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  1. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  2. Jüri Allik & Kenn Konstabel (2005). G. F. Parrot and the Theory of Unconscious Inferences. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 41 (4):317-330.
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  3. Joseph Anderson & Barbara Anderson (1993). The Myth of Persistence of Vision Revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.
  4. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1988). Can Non-Pure Perception Be Direct? Philosophical Quarterly 38 (July):315-325.
  5. Robert Briscoe, Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science.
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience or ‘seeing-in’, to use Richard Wollheim’s familiar expression. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that seeing-in and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same (...)
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  6. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Bodily Action and Distal Attribution in Sensory Substitution. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Proceedings of the British Academy
    According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (Hurley & Noë 2003, Noë 2004, O’Regan 2011), active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual (...)
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  7. Vicki Bruce & Patrick Green (1985). Visual Perception: Physiology, Psychology, and Ecology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
  8. Romane L. Clark (1993). Seeing and Inferring. Philosophical Papers 22 (2):81-96.
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  9. Dan D. Crawford (1982). Are There Mental Inferences in Direct Perceptions? American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):83-92.
    While there is virtually a consensus among contemporary philosophers of perception that some form of direct realism is true, there is less than complete agreement about whether normal, direct perceptions involve mental inferences in any sense. In taking another look at this recurrent question, my aim is twofold: first, to examine some of the arguments and evidences that have been offered in favor of inferences and to see if they can be accommodated within the direct realist framework, and second, to (...)
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  10. James E. Cutting (2003). Reconceiving Perceptual Space. In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. The MIT Press
  11. P. A. Frensch & R. Schwarzer (eds.) (2010). Cognition and Neuropsychology: International Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol.1. Psychology Press.
    Neuropsychology. International. Perspectives. on. Psychological. Science. ( Volume. 1). This is the first of two volumes which together present the main contributions from the 29th International Congress of Psychology, held in Berlin in 2008, ...
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  12. Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (2014). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...)
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  13. E. J. Green (forthcoming). A Layered View of Shape Perception. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv042.
    This article develops a view of shape representation both in visual experience and in subpersonal visual processing. The view is that, in both cases, shape is represented in a ‘layered’ manner: an object is represented as having multiple shape properties, and these properties have varying degrees of abstraction. I argue that this view is supported both by the facts about visual phenomenology and by a large collection of evidence in perceptual psychology. Such evidence is provided by studies of shape discriminability, (...)
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  14. Richard L. Gregory (1974). Perceptions as Hypotheses. In Philosophy Of Psychology. London,: Macmillan
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  15. Richard L. Gregory (1974). Philosophy Of Psychology. London,: Macmillan.
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  16. Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum (forthcoming). Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes. Mind and Language.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling’s classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics’ in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of (...)
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  17. Gary Hatfield (2014). Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy. Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish phenomenal from cognitive factors.
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  18. Gary Hatfield (2012). Phenomenal and Cognitive Factors in Spatial Perception. In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. OUP Oxford 35.
    This chapter provides an overview of the phenomenology of size perception and the use of instructions to tease apart phenomenal and cognitive aspects. It develops his own recent proposals concerning the geometry of visual space. The chapter proposes that visual space is contracted along the lines of sight. This contraction would explain the apparent convergence of railway tracks, but without invoking a “proximal mode” experience. Parallel railway tracks receding into the distance project converging lines onto the retinas. A (...)
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  19. Gary Hatfield (2002). Perception as Unconscious Inference. In D. Heyer (ed.), Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception. John Wiley and Sons Ltd 113--143.
    In this chapter I examine past and recent theories of unconscious inference. Most theorists have ascribed inferences to perception literally, not analogically, and I focus on the literal approach. I examine three problems faced by such theories if their commitment to unconscious inferences is taken seriously. Two problems concern the cognitive resources that must be available to the visual system (or a more central system) to support the inferences in question. The third problem focuses on how the (...)
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  20. Gary Hatfield (1988). Representation and Content in Some (Actual) Theories of Perception. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (2):175-214.
  21. Gary C. Hatfield (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited (...)
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  22. Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.) (2012). Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press.
    Many of us have been fascinated by visual illusions at some point, and have asked ourselves why something can look like one thing when it is fact something else. How can we perceive two different things, when the light coming into our eyes stays constant? This book brings together psychologists and philosophers to explore this aspect of vision.
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  23. Gary Hatfield & William Epstein (1985). The Status of the Minimum Principle in the Theoretical Analysis of Visual Perception. Psychological Bulletin 97 (2):155–186.
    We examine a number of investigations of perceptual economy or, more specifically, of minimum tendencies and minimum principles in the visual perception of form, depth, and motion. A minimum tendency is a psychophysical finding that perception tends toward simplicity, as measured in accordance with a specified metric. A minimum principle is a theoretical construct imputed to the visual system to explain minimum tendencies. After examining a number of studies of perceptual economy, we embark on a systematic analysis of this notion. (...)
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  24. Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.) (2003). Looking Into Pictures. The MIT Press.
    Interdisciplinary explorations of the implications of recent developments in vision theory for our understanding of the nature of pictorial representation and ...
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  25. D. Heyer (ed.) (2002). Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception. John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
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  26. Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.) (2002). Perception and the Physical World. Wiley.
    The focus of this book is on conceptual and philosophical issues of perception including the classic notion of unconscious inferences in perception. The book consists of contributions from a group of internationally renowned researchers who spent a year together as distinguised fellows at the German Centre for Advanced Study.
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  27. W. D. Joske (1963). Inferring and Perceiving. Philosophical Review 72 (4):433-445.
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  28. P. W. Jusczyk, S. P. Johnson, E. S. Spelke & L. J. Kennedy (1999). Synchronous Change and Perception of Object Unity: Evidence From Adults and Infants. Cognition 71 (3):257-88.
    Adults and infants display a robust ability to perceive the unity of a center-occluded object when the visible ends of the object undergo common motion (e.g. Kellman, P.J., Spelke, E.S., 1983. Perception of partly occluded objects in infancy. Cognitive Psychology 15, 483±524). Ecologically oriented accounts of this ability focus on the primacy of motion in the perception of segregated objects, but Gestalt theory suggests a broader possibility: observers may perceive object unity by detecting patterns of synchronous change, of which common (...)
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  29. In Kyeong Kim & Elizabeth S. Spelke, Infants' Sensitivity to Effects of Gravity on Visible Object Motion.
    A preference method probed infants` perception of object motion on an inclined plane. Infants viewed videotaped events in which a ball rolled downward (or upward) while speeding up (or slowing down). Then infants were tested with events in which the ball moved in the opposite direction with appropriate or inappropriate acceleration. Infants aged 7 months, but not 5 months, looked longer at the test event with inappropriate acceleration, suggesting emerging sensitivity to gravity. A further study tested whether infants appreciate that (...)
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  30. A. David Kline (1979). Constructivism and the Objects of Perception. Nature and System 1 (March):37-45.
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  31. Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gervant & Vishwanath Dhanraj (eds.) (forthcoming). Perception Beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes. MIT Press.
  32. Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Explaining Why Things Look the Way They Do. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press 18-60.
    How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it is possible (...)
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  33. Michael Madary (2014). Perceptual Presence Without Counterfactual Richness. Cognitive Neuroscience 5:131-133.
    In this commentary, I suggest that non-visual perceptual modalities provide counterexamples to Seth’s claim that perceptual presence depends on counterfactual richness. Then I suggest a modification to Seth’s view that is not vulnerable to these counterexamples.
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  34. Rainer Mausfeld (2011). Intrinsic Multiperspectivity: Conceptual Forms and the Functional Architecture of the Perceptual System. In Welsch Wolfgang, Singer Wolf & Wunder Andre (eds.), Interdisciplinary Anthropology. Springer 19--54.
    It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same perceptual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill equipped to deal with these achievements. I then outline a theoretical perspective that has emerged from a (...)
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  35. Rainer Mausfeld (2010). The Perception of Material Qualities and the Internal Semantics of the Perceptual System. In Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gert & Vishwanath Dhanraj (eds.), Perception beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes. MIT Press
    The chapter outlines an abstract theoretical framework that is currently (re-)emerging in the course of a theoretical convergence of several disciplines. In the first section, the fundamental problem of perception theory is formulated, namely, the generation, by the perceptual system, of meaningful categories from physicogeometric energy patterns. In the second section, it deals with basic intuitions and assumptions underlying what can be regarded as the current Standard Model of Perceptual Psychology and points out why this model is profoundly inadequate for (...)
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  36. Rainer Mausfeld (2002). The Physicalistic Trap in Perception Theory. In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World. Wiley
    The chapter deals with misconceptions in perception theory that are based on the idea of slicing the nature of perception along the joints of physics and on corresponding ill-conceived ʹpurposesʹ and ʹgoalsʹ of the perceptual system. It argues that the conceptual structure underlying the percept cannot be inferentially attained from the sensory input. The output of the perceptual system, namely meaningful categories, is evidently vastly underdetermined by the sensory input, namely physico-geometric energy patterns. Thus, the core task of perception theory (...)
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  37. Christopher Mole & Jiaying Zhao (forthcoming). Vision and Abstraction: An Empirical Refutation of Nico Orlandi’s Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This (...)
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  38. Aleksandra Mroczko, Thomas Metzinger, Wolf Singer & Danko Nikolić (2009). Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer. Journal of Vision 9 (12):1-8.
  39. María G. Navarro (2012). Critical Notice of 'Expression and the Inner' by David H. Finkelstein. [REVIEW] Polis 32.
    La obra del filósofo estadounidense David H. Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner, publicada originariamente en 2003 por Harvard University Press (2ª ed. 2008) puede ahora leerse en la versión española de Lino San Juan, editada por la ovetense KRK Ediciones con el título: La expresión y lo interno. Finkelstein propone en La expresión y lo interno un análisis expresivista del autoconocimiento. Podría parecer cuando menos sorprendente y aún más admirable que con tan sólo dos capítulos (“Detectivismo y constitutivismo” y “Expresión”) (...)
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  40. Robert Carry Osborne (forthcoming). Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Debunking arguments typically attempt to show that a set of beliefs or other intensional mental states bear no appropriate explanatory connection to the facts they purport to be about. That is, a debunking argument will attempt to show that beliefs about p are not held because of the facts about p. Such beliefs, if true, would then only be accidentally so. Thus, their causal origins constitute an undermining defeater. Debunking arguments arise in various philosophical domains, targeting beliefs about morality, the (...)
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  41. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2006). Defending Realism on the Proper Ground. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
    'Epistemological constructivism' holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently and they could agree on what they see only if they both espoused the same conceptual framework. This, in its turn, undermines the possibility of theory testing and choice on a common theory-neutral empirical basis. In this paper, I claim that the cognitive sciences suggest that a part of vision may be only indirectly penetrated by cognition (...)
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  42. Ayoob Shahmoradi (forthcoming). Why Do We Need Perceptual Content? Philosophical Psychology.
    Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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  43. Leen Spruit (1994). Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Brill.
    v. 1. Classical roots and medieval discussions -- v. 2. Renaissance controversis, later scholasticism, and the elimination of the intelligible species in modern philosophy.
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  44. Marten ten Hoor (1936). Awareness and Inference: An Approach to Realism. Journal of Philosophy 33 (22):589-596.
  45. Neil Van Leeuwen (2011). Review of Sleights of Mind: What the Neuroscience of Magic Reveals About Our Brains. [REVIEW] Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 16 (5):473-478.
    The book I review, _Sleights of Mind_, aims to illuminate properties of perceptual systems by discussing human susceptibility to magical illusions. I describe how the authors use psychological principles to explain two tricks, spoon bending and the Miser's Dream. I also argue that the book is congenial to the following view of illusions: susceptibility to illusion is the result of evolutionary trade-offs; perceptual systems must make assumptions in order to function at all, but susceptibility to illusion is the byproduct of (...)
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  46. Vander Veer & L. Garrett (1964). Austin on Perception. Review of Metaphysics 17 (June):557-567.
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  47. Dhanraj Vishwanath (2005). The Epistemological Status of Vision and its Implications for Design. Axiomathes 15 (3):399-486.
    Computational theories of vision typically rely on the analysis of two aspects of human visual function: (1) object and shape recognition (2) co-calibration of sensory measurements. Both these approaches are usually based on an inverse-optics model, where visual perception is viewed as a process of inference from a 2D retinal projection to a 3D percept within a Euclidean space schema. This paradigm has had great success in certain areas of vision science, but has been relatively less successful in understanding perceptual (...)
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  48. Ioannis Votsis (2015). Perception and Observation Unladened. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):563-585.
    Let us call ‘veridicalism’ the view that perceptual beliefs and observational reports are largely truthful. This paper aims to make a case for veridicalism by, among other things, examining in detail and ultimately deflating in import what many consider to be the view’s greatest threat, the so-called ‘theory-ladenness’ of perception and/or observation. In what follows, it is argued that to the extent that theoretical factors influence the formation of perceptual beliefs and observational reports, as theory-ladenness demands, that influence is typically (...)
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  49. Kendall Walton (1963). The Dispensability of Perceptual Inferences. Mind 72 (July):357-368.
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  50. John Williamson (1966). Realization and Unconscious Inference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (September):11-26.