994). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
    In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the (...)
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