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Summary There are two main questions regarding the relation between consciousness and intentional content: does consciousness play a role in intentionality, and does intentionality play a role in consciousness? Phenomenal intentionality theories hold that consciousness plays a role in intentionality, whereas representational theories of consciousness (which go by the labels "representationalism" and "intentionalism") hold that intentionality plays a role in consciousness. Some views bring together these two positions.  
Key works Key statements of phenomenal intentionality theories include Searle 1992Searle 1993Strawson 1994, Horgan & Tienson 2002 and Pitt 2004. Key statements of representationalism include Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Lycan 1996, Byrne 2001, and Chalmers 2004.
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  1. David J. Chalmers (2013). The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel. Analysis 73 (2):345-368.
    This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.
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  2. Soonja Choi & Kate Hattrup (2012). Relative Contribution of Perception/Cognition and Language on Spatial Categorization. Cognitive Science 36 (1):102-129.
    This study investigated the relative contribution of perception/cognition and language-specific semantics in nonverbal categorization of spatial relations. English and Korean speakers completed a video-based similarity judgment task involving containment, support, tight fit, and loose fit. Both perception/cognition and language served as resources for categorization, and allocation between the two depended on the target relation and the features contrasted in the choices. Whereas perceptual/cognitive salience for containment and tight-fit features guided categorization in many contexts, language-specific semantics influenced categorization where the two (...)
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  3. Erica Cosentino & Francesco Ferretti (2014). Communication as Navigation: A New Role for Consciousness in Language. Topoi 33 (1):263-274.
    Classical cognitive science has been characterized by an association with the computational theory of mind. Although this association has produced highly significant results, it has also limited the scope of scientific psychology. In this paper, we analyse the limits of the specific kind of computational model represented by the Chomskian-Fodorian tradition in the study of mind and language. In our opinion, the adhesion to the principle of formality imposed by this specific computational model has motivated the exclusion of consciousness in (...)
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  4. Barry F. Dainton (2002). The Gaze of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (2):31-48.
    According to one influential view, consciousness has an awareness– content structure: any experience consists of the awareness of some content. I focus on one version of this dualism, and argue that it should be rejected. My principal argument is directed at the status of the supposed contents of aware- ness; I argue that neither of the principal options is tenable, albeit for different reasons. Although the doctrine in question may seem to be supported by the find- ings of researchers in (...)
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  5. Ezio Di Nucci & Conor McHugh (eds.) (2006). Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time - belong to the natural world, - represent the world, - give rise to our subjective experience, - and ground human knowledge? Content, Consciousness and Perception is an edited collection, comprising eleven new contributions to the philosophy of mind, written by some of the most promising young philosophers in the UK and Ireland. The book is arranged into three parts. Part I, Concepts and (...)
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  6. Frances Egan (2013). Explaining Representation: A Reply to Matthen. Philosophical Studies (1):1-6.
    Mohan Matthen has failed to understand the position I develop and defend in “How to Think about Mental Content.” No doubt some of the fault lies with my exposition, though Matthen often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He construes clarifications and elaborations of my argument to be “concessions.” Rather than dwell too much on specific misunderstandings of my explanatory project and its attendant claims, I will focus on the main points of disagreement.RepresentationalismMy project in the paper is to (...)
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  7. Lorna Green (2003). Beyond Chance and Necessity. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (4):270-286.
    These essays propose a new "Copernican Revolution": Consciousness, not matter, is basic in the universe. They are non-technical, simply and clearly written.
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  8. Jennifer Greenwood (2013). Is Mind Extended or Scaffolded? Ruminations on Sterelney's (2010) Extended Stomach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    In his paper, in this journal, Sterelney (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9:465–481, 2010) claims that cases of extended mind are limiting cases of environmental scaffolding and that a niche construction model is a more helpful, general framework for understanding human action. He further claims that extended mind cases fit into a corner of a 3D space of environmental scaffolds of cognitive competence. He identifies three dimensions which determine where a resource fits into this space and suggests that extended mind (...)
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  9. Bryce Huebner (2013). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):315 - 318.
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  10. Charles D. Laughlin & Vincenza A. Tiberia (2012). Archetypes: Toward a Jungian Anthropology of Consciousness. Anthropology of Consciousness 23 (2):127-157.
    It is very curious that C.G. Jung has had so little influence upon the anthropology of consciousness. In this paper, the reasons for this oversight are given. The archetypal psychology of Jung is summarized and shown to be more complex and useful than extreme constructivist accounts would acknowledge. Jung's thinking about consciousness fits very well with a modern neuroscience view of the psyche and acts as a corrective to relativist notions of consciousness and its relation to the self.
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  11. Neil Levy (2013). Psychopaths and Blame: The Argument From Content. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.
    The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation (...)
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  12. Anne Newstead (2006). Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):5.
    This is a very short book review of a recent volume on the philosophy of Gareth Evans with special attention to work on first-person reference.
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  13. Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
    Merleau-Ponty’s notion of being motivated or solicited to act has recently been the focus of extensive investigation, yet work on this topic has tended to take the general notion of being motivated for granted. In this paper, I shall outline an account of what it is to be motivated. In particular, I shall focus on the relation between the affective character of states of being motivated and their intentional content, i.e. how things appear to the agent. Drawing on Husserl’s discussion (...)
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  14. B. Rogers (2004). Direction-of-Heading Judgments Are Poorer Under More Naturalistic Conditions. In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 167-167.
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  15. Pierre Steiner (2013). A Problem for Representationalist Versions of Extended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...)
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Consciousness and Intentionality
  1. Liliana Albertazzi (2007). At the Roots of Consciousness: Intentional Presentations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):94-114.
    The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation between phenomenal space (...)
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality in Practical Realism. MeQRiMa Rivista Di Analisi Testo Letterario E Figurativo 5:130-135.
    1. Suppose that John and Jane are junior colleagues in an academic department of a university. John, who thinks of Jane as his competitor, has seen her flirt with the head of the department. He tells his other colleagues that Jane is trying to gain an unfair advantage over him. He comes to dislike Jane, and often in conversation with people outside the department, he enjoys saying bad things about Jane.
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  3. John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
    My goal is to try to understand the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. My basic methodological assumption is that embodied agents, through their sensory-motor, affective, and cognitive activities directed at objects, engage in intentional relations with these objects. Furthermore, I assume that intentional relations can be viewed from a first- and a third-person perspective. What is called primary consciousness is the first-person perspective of the agent engaged in a current intentional relation. While primary consciousness posits an implicit.
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  4. Wolfgang Barz (2007). Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness? Acta Analytica 22 (3):183-188.
    It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise.
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  5. L. Bortolotti (2002). Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):247 – 248.
    Book Information Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Edited by Fisette Denis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht. 1999. Pp. viii + 361. Hardback, US$140, £88.
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  6. David Bourget, Regimentation and the Science of Consciousness.
    A chief aim of the science of consciousness is to discover general principles that determine exactly which states of phenomenal consciousness occur in exactly which conditions. In this paper I argue that making progress towards the discovery of such principles requires developing a new regimented language for describing phenomenal states. This language should allow us to describe phenomenal states in a way that is commensurable with our descriptions of physical states. I suggest one way of doing this. My approach extends (...)
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  7. David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
    Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range (...)
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  8. David Bourget (2010). The Representational Theory of Consciousness. Dissertation, Australian National University
    A satisfactory solution to the problem of consciousness would take the form of a simple yet fully general model which specifies the precise conditions under which any given state of consciousness occurs. Science has uncovered numerous correlations between consciousness and neural activity, but it has not yet come anywhere close to this. We are still looking for the Newtonian laws of consciousness. -/- One of the main difficulties with consciousness is that we lack a language in which to formulate illuminating (...)
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  9. Richard Brown (ed.) (2013). Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
    This volume is product of the third online consciousness conference, held at http://consciousnessonline.com in February and March 2011. Chapters range over epistemological issues in the science and philosophy of perception, what neuroscience can do to help us solve philosophical issues in the philosophy of mind, what the true nature of black and white vision, pain, auditory, olfactory, or multi-modal experiences are, to higher-order theories of consciousness, synesthesia, among others. Each chapter includes a target article, commentaries, and in most cases, a (...)
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  10. Richard Brown (2007). The Mark of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.
    The idea that there is something that it is like to have a thought is gaining acceptance in the philosophical community and has been argued for recently by several philosophers. Now, within this camp there is a debate about which component of the, say, the belief, is qualitative? Is the qualitative component part of the content of the belief, or part of the mental attitude that we take towards the content? Some argue that the qualitative character is had by the (...)
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  11. Richard Brown & Pete Mandik (2012). On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, Or: What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P? Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
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  12. Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Cognitive Phenomenology. Routledge.
    Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person ‘feel’ to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects of (...)
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  13. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
    In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, (...)
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  14. Rebecca Copenhaver (2006). Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289.
    Thomas Reid’s epistemological ambitions are decisively at the center of his work. However, if we take such ambitions to be the whole story, we are apt to overlook the theory of mind that Reid develops and deploys against the theory of ideas. Reid’s philosophy of mind is sophisticated and strikingly contemporary, and has, until recently, been lost in the shadow of his other philosophical accomplishments. Here I survey some aspects of Reid’s theory of mind that I find most interesting. I (...)
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  15. Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In , Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
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  16. Martin Davies (1995). Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press. 2.
    Thinking is special. There is nothing quite like it. Thinking.
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  17. Denis Fisette (ed.) (1999). Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer.
    The volume is divided into four sections, each section being prefaced by a specific introduction.
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1994). What is the Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837-45.
    The Connection Principle (hereafter, CP) says that there is some kind of internal relation between a state's1 having intentional content ("aspectual shape") and its being (at least potentially) conscious. Searle's argument for the principle is just that potential consciousness is the only thing he can think of that would distinguish original intentionality from ersatz (Searle, 1992, pp. 84, 155 and passim. All Searle references are to 1992). Cognitivists have generally found this argument underwhelming given the empirical successes recently enjoyed by (...)
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  19. Walter J. Freeman (1997). Three Centuries of Category Errors in Studies of the Neural Basis of Consciousness and Intentionality. Neural Networks 10:1175-83.
  20. Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of (...)
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  21. Grant R. Gillett & John McMillan (2001). Consciousness and Intentionality. John Benjamins.
    This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major...
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  22. Oscar L. Gonzalez-Castan (1999). The Connection Principle and the Classificatory Scheme of Reality. Teorema 18 (1):85-98.
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  23. George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 468--484.
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  24. David Miguel Gray (forthcoming). HOT: Keeping Up Appearances? Southern Philosophical Review.
    David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states (i.e. a conscious episode consisting of a HOT without the presence of a relevant lower order thought). Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to (...)
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  25. Keith Gunderson (1990). Consciousness and Intentionality: Robots with and Without the Right Stuff. In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind. Csli.
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  26. Ted Honderich (2001). Consciousness as Existence and the End of Intentionality. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophy at the New Millennium. Cambridge University Press. 1-26.
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  27. Donovan Hulse & Cynthia Read, Searle's Intentional Mistake.
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  28. Pierre Jacob (1995). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Function: What is the Right Order of Explanation? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200.
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  29. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving (first) an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and (second) the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation (all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality). The solution is correspondingly two-part: (...)
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  30. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Review of The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (463):749-753.
  31. Uriah Kriegel (2003). Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
    It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am (...)
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  32. Keith Lehrer (1986). Metamind: Belief, Consciousness and Intentionality. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.
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  33. Mark Leon (1987). Character, Content, and the Ontology of Experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (December):377-399.
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  34. Joseph Levine (2008). Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet. The Monist 91 (2):215-236.
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  35. Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (8).
    _The Significance of Consciousness_ . Princeton: Princeton University Press. $42.50 hbk. x + 374pp. ISBN: 0691027242. ABSTRACT: I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to.
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