This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:See also:
297 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 297
Material to categorize
  1. Derek Ball (2007). Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.
    It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. G. Bar-Elli (1994). Intentionality and Belief de Re: A Critical Study of Searle's Representative Internalism. Erkenntnis 41 (1):65-85.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Sven Bernecker (2010). Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
    Précis of memory: a philosophical study Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9639-4 Authors Sven Bernecker, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-4555, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Emma Borg (2009). Must a Semantic Minimalist Be a Semantic Internalist? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):31-51.
    I aim to show that a semantic minimalist need not also be a semantic internalist. §I introduces minimalism and internalism and argues that there is a prima facie case for a minimalist being an internalist. §II sketches some positive arguments for internalism which, if successful, show that a minimalist must be an internalist. §III goes on to reject these arguments and contends that the prima facie case for uniting minimalism and internalism is also not compelling. §IV returns to an objection (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Johannes L. Brandl (ed.) (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
    WHAT IS PRESENT TO THE MIND? Donald DAVIDSON The University of California at Berkeley There is a sense in which anything we think about is, ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Robert Briscoe (2006). Individualism, Externalism and Idiolectical Meaning. Synthese 152 (1):95-128.
    Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of its use. I here show (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. D. Brook (1992). Substantial Mind. South African Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):15-21.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David Brooks (1995). Cartesian Inner Space. South African Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):135-144.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Susan Brower-Toland (2007). Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham. History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4):317-336.
    In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Curtis Brown (1990). How to Believe the Impossible. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):271-285.
    Can we believe things that could not possibly be true? The world seems full of examples. Mathematicians have "proven" theorems which in fact turn out to be false. People have believed that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, that they themselves are essentially incorporeal, that heat is not molecular motion--all propositions which have been claimed to be not just false, but necessarily false. Some have even seemed to pride themselves on believing the impossible; Hegel thought contradictions could be true, and Kierkegaard seems (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Deborah J. Brown (1996). A Furry Tile About Mental Representation. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):448-66.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Deborah J. Brown (1993). Swampman of la Mancha. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):327-48.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jessica Brown (2003). Externalism and the Fregean Tradition. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 431--458.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Filip Buekens (1994). Externalism, Content, and Causal Histories. Dialectica 48 (3-4):267-86.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. John Campbell (1987). Is Sense Transparent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Andrew Carpenter (1998). Davidson's Externalism and the Unintelligibility of Massive Error. Disputatio 4 (1998):25-45.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. John Collins (2009). Methodology, Not Metaphysics: Against Semantic Externalism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):53-69.
    Borg (2009) surveys and rejects a number of arguments in favour of semantic internalism. This paper, in turn, surveys and rejects all of Borg's anti-internalist arguments. My chief moral is that, properly conceived, semantic internalism is a methodological doctrine that takes its lead from current practice in linguistics. The unifying theme of internalist arguments, therefore, is that linguistics neither targets nor presupposes externalia. To the extent that this claim is correct, we should be internalists about linguistic phenomena, including semantics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Donald Davidson (2003). Quine's Externalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):281-297.
    In this paper, I credit Quine with having implicitly held a view I had long urged on him: externalism. Quine was the first fully to recognize that all there is to meaning is what we learn or absorb from observed usage. This entails the possibility of indeterminacy, thus destroying the myth of meanings. It also entails a powerful form of externalism. There is, of course, a counter-current in Quine's work of the mid century: the idea of stimulus meaning. Attractive as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Willem A. de Vries (1996). Experience and the Swamp Creature. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):55-80.
  20. Dalia Drai (2003). Externalism and Identity. Synthese 134 (3):463-475.
    The main aim of this paper is to show that there is one version of supervenience of the mental on the physical which is entailed by token-token identity (I call this version change-supervenience); and to establish that of the other better known versions of supervenience in the literature (which I call difference-supervenience), none are so entailed. One consequence of this is that Burge's thought experiments while successful in refuting difference-supervenience cannot in themselves refute identity thesis. However, the introduction of change (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. S. Edwards (1994). Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Avebury.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Pascal Engel (1987). Functionalism, Belief, and Content. In S. Torrance (ed.), The Mind and the Machine. Horwood.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Bryan Frances (2007). Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.
    Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Christopher Gauker (1991). Mental Content and the Division of Epistemic Labour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):302-18.
    Tyler Burge's critique of individualistic conceptions of mental content is well known.This paper employs a novel strategy to defend a strong form of Burge's conclusion. The division of epistemic labor rests on the possibility of language-mediated transactions, such as asking for something in a store and getting it. The paper shows that any individualistic conception of content will render such transactions unintelligible.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Mikkel Gerken (2011). Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
    In this paper, I challenge a widely presupposed principle in the epistemology of inference. The principle, (Validity Requirement), is this: S’s (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-beliefs provides (conditional) warrant for S’s belief in its conclusion only if R is valid. I argue against (Validity Requirement) from two prominent assumptions in the philosophy of mind: that the cognitive competencies that constitute reasoning are fallible, and that the attitudes operative in reasoning are anti-individualistically individuated. Indeed, my discussion will amount to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Mikkel Gerken (2008). Is Internalism About Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism? Philosophia 36 (1):87-96.
    There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Mikkel Gerken (2007). A False Dilemma for Anti-Individualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):329-42.
    It is often presupposed that an anti-individualist about representational mental states must choose between two accounts of no-reference cases. One option is said to be an ‘illusion of thought’ version according to which the subject in a no-reference case fails to think a first-order thought but rather has the illusion of having one. The other is a ‘descriptive’ version according to which one thinks an empty thought via a description. While this presupposition is not uncommon, it rarely surfaces in an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Brie Gertler (2009). The Subject's Point of View – Katalin Farkas. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-747.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Brie Gertler (2007). Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37–56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John Gibbons (1993). Identity Without Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):59-79.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. John Greco (ed.) (2004). Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Blackwell Pub..
  32. John Gregg (2010). Language and Meaning. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 9:248-283.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. H. (2007). Externalism and a Posteriori Semantics. Erkenntnis 67 (3).
    It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. P. M. S. Hacker (1998). Davidson on Intentionality and Externalism. Philosophy 73 (286):539-552.
    Davidson has attempted to integrate externalism into his account of meaning and understanding. He contends that what words mean is fixed in part by the circumstances in which they were learnt, in which the basic connection between words and things is established. This connection is allegedly established by causal interaction between people and the world. Words and sentences derive their meanings from the objects and circumstances in which they were learnt, which.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Jussi Haukioja (2009). Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual Analysis. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):81-93.
    Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is often thought to make conceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since externalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically discoverable, it seems that mere reflection on one's natural kind concept will not be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall under one's natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even know anything substantial about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Lance P. Hickey (1999). The Chomskian Challenge to Externalism. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):39-51.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David Houghton (1997). Mental Content and External Representations: Internalism, Anti-Internalism. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):159-77.
    According to ‘internalism’, what mental states people are in depends wholly on what obtains inside their heads. This paper challenges that view without relying on arguments about the identity‐conditions of concepts that make up the content of mental states. Instead, it questions the internalist’s underlying assumption that, in Searle’s words, “the brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves”, which neglects the fact that human beings have used their brains to devise methods for extending (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Robert Howell (2011). The Skeptic, the Content Externalist, and the Theist. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):173-180.
    Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is that such a strong consequence is not desirable for the content-externalists, and that the availability of this argument therefore casts doubt on the anti-skeptical position. I argue that all content externalists should be troubled by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Susan L. Hurley (forthcoming). Varieties of Externalism. In R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Ashgate.
    Externalism comes in varieties. While the landscape isn.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Henry Jackman (2005). Intuitions and Semantic Theory. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.
    While engaged in the analysis of topics such as the nature of knowledge, meaning, or justice, analytic philosophers have traditionally relied extensively on their own intuitions about when the relevant terms can, and can't, be correctly applied. Consequently, if intuitions about possible cases turned out not to be a reliable tool for the proper analysis of philosophically central concepts, then a radical reworking of philosophy's (or at least analytic philosophy's) methodology would seem to be in order. It is thus not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Frank Jackson (2004). On an Argument From Properties of Words to Broad Content. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1988). Functionalism and Broad Content. Mind 97 (July):318-400.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Jussi Jylkk (2009). Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism: Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers' Language Use. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):37 – 60.
    Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby, Franks, and Hampton's (1996) study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. J. M. Katz (1990). The Domino Theory. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):3-39.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.
    Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.
    Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Review of The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (463):749-753.
  48. William S. Larkin, Content and Metacognition.
    C. Theses: 1. Content Externalism strictly implies the possibility of acquiring a new concept as the result of an unwitting switch of environments. 2. This intuitively compels us to accept the possibility of someone possessing a concept without being aware that she does. 3. This possibility strictly favors causal models of meta-cognition over constitution models. 4. The possibility of possessing a concept unawares suggests that the contents of metacognitive.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Andre Leclerc (2005). Davidson's Externalism and Swampman's Troublesome Biography. Principia 9 (1-2):159-175.
    After the seminal works of Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1982), the next important contribution to externalism is certainly Davidson’s (mainly 1987, 1988, 1989, 2001). By criticizing the positions of these philosophers, Davidson elaborated his own brand of externalism. We shall first present some features of Davidson’s externalism (the importance of historical-causal connections for the foundation of language and thought, for the explanation of how language can be learned, and how attitudes can be identified by the interpreter, and finally (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Arnold B. Levison & Gary S. Rosenkrantz (1983). Mental Events: An Epistemic Analysis. Philosophia 12 (March):307-321.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 297