This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
64 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 64
  1. John P. Anderson (1997). Sophie's Choice. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):439-450.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Vuko Andrić (2010). Eine Kritik an Norbert Hoersters Theorie der Normenvertretung. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (1):62-83.
    Norbert Hoerster has tried to show on the basis of what I call special and general interests that it is rational to endorse moral judgements. I argue that Hoerster’s attempt to vindicate the rationality of moral judgements fails. By appealing to special interests Hoerster can only establish the rationality of endorsing judgements that – by Hoerster’s own standards – are not moral judgements because they do not pass the test of generalization. While the appeal to general interests, on the other (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Skelton Anthony (2002). Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900). In J. Mander & A. P. F. Sell (eds.), The Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century British Philosophers. Thoemmes Press
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Guy Axtell, Utilitarianism and Dewey's “Three Independent Factors in Morals”.
    The centennial of Dewey & Tuft’s Ethics (1908) provides a timely opportunity to reflect both on Dewey’s intellectual debt to utilitarian thought, and on his critique of it. In this paper I examine Dewey’s assessment of utilitarianism, but also his developing view of the good (ends; consequences), the right (rules; obligations) and the virtuous (approbations; standards) as “three independent factors in morals.” This doctrine (found most clearly in the 2nd edition of 1932) as I argue in the last sections, has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Yitzhak Benbaji (2010). Dehumanization, Lesser Evil and the Supreme Emergency Exemption. Diametros 23:5-21.
    Many believe that if the indiscriminate bombings of German cities at the beginning of World War II were necessary for preventing unlimited spread of Nazism, then the bombings were justified. For, the outcome, in which innocent Germans living in Nazi Germany are killed, was not as bad as the outcome in which the Nazis inflict ethnic cleansing and enslavement on a massive scale. Recently, however, Daniel Statman has advanced a powerful case against this type of justification. I aim in this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Jonathan Bennett (1989). Two Departures From Consequentialism. Ethics 100 (1):54-66.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  7. Selim Berker (2013). Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions. Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
    When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  8. Scott Berman (2014). Prudence and Morality: Socrates Versus Moral Philosophers. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):381-394.
  9. Greg Bird & Jonathan Short (2013). Community, Immunity, and the Proper an Introduction to the Political Theory of Roberto Esposito. Angelaki 18 (3):1-12.
  10. H. G. Callaway (2008). R.W. Emerson, Society and Solitude, Twelve Chapters. Edwin Mellen Press.
    This new edition of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Society and Solitude reproduces the original 1870 edition—only updating nineteenth-century prose spellings. Emerson’s text is fully annotated to identify the authors and issues of concern in the twelve essays, and definitions are provided for selected words in Emerson’s impressive vocabulary. The work aims to facilitate a better understanding of Emerson’s late philosophy in relation to his sources, his development and his subsequent influence.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. H. G. Callaway (ed.) (2006). R.W. Emerson, The Conduct of Life: A Philosophical Reading. University Press of America.
    This new edition emphasizes Emerson's philosophy and thoughts on such issues as freedom and fate; creativity and established culture; faith, experience, and evidence; the individual, God, and the world; unity and dualism; moral law, grace, and compensation; and wealth and success. Emerson's text has been fully annotated to explain difficult words and to clarify his references. The Introduction, Notes, Bibliography, Index, and Chronology of Emerson's life help the reader understand his distinctive outlook, his contributions to philosophy, and his place in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Adam B. Cohen & Paul Rozin (2001). Religion and the Morality of Mentality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (4):697-710.
    Christian doctrine considers mental states important in judging a person's moral status, whereas Jewish doctrine considers them less important. The authors provide evidence from 4 studies that American Jews and Protestants differ in the moral import they attribute to mental states (honoring one's parents, thinking about having a sexual affair, and thinking about harming an animal). Although Protestants and Jews rated the moral status of the actions equally. Protestants rated a target person with inappropriate mental states more negatively than did (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  13. David Cummiskey (2008). Dignity, Contractualism and Consequentialism. Utilitas 20 (4):383-408.
    Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of dignity, on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. David Cummiskey (1990). Kantian Consequentialism. Ethics 100 (3):586-615.
    The central problem for normative ethics is the conflict between a consequentialist view--that morality requires promoting the good of all--and a belief that the rights of the individual place significant constraints on what may be done to help others. Standard interpretations see Kant as rejecting all forms of consequentialism, and defending a theory which is fundamentally duty-based and agent-centered. Certain actions, like sacrificing the innocent, are categorically forbidden. In this original and controversial work, Cummiskey argues that there is no defensible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  15. David Cummiskey (1989). Consequentialism, Egoism, and the Moral Law. Philosophical Studies 57 (2):111 - 134.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Neil Delaney (2015). The Doctrine of Double Effect. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):397-406.
    Abstract: This essay consists of some clarifying remarks on the doctrine of double effect (DDE). After providing a contemporary formulation of the doctrine we put special emphasis on the distinction between those aspects of an action plan that are intended and those that are merely foreseen (the I/F distinction). Making use of this distinction is often made difficult in practice because salient aspects of the action plan exhibit a felt “closeness” to one another that is difficult if not impossible to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Robert Elliot (1995). Consequentialism and Absolutism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):145 – 151.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Julian Fink (2007). Is the Right Prior to the Good? South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):143-149.
    One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situa- tions, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action's rightness. This indicates that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Scott Forschler (2013). Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):88-104.
    Richard Hare argues that the fundamental assumptions of Kant's ethical system should have led Kant to utilitarianism, had Kant not confused a norm's generality with its universality, and hence adopted rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra Hare that the gap between Kantian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. This article shows that Timmermann's claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and metaethical aspects of each view, and that Hare's attempt to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. James Griffin (1992). The Human Good and the Ambitions of Consequentialism. Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):118.
    I want to look at one aspect of the human good: how it serves as the basis for judgments about the moral right. One important view is that the right is always derived from the good. I want to suggest that the more one understands the nature of the human good, the more reservations one has about that view. I. One Route to Consequentialism Many of us think that different things make a life good, with no one deep value underlying (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  21. Alexander A. Guerrero (2016). Appropriately Using People Merely as a Means. Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):777-794.
    There has been a great deal of philosophical discussion about using people, using people intentionally, using people as a means to some end, and using people merely as a means to some end. In this paper, I defend the following claim about using people: NOT ALWAYS WRONG: using people—even merely as a means—is not always morally objectionable. Having defended that claim, I suggest that the following claim is also correct: NO ONE FEATURE: when it is morally objectionable to use people, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Ignace Haaz (2010). Les normes pénales chez Rawls. L'Harmattan.
    Le modèle de la justice comme équité est élaboré sur des éléments centraux (en particulier: le consentement éclairé des citoyens). Les fonctions de ce modèle chez Rawls sont: un accord rationnel autour de libertés individuelles, un principe raisonnable de maximisation de la stabilité sociale et la fondation de principes, acceptables du point de vue des personnes défavorisées. Notre objectif consiste à mettre à l'épreuve une semblable conception de la justice politique libérale, avec sa composante la moins libérale : la balance (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Madeleine Hayenhjelm & Jonathan Wolff (2012). The Moral Problem of Risk Impositions: A Survey of the Literature. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E142.
    This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Of Metaethics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism. In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Richard Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press
    In 1982, when T. M. Scanlon published “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” he noted that, despite the widespread attention to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, the appeal of contractualism as a moral theory had been under appreciated. In particular, the appeal of contractualism’s account of what he then called “moral motivation” had been under appreciated.1 It seems to me that, in the intervening quarter century, despite the widespread discussion of Scanlon’s work, the appeal of contractualism, in precisely this regard, has still been (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Brad Hooker (1997). Reply to Stratton-Lake. Mind 106 (424):759-760.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Adam Hosein, Numbers, Fairness and Charity.
    This paper discusses the "numbers problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of charity or beneficence.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Hardy E. Jones (1975). Consequentialism and Moral Conservatism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):319-330.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Whitley R. P. Kaufman (1999). The Lion's Den, Othello, and the Limits of Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):539-557.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Gerald Lang & Rob Lawlor (2016). Numbers Scepticism, Equal Chances and Pluralism Taurek Revisited. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (3):298-315.
    The ‘standard interpretation’ of John Taurek’s argument in ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ imputes two theses to him: first, ‘numbers scepticism’, or scepticism about the moral force of an appeal to the mere number of individuals saved in conflict cases; and second, the ‘equal greatest chances’ principle of rescue, which requires that every individual has an equal chance of being rescued. The standard interpretation is criticized here on a number of grounds. First, whilst Taurek clearly believes that equal chances are all-important, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Ken Levy (2014). Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System. Rutgers Law Review 66:629-684.
    Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin’s family to the jury verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family’s emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal punishment – especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why were – and are – they so upset that he didn’t? (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Duncan MacIntosh (1990). Ideal Moral Codes. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):389-408.
    Ideal rule utilitarianism says that a moral code C is correct if its acceptance maximizes utility; and that right action is compliance with C. But what if we cannot accept C? Rawls and L. Whitt suggest that C is correct if accepting C maximizes among codes we can accept; and that right action is compliance with C. But what if merely reinforcing a code we can't accept would maximize? G. Trianosky suggests that C is correct if reinforcing it maximizes; and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Kevin Magill (1998). The Idea of a Justification for Punishment. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (1):86-101.
    The argument between retributivists and consequentialists about what morally justifies the punishment of offenders is incoherent. If we were to discover that all of the contending justifications were mistaken, there is no realistic prospect that this would lead us to abandon legal punishment. Justification of words, beliefs and deeds, can only be intelligible on the assumption that if one's justification were found to be invalid and there were no alternative justification, one would be prepared to stop saying, believing or doing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. James Edwin Mahon (2012). Review of Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 32 (4):275-278.
    In this review of Brooke Harrington's edited collection of essays on deception, written by people from different disciplines and giving us a good "status report" on what various disciplines have to say about deception and lying, I reject social psychologist Mark Frank's taxonomy of passive deception, active consensual deception, and active non-consensual deception (active consensual deception is not deception), as well as his definition of deception as "anything that misleads another for some gain" ("for gain" is a reason for engaging (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. J. Mander & A. P. F. Sell (eds.) (2002). The Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century British Philosophers. Thoemmes Press.
  35. Joel Marks (2009). Ought Implies Kant: A Reply to the Consequentialist Critique. Lexington Books.
    Ought Implies Kant defends Kantianism via a critical examination of consequentialism. The latter is shown to be untenable on epistemic grounds; meanwhile, the charge that Kantianism is really consequentialism in disguise is refuted. The book also presents a novel interpretation of Kantianism as according direct duties to other animals.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. Jason Marsh (2015). Procreative Ethics and the Problem of Evil. In Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan & Vernon Richard (eds.), Permissible Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and Parenting. Oxford University Press 65-86.
    Many people think that the amount of evil and suffering we observe provides important and perhaps decisive evidence against the claim that a loving God created our world. Yet almost nobody worries about the ethics of human procreation. Can these attitudes be consistently maintained? This chapter argues that the most obvious attempts to justify a positive answer fail. The upshot is not that procreation is impermissible, but rather that we should either revise our beliefs about the severity of global arguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Thaddeus Metz (2001). Review of Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (4):614-617.
  38. Seiriol Morgan (2009). Can There Be a Kantian Consequentialism? Ratio 22 (1):19-40.
    In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that we need to make a significant reassessment of the relationship between some central positions in moral philosophy, because, contrary to received opinion, Kantians, contractualists and consequentialists are all 'climbing the same mountain on different sides'. In Parfit's view Kant's own attempt to outline an account of moral obligation fails, but when it is modified in ways entirely congenial to his thinking, a defensible Kantian contractualism can be produced, which survives the objections which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Francesco Orsi (2012). David Ross, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts. Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2).
    The denial of the intrinsic value of acts apart from both motives and consequences lies at the heart of Ross’s deontology and his opposition to ideal utilitarianism. Moreover, the claim that acts can have intrinsic value is a staple element of early and contemporary attempts to “consequentialise” all of morality. I first show why Ross’s denial is relevant both for his philosophy and for current debates. Then I consider and reject as inconclusive some of Ross’s explicit and implicit motivations for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Michael Otsuka (2009). The Kantian Argument for Consequentialism. Ratio 22 (1):41-58.
    A critical examination of Parfit's attempt to reconcile Kantian contractualism with consequentialism, which disputes his contention that the contracting parties would lack decisive reasons to choose principles that ground prohibitions against harming of the sort to which non-consequentialists have been attracted. 1.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Philip Pettit (1989). Consequentialism and Respect for Persons. Ethics 100 (1):116-126.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  42. Douglas W. Portmore (2014). Précis: Commonsense Consequentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):209-216.
    A summary of my book: Commonsense Consequentialism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Theron Pummer (2016). Whether and Where to Give. Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (1):77-95.
    Effective altruists recommend that we give large sums to charity, but by far their more central message is that we give effectively, i.e., to whatever charities would do the most good per dollar donated. In this paper, I’ll assume that it’s not wrong not to give bigger, but will explore to what extent it may well nonetheless be wrong not to give better. The main claim I’ll argue for here is that in many cases it would be wrong of you (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Duncan Purves (2011). Still in Hot Water: Doing, Allowing, and Rachels’ Bathtub Cases. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):129-137.
    The aim of this paper is to explain and defend a type of argument common in the doing/allowing literature called a “contrast argument.” I am concerned with defending a particular type of contrast argument that is intended to demonstrate the moral irrelevance of the doing/allowing distinction. This type of argument, referred to in this paper as an “irrelevance argument,” is exemplified by an argument offered by James Rachels (1975) that employs the Smith and Jones bathtub cases. My main contention in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Lisa Rivera (2010). Worthy Lives. Social Theory and Practice 32 (2):185-212.
    Susan Wolf's paper "Meaning and Morality" draws our attention to the fact that Williams's objection to Kantian morality is primarily a concern about a possible conflict between morality and that which gives our lives meaning. I argue that the force of Williams's objection requires a more precise understanding of meaning as dependent on our intention to make our lives themselves worthwhile. It is not meaning simpliciter that makes Williams's objective persuasive but rather meaning as arising out of our positive evaluation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Jacob Ross (2009). Should Kantians Be Consequentialists? Ratio 22 (1):126-135.
    Parfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit's derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism. 1.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. S. Andrew Schroeder (forthcoming). Consequentializing and its Consequences. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that we can and should “consequentialize” non-consequentialist moral theories, putting them into a consequentialist framework. I argue that these philosophers, usually treated as a group, in fact offer three separate arguments, two of which are incompatible. I show that none represent significant threats to a committed non-consequentialist, and that the literature has suffered due to a failure to distinguish these arguments. I conclude by showing that the failure of the consequentializers’ arguments has implications (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. S. Andrew Schroeder (2011). You Don't Have to Do What's Best! (A Problem for Consequentialists and Other Teleologists). In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 1. Oxford University Press
    Define teleology as the view that requirements hold in virtue of facts about value or goodness. Teleological views are quite popular, and in fact some philosophers (e.g. Dreier, Smith) argue that all (plausible) moral theories can be understood teleologically. I argue, however, that certain well-known cases show that the teleologist must at minimum assume that there are certain facts that an agent ought to know, and that this means that requirements can't, in general, hold in virtue of facts about value (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Re'em Segev (2010). Hierarchical Consequentialism. Utilitas 22 (3):309-330.
    The paper considers a hierarchical theory that combines concern for two values: individual well-being – as a fundamental, first-order value – and (distributive) fairness – as a high-order value that its exclusive function is to complete the value of individual well-being by resolving internal clashes within it that occur in interpersonal conflicts. The argument for this unique conception of high-order fairness is that fairness is morally significant in itself only regarding what matters – individual well-being – and when it matters (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50. Re’em Segev (2016). Should We Prevent Deontological Wrongdoing? Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2049-2068.
    Is there a reason to prevent deontological wrongdoing—an action that is wrong due to the violation of a decisive deontological constraint? This question is perplexing. On the one hand, the intuitive response seems to be positive, both when the question is considered in the abstract and when it is considered with regard to paradigmatic cases of deontological wrongdoing such as Bridge and Transplant. On the other hand, common theoretical accounts of deontological wrongdoing do not entail this answer, since not preventing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 64