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  1. Bernard J. Baars & Katharine A. McGovern (2000). Consciousness Cannot Be Limited to Sensory Qualities: Some Empirical Counterexamples. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):11-13.
  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality in Practical Realism. MeQRiMa Rivista Di Analisi Testo Letterario E Figurativo 5:130-135.
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  3. Giulio Benedetti, Giorgio Marchetti, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts (2010). Mind Operational Semantics and Brain Operational Architectonics: A Putative Correspondence. Open Neuroimaging Journal 4:53-69.
    Despite allowing for the unprecedented visualization of brain functional activity, modern neurobio-logical techniques have not yet been able to provide satisfactory answers to important questions about the relationship between brain and mind. The aim of this paper is to show how two different but complementary approaches, Mind Operational Semantics (OS) and Brain Operational Architectonics (OA), can help bridge the gap between a specific kind of mental activity—the higher-order reflective thought or linguistic thought—and brain. The fundamental notion that allows the two (...)
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  4. B. H. Bode (1905). Cognitive Experience and its Object. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (24):658-663.
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  5. Richard Brown (2007). The Mark of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.
    The idea that there is something that it is like to have a thought is gaining acceptance in the philosophical community and has been argued for recently by several philosophers. Now, within this camp there is a debate about which component of the, say, the belief, is qualitative? Is the qualitative component part of the content of the belief, or part of the mental attitude that we take towards the content? Some argue that the qualitative character is had by the (...)
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  6. Richard Brown & Pete Mandik (forthcoming). On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology or What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P? Philosophical Topics 40 (2).
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
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  7. Mike Bruno & Eric Mandelbaum (2010). Locke's Answer to Molyneux's Thought Experiment. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):165-80.
    Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's problem has (...)
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  8. Peter Carruthers (2006). Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
    Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of selfreference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking, one that would leave the (...)
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  9. Peter Carruthers (1998). Conscious Thinking: Language or Elimination? Mind and Language 13 (4):457-476.
    Do we conduct our conscious propositional thinking in natural language? Or is such language only peripherally related to human conscious thought-processes? In this paper I shall present a partial defence of the former view, by arguing that the only real alternative is eliminativism about conscious propositional thinking. Following some introductory remarks, I shall state the argument for this conclusion, and show how that conclusion can be true. Thereafter I shall defend each of the three main premises in turn.
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  10. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intellectual Gestalts. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 174.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...)
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  11. Paul Coates (1987). Swinburne on Thought and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 52 (September):227-238.
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  12. David J. Cole (1994). Thought and Qualia. Minds and Machines 4 (3):283-302.
    I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events. I also attempt to rebut arguments against the possibility of functionalist accounts of conscious experience and qualia.
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  13. Daniel C. Dennett (1968/1986). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.
    This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.
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  14. Jordan Dodd (2014). Realism and Anti-Realism About Experiences of Understanding. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):745-767.
    Strawson (1994) and Peacocke (1992) introduced thought experiments that show that it seems intuitive that there is, in some way, an experiential character to mental events of understanding. Some (e.g., Siewert 1998, 2011; Pitt 2004) try to explain these intuitions by saying that just as we have, say, headache experiences and visual experiences of blueness, so too we have experiences of understanding. Others (e.g., Prinz 2006, 2011; Tye 1996) propose that these intuitions can be explained without positing experiences of understanding. (...)
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  15. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. 38--71.
    What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we cannot (...)
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  16. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Giorgio Marchetti (2010). Editorial: Brain, Mind and Language Functional Architectures. Open Neuroimaging Journal 4:26-29.
    The interaction between brain and language has been investigated by a vast amount of research and different approaches, which however do not offer a comprehensive and unified theoretical framework to analyze how brain functioning performs the mental processes we use in producing language and in understanding speech. This Special Issue addresses the need to develop such a general theoretical framework, by fostering an interaction among the various scientific disciplines and methodologies, which centres on investigating the functional architecture of brain, mind (...)
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  17. Grant R. Gillett (1987). The Generality Constraint and Conscious Thought. Analysis 47 (January):20-24.
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  18. A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  19. Christopher Hookway (1981). Conscious Belief and Deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75:75-89.
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  20. Pierre Jacob (1998). What is the Phenomenology of Thought? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):443-448.
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  21. Marta Jorba & Agustin Vicente (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents, and Inner Speech. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects (...)
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  22. Sørenarnow H. Klausen (2008). The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
    Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, (...)
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  23. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Entertaining as a Propositional Attitude: A Non-Reductive Characterization. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):1-22.
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  24. Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
    When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for (...)
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  25. David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.) (2011). Expérience Et Réflexivité: Perspectives au-Delà de L’Empirisme Et de L’Idéalisme. L'Harmattan.
    This book collects essays from the 2006 and 2007 International Philosophy Colloquia Evian, centred around a central problem in the philosophy of mind: the relationship between the human faculty of sensory experience and the faculty of conceptual reflection, that is self-consciousness. Containing articles by philosophers of eight nationalities, in three languages (English, French, German), and of "analytical" as well as "continental" provenance, it beautifully represents the spirit of the colloquia. Authors include Joshua Andresen (AU Beirut), Valérie Aucouturier (Kent U / (...)
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  26. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2013). Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague's Cognitive Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):601-604.
    (2013). Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 601-604. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.800126.
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  27. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Meanings of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Noetic feelings, like the feeling of certainty and the tip-of-the-tongue state, have an interesting place in our cognitive economy. Joelle Proust’s account of these feelings emphasizes the procedural guidance they supply, while arguing that this guidance does not depend on any conceptual ability to attribute mental states. I argue that she has made a strong case for their procedural value but hasn’t conclusively shown that they work in a way that is independent of our capacities for mental state attribution.
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  28. Jennifer Nagel (2014). Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):219-241.
    Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler (2014) contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this divergence does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive and reflective thinking, this paper (...)
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  29. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Gendler on Alief. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (4):774-788.
    Contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
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  30. N. M. L. Nathan (1982). Conscious Belief. Analysis 42 (March):90-93.
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  31. Norton Nelkin (1989). Propositional Attitudes and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):413-30.
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  32. Anders Nes (2012). Thematic Unity in the Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):84-105.
    Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought (...)
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  33. Georges Rey (2007). Phenomenal Content and the Richness and Determinacy of Colour Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):112-131.
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  34. William S. Robinson (2005). Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.
    Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think (...)
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  35. Declan Smithies (2013). The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
    This is the first in a series of two articles that serve as an introduction to recent debates about cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical role. The first article examines questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology, while the second article explores the (...)
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  36. Declan Smithies (2013). The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.
    This is the second in a series of two articles that serve as an introduction to recent debates about cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical role. The first article examines questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology, while the second article explores the (...)
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  37. Declan Smithies (2012). The Mental Lives of Zombies. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.
    Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, a creature with the capacity for cognition, but no capacity for consciousness? Searle argues that there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be an intentional zombie: on this view, there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and intentionality. However, I argue that there are good empirical reasons for rejecting the proposed connection between consciousness and intentionality. Instead, I argue (...)
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  38. Pierre Steiner (2013). The Delocalized Mind. Judgements, Vehicles, and Persons. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2013:1-24.
    Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...)
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  39. Marten Ten Hoor (1934). Thought as Awareness and Thought as Behavior. Journal of Philosophy 31 (20):533-543.
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  40. Michael Tye & Briggs Wright (2011). Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 35.
  41. Mary Ellen Waithe, Studied Abroad for 400 Years: Oliva Sabuco's New Philosophy of Human Nature.
    Oliva Sabuco's New Philosophy of Human nature (1587) is an early modern philosophy of medicine that challenged the views of the successors to Aristotle, especially Galen and Ibn Sina (Avicenna). It also challenged the paradigm of the male as the epitome of the human and instead offers a gender-neutral philosophy of human nature. Now largely forgotten, it was widely read and influential amongst philosophers of medicine including DeClave, LePois, Harvey,Southey and others, particularly for its account of the role of the (...)
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  42. Charles Wallis (2008). Consciousness, Context, and Know-How. Synthese 160 (1):123 - 153.
    In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394–409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53–61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(1), 87–96] and Stanley & Williamson [2001, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight in to the use (...)
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  43. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1981). Conscious Belief and Deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-107.
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  44. John N. Williams (2006). Moore's Paradox and Conscious Belief. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
    For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don.
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  45. Sara Worley (1997). Belief and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.
    In this paper, I argue that we should not ascribe beliefs and desires to subjects like zombies or (present day) computers which do not have phenomenal consciousness. In order to ascribe beliefs, we must distinguish between personal and subpersonal content. There may be states in my brain which represent the array of light intensities on my retina, but these states are not beliefs, because they are merely subpersonal. I argue that we cannot distinguish between personal and subpersonal content without reference (...)
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  46. Wayne Wu (2011). What is Conscious Attention? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):93-120.
    Perceptual attention is essential to both thought and agency, for there is arguably no demonstrative thought or bodily action without it. Psychologists and philosophers since William James have taken attention to be a ubiquitous and distinctive form of consciousness, one that leaves a characteristic mark on perceptual experience. As a process of selecting specific perceptual inputs, attention influences the way things perceptually appear. It may then seem that it is a specific feature of perceptual representation that constitutes what it is (...)
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