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  1. Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and (...)
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  2. John R. Baker (1946). A Critique of Materialism. Hibbert Journal 45:31-37.
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  3. Katalin Balog (2004). Review: Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):774-778.
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
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  4. R. L. Barnette (1978). Grounding the Mental. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (September):92-105.
  5. Reinaldo J. Bernal Velásquez (2012). E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  6. James Bissett Pratt (1922). The New Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 19 (13):337-351.
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  7. Ned Block (forthcoming). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  8. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Status of Consciousness in Nature. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Consciousness, Volume 2. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
    The most central metaphysical question about phenomenal consciousness is that of what constitutes phenomenal consciousness, whereas the most central epistemic question about consciousness is that of whether science can eventually provide an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Many philosophers have argued that science doesn't have the means to answer the question of what consciousness is (the explanatory gap) but that consciousness nonetheless is fully determined by the physical facts underlying it (no metaphysical gap). Others have argued that the explanatory gap in (...)
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  9. Richard Brown, The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Dualism.
    At this point in time the two-dimensional (2D) argument against physicalism is well known (Chalmers 2009; 2010), as are the many responses to it. However there has been a recent development that has yet to be widely discussed. Some philosophers have argued that we have equally compelling reasons to think that dualism is false based on the conceivability of mere physical duplicates which enjoy conscious experience in just the way we do (Martin 1998; Sturgeon 2000; Piccinini 2006; Frankish 2007; Brown (...)
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  10. Janice Dowell, Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Explanatory Reductions.
  11. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly. Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  12. Markus I. Eronen (2013). Hypothetical Identities: Explanatory Problems for the Explanatory Argument. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
  13. William Fish (2008). Relationalism and the Problems of Consciousness. Teorema 28:167-80.
    Recent attempts to show that functional processing entails the presence of phenomenal consciousness have failed to deliver the kind of answers to the “problems of consciousness” that anti-materialists insist the functionalist must provide. I will illustrate this by focusing on the claims that there is a special “Hard Problem” of consciousness and an “explanatory gap” between functional and phenomenal facts. I then argue that if we supplement the functionalist stories with a relationalist conception of phenomenal properties, we can begin to (...)
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  14. Michael Fox (1978). Beyond Materialism. Dialogue 17 (02):367-70.
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  15. Irwin Goldstein (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  16. Michael Gorman (2005). Nagasawa Vs. Nagel: Omnipotence, Pseudo-Tasks, and a Recent Discussion of Nagel's Doubts About Physicalism. Inquiry 48 (5):436 – 447.
    In his recent "Thomas vs. Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument", Yujin Nagasawa interprets Thomas Nagel as making a certain argument against physicalism and objects that this argument transgresses a principle, laid down by Thomas Aquinas, according to which inability to perform a pseudo-task does not count against an omnipotence claim. Taking Nagasawa's interpretation of Nagel for granted, I distinguish different kinds of omnipotence claims and different kinds of pseudo-tasks, and on that basis show that Nagasawa's criticism of (...)
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  17. Simone Gozzano (2009). La Coscienza. Carocci.
    Quale sia la natura della coscienza è uno dei problemi più analizzati e discussi sia nella ricerca filosofica sia in quella scientifica. Ogni mese nel mondo vengono pubblicati diversi libri dedicati a questo argomento, e decine di riviste specialistiche ospitano articoli e saggi volti a chiarirne le varie componenti; sotto una tale pressione sono nate alcune riviste scientifiche dedicate esclusivamente all'argomento. A questo fiorire di ricerche corrisponde una quantità altrettanto elevata di approcci. Una rivista come il Journal of consciousness studies, (...)
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  18. Roger Hancock (1967). Materialism, Privacy, and Reference. Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):119-125.
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  19. Christopher S. Hill (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and (...)
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  20. James Hopkins, Mind as Metaphor: A Physicalistic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness.
    In what follows I present an approach to the problem of consciousness, which I take to be suggested by Wittgenstein's remarks on sensation. As sketched here, this consists of a number of empirical hypotheses about the mind and how we represent it, and a series of arguments that these hypotheses explain phenomena which constitute the problem of consciousness, in such a way as to render them neither mysterious nor problematic.
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  21. Robert J. Howell, The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Scholarpedia.
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  22. John Hubbard, Parsimony and the Mind.
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  23. Norman Jacobs (1937). Physicalism and Sensation Sentences. Journal of Philosophy 34 (22):602-611.
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  24. Mahmoud Khatami (2005). On the Physicalistic Approach to Consciousness. Teorema 24 (1):35-51.
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  25. Ole Koksvik (2010). Metaphysics of Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing.
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  26. Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.) (2010). The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press.
    Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting.
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  27. Benjamin Kozuch (forthcoming). Elizabeth Irvineconsciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axt029.
  28. Geoffrey Lee (forthcoming). Alien Subjectivity and the Importance of Consciousness. In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Themes from Block. MIT Press.
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  29. Miltos Livaditis & Evgenia Tsatalmpasidou (2007). A Critical Review of the Physicalistic Approaches of the Mind and Consciousness. Cognitive Processing 8 (1):1-9.
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  30. Peter Lloyd (1993). Is the Mind Physical? Dissecting Conscious Brain Tissue. Philosophy Now 6:17-21.
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  31. Don Locke (1971). Must a Materialist Pretend He's Anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):217-31.
  32. D. H. Lund (2000). Materialism and the Subject of Consciousness. Idealistic Studies 30 (1):7-23.
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  33. Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Cutting God in Half. Philosophy Now 35 (35):22-25.
    In order to solve the problem of the monstrous acts that an all-powerful, all-knowing God would daily be performing, we need to sever the God of Power from the God of Value. The former is the underlying dynamic unity in the physical universe, eternal, omnipresent, all-powerful, but an It, and thus not capable of knowing what It does. It can be forgiven the terrible things It does. The latter is what is of most value associated with our human world - (...)
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  34. Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Science and Meaning. The Philosophers' Magazine (18):15-16.
  35. Robert N. McCauley (ed.) (1996). The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell Publishers.
  36. Tom McClelland (2013). Review of Derk Pereboom Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):193-200.
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  37. Michael McGlone, Strong Impossibilities (Partial Draft 1).
    A strong impossibility is a situation that is epistemically, but not metaphysically, possible. Opponents of strong impossibilities (including Chalmers, Jackson and Stalnaker) have argued that we have “overwhelming reason” to reject and “very little” or “no reason” to think that such impossibilities exist. This partial draft argues that there are strong impossibilities and (very briefly) discusses the manner in which the existence of strong impossibilities is related to some much-discussed arguments in the philosophy of conscious experience. (The full version of (...)
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  38. Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 431--444.
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  39. Marvin L. Minsky, Minds Are Simply What Brains Do.
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  40. Stephen J. Noren (1973). Materialism, Sentience and Ontology. Metaphilosophy 4 (January):47-53.
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  41. Adam Pautz (2013). He Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain- Based Theory of Consciousnes. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. 237-298.
  42. K. R. Popper, B. I. B. Lindahl & P. Århem (1993). A Discussion of the Mind-Brain Problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):167-180.
    In this paper Popper formulates and discusses a new aspect of the theory of mind. This theory is partly based on his earlier developed interactionistic theory. It takes as its point of departure the observation that mind and physical forces have several properties in common, at least the following six: both are (i) located, (ii) unextended, (iii) incorporeal, (iv) capable of acting on bodies, (v) dependent upon body, (vi) capable of being influenced by bodies. Other properties such as intensity and (...)
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  43. Daniel N. Robinson (2012). Determinism: Did Libet Make the Case? Philosophy 87 (03):395-401.
    Benjamin Libet's influential publications have raised important questions about voluntarist accounts of action. His findings are taken as evidence that the processes in the central nervous system associated with the initiation of an action occur earlier than the decision to act. However, in light of the methods employed and of relevant findings drawn from research addressed to the timing of neurobehavioural processes, Libet's conclusions are untenable.
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  44. William S. Robinson (1982). Sellarsian Materialism. Philosophy of Science 49 (June):212-27.
    Wilfrid Sellars has proposed a materialist account of sensation which relies in part on the postulation of special kinds of individuals. This postulational strategy appears to be analogous to the one that introduces such entities as electrons. After setting out Sellars' account, I focus on his application of the postulational strategy. I argue that this application requires the discovery of new effects for familiar properties; that this kind of discovery is disanalogous to what postulation usually does; and that this kind (...)
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  45. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
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  46. W. C. Ruediger (1924). Monism and Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 21 (13):347-352.
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  47. Elizabeth Schier & John Sutton (2014). Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science Since 1980. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Springer.
    If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...)
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  48. William E. Seager (1992). Metaphysics of Consciousness. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    Metaphysics of Consciousness , a volume in the series Philosophical Issues in Science , discusses the philosophical issue of the nature of consciousness. William Seager argues that the purely physicalist or materialist view of human consciousness is by no means disproved and is in fact strongly supported by some developments in artificial intelligence. William Seager proceeds by addressing the problems of consciousness that remain even for a minimal physicalism. The particular modes of subjective consciousness that constitute experience threaten a paradigm (...)
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  49. Roy Wood Sellars (1944). Is Naturalism Enough? Journal of Philosophy 41 (September):533-543.
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  50. Jane Skinner (2006). Beyond Materialism: Mental Capacity and Naturalism, a Consideration of Method. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):74-91.
    This article challenges the neo-Darwinist physicalist position assumed by currently prevalent naturalizing accounts of consciousness. It suggests instead an evolutionary (Deweyan) understanding of cognitive emergence and an acceptance of mental capacity as a phenomenon in its own right, differing qualitatively from, although not independent of, the physical and material world. I argue that if we accept that consciousness is an adaptation enabling survival through immediate individual intuition of the world, we may accept this metaphysics as a given. Methodological focus can (...)
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