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  1. Keith Allen, Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World.
  2. Dorit Bar-On, Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.
    As I am sitting at my desk in front of my computer, a thought crosses my mind: There's water in the glass. The thought has a particular content: that there is water in the glass. And, if all is well, there is water in the glass, so my thought is true. According to external-world skepticism, I still do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling what's in front of me does not allow me (...)
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  3. James K. Beilby (ed.) (2002). Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press.
    In this, the first book to address the ongoing debate, Plantinga presents his influential thesis and responds to critiques by distinguished philosophers from a ...
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  4. Michael Bergmann (2008). Externalist Responses to Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Skepticism. Oxford University Press. 504--32.
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  5. Michael Bergmann (2001). Putting Skeptics in Their Place. International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):484-486.
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  6. Michael Bergmann (2000). Externalism and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
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  7. Sven Bernecker (2000). Knowing the World by Knowing One's Mind. Synthese 123 (1):1-34.
    This paper addresses the question whetherintrospection plus externalism about mental contentwarrant an a priori refutation of external-worldskepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestionis that if thought content is partly determined byaffairs in the environment and if we can havenon-empirical knowledge of our current thoughtcontents, we can, just by reflection, know about theworld around us – we can know that our environment ispopulated with content-determining entities. Afterexamining this type of transcendental argument anddiscussing various objections found in the literature,I argue that the notion (...)
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  8. Jochen Briesen (2011). Antiskeptische Trittbrettfahrer des semantischen Externalismus. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (4):100-122.
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  9. Jochen Briesen (2008). Skepticism, Externalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation. Abstracta 4 (1):5-26.
    This paper focuses on a combination of the antiskeptical strategies offered by semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation. I argue that the most difficult problems of the two strategies can be solved, if the strategies are combined: The strategy offered by semantic externalism is successful against standard skeptical brain-in-a-vat arguments. But the strategy is ineffective, if the skeptical argument is referring to the recent-envatment scenario. However, by focusing on the scenario of recent envatment the most difficult problems (...)
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  10. Jessica Brown (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  11. Anthony Brueckner (1999). Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Analysis 59 (1):59–62.
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  12. Anthony Brueckner (1995). Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):199-201.
  13. Anthony Brueckner (1995). Reply to Steinitz. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):205-206.
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  14. Anthony Brueckner (1992). Genova, Davidson and Content-Scepticism. Analysis 52 (4):228 - 231.
    This paper is a discussion of A C Genova's defense of Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter anti-skeptical argument ("Analysis", 1991.
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  15. Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Skepticism and Externalism. Philosophia 22 (1-2):169-71.
  16. Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). Semantic Answers to Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19.
  17. Anthony L. Brueckner (1990). Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
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  18. Keith Butler (2000). Problems for Semantic Externalism and A Priori Refutations of Skeptical Arguments. Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.
  19. Keith Butler (1998). Externalism and Skepticism. Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.
  20. J. Adam Carter (2011). Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
    The Neo-Moorean response to the radical skeptical challenge boldly maintains that we can know we’re not the victims of radical skeptical hypotheses; accordingly, our everyday knowledge that would otherwise be threatened by our inability to rule out such hypotheses stands unthreatened. Given the leverage such an approach has against the skeptic from the very start, the Neo-Moorean line is an especially popular one; as we shall see, though, it faces several commonly overlooked problems. An initial problem is that this particular (...)
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  21. David J. Chalmers (2005). The Matrix as Metaphysics. In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press. 132.
    The Matrix presents a version of an old philosophical fable: the brain in a vat. A disembodied brain is floating in a vat, inside a scientist’s laboratory. The scientist has arranged that the brain will be stimulated with the same sort of inputs that a normal embodied brain receives. To do this, the brain is connected to a giant computer simulation of a world. The simulation determines which inputs the brain receives. When the brain produces outputs, these are fed back (...)
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  22. David Christensen (1993). Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):301-321.
  23. David Christensen (1993). Switched-Words Skepticism: A Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):33 - 58.
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  24. Earl Conee, Opposing Skepticism Disjunctively.
    Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent perception is fundamentally unlike a perception. (...)
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  25. Earl Conee (2007). Disjunctivism and Anti-Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):16–36.
  26. Damian Cox (2000). Scepticism and the Interpreter. Philosophical Papers 29 (2):61-72.
    Abstract This paper defends an argument from interpretation against the possibility of massive error. The argument shares many important features with Donald Davidson's famous argument, but also key differences. I defend the argument against claims that it begs the question against scepticism and that it leaves the sceptic with an obvious means of escape.
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  27. Marian David (1991). Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove That We Are Not Brains in a Vat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):891-896.
    In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in (...)
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  28. John M. DePoe (2008). Williamson on the Evidence for Skepticism. Southwest Philosophical Studies 30:23-32.
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  29. Willem A. deVries (1990). Burgeoning Skepticism. Erkenntnis 33 (2):141-164.
    This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.
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  30. Kevin Falvey & Joseph Owens (1994). Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37.
  31. Peter S. Fosl (1999). Bohlin, Henrik. Groundless Knowledge: A Humean Solution to the Problem of Skepticism. Review of Metaphysics 53 (1):144-145.
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  32. A. N. Gallois (1992). Putnam, Brains in Vats, and Arguments for Scepticism. Mind 101 (402):273-286.
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  33. André Gallois & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1996). Externalism and Scepticism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1 - 26.
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  34. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...)
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  35. John Greco (2004). Externalism and Skepticism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 53.
    Part 1 argues that, despite rhetorical appearances, McDowell accepts a standard version of epistemic externalism. Moreover, epistemic externalism plays an important role in McDowell’s response to skepticism. Part 2 argues that, contra McDowell, epistemic externalism is necessary for rejecting skepticism, and content externalism is not sufficient for rejecting skepticism.
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  36. John Greco (2003). Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):466–480.
    This paper replies to various concerns raised in a symposium on Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.
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  37. Lars Bo Gundersen (2009). Disjunctivism, Contextualism and the Sceptical Aporia. Synthese 171 (3):387 - 397.
    We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
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  38. Allan Hazlett, A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condition to the analysis of knowledge.
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  39. R. J. Henle (1987). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. By Barry Stroud. Modern Schoolman 64 (2):148-150.
  40. Thomas Hofweber, Contextualism and the Meaning-Intention Problem.
    The relevant alternatives approach in epistemology1 arose some years ago partly out of the hope to be able to reconcile our ordinary claims of knowledge with our inability to answer the skeptic. It was supposed to give rise to an account of knowledge according to which our ordinary claims of knowledge are true, even though the claims about our lack of knowledge that the skeptics make in one of their more persuasive moments are also true. To know, according to such (...)
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  41. Robert G. Hudson (2006). Pritchard's Angst. Acta Analytica 21 (3):85-92.
    In this paper, I raise some questions about Pritchard’s (2005) internalist argument for scepticism. I argue that his internalism begs the question in support of scepticism. Correlatively I advance what I take to be a better internalist argument for scepticism, one that leaves open the possibility of empirically adjudicating sceptical hypotheses. I close by discussing what it means to be an internalist.
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  42. Leo W. Iacono, A Defense of Moderate Invariantism.
    This dissertation is a defense of moderate invariantism, the traditional epistemological position combining the following three theses: invariantism, according to which the word ‘know’ expresses the same content in every context of use; intellectualism, according to which whether one knows a certain proposition does not depend on one’s practical interests; and antiskepticism, according to which we really do know much of what we ordinarily take ourselves to know. Moderate invariantism needs defending because of seemingly powerful arguments for contextualism, the view (...)
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  43. Stephen Jacobson (2001). Contextualism and Global Doubts About the World. Synthese 129 (3):381 - 404.
    Several recent contextualist theorists (e.g. David Lewis, Michael Williams, andKeith DeRose) have proposed contextualizing the skeptic. Their claim is that oneshould view satisfactory answers to global doubts regarding such subjects as theexternal world, other minds, and induction as requirements for justification incertain philosophical contexts, but not in everyday and scientific contexts. Incontrast, the skeptic claims that a satisfactory answer to a global doubt in eachof these areas is a context-invariant requirement for justified belief. In this paper,I consider and reject (...)
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  44. Michael Jacovides (2007). How Is Descartes' Argument Against Scepticism Better Than Putnam's? Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):593 - 612.
    'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F in the right way' is a premise in an obvious reconstruction of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats. 'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F or with something at least as good as an F' is the only controversial premise in Descartes' argument for the existence of (...)
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  45. Jesper Kallestrup (2011). Semantic Externalism. Routledge.
    Descriptivism -- Referentialism -- From language to thought -- Varieties of narrow and wide content -- Self-knowledge -- Scepticism -- Mental causation.
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  46. Thomas Kelly (2006). Review: The Cost of Skepticism: Who Pays? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 131 (3):695 - 712.
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  47. Christoph Kelp (2011). A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-92.
    This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge.
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  48. Dirk Kindermann (2013). Relativism, Sceptical Paradox, and Semantic Blindness. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):585-603.
    Abstract Relativism about knowledge attributions is the view that a single occurrence of ‘S knows [does not know] that p’ may be true as assessed in one context and false as assessed in another context. It has been argued that relativism is equipped to accommodate all the data from speakers’ use of ‘know’ without recourse to an error theory. This is supposed to be relativism’s main advantage over contextualist and invariantist views. This paper argues that relativism does require the attribution (...)
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  49. Eong D. Lee (2006). On Davidson's Semantic Anti-Sceptical Argument. Dialogue 45 (3):529-535.
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  50. Adam Leite (2004). Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):335-350.
    Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take (...)
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