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Summary There are two main questions regarding the relation between consciousness and intentional content: does consciousness play a role in intentionality, and does intentionality play a role in consciousness? Phenomenal intentionality theories hold that consciousness plays a role in intentionality, whereas representational theories of consciousness (which go by the labels "representationalism" and "intentionalism") hold that intentionality plays a role in consciousness. Some views bring together these two positions.  
Key works Key statements of phenomenal intentionality theories include Searle 1992Searle 1993Strawson 1994, Horgan & Tienson 2002 and Pitt 2004. Key statements of representationalism include Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Lycan 1996, Byrne 2001, and Chalmers 2004.
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  1. Peter Achinstein (1975). Causation, Transparency, and Emphasis. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):1 - 23.
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  2. G. Allen (2006). Transparency and Teaching. Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3):568-570.
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  3. Torin Alter, Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge.
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  4. Torin Alter (2008). 13 Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In Edmond L. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press. 247.
  5. Zenon Bankowski (1999). Transparency and the Particular. Journal for Cultural Research 3 (4):427-444.
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  6. Gary Bartlett (2014). Internalism and the Snapshot Conception of Phenomenal Experience: A Reply to Fisher. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):652-664.
  7. David Best (1981). Intentionality and Art. Philosophy 56 (217):349 - 363.
    A work of art is something which is unlike anything else. It is art which, best of all, gives us the idea of what is particular.
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  8. P. W. Bridgman (1951). The Nature of Some of Our Physical Concepts. I. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):257-272.
  9. P. W. Bridgman (1951). The Nature of Some of Our Physical Concepts--II. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (5):25-44.
  10. P. W. Bridgman (1951). The Nature of Some of Our Physical Concepts. III. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (6):142-160.
  11. Harold Brown (2006). Comment on Radical Externalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):14-27.
  12. C. R. Bukala (1991). Consciousness: Creative and Self-Creating. Philosophy Today 14 (1):14-25.
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  13. John Chapman (1995). Transparency? What Transparency? Business Ethics 4 (3):139–142.
  14. Robert C. Coghill (2005). Pain: Making the Private Experience Public. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
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  15. Richard Double (1987). Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 31:481-482.
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  16. Michael Gaebler & Jan-Peter Lamke (2013). Phenomenal Depth A Common Phenomenological Dimension in Depression and Depersonalization. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):7-8.
    Describing, understanding, and explaining subjective experience in depression is a great challenge for psychopathology. Attempts to uncover neurobiological mechanisms of those experiences are in need of theoretical concepts that are able to bridge phenomenological descriptions and neurocognitive approaches, which allow us to measure indicators of those experiences in quantitative terms. Based on our own on going work with patients who suffer from depersonalization disorder and describe their experience as flat and detached from self, body, and world, we introduce the idea (...)
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  17. Christina Garsten & Monica Lindh de Montoya (2009). Transparency Tricks. In Christina Garsten & Tor Hernes (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas in Management. Routledge.
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  18. James Garvey (2006). Consciousness and Absence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):44-60.
  19. Brie Gertler (2001). Introspecting Phenomenal States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions (...)
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  20. Herbert Heidelberger & G. Lynn Stephens (1978). Transparency and Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (4):549.
  21. Benj Hellie (2007). Factive Phenomenal Characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
    This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does (...)
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  22. Ted Honderich (2004). On Consciousness. Edinburgh University Press.
    This is not just another book about consciousness: it takes the subject of consciousness forward, out of the impasse into which it has come.
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  23. Terry Horgan (2007). Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection. Psyche 13.
    I explore the prospects for overcoming the prima facie tension in the following four claims, all of which I accept: the phenomenal character of experience is narrow; virtually all aspects of the phenomenal character of experience are intentional; the most fundamental kind of mental intentionality is fully constituted by phenomenal character; and yet introspection does not by itself reliably generate answers to certain philosophically important questions about the phenomenally constituted intentional content of experience. The apparent tension results from the following (...)
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  24. Pierre Jacob (1996). State Consciousness Revisited. Acta Analytica 11 (16):29-54.
  25. Robert Kirk (2002). Thinking About Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. SWIF Philosophy of Mind [December 2.
  26. Daniel Kolak (1990). Art and Intentionality. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (2):158-162.
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  27. Ronald W. Langacker (1999). And Transparency. In Andreas Blank & Peter Koch (eds.), Historical Semantics and Cognition. Mouton de Gruyter. 13--147.
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  28. M. Lewis (1990). The Development of Intentionality and the Role of Consciousness. Psychological Inquiry 1:231-247.
  29. Caleb Liang (2006). Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:21-36.
    In “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” Alston argues against Sellars’s position in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) that there is no nonconceptual cognition. According to him, Sellars ignores phenomenal look-concepts that capture the phenomenal character of experience. I contend that the Sellarsian can agree that the phenomenal aspect of looks should be accommodated, but he is not thereby forced to concede a form of the nonconceptual Given. I examine some of Alston’s arguments, especially the Fineness of (...)
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  30. Eric Lormand (2005). Phenomenal Impressions. In T.S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oup. 316--353.
  31. Cynthia Macdonald (1997). Naturalizing the Mind By Fred Dretske Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996. Pp. Xiii + 208. Philosophy 72 (279):150-.
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  32. Steve Martinot (1992). The Contingency of Consciousness. Auslegung 18 (1):39-67.
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  33. Sergio Cesare Masin (1987). The Lightness of a Transparent Surface in Metelli's Model of Phenomenal Transparency. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (4):263-265.
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  34. Derek Matravers (2006). Some Questions About Radical Externalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):95-108.
    It is hard not to sympathise with Professor Honderich's starting point. It is easy to feel pessimistic about philosophy's ability to throw light on the nature of consciousness. What, then, to do? One option is to persist with the various current approaches. It is clear that Honderich thinks this would be akin to putting more effort into trying to work out the temporal priority of the chicken and the egg. The thought of the orthodox is that an account of consciousness (...)
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  35. Barry Maund (2005). Michael Tye on Pain and Representational Content. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
    Michael Tye argues for two crucial theses: (1) that experiences of pain have representational content (essentially); (2) that the representational content can be specified in terms of something like damage in parts of the body. (Different types of pain are connected with different types of damage.) I reject both of these theses. In my view experiences of pain carry nonconceptual content, but do not represent essentially. Rather they are apt to represent when the subject attends to them. The experiences carry (...)
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  36. Barry Maund (2003). Review: Tye: Consciousness, Color and Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):249 - 260.
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  37. Linda Lopez McAlister (1983). Intentionality. International Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):71-72.
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  38. Colin McGinn (1997). Fred Dretske'snaturalizing the Mind(MIT Press, 1995)Missing the Mind: Consciousness in the Swamps. Noûs 31 (4):528–537.
  39. Michelle Montague (2012). The Content, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Experience. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. 47--73.
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  40. Ezequiel Morsella (2005). The Function of Phenomenal States: Supramodular Interaction Theory. Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.
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  41. Arkadi Nedel (1995). Of Intentional Consciousness. Philosophy Today 39 (3):295-310.
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  42. Paul Noordhof (2005). In a State of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
    Michael Tye and I are both Representationalists. Nevertheless, we have managed to disagree about the semantic character of ‘in’ in ‘There is a pain in my fingertip’ (see Noordhof (2001); Tye (2002); Noordhof (2002)). The first section of my commentary will focus on this disagreement. I will then turn to the location of pain. Here, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be much more agreement between Tye and me. I restrict myself to three points. First, I argue that Tye has (...)
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  43. Kevin J. O'Regan, Erik Myin & No (2001). Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness". In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer.
    In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes.
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  44. Adam Pautz (2009). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau’s worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are ’reference magnets’.
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  45. Jérome Pelletier (2007). On the 'Hyperinsulation' and 'Transparency' of Imaginery Situations. In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  46. Shaun Perceval-Maxwell (2003). Information and Consciousness. Dissertation, Queen's University at Kingston (Canada)
    This thesis includes both critical and constructive components. It presents ontological and epistemic arguments against reductive, physicalist accounts of consciousness and develops a limited form of content-first dual aspect theory as an alternative. Phenomenally conscious states, states that it is like something to have, are hypothesized to be dependent on, but irreducible to, certain sorts of information states. The cost of this position is not the unity of science but the inflation of our ontology. ;The case for inflation is supported (...)
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  47. Susanna Radovic, Watching Representations. 10th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness.
    One kind of substantial critique which has been raised by several philosophers against the so called higher order perception theory , advocated for mainly by William Lycan, concerns the combination of two important claims: that qualia are wide contents of perceptual experiences, and that the subject becomes aware of what the world is like by perceiving her own experiences of the world. In what sense could we possibly watch our own mental states if they are representations whose content and qualitative (...)
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  48. Georges Rey (1992). Sensational Sentences Switched. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
  49. Dan Ryder, Explaining the "Inhereness" of Qualia Representationally: Why We Seem to Have a Visual Field.
    A representationalist about qualia takes qualitative states to be aspects of the intentional content of sensory or sensory-like representations. When you experience the redness of an apple, they say, your visual system is merely representing that there is a red surface at such-and-such a place in front of you. And when you experience a red afterimage, your visual system is representing something similar . Your sensory state does not literally have an intrinsic quality of phenomenal redness, just as you do (...)
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  50. Robert Schroer (2007). Reticence of Visual Phenomenal Character: A Spatial Interpretation of Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):393-414.
    It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is 'transparent' in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem 'mental'. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in (...)
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