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  1. Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and (...)
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  2. Victor Argonov (2014). Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-Body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 35 (1-2):51-70.
    A rigorous approach to the study of the mind–body problem is suggested. Since humans are able to talk about consciousness (produce phenomenal judgments), it is argued that the study of neural mechanisms of phenomenal judgments can solve the hard problem of consciousness. Particular methods are suggested for: (1) verification and falsification of materialism; (2) verification and falsification of interactionism; (3) falsification of epiphenomenalism and parallelism (verification is problematic); (4) verification of particular materialistic theories of consciousness; (5) a non-Turing test for (...)
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  3. John R. Baker (1946). A Critique of Materialism. Hibbert Journal 45:31-37.
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  4. Katalin Balog (2004). Review: Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):774-778.
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
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  5. R. L. Barnette (1978). Grounding the Mental. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (September):92-105.
  6. Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness". Ideas Y Valores 152:268-297.
  7. Reinaldo J. Bernal (2012). E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  8. Reinaldo J. Bernal, Pierre Jacob, Maximilian Kistler, David Papineau, Jérôme Dokic, Jaime Ramos & Juan D. Morales (2013). Précis de "E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory Of Phenomenal Consciousness". Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):267-297.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  9. James Bissett Pratt (1922). The New Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 19 (13):337-351.
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  10. Ned Block (2015). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press 105-133.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  11. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Status of Consciousness in Nature. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Consciousness, Volume 2. John Benjamins Publishing Company
    The most central metaphysical question about phenomenal consciousness is that of what constitutes phenomenal consciousness, whereas the most central epistemic question about consciousness is that of whether science can eventually provide an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Many philosophers have argued that science doesn't have the means to answer the question of what consciousness is (the explanatory gap) but that consciousness nonetheless is fully determined by the physical facts underlying it (no metaphysical gap). Others have argued that the explanatory gap in (...)
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  12. Richard Brown, The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Dualism.
    At this point in time the two-dimensional (2D) argument against physicalism is well known (Chalmers 2009; 2010), as are the many responses to it. However there has been a recent development that has yet to be widely discussed. Some philosophers have argued that we have equally compelling reasons to think that dualism is false based on the conceivability of mere physical duplicates which enjoy conscious experience in just the way we do (Martin 1998; Sturgeon 2000; Piccinini 2006; Frankish 2007; Brown (...)
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  13. Janice Dowell, Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Explanatory Reductions.
  14. Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1).
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
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  15. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly. Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  16. Markus I. Eronen (2014). Hypothetical Identities: Explanatory Problems for the Explanatory Argument. Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):571-582.
    Recently, several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. I show that the supporters of the (...)
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  17. William Fish (2008). Relationalism and the Problems of Consciousness. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):167-80.
    Recent attempts to show that functional processing entails the presence of phenomenal consciousness have failed to deliver the kind of answers to the “problems of consciousness” that anti-materialists insist the functionalist must provide. I will illustrate this by focusing on the claims that there is a special “Hard Problem” of consciousness and an “explanatory gap” between functional and phenomenal facts. I then argue that if we supplement the functionalist stories with a relationalist conception of phenomenal properties, we can begin to (...)
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  18. Michael Fox (1978). Beyond Materialism. Dialogue 17 (2):367-70.
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  19. Irwin Goldstein (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  20. Michael Gorman (2005). Nagasawa Vs. Nagel: Omnipotence, Pseudo-Tasks, and a Recent Discussion of Nagel's Doubts About Physicalism. Inquiry 48 (5):436 – 447.
    In his recent "Thomas vs. Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument", Yujin Nagasawa interprets Thomas Nagel as making a certain argument against physicalism and objects that this argument transgresses a principle, laid down by Thomas Aquinas, according to which inability to perform a pseudo-task does not count against an omnipotence claim. Taking Nagasawa's interpretation of Nagel for granted, I distinguish different kinds of omnipotence claims and different kinds of pseudo-tasks, and on that basis show that Nagasawa's criticism of (...)
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  21. Simone Gozzano (2009). La Coscienza. Carocci.
    Quale sia la natura della coscienza è uno dei problemi più analizzati e discussi sia nella ricerca filosofica sia in quella scientifica. Ogni mese nel mondo vengono pubblicati diversi libri dedicati a questo argomento, e decine di riviste specialistiche ospitano articoli e saggi volti a chiarirne le varie componenti; sotto una tale pressione sono nate alcune riviste scientifiche dedicate esclusivamente all'argomento. A questo fiorire di ricerche corrisponde una quantità altrettanto elevata di approcci. Una rivista come il Journal of consciousness studies, (...)
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  22. Roger Hancock (1967). Materialism, Privacy, and Reference. Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):119-125.
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  23. Christopher S. Hill (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories , and explores a number of important issues: (...)
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  24. James Hopkins, Mind as Metaphor: A Physicalistic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness.
    In what follows I present an approach to the problem of consciousness, which I take to be suggested by Wittgenstein's remarks on sensation. As sketched here, this consists of a number of empirical hypotheses about the mind and how we represent it, and a series of arguments that these hypotheses explain phenomena which constitute the problem of consciousness, in such a way as to render them neither mysterious nor problematic.
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  25. Robert J. Howell, The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Scholarpedia.
  26. John Hubbard, Parsimony and the Mind.
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  27. Jerome Iglowitz (2010). Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really Explained! (Third Edition). JERRYSPLACE Publishing.
    Employing the ideas of modern mathematics and biology, seen in the context of Ernst Cassirer's "Symbolic Forms, the author presents an entirely new and novel solution to the classical mind-brain problem. This is a "hard" book, I'm sorry, but it is the problem itself, and not me which has made it so. I say that Dennett, and, indeed, the whole of academia is wrong.
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  28. Norman Jacobs (1937). Physicalism and Sensation Sentences. Journal of Philosophy 34 (22):602-611.
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  29. Mahmoud Khatami (2005). On the Physicalistic Approach to Consciousness. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):35-51.
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  30. Marvin E. Kirsh, Einstein and Mythology : The Lengthier the Relations in a Myth the Greater Its' Mass.
    The theory of relativity (1) is considered form a perspective of folklore. Abstracted entities in the theory of relativity are stripped of units in order to provide explanation, to expose an ordinary meaning that employs a fulcrum for visual description. It is suggested that components of the theory’s construction are not only unusually compatible with religious and spiritual but are also unaccounted for scientifically; they may not render the expected power struggle of church doctrine with scientific notions but an opposite (...)
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  31. Stan Klein (2015). A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to Take Phenomenological Reality on its Own Terms in the Study of the Mind. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Practice and Research 2 (1):41-56.
    In this paper I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its own terms. In defense of “experiential realism” I offer a critique of modern psychology’s all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is “What can we learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into quantitative indices?” I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, (...)
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  32. Ole Koksvik (2010). Metaphysics of Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing
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  33. Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.) (2010). The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press.
    Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting.
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  34. Benjamin Kozuch (2014). Elizabeth Irvine, Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):651-655.
  35. Benjamin Kozuch & Uriah Kriegel (2015). Correlation, Causation, Constitution: On the Interplay Between the Science and Philosophy of Consciousness. In S. M. Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. John Benjamins 400-417.
    Consciousness is a natural phenomenon, the object of a flourishing area of research in the natural sciences – research whose primary goal is to identify the neural correlates of consciousness. This raises the question: why is there need for a philosophy of consciousness? As we see things, the need for a philosophy of consciousness arises for two reasons. First, as a young and energetic science operating as yet under no guiding paradigm, the science of consciousness has been subject to considerable (...)
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  36. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. OUP
    The centerpiece of the scientific study of consciousness is the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Yet science is typically interested not only in correlation relations, but also – and more deeply – in causal and constitutive relations. When faced with a correlation between two phenomena in nature, we typically feel compelled to produce an explanation of why the two correlate. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first half attempts to lay out the various possible explanations of (...)
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  37. Geoffrey Lee (forthcoming). Alien Subjectivity and the Importance of Consciousness. In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Themes from Block. MIT Press
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  38. Miltos Livaditis & Evgenia Tsatalmpasidou (2007). A Critical Review of the Physicalistic Approaches of the Mind and Consciousness. Cognitive Processing 8 (1):1-9.
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  39. Peter Lloyd (1993). Is the Mind Physical? Dissecting Conscious Brain Tissue. Philosophy Now 6:17-21.
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  40. Don Locke (1971). Must a Materialist Pretend He's Anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):217-31.
  41. D. H. Lund (2000). Materialism and the Subject of Consciousness. Idealistic Studies 30 (1):7-23.
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  42. Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Cutting God in Half. Philosophy Now 35 (35):22-25.
    In order to solve the problem of the monstrous acts that an all-powerful, all-knowing God would daily be performing, we need to sever the God of Power from the God of Value. The former is the underlying dynamic unity in the physical universe, eternal, omnipresent, all-powerful, but an It, and thus not capable of knowing what It does. It can be forgiven the terrible things It does. The latter is what is of most value associated with our human world - (...)
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  43. Nicholas Maxwell (2002). Science and Meaning. The Philosophers' Magazine (18):15-16.
  44. Robert N. McCauley (ed.) (1996). The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell Publishers.
  45. Tom McClelland (2013). Review of Derk Pereboom Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):193-200.
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  46. Michael McGlone, Strong Impossibilities (Partial Draft 1).
    A strong impossibility is a situation that is epistemically, but not metaphysically, possible. Opponents of strong impossibilities (including Chalmers, Jackson and Stalnaker) have argued that we have “overwhelming reason” to reject and “very little” or “no reason” to think that such impossibilities exist. This partial draft argues that there are strong impossibilities and (very briefly) discusses the manner in which the existence of strong impossibilities is related to some much-discussed arguments in the philosophy of conscious experience. (The full version of (...)
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  47. Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 431--444.
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  48. Brian P. McLaughlin & Ronald J. Planer (2014). The Contributions of U.T. Place, H. Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart to the Identity Theory of Consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Bloomsbury Academic 103-128.
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  49. Andrew Melnyk (2012). Materialism. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 3 (3):281-292.
    Materialism is nearly universally assumed by cognitive scientists. Intuitively, materialism says that a person’s mental states are nothing over and above his or her material states, while dualism denies this. Philosophers have introduced concepts (e.g., realization, supervenience) to assist in formulating the theses of materialism and dualism with more precision, and distinguished among importantly different versions of each view (e.g., eliminative materialism, substance dualism, emergentism). They have also clarified the logic of arguments that use empirical findings to support materialism. Finally, (...)
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  50. Andrew Melnyk (2002). Review of Joe Levine's "Purple Haze". [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):359-362.
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