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  1. Bernard J. Baars & Katharine A. McGovern (2000). Consciousness Cannot Be Limited to Sensory Qualities: Some Empirical Counterexamples. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):11-13.
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality in Practical Realism. MeQRiMa Rivista Di Analisi Testo Letterario E Figurativo 5:130-135.
    1. Suppose that John and Jane are junior colleagues in an academic department of a university. John, who thinks of Jane as his competitor, has seen her flirt with the head of the department. He tells his other colleagues that Jane is trying to gain an unfair advantage over him. He comes to dislike Jane, and often in conversation with people outside the department, he enjoys saying bad things about Jane.
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  3. Steven James Bartlett (1975). Phenomenology of the Implicit. Dialectica 29 (2‐3):173-188.
    Summary: The author describes an alternative approach to certain of the problems central to transcendental philosophy. In particular, the present understanding of pre‐reflective awareness, of reflection, and of their interrelation can acquire a greater degree of rigour and clarity. To this end, attention is paid to preconditions of reference that are entailed by the phenomenological distinction between implicit experience and explicit reflection.
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  4. Giulio Benedetti, Giorgio Marchetti, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts (2010). Mind Operational Semantics and Brain Operational Architectonics: A Putative Correspondence. Open Neuroimaging Journal 4:53-69.
    Despite allowing for the unprecedented visualization of brain functional activity, modern neurobio-logical techniques have not yet been able to provide satisfactory answers to important questions about the relationship between brain and mind. The aim of this paper is to show how two different but complementary approaches, Mind Operational Semantics (OS) and Brain Operational Architectonics (OA), can help bridge the gap between a specific kind of mental activity—the higher-order reflective thought or linguistic thought—and brain. The fundamental notion that allows the two (...)
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  5. B. H. Bode (1905). Cognitive Experience and its Object. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (24):658-663.
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  6. Miro Brada, The Existence.
    In 1995, I wrote an essay 'Existence'. From the analysis of the process of self-consciousness, I concluded: "All I know, only I know", because if YOU know 'what I know', only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know'', and if you know that 'only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know''', only I know that... etc. At every moment, I know something more (I know that YOU know), or something less (I don't know that YOU know that I (...)
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  7. Richard Brown (2007). The Mark of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.
    The idea that there is something that it is like to have a thought is gaining acceptance in the philosophical community and has been argued for recently by several philosophers. Now, within this camp there is a debate about which component of the, say, the belief, is qualitative? Is the qualitative component part of the content of the belief, or part of the mental attitude that we take towards the content? Some argue that the qualitative character is had by the (...)
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  8. Richard Brown & Pete Mandik (2012). On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, Or: What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P? Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
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  9. Mike Bruno & Eric Mandelbaum (2010). Locke's Answer to Molyneux's Thought Experiment. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):165-80.
    Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's problem has (...)
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  10. Peter Carruthers (2005). Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press
    Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of selfreference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking, one that would leave the (...)
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  11. Peter Carruthers (1998). Conscious Thinking: Language or Elimination? Mind and Language 13 (4):457-476.
    Do we conduct our conscious propositional thinking in natural language? Or is such language only peripherally related to human conscious thought-processes? In this paper I shall present a partial defence of the former view, by arguing that the only real alternative is eliminativism about conscious propositional thinking. Following some introductory remarks, I shall state the argument for this conclusion, and show how that conclusion can be true. Thereafter I shall defend each of the three main premises in turn.
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  12. Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Cognitive Phenomenology. Routledge.
    Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person ‘feel’ to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects of (...)
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  13. Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.
    According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant (...)
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  14. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intellectual Gestalts. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press 174.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...)
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  15. Paul Coates (1987). Swinburne on Thought and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 52 (September):227-238.
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  16. David J. Cole (1994). Thought and Qualia. Minds and Machines 4 (3):283-302.
    I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events. I also attempt to rebut arguments against the possibility of functionalist accounts of conscious experience and qualia.
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  17. Erica Cosentino & Francesco Ferretti (2014). Communication as Navigation: A New Role for Consciousness in Language. Topoi 33 (1):263-274.
    Classical cognitive science has been characterized by an association with the computational theory of mind. Although this association has produced highly significant results, it has also limited the scope of scientific psychology. In this paper, we analyse the limits of the specific kind of computational model represented by the Chomskian-Fodorian tradition in the study of mind and language. In our opinion, the adhesion to the principle of formality imposed by this specific computational model has motivated the exclusion of consciousness in (...)
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  18. Daniel C. Dennett (1968). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.
    This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.
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  19. Jordan Dodd (2014). Realism and Anti-Realism About Experiences of Understanding. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):745-767.
    Strawson (1994) and Peacocke (1992) introduced thought experiments that show that it seems intuitive that there is, in some way, an experiential character to mental events of understanding. Some (e.g., Siewert 1998, 2011; Pitt 2004) try to explain these intuitions by saying that just as we have, say, headache experiences and visual experiences of blueness, so too we have experiences of understanding. Others (e.g., Prinz 2006, 2011; Tye 1996) propose that these intuitions can be explained without positing experiences of understanding. (...)
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  20. Fabian Dorsch (2016). The Phenomenology of Attitudes and the Salience of Rational Role and Determination. Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):114-137.
    The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, (...)
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  21. Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati (2005). Conceptual Qualia and Communication. In Gilian Crampton Smith (ed.), The Foundations of Interaction Design. 1-14.
    The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
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  22. Marius Dumitru (2014). Cognitive-Phenomenological Penetration. Hypothesis 1 (1).
    The study of the mind has to grapple with both the unconscious and the conscious. While the phenomenon of cognitive penetration has already been explored especially in connection to the modularity of perceptual and cognitive processes, the phenomenon of cognitive-phenomenological penetration, the penetration within the stream of consciousness of the phenomenological fabric of experiences by the phenomenology of thought, has not been given much attention thus far. In this paper, I focus with analytic-phenomenological methods on cognitive-phenomenological penetration as a phenomenon (...)
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  23. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Giorgio Marchetti (2010). Editorial: Brain, Mind and Language Functional Architectures. Open Neuroimaging Journal 4:26-29.
    The interaction between brain and language has been investigated by a vast amount of research and different approaches, which however do not offer a comprehensive and unified theoretical framework to analyze how brain functioning performs the mental processes we use in producing language and in understanding speech. This Special Issue addresses the need to develop such a general theoretical framework, by fostering an interaction among the various scientific disciplines and methodologies, which centres on investigating the functional architecture of brain, mind (...)
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  24. Walter J. Freeman & J. Burns (1996). Societies of Brains: Walter Freeman in Conversation with Jean Burns. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (2):172-180.
    [opening paragraph]: Walter Freeman discusses with Jean Burns some of the issues relating to consciousness in his recent book. Burns: To understand consciousness we need know its relationship to the brain, and to do that we need to know how the brain processes information. A lot of people think of brain processing in terms of individual neurons, and you're saying that brain processing should be understood in terms of dynamical states of populations?
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  25. Grant R. Gillett (1987). The Generality Constraint and Conscious Thought. Analysis 47 (January):20-24.
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  26. A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  27. Marie Guillot (2016). Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: The Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection. Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):138-160.
    The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts or more generally phenomenally grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the (...)
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  28. Christopher Hookway (1981). Conscious Belief and Deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75:75-89.
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  29. Pierre Jacob (1998). What is the Phenomenology of Thought? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):443-448.
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  30. Marta Jorba (2016). Attitudinal Cognitive Phenomenology and the Horizon of Possibilities. In Thiemo Breyer Christopher Gutland (ed.), The Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. Routledge 77-96.
    This article presents two ways of contributing to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. First, it is argued that cognitive attitudes have a specific phenomenal character or attitudinal cognitive phenomenology and, second, an element in cognitive experiences is described, i.e., the horizon of possibilities, which arguably gives us more evidence for cognitive phenomenology views.
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  31. Marta Jorba (2015). Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):730-753.
    This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument. Following this (...)
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  32. Marta Jorba (2015). Conscious Thought and the Limits of Restrictivism. Critica 47 (141):3-32.
    How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought? In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mental episodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenology views through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents. Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed by Restrictivism, classifying it in two strategies, sensory restrictivism and accompanying states. On (...)
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  33. Marta Jorba & Agustin Vicente (2014). Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents, and Inner Speech. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):74-99.
    In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects (...)
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  34. Sørenarnow H. Klausen (2008). The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
    Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, (...)
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  35. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Entertaining as a Propositional Attitude: A Non-Reductive Characterization. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):1-22.
    Contemporary philosophy of mind tends to theorize about the propositional attitudes primarily in terms of belief and desire. But there is a propositional attitude, sometimes called ‘entertaining,’ that seems to resist analysis in terms of belief and desire, and has been thought at other times and places (notably, in late nineteenth-century Austrian philosophy) to be more fundamental than belief and desire. Whether or not we accept the fundamentality of entertaining, it certainly seems to be an attitude ill understood in contemporary (...)
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  36. Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
    When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for (...)
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  37. Peter Langland-Hassan, Frank R. Faries, Michael J. Richardson & Aimee Dietz (2015). Inner Speech Deficits in Aphasia. Frontiers in Psychology 6 (528):1-10.
    Despite the ubiquity of inner speech in our mental lives, methods for objectively assessing inner speech capacities remain underdeveloped. The most common means of assessing inner speech is to present participants with tasks requiring them to silently judge whether two words rhyme. We developed a version of this task to assess the inner speech of a population of patients with aphasia and corresponding language production deficits. Patients’ performance on the silent rhyming task was severely impaired relative to controls. Patients’ performance (...)
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  38. David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.) (2011). Expérience Et Réflexivité: Perspectives au-Delà de L’Empirisme Et de L’Idéalisme. L'Harmattan.
    This book collects essays from the 2006 and 2007 International Philosophy Colloquia Evian, centred around a central problem in the philosophy of mind: the relationship between the human faculty of sensory experience and the faculty of conceptual reflection, that is self-consciousness. Containing articles by philosophers of eight nationalities, in three languages (English, French, German), and of "analytical" as well as "continental" provenance, it beautifully represents the spirit of the colloquia. Authors include Joshua Andresen (AU Beirut), Valérie Aucouturier (Kent U / (...)
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  39. Pablo López-Silva (2014). La relevancia filosófica del estudio de la esquizofrenia. Cuestiones metodológicas y conceptuales. Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría 43 (3).
    El estudio de las enfermedades mentales propone profundas discusiones metodológicas y filosóficas. Este artículo explora la complementariedad disciplinaria que existe, específicamente, entre filosofía de la mente, fenomenología y los estudios empíricos en psiquiatría y psicopatología en el contexto de la comprensión de la esquizofrenia. Luego de clarificar el posible rol de cada una de estas disciplinas, se explora la forma en que un síntoma específico de la esquizofrenia (delirios de inserción de pensamiento) desafía el actual enfoque fenomenológico sobre la relación (...)
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  40. Tom McClelland (2016). Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism About Phenomenal Properties. Philosophical Quarterly (264):536-558.
    Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory phenomenal properties such as what it’s like to perceive some high-level property, and what it’s like to think that p. A hallmark of phenomenal properties is that they present an explanatory gap, so to resolve the dispute we should consider whether experience has non-sensory properties that appear ‘gappy’. The classic tests for ‘gappiness’ are the invertibility test and the zombifiability test. I suggest that these tests yield conflicting results: non-sensory (...)
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  41. Tom McClelland (2015). Review of Uriah Kriegel, The Varieties of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly:NA.
    Review of Uriah Kriegel's The Varieties of Consciousness.
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  42. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2013). Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague's Cognitive Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):601-604.
    (2013). Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 601-604. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.800126.
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  43. Jennifer Nagel (2014). Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):219-241.
    Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler (2014) contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this divergence does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive and reflective thinking, this paper (...)
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  44. Jennifer Nagel (2014). The Meanings of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):710-718.
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  45. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Gendler on Alief. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (4):774-788.
    Contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
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  46. N. M. L. Nathan (1982). Conscious Belief. Analysis 42 (March):90-93.
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  47. Norton Nelkin (1989). Propositional Attitudes and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):413-30.
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  48. Anders Nes (2016). The Sense of Natural Meaning in Conscious Inference. In T. Breyer & C. Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking. Routledge 97-115.
    The paper addresses the phenomenology of inference. It proposes that the conscious character of conscious inferences is partly constituted by a sense of meaning; specifically, a sense of what Grice called ‘natural meaning’. In consciously drawing the (outright, categorical) conclusion that Q from a presumed fact that P, one senses the presumed fact that P as meaning that Q, where ‘meaning that’ expresses natural meaning. This sense of natural meaning is phenomenologically analogous, I suggest, to our sense of what is (...)
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  49. Anders Nes (2015). Review of T. Bayne and M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: OUP, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind 124 (494):607-612.
  50. Anders Nes (2012). Thematic Unity in the Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):84-105.
    Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought (...)
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