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  1. John Bickle (1993). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Semantic View of Theories. Erkenntnis 39 (3):359-382.
    Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not principled. Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in this (...)
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  2. George Botterill (1994). Beliefs, Functionally Discrete States, and Connectionist Networks. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):899-906.
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  3. Anthony Chemero (2007). Asking What's Inside the Head: Neurophilosophy Meets the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 17 (3):345-351.
    In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing (...)
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  4. Hugh Clapin (1991). Connectionism Isn't Magic. Minds and Machines 1 (2):167-84.
    Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols (...)
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  5. Andy Clark (1990). Connectionist Minds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:83-102.
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  6. Andy Clark (1989). Beyond Eliminativism. Mind and Language 4 (4):251-79.
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  7. Martin Davies (1991). Concepts, Connectionism, and the Language of Thought. Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum:229--57.
  8. Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
    It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
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  9. Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.) (2005). Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
  10. M. Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437-52.
    Abstract Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best understood as (...)
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  11. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1995). Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.
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  12. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Connectionism and Eliminativism. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  13. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1995). Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
  14. Gerard O'Brien (1991). Is Connectionism Commonsense? Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):165-78.
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  15. John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1994). On the Threat of Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 74 (3):325-46.
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  16. Ullin T. Place (1992). Eliminative Connectionism: Its Implications for a Return to an Empiricist/Behaviorist Linguistics. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):21-35.
    For the past three decades linguistic theory has been based on the assumption that sentences are interpreted and constructed by the brain by means of computational processes analogous to those of a serial-digital computer. The recent interest in devices based on the neural network or parallel distributed processor (PDP) principle raises the possibility ("eliminative connectionism") that such devices may ultimately replace the S-D computer as the model for the interpretation and generation of language by the brain. An analysis of the (...)
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  17. William Ramsey (1994). Distributed Representation and Causal Modularity: A Rejoinder to Forster and Saidel. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):453-61.
    In “Connectionism and the fats of folk psychology”, Forster and Saidel argue that the central claim of Ramsey, Stich and Garon (1991)—that distributed connectionist models are incompatible with the causal discreteness of folk psychology—is mistaken. To establish their claim, they offer an intriguing model which allegedly shows how distributed representations can function in a causally discrete manner. They also challenge our position regarding projectibility of folk psychology. In this essay, I offer a response to their account and show how their (...)
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  18. William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon (1991). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum. 499-533.
  19. William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.) (1991). Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    The philosophy of cognitive science has recently become one of the most exciting and fastest growing domains of philosophical inquiry and analysis. Until the early 1980s, nearly all of the models developed treated cognitive processes -- like problem solving, language comprehension, memory, and higher visual processing -- as rule-governed symbol manipulation. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the last half dozen years. In that period there has been an enormous shift of attention toward connectionist models of cognition that are (...)
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  20. Paul G. Skokowski, Belief in Networks.
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  21. Paul Smolensky (1995). On the Projectable Predicates of Connectionist Psychology: A Case for Belief. In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
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  22. Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (1995). Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do Connectionist Minds Have Beliefs? In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
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  23. Barbara Von Eckhardt (2004). Connectionism and the Propositional Attitudes. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.