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  1. John Barresi (2004). Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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  2. Pavel Baryshnikov (2012). Information, meaning and sense Iin the linguistic process of consciousness. RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA DEL LINGUAGGIO.
    In this article the linguistic processes of consciousness are discussed at the informational and semantic levels. The key question is devoted to the distinction between the information, meaning and sense in the physical, logico-semantic and historic levels of brain and consciousness. The principal point runs that the human linguistic process of sense producing takes the variety and indistinctness in the cultural presupposition. The modern theories of philosophy of mind relying on the theories of Soviet psychological school propose some new solutions (...)
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  3. Tim Bayne (2009). Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
    The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can (...)
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  4. Peter Binns (1995). Commentary on Contentless Consciousness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (1):61-63.
  5. David Bourget, Regimentation and the Science of Consciousness.
    A chief aim of the science of consciousness is to discover general principles that determine exactly which states of phenomenal consciousness occur in exactly which conditions. In this paper I argue that making progress towards the discovery of such principles requires developing a new regimented language for describing phenomenal states. This language should allow us to describe phenomenal states in a way that is commensurable with our descriptions of physical states. I suggest one way of doing this. My approach extends (...)
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  6. Tyler Burge (1991). Vision and Intentional Content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.
  7. Philip Cam (1984). Consciousness and Content-Formation. Inquiry 27 (December):381-98.
    How can materialists begin to do justice to the experiencing subject? Some materialists, whom I call ?structuralists?, believe that the brain sciences offer at least the distant prospect of a materialist psychology with an experiencing subject. Others, and notably those materialists who are functionalists, believe that this faith is misplaced, and offer us instead a functional psychology. I argue, briefly, that functionalism cannot deliver the goods, and go on to elaborate and defend the structuralist claim that consciousness or experience is (...)
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  8. J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
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  9. John Campbell (2011). Consciousness and Reference. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  10. David J. Chalmers, Consciousness and Cognition.
    *[[I wrote this paper in January of 1990, but did not publish it because I was never entirely happy with it. My ideas on consciousness were in a state of flux, ultimately evolving into those represented in my book _The Conscious Mind_ (Oxford University Press, 1996). I now think that some parts of this paper are unsatisfactory, especially the positive theory outlined at the end, although a successor to that theory is laid out in the book. Nevertheless, I think the (...)
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  11. Tim Crane (1997). Galen Strawson on Mental Reality. Ratio 10 (1):82-90.
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  12. Barry F. Dainton (2003). Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche 9 (12).
    Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl (...)
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  13. Daniel C. Dennett (1968/1986). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.
    This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.
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  14. John Drummond (2008). Moral Phenomenology and Moral Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.
    This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense (drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal (...)
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  15. Lester Embree (ed.) (2004). Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer.
    He died before cognitive science came together in the 1970s, but his positions on many issues - the self, the other, practical action in situations, the lived ...
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  16. Barrie Falk (1993). Consciousness, Cognition, and the Phenomenal. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67 (67):55-73.
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  17. James H. Fetzer (2003). Consciousness and Cognition: Semiotic Conceptions of Bodies and Minds. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 295.
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  18. Ivan Fox (1989). On the Nature and Cognitive Function of Phenomenal Content -- Part One. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-103.
  19. N. Georgalis (2006). Representation and the First-Person Perspective. Synthese 150 (2):281-325.
    The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call.
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  20. Joseph Glicksohn (1998). States of Consciousness and Symbolic Cognition. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):105-118.
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  21. James G. Hart (1998). Intentionality, Phenomenality, and Light. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 59--82.
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  22. James G. Hart (1998). Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  23. Jane Heal (1998). Consciousness and Content. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  24. Paul Katsafanas (2005). Nietzsche's Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1–31.
    I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states (...)
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  25. Wolfgang Kohler (1929). An Old Pseudoproblem. Die Naturwissenschaften 17:395-401.
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  26. Harold N. Lee (1985). A Semiotic-Pragmatic Theory of Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):217-228.
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  27. Joseph Levine (2011). On the Phenomenology of Thought. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 103.
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  28. Brian Loar (2003). Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  29. J. Christopher Maloney (1986). Sensuous Content. Philosophical Papers 15 (November):131-54.
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  30. Glen Mazis (2008). Humans, Animals, Machines: Blurring Boundaries. State University of New York.
    Examining Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Haraway; artificial intelligence that includes "MIT Embodied AI"; newer holistic brain research; animal studies; the ...
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  31. Colin McGinn (2006). Hard Questions - Comments on Galen Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):90-99.
    I find myself in agreement with almost all of Galen's paper (Strawson, 2006) -- except, that is, for his three main claims. These I take to be: that he has provided a substantive and useful definition of 'physicalism'; that physicalism entails panpsychism; and that panpsychism is a necessary and viable doctrine. But I find much to applaud in the incidentals Galen brings in to defend these three claims, particularly his eloquent and uncompromising rejection of the idea of brute emergence, as (...)
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  32. Colin McGinn (1988). Consciousness and Content. Proceedings of the British Academy 74:219-39.
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  33. Ronald McIntyre & David Woodruff Smith (1989). Theory of Intentionality. In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook. University Press of America.
    §1. Intentionality; §2. Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality; §3. The Distinction between Content and Object; §4. Husserl's Theory of Content: Noesis and Noema; §5. Noema and Object; §6. The Sensory Content of Perception; §7. The Internal Structure of Noematic Sinne; §8. Noema and Horizon; §9. Horizon and Background Beliefs.
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  34. Franklin Merrell-Wolff (1973). The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object. New York,Julian Press.
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  35. Norton Nelkin (1994). Phenomena and Representation. Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-47.
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  36. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1997). Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
    When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between (...)
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  37. C. G. Prado (1977). Reference and Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (May):22-26.
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  38. Sydney Shoemaker (2000). Phenomenal Character Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.
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  39. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Phenomenal Character of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2).
    These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes of sense- perception. One of these, based primarily on the case of vision, is what I called the object-perceptual model -- it takes perception (...)
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  40. Kendon Rasey Smith (1969). Behavior and Conscious Experience. Athens, Ohio University Press.
  41. Stephen P. Stich (1981). On the Relation Between Occurrents and Contentful Mental States. Inquiry 24 (October):353-358.
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  42. Galen Strawson (2003). What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315.
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, (...)
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  43. Galen Strawson (1998). Replies to Noam Chomsky, Pierre Jacob, Michael Smith, and Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):461-486.
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  44. Philip R. Sullivan (1995). Contentless Consciousness and Information-Processing Theories of Mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (1):51-59.
  45. Pär Sundström (2004). Lessons for Mary. In Marek and Reicher (ed.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  46. Pär Sundström (2002). An Argument Against Spectrum Inversion. In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. 65--94.
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  47. Michael Thau (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
    This book maintains that our conception of consciousness and cognition begins with and depends upon a few fundamental errors. Thau elucidates these errors by discussing three important philosophical puzzles - Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White Mary - each of which concerns some aspect of either consciousness or cognition. He argues that it has gone unnoticed that each of these puzzles presents the very same problem and, in bringing this commonality to light, the errors in our natural conception of consciousness (...)
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  48. Michael Tye (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Mit Press.
    Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal (...)
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  49. Wayne Wu (2014). Against Division: Consciousness, Information and the Visual Streams. Mind and Language 29 (4):383-406.
    Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventral stream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a ‘zombie’ stream. In this article, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the dorsal stream contributes to a pervasive feature (...)
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