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  1. Richard Boyd (2013). Semantic Externalism and Knowing Our Own Minds: Ignoring Twin‐Earth and Doing Naturalistic Philosophy. Theoria 79 (3):204-228.
    In this article I offer a naturalistic defence of semantic externalism. I argue against the following: (1) arguments for externalism rest mainly on conceptual analysis; (2) the community conceptual norms relevant to individuation of propositional attitudes are quasi-analytic; (3) externalism raises serious questions about knowledge of propositional attitudes; and (4) externalism might be OK for “folk psychology” but not for cognitive science. The naturalist alternatives are as follows. (1) Community norms are not anything like a priori; sometimes they are incoherent. (...)
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  2. Jason Bridges (2006). Davidson's Transcendental Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):290-315.
    One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson's later work was to show that participation in a certain causal nexus involving two creatures and a shared environment–Davidson calls this nexus “triangulation”–is a metaphysically necessary condition for the acquisition of thought. This doctrine, I suggest, is aptly regarded as a form of what I call transcendental externalism. I extract two arguments for the transcendental-externalist doctrine from Davidson's writings, and argue that neither succeeds. A central interpretive claim is that the arguments are (...)
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  3. Sean Crawford (2013). Object-Dependent Thought. In Pashler Harold (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Mind. SAGE.
  4. Sean Crawford (2006). Object-Dependent Thoughts. In Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed.
  5. Max Deutsch (2012). The Way Ripe Tomatoes Look: An Argument Against Externalist Representationalism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 77 (3):297-316.
    Representationalist theories of the phenomenal character of conscious experience are attractive because they promise a simpler 'naturalization' of the mind. However, I argue that representationalists cannot endorse an otherwise attractive externalist theory of the representational contents of conscious experiences. The combination of representationalism and externalism conflicts with a true principle linking phenomenal character to perceptual indistinguishability.
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  6. Frances Egan (2009). Wide Content. In A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP.
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  7. Zoltan Jakab (2012). Reflectance Physicalism About Color: The Story Continues. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):463-488.
    A stubborn problem for reflectance physicalism about color is to account for individual differences in normal trichromat color perception. The identification of determinate colors with physical properties of visible surfaces in a universal, perceiver-independent way is challenged by the observation that the same surfaces in identical viewing conditions often look different in color to different human subjects with normal color vision. Recently, leading representatives of reflectance physicalism have offered some arguments to defend their view against the individual differences challenge. In (...)
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  8. Zoltán Jakab (2005). Opponent Processing, Linear Models, and the Veridicality of Color Perception. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 336--378.
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  9. Holger Lyre, What is Active Externalism?
    The aim of this paper is to scrutinize active externalism and its repercussions for externalism about mental content. I start from the claim that active externalism is a variant of content externalism that is induced by the extended cognition thesis as a thesis about cognitive vehicles. Various features of active externalism are explored by comparison with the known forms of passive externalism - particularly in connection with the multirealizability of the external content-determining components and mental causation. A crucial result is (...)
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  10. Joseph Mendola (2008). Anti-Externalism. Oxford University Press.
    Joseph Mendola argues that internalism is true, and that there are no good arguments that support externalism. Anti-Externalism has three parts.
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  11. Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (forthcoming). Putnam on Brains-in-Vats and Radical Skepticism. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Putnam on Brains in Vats. Cambridge University Press.
  12. Dan Ryder, Models in the Brain (Book Summary).
    The central idea is that the cerebral cortex is a model building machine, where regularities in the world serve as templates for the models it builds. First it is shown how this idea can be naturalized, and how the representational contents of our internal models depend upon the evolutionarily endowed design principles of our model building machine. Current neuroscience suggests a powerful form that these design principles may take, allowing our brains to uncover deep structures of the world hidden behind (...)
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  13. Stephen Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.) (1988). Cognition and Representation. Westview Press.
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  14. Charles Travis (2006). Morally Alien Thought. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
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  15. Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). Hegel's Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion. In Jon Stewart (ed.), The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: A Collection of Critical and Interpretive Essays. SUNY. 173 - 188.
    [Revised version.] Contemporary epistemologists, including Chisholm, Moser, Alston and Fogelin, have over-simplified Pyrrhonian scepticism and in particular Sextus Empiricus’ Dilemma of the Criterion. I argue that the central methodological problem Hegel addresses in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit is the ‘Dilemma of the Criterion’, which purports to show that no criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood can be established. I show that the Dilemma is especially pressing for any epistemology which, like Hegel’s, rejects ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, aims to (...)
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  16. Dan Zahavi (2008). Internalism, Externalism, and Transcendental Idealism. Synthese 160 (3):355 - 374.
    The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in (...)
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Varieties of Content Externalism
Twin Earth and Externalism
  1. Kent Bach & Reinaldo Elugardo (2003). Conceptual Minimalism and Anti-Individualism: A Reply to Goldberg. Noûs 37 (1):151-160.
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (1986). Just What Do We Have In Mind? In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, X (1986). University of Minnesota Press. 25-48.
    M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
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  3. Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.) (2005). Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume discuss Putnam's major philosophical contributions.
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  4. Akeel Bilgrami (1992). Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Blackwell.
  5. Akeel Bilgrami (1989). Realism Without Internalism: A Critique of Searle on Intentionality. Journal of Philosophy 86 (February):57-72.
  6. Gregory Bochner (2014). The Anti-Individualist Revolution in the Philosophy of Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (2):91-120.
    The canonical arguments against the description theory of names are usually taken to have established that the reference of a name as used on a given occasion is not semantically determined by the qualitative descriptions that the speaker may have in mind. The deepest moral of these arguments, on the received view, would be that the speaker’s narrow mental states play no semantic role in fixing reference. My central aim in this paper is to challenge this common understanding by highlighting (...)
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  7. George S. Boolos (ed.) (1990). Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is a report on the state of philosophy in a number of significant areas.
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  8. J. Brown (1998). Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities. Mind 107 (426):275-303.
    The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a natural kind in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that (1) typically, an item that instantiates one natural kind instantiates several (...)
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  9. Jessica Brown (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  10. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Contents Just Aren't in the Head. Erkenntnis 58 (1):1-6.
    A. Horowitz has recently argued against semantic externalism. In this paper, I will show that his arguments are unsuccessful, owing to misconceptions regarding the nature of that semantic view.
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  11. Anthony L. Brueckner (1995). The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 55 (3):146-48.
    This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism.
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  12. M. Bruns & Gianfranco Soldati (1997). Object-Dependent and Property-Dependent Concepts. Dialectica 48 (3-4):185-208.
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  13. Tyler Burge (2003). Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):682–690.
  14. Tyler Burge (1982). Other Bodies. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.
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  15. Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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  16. Keith Butler (1998). Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism. Kluwer.
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  17. John Campbell (1982). Extension and Psychic State: Twin Earth Revisited. Philosophical Studies 42 (June):67-90.
    Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter.
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  18. Noam A. Chomsky (2003). Internalist Explorations. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
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  19. Carleton B. Christensen (2001). Escape From Twin Earth: Putnam's 'Logic' of Natural Kind Terms. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.
    Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , (...)
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  20. Tim Crane (1991). All the Difference in the World. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (January):1-25.
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  21. Robert C. Cummins (1991). Methodological Reflections on Belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. 53--70.
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  22. Steven Davis (2003). Arguments for Externalism. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.
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  23. Michael Devitt (2001). A Shocking Idea About Meaning. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (218):471-494.
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  24. Michael Devitt (1990). Meanings Just Ain't in the Head. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. 79--104.
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  25. Fred Dretske (1993). The Nature of Thought. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.
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  26. Ronald P. Endicott (forthcoming). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.
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  27. Ronald P. Endicott (forthcoming). Multiple Realizability. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.
    Multiple realizability is a key issue in debates over the nature of mind and reduction in the sciences. The subject consists of two parts:.
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  28. Michael Esfeld (2002). Externalism About Content: Its Social and Its Physical Roots. Filosoficky Casopis 50:387-400.
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  29. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We (...)
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  30. Katalin Farkas (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  31. Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic Internalism and Externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
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  32. Katalin Farkas (2003). Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.
    In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we (...)
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  33. Katalin Farkas (2003). What is Externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...)
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  34. Justin C. Fisher (2007). Why Nothing Mental is Just in the Head. Noûs 41 (2):318-334.
    Mental internalists hold that an individuals mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individuals head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from Pulse World. These creatures environments, behavioral dispositions and (...)
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