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  1. Lutz Antoine, A. Thompson E., Lutz & D. Cosmelli, Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers in Cognition and the Brain : The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.
  2. Jay David Atlas, Qualia, Consciousness, and Memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004).
    In his recent (2005) book "Sweet Dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness," Dennett renews his attack on a philosophical notion of qualia, the success of which attack is required if his brand of Functionalism is to survive. He also articulates once again what he takes to be essential to his notion of consciousness. I shall argue that his new, central argument against the philosophical concept of qualia fails. In passing I point out a difficulty that David (...)
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  3. Bernard J. Baars (2005). Subjective Experience is Probably Not Limited to Humans: The Evidence From Neurobiology and Behavior. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21.
  4. Bernard J. Baars (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: A Stew of Confusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):29-31.
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  5. Bernard J. Baars (2001). How Could Brain Imaging Not Tell Us About Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):24-29.
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  6. Bernard J. Baars (2001). The Brain Basis of a "Consciousness Monitor": Scientific and Medical Significance. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):159-164.
    Surgical patients under anesthesia can wake up unpredictably and be exposed to intense, traumatic pain. Current medical techniques cannot maintain depth of anesthesia at a perfectly stable and safe level; the depth of unconsciousness may change from moment to moment. Without an effective consciousness monitor anesthesiologists may not be able to adjust dosages in time to protect patients from pain. An estimated 40,000 to 200,000 midoperative awakenings may occur in the United States annually. E. R. John and coauthors present the (...)
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  7. Bernard J. Baars & Steven Laureys (2005). One, Not Two, Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):269.
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  8. Bernard J. Baars & Katharine A. McGovern (2000). Consciousness Cannot Be Limited to Sensory Qualities: Some Empirical Counterexamples. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):11-13.
  9. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Closing the Gap: Some Questions for Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.
    In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To (...)
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  10. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Phenomenal Holism, Internalism, and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.
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  11. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenal Holism, Internalism, and the NCC. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1).
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  12. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenal Holism, Internalism and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.
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  13. John Bickle (2005). Phenomenology and Cortical Microstimulation. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 140.
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  14. Dieter Birnbacher (2006). Causal Interpretations of Correlations Between Neural and Conscious Events. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):115-128.
    The contribution argues that causal interpretations of empirical correlations between neural and conscious events are meaningful even if not fully verifiable and that there are reasons in favour of an epiphenomenalist construction of psychophysical causality. It is suggested that an account of causality can be given that makes interactionism, epiphenomenalism and Leibnizian parallelism semantically distinct interpretations of the phenomena. Though neuroscience cannot strictly prove or rule out any one of these interpretations it can be argued that methodological principles favour a (...)
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  15. E. Bisiach (1988). The (Haunted) Brain and Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. 101--120.
  16. Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  17. Ned Block (2005). The Merely Verbal Problem of Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):270.
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  18. Ned Block (2003). Tactile Sensation Via Spatial Perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7):285-286.
  19. Ned Block (2001). How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes (...)
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  20. Ned Block (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  21. Ned Block (1998). How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. MIT Press. 23-34.
    same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes wrong because he conflates the two senses. And Francis Crick and Christof Koch fall afoul of the ambiguity in arguing that visual area V1 is not part of the neural correlate of (...)
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  22. Worth Boone (2013). Operationalizing Consciousness: Subjective Report and Task Performance. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1031-1041.
    There are two distinct but related threads in this article. The first is methodological and is aimed at exploring the relative merits and faults of different operational definitions of consciousness. The second is conceptual and is aimed at understanding the prior commitments regarding the nature of conscious content that motivate these positions. I consider two distinct operationalizations: one defines consciousness in terms of dichotomous subjective reports, the other in terms of graded subjective reports. I ultimately argue that both approaches are (...)
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  23. David Bourget, Regimentation and the Science of Consciousness.
    A chief aim of the science of consciousness is to discover general principles that determine exactly which states of phenomenal consciousness occur in exactly which conditions. In this paper I argue that making progress towards the discovery of such principles requires developing a new regimented language for describing phenomenal states. This language should allow us to describe phenomenal states in a way that is commensurable with our descriptions of physical states. I suggest one way of doing this. My approach extends (...)
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  24. Noel Boyle (2008). Neurobiology and Phenomenology: Towards a Three-Tiered Intertheoretic Model of Explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):34-58.
    Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these (...)
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  25. R. Buck (1993). What is This Thing Called Subjective Experience? Reflections on the Neuropsychology of Qualia. Neuropsychology 7:490-99.
  26. Jean E. Burns (2010). What Does the Mind Do That the Brain Does Not? In R. L. Amoroso (ed.), The Complementarity of Mind and Body: Fulfilling the Dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles. Nova Science.
    Two forms of independent action by consciousness have been proposed by various researchers – free will and holistic processing. (Holistic processing contributes to the formation of behavior through the holistic use of brain programs and encoding.) The well-known experiment of Libet et al. (1983) implies that if free will exists, its action must consist of making a selection among alternatives presented by the brain. As discussed herein, this result implies that any physical changes mind can produce in the brain are (...)
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  27. Jean E. Burns (1991). Does Consciousness Perform a Function Independently of the Brain? Frontier Perspectives, Center for Frontier Sciences, Temple University 2 (1):19-34.
    Even if all of the content of conscious experience is encoded in the brain, there is a considerable difference between the view that consciousness does independent processing and the view that it does not. If all processing is done by the brain, then conscious experience is unnecessary and irrelevant to behavior. If consciousness performs a function, then its association with particular aspects of brain processing reflect its functional use in determining behavior. However, if consciousness does perform a function, it cannot (...)
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  28. Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem (2005). Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison. Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness-brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both (...)
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  29. Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.) (1997). Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
  30. David J. Chalmers, Determining the Moment of Consciousness?
    It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course (...)
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  31. David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 17--39.
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  32. David J. Chalmers (1998). On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--219.
    *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my (...)
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  33. Patricia S. Churchland (1994). Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything About Consciousness? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):23-40.
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  34. Patricia S. Churchland (1988). Reduction and the Neurobiological Basis of Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
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  35. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
    The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...)
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  36. Philip Clapson (2001). Consciousness: The Organismic Approach. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 3 (2):203-220.
  37. Austen Clark (forthcoming). Vicissitudes of Consciousness, Varieties of Correlates: Review of The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. [REVIEW] American Journal of Psychology.
    and denotes a number of different phenomena. We reason about “consciousness” using some premises that apply to one of the..
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  38. Axel Cleeremans & John Haynes (1999). Correlating Consciousness: A Vew From Empirical Science. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3 (209):387-420.
    Research on consciousness is currently enjoying a spectacular revival of interest in the cognitive sciences. From an empirical point of view, the NCC program — the search for the “Neural Correlates of Consciousness” — holds the promise of establishing correlations between physiological and phenomenal states in a way that directly resembles G. T. Fechner´s (1860) so-called “inner psychophysics”. Should the NCC program be entirely successful, we would thus be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. we would be (...)
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  39. S. Cobb (1952). On the Nature and Locus of Mind. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 67:172-7.
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  40. Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.) (1997). Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  41. O. D. Creutzfeld (1987). Inevitable Deadlocks of the Brain-Mind Discussion. In B. Gulyas (ed.), The Brain-Mind Problem: Philosophical and Neurophyiological Approaches. Leuven University Press.
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  42. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2003). A Framework for Consciousness. Nature Neuroscience 6:119-26.
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  43. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 3-11.
  44. Thomas C. Dalton (1998). The Developmental Gap in Phenomenal Experience: A Comment on J. G. Taylor's "Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap''. J:Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164.
    J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence (i.e., persistence, latency, and seamlessness) and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nonlinear relationship between local and global neural systems. In addition, the ontological assumptions that PE is immediate, intrinsic, and incorrigible limit an (...)
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  45. Huib de JongLooren (1996). Brain Waves and Bridges: Comments on Hardcastle's Discovering the Moment of Consciousness?. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):197-209.
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  46. G. Derfer, Z. Wang & M. Weber (eds.) (2009). The Roar of Awakening. A Whiteheadian Dialogue Between Western Psychotherapies and Eastern Worldviews. Ontos Verlag.
    This Whiteheadian Dialogue explores a fresh and important cross-elucidatory path: What have we, and what can be learned from a dialogue with Eastern worldviews?
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  47. Ilya B. Farber (2005). How a Neural Correlate Can Function as an Explanation of Consciousness: Evidence From the History of Science Regarding the Likely Explanatory Value of the NCC Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):77-95.
    A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain and mind. Drawing on (...)
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  48. Ilya B. Farber & Patricia S. Churchland (1995). Consciousness and the Neurosciences: Philosophical and Theoretical Issues. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. Mit Press.
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  49. Tomer Fekete (2010). Representational Systems. Minds and Machines 20 (1):69-101.
    The concept of representation has been a key element in the scientific study of mental processes, ever since such studies commenced. However, usage of the term has been all but too liberal—if one were to adhere to common use it remains unclear if there are examples of physical systems which cannot be construed in terms of representation. The problem is considered afresh, taking as the starting point the notion of activity spaces—spaces of spatiotemporal events produced by dynamical systems. It is (...)
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  50. Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman (2012). The (Lack of) Mental Life of Some Machines. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins.. 88--95.
    The proponents of machine consciousness predicate the mental life of a machine, if any, exclusively on its formal, organizational structure, rather than on its physical composition. Given that matter is organized on a range of levels in time and space, this generic stance must be further constrained by a principled choice of levels on which the posited structure is supposed to reside. Indeed, not only must the formal structure fit well the physical system that realizes it, but it must do (...)
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