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  1. Matthew Adler, The Pigou-Dalton Principle and the Structure of Distributive Justice.
    The Pigou-Dalton (PD) principle recommends a non-leaky, non-rank-switching transfer of goods from someone with more goods to someone with less. This Article defends the PD principle as an aspect of distributive justice—enabling the comparison of two distributions, neither completely equal, as more or less just. It shows how the PD principle flows from a particular view, adumbrated by Thomas Nagel, about the grounding of distributive justice in individuals’ “claims.” And it criticizes two competing frameworks for thinking about justice that less (...)
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  2. R. B. Brandt (1989). Fairness To Happiness. Social Theory and Practice 15 (1):33-58.
  3. D. Dolinko (1997). Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment. Law and Philosophy 16 (5):507-528.
    Retributivism is commonly taken as an alternative to a consequentialist justification of punishment. It has recently been suggested, however, that retributivism can be recast as a consequentialist theory. This suggestion is shown to be untenable. The temptation to advance it is traced to an ``intrinsic good'' claim prominent in retributive thinking. This claim is examined, and is argued to be of little help in coping with the difficulties besetting the retributive theory, as well as clashing with a ``desert'' claim equally (...)
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  4. Annette Dufner (2012). Surprising Theses in Classical Utilitarianism. Henry Sidgwick's Neglected Completion of Classical British Moral Philosophy. Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy / Archives de Philosophie du Droit Et de Philosophie Sociale / Archivo de Filosofía Jurídica y Social 98 (4):510-534.
    This paper argues that Henry Sidgwick’s account of the relationship between the right and the good, as well as his theory of the good are still undervalued in many respects. An applied section illustrates the practical significance of this finding. In cases in which shooting down a passenger plane can save a greater number of people on the ground, and no other relevant considerations apply, the passengers should desire their own destruction—not only to promote the general good, but also in (...)
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  5. Ken Levy (2014). Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System. Rutgers Law Review 66:629-684.
    Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin’s family to the jury verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family’s emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal punishment – especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why were – and are – they so upset that he didn’t? (...)
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  6. Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2003). Egalitarianism and Repugnant Conclusions. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 38:115-125.
    Most philosophers discuss the Repugnant Conclusion as an objection to total utilitarianism. But this focus on total utilitarianism seems to be one-sided. It conceals the important fact that other competing moral theories are also subject to the Repugnant Conclusion. The primary aim of this paper is to demonstrate that versions of egalitarianism are subject to the Repugnant Conclusion and other repugnant conclusions.
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  7. Matthew Rendall (2013). Priority and Desert. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):939-951.
    Michael Otsuka, Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey have challenged the priority view in favour of a theory based on competing claims. The present paper shows how their argument can be used to recast the priority view. All desert claims in distributive justice are comparative. The stronger a party’s claims to a given benefit, the greater is the value of her receiving it. Ceteris paribus, the worse-off have stronger claims on welfare, and benefits to them matter more. This can account for (...)
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  8. Julian Savulescu (1998). Consequentialism, Reasons, Value and Justice. Bioethics 12 (3):212–235.
    Over the past 10 years, John Harris has made important contributions to thinking about distributive justice in health care. In his latest work, Harris controversially argues that clinicians should stop prioritising patients according to prognosis. He argues that the good or benefit of health care is providing each individual with an opportunity to live the best and longest life possible for him or her. I call this thesis, opportunism. For the purpose of distribution of resources in health care, Harris rejects (...)
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  9. Re'em Segev (2010). Hierarchical Consequentialism. Utilitas 22 (3):309-330.
    The paper considers a hierarchical theory that combines concern for two values: individual well-being – as a fundamental, first-order value – and (distributive) fairness – as a high-order value that its exclusive function is to complete the value of individual well-being by resolving internal clashes within it that occur in interpersonal conflicts. The argument for this unique conception of high-order fairness is that fairness is morally significant in itself only regarding what matters – individual well-being – and when it matters (...)
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  10. Re'em Segev (2009). Balancing, Judicial Review and Disobedience: Comments on Richard Posner’s Analysis of Anti-Terror Measures (Not a Suicide Pact). Israel Law Review 43 (2):234-247.
    The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner’s argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively (...)
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  11. Re'em Segev (2009). Second-Order Equality and Levelling Down. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):425 – 443.
    Many think that equality is an intrinsic value. However, this view, especially when based on a consequential foundation, faces familiar objections related to the claim that equality is sometimes good for none and bad for some: most notably the levelling down objection. This article explores a unique (consequential) conception of equality, as part of a more general conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, which is not exposed to these objections.
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  12. Kai Spiekermann (2014). Small Impacts and Imperceptible Effects: Causing Harm with Others. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):75-90.
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  13. Peter Vallentyne (1995). Taking Justice Too Seriously. Utilitas 7 (2):207-216.
    000000001. Introduction One of the standard objections to traditional act utilitarianism is that it is insensitive to issues of justice and desert. Traditional act utilitarianism holds, for example, that it is morally obligatory to torture or kill an innocent person, when doing so increases the happiness of others more than it decreases the happiness of the innocent person. Utilitarianism is, of course, sensitive to what people believe about justice (for example, people might riot, if they believe a gross injustice has (...)
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  14. Alex Voorhoeve & Marc Fleurbaey (forthcoming). Priority or Equality for Possible People? Ethics.
    Suppose that you must make choices that may influence the well-being and the identities of the people who will exist, though not the number of people who will exist. How ought you to choose? This paper answers this question. It argues that the currency of distributive ethics in such cases is a combination of an individual’s final well-being and her expected well-being conditional on her existence. It also argues that this currency should be distributed in an egalitarian, rather than a (...)
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  15. David Wood (2010). Punishment: Consequentialism. Philosophy Compass 5 (6):455-469.
    Punishment involves deliberating harming individuals. How, then, if at all, is it to be justified? This, the first of three papers on the philosophy of punishment (see also 'Punishment: Nonconsequentialism' and 'Punishment: The Future'), examines attempts to justify the practice or institution according to its consequences. One claim is that punishment reduces crime, and hence the resulting harms. Another is that punishment functions to rehabilitate offenders. A third claim is that punishment (or some forms of punishment) can serve to make (...)
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