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Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational Issues

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  1. Lutz Antoine, A. Thompson E., Lutz & D. Cosmelli, Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers in Cognition and the Brain : The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.
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  2. Jay David Atlas, Qualia, Consciousness, and Memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004).
    In his recent (2005) book "Sweet Dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness," Dennett renews his attack on a philosophical notion of qualia, the success of which attack is required if his brand of Functionalism is to survive. He also articulates once again what he takes to be essential to his notion of consciousness. I shall argue that his new, central argument against the philosophical concept of qualia fails. In passing I point out a difficulty that David (...)
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  3. Bernard J. Baars (2005). Subjective Experience is Probably Not Limited to Humans: The Evidence From Neurobiology and Behavior. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21.
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  4. Bernard J. Baars (2001). The Brain Basis of a "Consciousness Monitor": Scientific and Medical Significance. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):159-164.
    Surgical patients under anesthesia can wake up unpredictably and be exposed to intense, traumatic pain. Current medical techniques cannot maintain depth of anesthesia at a perfectly stable and safe level; the depth of unconsciousness may change from moment to moment. Without an effective consciousness monitor anesthesiologists may not be able to adjust dosages in time to protect patients from pain. An estimated 40,000 to 200,000 midoperative awakenings may occur in the United States annually. E. R. John and coauthors present the (...)
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  5. Bernard J. Baars (2001). How Could Brain Imaging Not Tell Us About Consciousness? Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):24-29.
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  6. Bernard J. Baars & Steven Laureys (2005). One, Not Two, Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):269.
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  7. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Closing the Gap: Some Questions for Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.
    In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To (...)
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  8. Dieter Birnbacher (2006). Causal Interpretations of Correlations Between Neural and Conscious Events. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):115-128.
    The contribution argues that causal interpretations of empirical correlations between neural and conscious events are meaningful even if not fully verifiable and that there are reasons in favour of an epiphenomenalist construction of psychophysical causality. It is suggested that an account of causality can be given that makes interactionism, epiphenomenalism and Leibnizian parallelism semantically distinct interpretations of the phenomena. Though neuroscience cannot strictly prove or rule out any one of these interpretations it can be argued that methodological principles favour a (...)
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  9. Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30:481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  10. Ned Block (2003). Tactile Sensation Via Spatial Perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:285-286.
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  11. Ned Block (2001). How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes (...)
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  12. Ned Block (1998). How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes wrong because he conflates the two senses. And Francis Crick and Christof Koch fall afoul of the ambiguity in arguing that visual area V1 is not part of the neural correlate of (...)
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  13. David Bourget, Regimentation and the Science of Consciousness.
    A chief aim of the science of consciousness is to discover general principles which determine exactly which states of phenomenal consciousness occur in exactly which conditions. In this paper I argue that making progress towards the discovery of such principles requires developing a new regimented language for describing phenomenal states. This language should allow us to describe phenomenal states in a way that is commensurable with our descriptions of physical states. I suggest one way of doing this. My approach extends (...)
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  14. Noel Boyle (2008). Neurobiology and Phenomenology: Towards a Three-Tiered Intertheoretic Model of Explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):34-58.
    Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these (...)
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  15. Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (1997). Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
  16. David J. Chalmers, Determining the Moment of Consciousness?
    It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course (...)
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  17. David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  18. David J. Chalmers (1998). On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.
    *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my (...)
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  19. Patricia S. Churchland (1994). Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything About Consciousness? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):23-40.
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  20. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
    The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...)
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  21. Philip Clapson (2001). Consciousness: The Organismic Approach. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 3 (2):203-220.
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  22. Austen Clark (forthcoming). Vicissitudes of Consciousness, Varieties of Correlates: Review of The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. American Journal of Psychology.
    and denotes a number of different phenomena. We reason about “consciousness” using some premises that apply to one of the..
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  23. Axel Cleeremans & John Haynes (1999). Correlating Consciousness: A Vew From Empirical Science. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3 (209):387-420.
    Research on consciousness is currently enjoying a spectacular revival of interest in the cognitive sciences. From an empirical point of view, the NCC program — the search for the “Neural Correlates of Consciousness” — holds the promise of establishing correlations between physiological and phenomenal states in a way that directly resembles G. T. Fechner´s (1860) so-called “inner psychophysics”. Should the NCC program be entirely successful, we would thus be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. we would be (...)
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  24. S. Cobb (1952). On the Nature and Locus of Mind. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 67:172-7.
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  25. Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (1997). Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  26. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2003). A Framework for Consciousness. Nature Neuroscience 6:119-26.
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  27. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  28. Thomas C. Dalton (1998). The Developmental Gap in Phenomenal Experience: A Comment on J. G. Taylor's "Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap''. J:Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164.
    J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence (i.e., persistence, latency, and seamlessness) and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nonlinear relationship between local and global neural systems. In addition, the ontological assumptions that PE is immediate, intrinsic, and incorrigible limit an (...)
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  29. G. Derfer, Z. Wang & M. Weber (2009). The Roar of Awakening. A Whiteheadian Dialogue Between Western Psychotherapies and Eastern Worldviews. Ontos Verlag.
    This Whiteheadian Dialogue explores a fresh and important cross-elucidatory path: What have we, and what can be learned from a dialogue with Eastern worldviews?
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  30. Ilya B. Farber (2005). How a Neural Correlate Can Function as an Explanation of Consciousness: Evidence From the History of Science Regarding the Likely Explanatory Value of the NCC Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):77-95.
    A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain and mind. Drawing on (...)
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  31. Tomer Fekete (2010). Representational Systems. Minds and Machines 20 (1):69-101.
    The concept of representation has been a key element in the scientific study of mental processes, ever since such studies commenced. However, usage of the term has been all but too liberal—if one were to adhere to common use it remains unclear if there are examples of physical systems which cannot be construed in terms of representation. The problem is considered afresh, taking as the starting point the notion of activity spaces—spaces of spatiotemporal events produced by dynamical systems. It is (...)
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  32. Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman (2011). Towards a Computational Theory of Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
    A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must (...)
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  33. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (forthcoming). EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in resting condition quantitatively (...)
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  34. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18.
    Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of (...)
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  35. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2010). Natural World Physical, Brain Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time. Physics of Life Reviews 7 (2):195-249.
    Concepts of space and time are widely developed in physics. However, there is a considerable lack of biologically plausible theoretical frameworks that can demonstrate how space and time dimensions are implemented in the activity of the most complex life-system – the brain with a mind. Brain activity is organized both temporally and spatially, thus representing space-time in the brain. Critical analysis of recent research on the space-time organization of the brain’s activity pointed to the existence of so-called operational space-time in (...)
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  36. Walter J. Freeman (1997). Three Centuries of Category Errors in Studies of the Neural Basis of Consciousness and Intentionality. Neural Networks 10:1175-83.
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  37. Michael S. Gazzaniga (1995). The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.
  38. Grant R. Gillett (1988). Consciousness and Brain Function. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):325-39.
    Abstract The language of consciousness and that of brain function seem vastly different and incommensurable ways of approaching human mental life. If we look at what we mean by consciousness we find that it has a great deal to do with the sensitivity and responsiveness shown by a subject toward things that happen. Philosophically, we can understnd ascriptions of consciousness best by looking at the conditions which make it true for thinkers who share the concept to say that one of (...)
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  39. Daniel Gilman (1999). Network Stability and Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):155-156.
    A connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness needs to disambiguate its criteria for identifying the relevant vehicles. Moreover, a vehicle theory may appear entirely arbitrary in sorting between what are typically thought of as conscious and unconscious processes.
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  40. P. Gloor (1986). Consciousness as a Neurological Concept in Epileptology: A Critical Review. Epilepsia 27.
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  41. Jeffrey A. Gray (1998). Creeping Up on the Hard Question of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.
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  42. T. Hamanaka (1997). The Concept of Consciousness in the History of Neuropsychiatry. History of Psychiatry 8:361-373.
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  43. Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (1998). Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.
    This volume presents a selection of invited papers from the second conference, held in April 1996.
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  44. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1996). Discovering the Moment of Consciousness? I: Bridging Techniques at Work, & II. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):149-96.
    Abstract Connectionist views in psychology and neuroscience give the impression that there is no one place in the brain into which all information funnels. If these impression are accurate, then we will have great difficulty picking out a point in neuronal or psychological time at which phenomena become conscious. If so, pointing to one place in which we are conscious of a particular event and expecting a psychophysical correlation between qualitative and neural events seems hopeless. In response to this worry, (...)
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  45. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1995). Locating Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    Spelling out in detail what we do and do not know about phenomenological experience, this book denies the common view of consciousness as a central decision...
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  46. Rudolf Hernegger, Changes of Paradigm in Consciousness Research.
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  47. Jakob Hohwy (2007). The Search for Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.
    Most consciousness researchers, almost no matter what their views of the metaphysics of consciousness, can agree that the first step in a science of consciousness is the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (the NCC). The reason for this agreement is that the notion of ‘correlation’ doesn’t by itself commit one to any particular metaphysical view about the relation between (neural) matter and consciousness. For example, some might treat the correlates as causally related, while others might view the correlation (...)
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  48. Jakob Hohwy & Christopher D. Frith (2004). Can Neuroscience Explain Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):180-198.
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  49. Jakob Hohwy & Christopher D. Frith (2004). The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Room for Improvement, but on the Right Track: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):45-51.
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  50. Susan L. Hurley & No (2003). Neural Plasticity and Consciousness. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168.
    and apply it to various examples of neural plasticity in which input is rerouted intermodally or intramodally to nonstandard cortical targets. In some cases but not others, cortical activity ‘defers’ to the nonstandard sources of input. We ask why, consider some possible explanations, and propose a dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. We believe that this distinction is important and worthy of further study, both philosophical and empirical, whether or not our hypothesis turns out to be correct. In particular, the question of how (...)
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  51. Susan L. Hurley & Alva Noe (2003). Neural Plasticity and Consciousness: Reply to Block. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):342.
    Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley1111 andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë2222.
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  52. A. M. Ivanitsky (1993). Consciousness: Criteria and Possible Mechanisms. International Journal of Psychophysiology 14:179-87.
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  53. Ray S. Jackendoff (2000). Unconscious, Yes; Homunculus,??? Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):17-20.
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  54. S. Kitazawa (2002). Where Conscious Sensation Takes Place. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):475-477.
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  55. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Gray Matters: Functionalism, Intentionalism, and the Search for NCC in Jeffrey Gray's Work. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (4):96-116.
    Since Francis Crick popularized the term `Neural Correlate of Consciousness' (NCC), it has been the focus of what is perhaps the most exciting research area in the cognitive sciences. Different researchers and laboratories have offered different brain structures as candidates for the NCC prize. Different chunks of gray matter have been identified as the potential seat of consciousness. Some researchers attempt to identify the NCC via a characterization of the cognitive aspects of consciousness, such as its functional significance or intentional (...)
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  56. M. Moskopp Kurthen (1999). Conscious Behavior Explained. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):155-158.
    Current neurobiological research on temporal binding in binocular rivalry settings contributes to a better understanding of the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness. This research can easily be integrated into a theory of conscious behavior, but if it is meant to promote a naturalistic theory of perceptual consciousness itself, it is confronted with the notorious explanatory gap argument according to which any statement of psychophysical correlations (and their interpretation) leaves the phenomenal character of, e.g., states of perceptual consciousness open. It is (...)
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  57. Ran Lahav (1993). What Neuropsychology Tells Us About Consciousness. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):67-85.
    I argue that, contrary to some critics, the notion of conscious experience is a good candidate for denoting a distinct and scientifically interesting phenomenon in the brain. I base this claim mainly on an analysis of neuropsychological data concerning deficits resulting from various types of brain damage as well as some additional supporting empirical evidence. These data strongly point to the hypothesis that conscious experience expresses information that is available for global, integrated, and flexible behavior.
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  58. Benjamin W. Libet (2000). Conscious and Unconscious Mental Activity. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):21-24.
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  59. B. I. B. Lindahl & P. Århem (1994). Mind as a Force Field: Comments on a New Interactionistic Hypothesis. Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:111-22.
    The survival and development of consciousness in biological evolution call for an explanation. An interactionistic mind-brain theory seems to have the greatest explanatory value in this context. An interpretation of an interactionistic hypothesis, recently proposed by Karl Popper, is discussed both theoretically and based on recent experimental data. In the interpretation, the distinction between the conscious mind and the brain is seen as a division into what is subjective and what is objective, and not as an ontological distinction between something (...)
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  60. Dan Lloyd (2002). Functional MRI and the Study of Human Consciousness. Journal Of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (6):818-831.
    & Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, datasets from the (...)
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  61. Pete Mandik (2007). The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
    The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the (...)
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  62. Thomas Metzinger (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
  63. E. Niedermeyer (1999). A Concept of Consciousness. Italian Journal of Neurological Sciences 20:7-15.
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  64. E. Niedermeyer (1994). Consciousness: Function and Definition. Clinical Electroencephalography 25:86-93.
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  65. Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (2004). Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.
    In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No (...)
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  66. Jaak Panksepp (2000). The Neuro-Evolutionary Cusp Between Emotions and Cognitions: Implications for Understanding Consciousness and the Emergence of a Unified Mind Science. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):15-54.
    The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values (...)
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  67. Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (2001). Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
  68. Geraint Rees (2001). Seeing is Not Perceiving. Nature Neuroscience 4:678-680.
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  69. Antti Revonsuo (2001). Discovering the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Reply to Commentaries. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):44-50.
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  70. Antti Revonsuo (2001). Can Functional Brain Imaging Discover Consciousness in the Brain? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):3-23.
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  71. F. C. S. Schiller (1952). Consciousness Reconsidered. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 67:199-227.
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  72. D. Smith (2000). Freudian Science of Consciousness: Then and Now. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):38-45.
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  73. J. Smythies (1999). Consciousness: Some Basic Issues- a Neurophilosophical Perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):164-172.
    This paper concentrates on the basic properties of ''consciousness'' that temporal coding is postulated to relate to. A description of phenomenal consciousness based on what introspection tells us about its contents is offered. This includes a consideration of the effect of various brain lesions that result in cortical blindness, apperceptive and associative agnosia, and blindsight, together with an account of the manner in which sight is regained after cortical injuries. I then discuss two therories of perception-Direct Realism and the Representative (...)
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  74. J. R. Smythies (1994). Shipwreck of a Grand Hypothesis (Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis). Inquiry 37 (2):267-281.
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  75. Roger W. Sperry (1975). In Search of Psyche. In F. G. Worden, J. P. Swazey & G. Adelman (eds.), The Neurosciences: Paths of Discovery. Mit Press.
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  76. Roger W. Sperry (1968). Psychobiology and Vice Versa. Engineering and Science Magazine, November 1968.
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  77. Roger W. Sperry (1952). Neurology and the Mind-Brain Problem. American Scientist 40 (2).
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  78. Arnold S. Tannenbaum (2006). Consciousness and the Self-Sensing Brain: Implications for Feeling and Meaning. American Journal of Psychology 119 (2):205-222.
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  79. John G. Taylor (2001). Functional Brain Imaging to Search for Consciousness Needs Attention. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):39-43.
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  80. Evan Thompson & Francisco J. Varela (2001). Radical Embodiment: Neural Dynamics and Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):418-425.
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  81. Ruediger Vaas (1999). Why Neural Correlates of Consciousness Are Fine, but Not Enough. Anthropology and Philosophy 2 (2).
    The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either (...)
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