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Consciousness and Intentionality
- Liliana Albertazzi (2007). At the Roots of Consciousness: Intentional Presentations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):94-114.
- John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
- Wolfgang Barz (2007). Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness? Acta Analytica 22 (3).
- L. Bortolotti (2002). Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):247 – 248.
- David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32-58.
- David Bourget (2010). The Representational Theory of Consciousness. Dissertation, Australian National University
- Richard Brown (2007). The Mark of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.
- Rebecca Copenhaver (2006). Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289.
- Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In Tim Crane (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
- Martin Davies (1995). Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press.
- Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1994). What is the Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837-45.
- Walter J. Freeman (1997). Three Centuries of Category Errors in Studies of the Neural Basis of Consciousness and Intentionality. Neural Networks 10:1175-83.
- Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
- Grant R. Gillett & John McMillan (2001). Consciousness and Intentionality. John Benjamins.
- Oscar L. Gonzalez-Castan (1999). The Connection Principle and the Classificatory Scheme of Reality. Teorema 18 (1):85-98.
- Ted Honderich (2001). Consciousness as Existence and the End of Intentionality. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophy at the New Millennium. Cambridge University Press.
- Pierre Jacob (1995). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Function: What is the Right Order of Explanation? Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200.
- Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
- Uriah Kriegel (2003). Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
- Mark Leon (1987). Character, Content, and the Ontology of Experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (December):377-399.
- Joseph Levine (2008). Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet. Monist 91 (2).
- Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (8).
- Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). A Dilemma for Searle's Argument for the Connection Principle. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 16:194-5.
- Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.
- Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
- Fiona Macpherson (2003). Novel Colours and the Content of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
- Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling
- Eduard Marbach (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness: Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Kluwer.
- Gregory McCulloch (1999). Bipartism and the Phenomenology of Content. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):18-32.
- Colin McGinn (2008). Consciousness as Knowingness. Monist 91 (2).
- Boyd Millar (2010). Peacocke's Trees. Synthese 174 (3).
- Bernard Molyneux (2009). Why Experience Told Me Nothing About Transparency. Noûs 43 (1):116-136.
- Dana K. Nelkin (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality. Psyche 7 (13).
- Alva Noë (2006). Experience Without the Head. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
- Adam Pautz, The Intentional Structure of Consciousness: A Primitivist Theory.
- Christopher Peacocke (2001). Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
- William S. Robinson, Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Vive La Difference!
- Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, Qualia, and Mind/Brain Identity. Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.
- John R. Searle (1995). Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: A Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):217-232.
- Charles Siewert, Consciousness and Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Galen Strawson (2005). Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Galen Strawson (2005). Real Intentionality V.2: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):279-297.
- Par Sundstrom, Consciousness and Intentionality of Action.
- Pär Sundström (2004). Lessons for Mary. In Marek and Reicher (ed.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
- Nigel J. T. Thomas, Coding Dualism: Conscious Thought Without Cartesianism or Computationalism.
- Amie Thomasson (2008). Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World. Monist 91 (2).
- Amie L. Thomasson (2001). Two Puzzles for a New Theory of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (3).
- Robbert Van Baaren (1999). A Critical Evaluation of Searle's Connection Principle. Teorema 18 (1):73-83.
- Robert van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.
- Dan Zahavi (2005). Intentionality and Experience. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):299-318.
Representationalism
- Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
- William P. Alston (2005). Perception and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
- Torin Alter (2006). Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
- Torin Alter (2006). Does Synesthesia Undermine Representationalism? Psyche 12 (5).
- Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.
- Kent Bach, Engineering the Mind.
- Kent Bach (1997). Engineering the Mind (Review of Dretske 1995, Naturalizing the Mind). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):459-468.
- Andrew R. Bailey (2007). Representation and a Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.
- Andrew R. Bailey (2005). What is It Like to See a Bat? A Critique of Dretske's Representationalist Theory of Qualia. Disputatio 1 (18).
- David Bain (2003). Intentionalism and Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
- Ansgar Beckermann (1995). Visual Information Processing and Phenomenal Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
- Stephen Biggs (2009). The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 215-236.
- Ned Block (2005). Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
- Ned Block (2003). Mental Paint. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
- Ned Block (1999). Sexism, Ageism, Racism, and the Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Topics 26 (1):39-70.
- Ned Block (1998). Is Experiencing Just Representing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.
- Ned Block (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
- Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
- Clive V. Borst (1970). Perception and Intentionality. Mind 79 (January):115-121.
- David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32-58.
- David Bourget (2010). The Representational Theory of Consciousness. Dissertation, Australian National University
- Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
- Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Strong Representationalism and Centered Content. Philosophical Studies.
- Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont (2006). The Representational Base of Consciousness. Psyche 12 (2).
- Tyler Burge (2003). Qualia and Intentional Content: Reply to Block. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
- Alex Byrne, Tye on Color and the Explanatory Gap.
- Alex Byrne, Don't PANIC: Tye's Intentionalist Theory of Consciousness. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
- Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
- Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
- David J. Chalmers (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
- David J. Cole, Dretske on Naturalizing the Mind.
- Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
- Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
- Paul Sheldon Davies (1997). Deflating Consciousness: A Critical Review of Fred Dretske's Naturalizing the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):541-550.
- Max Deutsch (2005). Intentionalism and Intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
- John Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.
- Fabian Dorsch, Transparency and Imagining Seeing.
- Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
- Fred Dretske (2000). Reply to Lopes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):455-459.
- Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
- Paula Droege (2003). Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness. John Benjamins.
- Paula Droege, Second Sense: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness.
- David C. Earle (1998). On the Roles of Consciousness and Representations in Visual Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):757-758.
- Jonathan Ellis (2010). Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism. Philosophical Studies 147 (2).
- Jason Ford (forthcoming). Tye-Dyed Teleology and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Studies.
- Denise Gamble (1997). P-Consciousness Presentation/a-Consciousness Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.
- Daniel Gilman (1997). Consciousness and Mental Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):150-151.
- Richard Gray (2003). Tye's Representationalism: Feeling the Heat? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):245-256.
- Guven Guzeldere & Murat Aydede (2000). On the Relation Between Phenomenal and Representational Properties. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):151-153.
- Guven Guzeldere & Murat Aydede (1997). On the Relation Between Phenomenal and Representational Properties. .
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