Related categories
Siblings:See also:
125 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 100 / 125
  1. Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (2009). Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control. Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.
    On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Roman Altshuler (2009). Agency and the A-Series. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):153-161.
    Debates between A-theorists and B-theorists about time often center on our experiential beliefs about reality. Because we experience events as past, present, or future, the A-theorists argue, a tenseless theory of time cannot account for reality. B-theorists, in response, have sought to painstakingly explain away every argument for the existence of A-properties on the basis of experience. Recently, the dominant strategy in this response has involved turning our attention away from our beliefs about experience and toward the truth-makers of those (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Holly Andersen, Causation and the Awareness of Agency.
    I criticize the tendency to address the causal role of awareness in agency in terms of the awareness of agency, and argue that this distorts the causal import of experimental results in significant ways. I illustrate, using the work of Shaun Gallagher, how the tendency to focus on the awareness of agency obscures the role of extrospective awareness by considering it only in terms of what it contributes to the awareness of agency. Focus on awareness of agency separates awareness from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Holly Andersen, Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will.
    Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Julia Annas (2008). The Phenomenology of Virtue. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):21-34.
    What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Tim Bayne (2011). The Sense of Agency. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives.
    Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Tim Bayne (2008). The Phenomenology of Agency. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Timothy J. Bayne, Putting the Experience of Acting in its Place.
    Although the notion can be found in Anscombe.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing : Wegner on the Conscious Will. In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Mit Press.
    Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illusion of Conscious (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy (2006). The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agnecy. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
    Disorders of volition are often accompanied by, and may even be caused by, disruptions in the phenomenology of agency. Yet the phenomenology of agency is at present little explored. In this paper we attempt to describe the experience of normal agency, in order to uncover its representational content.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Melissa R. Beck, Daniel T. Levin & Bonnie L. Angelone (2007). Change Blindness Blindness: Beliefs About the Roles of Intention and Scene Complexity in Change Detection. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.
  13. A. Berthoz (2008). The Physiology and Phenomenology of Action. Oxford University Press.
    Though many philosophers of mind have taken an interest in the great developments in the brain sciences, the interest is seldom reciprocated by scientists, who frequently ignore the contributions philosophers have made to our understanding of the mind and brain. In a rare collaboration, a world famous brain scientist and an eminent philosopher have joined forces in an effort to understand how our brain interacts with the world. Does the brain behave as a calculator, combining sensory data before deciding how (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. T. J. Bittner (1996). Consciousness and the Act of Will. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):31-41.
  15. Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Chris Frith (2003). Self-Awareness and Action. Current Opinion in Neurobiology. Special Issue 13 (2):219-224.
  16. G. Botterill (2010). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will * By ALFRED R. MELE. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (2):395-398.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Berit Brogaard (2011). Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action? Cognitive Science 35 (6):1076-1104.
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception-related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Brian Bruya (2010). Introduction: Toward a Theory of Attention That Includes Effortless Attention. In Brian Bruya (ed.), Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. MIT Press.
    In this Introduction, I identify seven discrete aspects of attention brought to the fore by by considering the phenomenon of effortless attention: effort, decision-making, action syntax, agency, automaticity, expertise, and mental training. For each, I provide an overview of recent research, identify challenges to or gaps in current attention theory with respect to it, consider how attention theory can be advanced by including current research, and explain how relevant chapters of this volume offer such advances.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Andrei A. Buckareff (2012). Mental Action. Edited by Lucy O'Brien and Matthew Soteriou. (Oxford UP, 2009. Pp. X + 286. Price £50.00). Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):401-403.
  20. Glenn Carruthers (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515 - 520.
    Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Peter Carruthers (2011). Action-Awareness and the Active Mind. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):133-156.
    In a pair of recent papers and his new book, Christopher Peacocke (2007, 2008a, 2008b) takes up and defends the claim that our awareness of our own actions is immediate and not perceptually based, and extends it into the domain of mental action.1 He aims to provide an account of action-awareness that will generalize to explain how we have immediate awareness of our own judgments, decisions, imaginings, and so forth. These claims form an important component in a much larger philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Peter Carruthers (2007). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Synthese 96 (2):197 - 213.
    Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., & Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, K. (1999). Who is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. William R. Carter (1982). Comments on L. H. Davis, What is It Like to Be an Agent?. Erkenntnis 18 (September):215-221.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Suparna Choudhury & Sarah-Jayne Blakemore (2006). Intentions, Actions, and the Self. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Axel Cleeremans, A Short Review of 'Consciousness in Action'.
    Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jonathan Cole (2007). The Phenomenology of Agency and Intention in the Face of Paralysis and Insentience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):309-325.
    Studies of perception have focussed on sensation, though more recently the perception of action has, once more, become the subject of investigation. These studies have looked at acute experimental situations. The present paper discusses the subjective experience of those with either clinical syndromes of loss of movement or sensation (spinal cord injury, sensory neuronopathy syndrome or motor stroke), or with experimental paralysis or sensory loss. The differing phenomenology of these is explored and their effects on intention and agency discussed. It (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. David Cunning (1999). Agency and Consciousness. Synthese 120 (2):271-294.
    In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing is always a component of one'€™s action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle'€™s view to establish that there are actions in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. T. D., G. Knoblich, M. Erb & J. T. (2003). Observing One's Hand Become Anarchic: An fMRI Study of Action Identification. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):597-608.
    The self seems to be a unitary entity remaining stable across time. Nevertheless, current theorizing conceptualizes the self as a number of interacting sub-systems involving perception, intention and action (self-model). One important function of such a self-model is to distinguish between events occurring as a result of one's own actions and events occurring as the result of somebody else's actions. We conducted an fMRI experiment that compared brain activation after an abrupt mismatch between one's own movement and its visual consequences (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod (1997). Looking for the Agent: An Investigation Into Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenic Patients. Cognition 65:71-86.
    The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty normal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Lawrence H. Davis (1982). What is It Like to Be an Agent? Erkenntnis 18 (September):195-213.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin (2010). Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. J. Dokic (2003). The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy Between Sensation and Action. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
    What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we cannot (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  36. Carlo Filice (1988). Non-Substantial Streams of Consciousness and Free Action. International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):1-11.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Ellen Fridland (2011). The Case for Proprioception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):521-540.
    In formulating a theory of perception that does justice to the embodied and enactive nature of perceptual experience, proprioception can play a valuable role. Since proprioception is necessarily embodied, and since proprioceptive experience is particularly integrated with one’s bodily actions, it seems clear that proprioception, in addition to, e.g., vision or audition, can provide us with valuable insights into the role of an agent’s corporal skills and capacities in constituting or structuring perceptual experience. However, if we are going to have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Christopher D. Frith (2002). Attention to Action and Awareness of Other Minds. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):481-487.
  39. Shaun Gallagher (2010). Multiple Aspects of Agency. New Ideas in Psychology.
    Recent significant research in a number of disciplines centers around the concept of the sense of agency. Because many of these studies cut across disciplinary lines there is good reason to seek a clear consensus on what ‘sense of agency’ means. In this paper I indicate some complexities that this consensus might have to deal with. I also highlight an important phenomenological distinction that needs to be considered in any discussion of the sense of agency, regardless of how it gets (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Shaun Gallagher (2007). The Natural Philosophy of Agency. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):347–357.
    A review of several theories and brain-imaging experiments shows that there is no consensus about how to define the sense of agency. In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Shaun Gallagher (2005). Consciousness and Free Will. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39:7-16.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. N. Georgieff & Marc Jeannerod (1998). Beyond Consciousness of External Reality: A ''Who'' System for Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):465-477.
    This paper offers a framework for consciousness of internal reality. Recent PET experiments are reviewed, showing partial overlap of cortical activation during self-produced actions and actions observed from other people. This overlap suggests that representations for actions may be shared by several individuals, a situation which creates a potential problem for correctly attributing an action to its agent. The neural conditions for correct agency judgments are thus assigned a key role in self/other distinction and self-consciousness. A series of behavioral experiments (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Nicolas Georgieff & Yves Rossetti (1999). How Does Implicit and Explicit Knowledge Fit in the Consciousness of Action? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):765-766.
    Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) target articles proposes an analysis of explicit knowledge based on a progressive transformation of implicit into explicit products, applying this gradient to different aspects of knowledge that can be represented. The goal is to integrate a philosophical concept of knowledge with relevant psychophysical and neuropsychological data. D&P seem to fill an impressive portion of the gap between these two areas. We focus on two examples where a full synthesis of theoretical and empirical data seems difficult to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Michael Gill (2008). Variability and Moral Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):99-113.
    Many moral philosophers in the Western tradition have used phenomenological claims as starting points for philosophical inquiry; aspects of moral phenomenology have often been taken to be anchors to which any adequate account of morality must remain attached. This paper raises doubts about whether moral phenomena are universal and robust enough to serve the purposes to which moral philosophers have traditionally tried to put them. Persons’ experiences of morality may vary in a way that greatly limits the extent to which (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Don Gustafson (2007). Neurosciences of Action and Noncausal Theories. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):367–374.
    Recent neuroscience and psychology of behavior have suggested that conscious decisions may have no causal role in the etiology of intentional action. Such results pose a threat to traditional philosophical analyses of action. On such views beliefs, desires and conscious willing are part of the causal structure of intentional action. But if the suggestions from neuroscience/psychology are correct, analyses of this kind are wrong. Conscious antecedents of action are epiphenomenal. This essay explores this consequence. It also notes that the traditional (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Patrick Haggard (2005). Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.
  47. Alastair Hannay (1991). Consciousness and the Experience of Freedom. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Jakob Hohwy (2005). The Experience of Mental Causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377-400.
    subjects mean when they report their mental states it is useful to be guided by a sound grasp of their concepts for mental events. 3 Though this is often ignored in favor of libertarian notions of free will, in which free action is seen as completely undetermined by the subject.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2003). The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):115-131.
    Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  51. Keith Hossack (2003). Consciousness in Act and Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.
    This paper develops an account of consciousness in action. Both consciousness and action are related to knowledge. A voluntary action is defined as a volition, or something intentionally effected by means of such volitions. Volitions are conscious mental acts whose proper function is to make their content true. A mental act is the exercise of a power of mind and a conscious mental act is identical with knowledge of its own phenomenal character. This set of definitions elucidates the relations between (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  52. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
  53. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Self-Consciousness, Spontaneity, and the Myth of the Giving. In Consciousness in Action. Cambridge.
    From my Consciousness in Action, ch. 2; see Consciousness in Action for bibligraphy. This chapter revises material from "Kant on Spontaneity and the Myth of the Giving", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1993-94, pp. 137-164, and "Myth Upon Myth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1996, vol. 96, pp. 253-260.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  54. Marc Jeannerod (2007). Consciousness of Action. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
  55. Marc Jeannerod (2006). Consciousness of Action as an Embodied Consciousness. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.
  56. Marc Jeannerod (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  57. Marc Jeannerod (2003). Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness: A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach. In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  58. Luis Jimenez (2003). Intention, Attention, and Consciousness in Probabilistic Sequence Learning. In Luis Jimenez (ed.), Attention and Implicit Learning. John Benjamins.
  59. Tomis Kapitan, The Phenomenology of Freedom.
    John Searle describes our sense of freedom as an experience of a “gap” between an intentional action and its psychological antecedents, specifically, our reasons.. Since the gap is itself understood as a lack of causation, then no agent can accept the antecedent determination of voluntary action except at the price of “practical inconsistency.” I argue that despite Searle’s insightful discussion, the sense of freedom is not an experience of a gap as he describes it but, instead, is a higher-order attitude (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  60. Uriah Kriegel (2008). Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):1-19.
    In this paper, I address the what, the how, and the why of moral phenomenology. I consider first the question What is moral phenomenology?, secondly the question How to pursue moral phenomenology?, and thirdly the question Why pursue moral phenomenology? My treatment of these questions is preliminary and tentative, and is meant not so much to settle them as to point in their answers’ direction.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  61. Dorothée Legrand (2007). Naturalizing the Acting Self: Subjective Vs. Anonymous Agency. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):457 – 478.
    This paper considers critically the enterprise of naturalizing the subjective experience of acting intentionally. I specifically expose the limits of the model that conceives of agency as composed of two stages. The first stage consists in experiencing an anonymous intention without being conscious of it as anybody's in particular. The second stage disambiguates this anonymous experience thanks to a mechanism of identification and attribution answering the question: "who is intending to act?" On the basis of phenomenological, clinical, methodological and empirical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  62. Brian Leiter (2009). Nietzsche's Theory of the Will. In Ken Gemes & Simon May (eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
    The essay offers a philosophical reconstruction of Nietzsche's theory of the will, focusing on (1) Nietzsche's account of the phenomenology of "willing " an action, the experience we have which leads us (causally) to conceive of ourselves as exercising our will; (2) Nietzsche's arguments that the experiences picked out by the phenomenology are not causally connected to the resulting action (at least not in a way sufficient to underwrite ascriptions of moral responsibility); and (3) Nietzsche's account of the actual causal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  63. Brian Leiter (2007). Nietzsche's Theory of the Will. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (7):1-15.
    The essay offers a philosophical reconstruction of Nietzsche’s theory of the will, focusing on (1) Nietzsche’s account of the phenomenology of “willing” an action, the experience we have which leads us (causally) to conceive of ourselves as exercising our will; (2) Nietzsche’s arguments that the experiences picked out by the phenomenology are not causally connected to the resulting action (at least not in a way sufficient to underwrite ascriptions of moral responsibility); and (3) Nietzsche’s account of the actual causal genesis (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  64. Ernest LePore (ed.) (1991). John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  65. D. T. Leube, G. Knoblich, M. Erb & T. T. J. Kircher (2003). Observing One's Hand Become Anarchic: An fMRI Study of Action Identification. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):597-608.
    The self seems to be a unitary entity remaining stable across time. Nevertheless, current theorizing conceptualizes the self as a number of interacting sub-systems involving perception, intention and action (self-model). One important function of such a self-model is to distinguish between events occurring as a result of one's own actions and events occurring as the result of somebody else's actions. We conducted an fMRI experiment that compared brain activation after an abrupt mismatch between one's own movement and its visual consequences (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  66. Pete Mandik (2010). Control Consciousness. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
    Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. In such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  67. Paul McIntosh (2010). Action Research and Reflective Practice: Creative and Visual Methods to Facilitate Reflection and Learning. Routledge.
    The tension in evidence-based practice and reflective practice -- The relationship between reflection and action research -- An overview of theories of consciousness and unconsciousness -- What do we mean by creativity? -- Using metaphor and symbolism as analysis -- Infinite possibilities of knowing and transformation -- Concluding thoughts; the linkages to action research and critical creativity.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  68. Alfred Mele (2010). Conscious Deciding and the Science of Free Will. In R. Baumeister, A. Mele & K. Vohs (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? Oxford University Press.
  69. Alfred Mele (2010). Conscious Intentions. In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  70. Alfred R. Mele (2011). Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness. In W. Sinnot-Armstrong & L. Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
  71. Alfred R. Mele (2007). Decisions, Intentions, Urges, and Free Will: Why Libet Has Not Shown What He Says He Has. In J. Campbell, M. O.’Rourke & D. Shier (eds.), Explanation and Causation: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy. Mit Press.
  72. Alfred R. Mele (2004). The Illusion of Conscious Will and the Causation of Intentional Actions. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):193-213.
    My aim in this article is to ascertain whether any of the interesting phenomena that Daniel Wegner discusses in The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002) falsify a certain hypothesis about intentional actions. Here is a rough, preliminary statement of the hypothesis: Whenever human agents perform an overt, intentional action, A, some intention of theirs is a cause of A. The hypothesis is refined in section 1. In section 2, I turn to this article's main question.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  73. Alfred R. Mele (1997). Strength of Motivation and Being in Control - Learning From Libet. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):319-32.
  74. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Conscious Volition and Mental Representation: Toward a More Fine-Grained Analysis. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
    A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  75. Christopher Mole (forthcoming). Embodied Demonstratives: A Reply to Wu. Mind.
    Although Wayne Wu correctly identifies a flaw in the way in which my 2009 article frames the debate about ‘zombie action’, he fails in his attempts to strengthen the case for thinking that our actions are under less conscious control than we usually imagine. His argument, like the arguments that my earlier paper addressed, can be blocked by allowing that an embodied demonstrative concept can contribute contents to a visual experience.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  76. James Moore (2007). Awareness of Action: Inference and Prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):136-144.
    This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential “sense-making” process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  77. James W. Moore & Patrick Haggard (2010). Intentional Binding and Higher Order Agency Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):490-491.
  78. Benjamin Mossel (2005). Action, Control and Sensations of Acting. Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.
    Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  79. Myrto I. Mylopoulos (2011). Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness? Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272.
    Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  80. Eddy Nahmias (2005). Agency, Authorship, and Illusion. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):771-785.
    Daniel Wegner argues that conscious will is an illusion. I examine the adequacy of his theory of apparent mental causation and whether, if accurate, it suggests that our experience of agency and authorship should be considered illusory. I examine various interpretations of this claim and raise problems for each interpretation. I also distinguish between the experiences of agency and authorship.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  81. Eddy A. Nahmias (2002). When Consciousness Matters: A Critical Review of Daniel Wegner's the Illusion of Conscious Will. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):527-541.
    In The illusion of conscious will , Daniel Wegner offers an exciting, informative, and potentially threatening treatise on the psychology of action. I offer several interpretations of the thesis that conscious will is an illusion. The one Wegner seems to suggest is "modular epiphenomenalism": conscious experience of will is produced by a brain system distinct from the system that produces action; it interprets our behavior but does not, as it seems to us, cause it. I argue that the evidence Wegner (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  82. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). An Experiential Account of Creativity. In Elliot Paul & Scott Barry Kaufman (eds.), The Philosophy of Creativity. Oxford University Press.
    The aim of the paper is to argue that the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes is not a functional/computational, but an experiential one. In other words, what is distinctive about creative mental processes is not the functional/computational mechanism that leads to the emergence of a creative idea, be it the recombination of old ideas or the transformation of one’s conceptual space, but the way in which this mental process is experienced. The explanatory power of the functional/computational theories and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  83. Albert Newen, Reply to Carruthers.
    Glenn Carruthers presents a very detailed and thorough critique of our multi-factorial twostep account of agency to the effect that it would not succeed in being superior and more general as the comparator model (CM). This critique gives us the opportunity to refine some of our points and to make the overall argument clearer. As Carruthers notes, “This move [the distinction between a feeling of agency (FoA) and a judgment of agency (JoA)] usefully limits the explanatory target of the CM (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  84. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2007). Doings and Subject Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):255 - 272.
    In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  85. Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.) (2009). Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
    This volume investigates the neglected topic of mental action, and shows its importance for the metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology of mind.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  86. Elisabeth Pacherie (2010). Self-Agency. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self.
    We are perceivers, we are thinkers, and we are also agents, bringing about physical events, such as bodily movements and their consequences. What we do tells us, and others, a lot about who we are. On the one hand, who we are determines what we do. On the other hand, acting is also a process of self-discovery and self-shaping. Pivotal to this mutual shaping of self and agency is the sense of agency, or agentive self-awareness, i.e., the sense that one (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  87. Elisabeth Pacherie (2008). The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework. Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
    After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  88. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window Onto Agentive Self-Awareness. Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217.
    Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  89. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.
    The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it will focus on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  90. Costas Pagondiotis & Spyros Petrounakos (2007). The Sense of Agency and the Naturalization of the Mental. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:139-143.
    In this paper we examine whether the sense of agency represents an obstacle to the project of naturalizing the mental. On the basis of a thought experiment we suggest that the sense of agency is not an epiphenomenon. We also examine Frith's attempt to explain in functionalist terms the sense of agency through the comparator and metarepresentational mechanisms. Through a variety of arguments we try to show that explanation by recourse to these mechanisms is inadequate. We conclude by suggesting that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  91. John Paul (1979). The Acting Person. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    Originally entitled Osoba i Czyn and published in Poland in 1969, TheActing Person is the official English translation and has been thoroughly edited and revised with the collaboration of the author. The book stresses that Man must ceaselessly unravel his mysteries and strive for a new and more mature expression of his nature. The author sees this expression as an emphasis on the significance of the individual living in community and on the person in the process of performing an action. (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  92. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
  93. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
  94. Christopher Peacocke (2003). Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  95. Susan Pockett (2004). Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):23-40.
  96. Jesse Preston, Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner (2006). The Godfather of Soul. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):482-+.
    An important component of souls is the capacity for free will, as the origin of agency within an individual. Belief in souls arises in part from the experience of conscious will, a compelling feeling of personal causation that accompanies almost every action we take, and suggests that an immaterial self is in charge of the physical body.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  97. Jesse J. Prinz (2007). All Consciousness is Perceptual. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  98. Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.) (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  99. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Timing of Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  100. Christian Sachse (2007). What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan. Erkenntnis 67 (2):201 - 205.
    In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally assume a causally closed physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation in addition to physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons and that is compatible with physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical with physical properties because there are different ontological levels. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 100 / 125