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  1. J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup (2015). Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2).
    The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ ; though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments (...)
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  2. Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2009). Why the Mind is Still in the Head. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge. 78--95.
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  3. Max F. Adams, R. Stecker & G. Fuller (1999). Object Dependent Thoughts, Perspectival Thoughts, and Psychological Generalization. Dialectica 53 (1):47–59.
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  4. Laird Addis (2005). The Necessity and Nature of Mental Content. In Gabor Forrai & George Kampis (eds.), Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.
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  5. Kenneth Aizawa (2012). Distinguishing Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):91 - 106.
    This paper pursues two lines of thought that help characterize the differences between some versions of virtue epistemology and the hypothesis that cognitive processes are realized by brain, body, and world.
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  6. Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Boundaries Still Stand: A Reply to Fisher. Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (1):37.
    In his recent critical notice of The Bounds of Cognition in this journal, Justin Fisher advances a set of concerns that favor the hypothesis that, under certain circumstances, cognitive processes span the brain, body, and world. One is that it is too much to require that representations in cognitive process must have non-derived content. A second is that it is possible that extended objects bear non-derived content. A third is that extended cognition might advocate the extension of certain general categories (...)
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  7. A. D. S. Alexandrescu (1995). Apatie Sau Individualism?(Apathie of Individualisme?). Dilema 130:10.
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  8. Barry Allen (1991). The Lessons of Solipsism. Idealistic Studies 21 (2/3):151-154.
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  9. Marc Alspector-kelly (2006). Knowledge Externalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):289–300.
    A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification.
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  10. William P. Alston (1988). An Internalist Externalism. Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.
  11. Maria Cristina Amoretti & Riccardo Manzotti (2012). Externalisms. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (1):41-68.
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  12. Carl Anderson (2000). The Extended Organism: The Physiology of Animal‐Built Structures. Complexity 6 (2):58-59.
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  13. David Leech Anderson (2012). Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem. In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), The Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. 312-333.
    According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a family of theories we will refer to as “functional intentionality,” a machine can have genuine intentional states so long as it has functionally characterizable mental states that are causally hooked up to the world in the right way. This paper considers a detailed description of a robot that seems to meet the conditions of functional intentionality, but which falls victim to what I call “the composition problem.” One obvious way to escape (...)
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  14. Lyle V. Anderson (1987). Essays on Individualism. Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):381-383.
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  15. W. Anderson (1938). The Lasting Elements of Individualism. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 16:255.
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  16. Enrique Aramendia Muneta (2013). La visión en Marr y Berkeley. El problema de perderse el principio de la película. Daimon 59:125-144.
    Se comparan las teorías de Marr y Berkeley sobre la visión a partir de las cualidades de Descartes. La descripción de tres niveles de Marr, donde la conciencia está ausente, contrasta con el nivel único de Berkeley construido sobre la conciencia y la experiencia carece de importancia en los momentos esquemáticos y cobra protagonismo en el último paso del proceso de la visión de Marr mediante la noción de marcación. Bajo la premisa de que las descripciones puramente sincrónicas han de (...)
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  17. Knowing-Attributions as Endorsements (1997). Philosophy, Solipsism and Thought, HO MOUNCE. Philosophy 47 (186).
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  18. Richard Ashcroft, Stephen Burwood, J. B. Kennedy, David Papineau & Bart Schultz (2005). Head Hurters. The Philosophers' Magazine 30 (30):57-61.
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  19. Richard Ashcroft, Stephen Burwood, J. B. Kennedy, David Papineau & Bart Schultz (2005). Head Hurters. The Philosophers' Magazine 30:57-61.
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  20. Robert Audi (1989). Internalism and Externalism in Moral Epistemology. Logos 10:13-37.
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  21. A. Avramides (2009). The Subject's Point of View * by Katalin Farkas. Analysis 69 (4):791-794.
    On the dust jacket of The Subject's Point of View there is a detail from Vilhelm Hammershoi's Interior with Sitting Woman. It is hard to think of a painter who better captures the inner in his work. From the monochrome colour, to the back that faces us, to the door swung open to reveal yet another doorway, we are led to interiority – to the inner. This is a perfect image for a book whose author wants to persuade us to (...)
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  22. Murat Aydede (1998). Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...)
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  23. D. J. B. (1966). Paradise on Earth. Review of Metaphysics 19 (4):804-804.
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  24. Silvia Andrés Balsera (2011). Una discusión de la estrategia de Tim Crane contra el argumento de la Tierra Gemela. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 35 (2):145-165.
    In his book Elements of mind Tim Crane has developed some resources in order to answer the Twin Earth mental experiment, invented by Hilary Putnam. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that Crane’s strategy is ineffective because he misunderstands that argument. We intend to examine in detail the reconstruction of the argument that Crane offers to detect its problems. A tighter version of it is also proposed, more consistent with Putnam intentions.
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  25. Az Bar-on (1996). Solipsism, Intersubjectivity and Lebenswelt: The Individualising Dynamisms of Passions and the Tying of Communal Order. Analecta Husserliana 48:167-174.
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  26. Axel Arturo Barcelo Aspeitia (2011). Comments and Criticism an Insubstantial Externalism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (10):576-582.
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  27. Chris Barker, Marlene Behrmann, Charles Elkan, Jeff Elman & Keith Holyoak (1996). Marr Prize Committee. In Garrison W. Cottrell (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum.
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  28. Kelly Becker (2002). Individualism and Self-Knowledge: Tu Quoque. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):289 - 295.
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  29. Ronald Beiner (1995). Beyond Individualism. Review of Metaphysics 48 (3):649-651.
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  30. David Bell (1996). Solipsism and Subjectivity. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):155-174.
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  31. Michael Bergmann (2008). Reidian Externalism. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
    What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic externalism about justification is its proper functionalism and its commonsensism, both of which are inspired by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Its proper functionalism is a particular analysis of justification; its commonsensism is a certain thesis about what we are noninferentially justified in believing.
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  32. Michael Bergmann (2000). Externalism and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
  33. Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower (2007). The God of Eth and the God of Earth. Think 5 (14):33-38.
    Stephen Law has recently argued (Think 9), using a dialogue set on the fictional planet Eth, that traditional belief in God is . Bergmann and Brower argue that theists on Earth should not be convinced.
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  34. Jeffrey Berman (2013). The Man Within My Head. Common Knowledge 19 (3):578-579.
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  35. Sven Bernecker (2014). How to Understand the Extended Mind. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):1-23.
    Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothesis of extended mind? If the extended mind debate is a substantive dispute, then we have only superficial understanding of the extended mind hypothesis. And if we have deep understanding of the extended mind hypothesis, then the debate over this hypothesis is nothing but a verbal dispute.
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  36. Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605 - 632.
    Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
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  37. Rod Bertolet (1979). McKinsey, Causes and Intentions. Philosophical Review 88 (4):619-632.
  38. Thomas Wheaton Bestor (1973). The Things People Do: Solipsism and Behavior. Dissertation, University of Oregon
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  39. C. Bhattacharya (1996). I Linguistic Solipsism. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 23 (3-4):473-473.
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  40. Hierarchical Biocentrism (forthcoming). A Individualism (Polycentrism). Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions.
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  41. Thomas Bittner (2011). Parity Cuts Both Ways: Split Brains and Extended Cognition. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 30 (2):19-34.
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  42. Lubos Blaha (2012). Individualism as You Don't Know It. Filosoficky Casopis 60 (1):77-97.
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  43. Ned Block (2003). Mental Paint. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 165--200.
    The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind--maybe even all of philosophy-- divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are.
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  44. Jerzy Bobryk (1999). Czego mogą się nauczyć od W. Witwickiego współcześnie psychologowie? Filozofia Nauki 3.
    The article is devoted to the evaluation of the ecological alternative in cognitive psychology. The theory of „extended minds” is discussed in this paper as a version of ecological psychology. The authors of the theory of extended mind advocate „active externalism”, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes. The environment, driving cognitive processes, comprises books, diagrams, language, and other culture products. Władysław Witwicki's psychology and his idea of real presence of persons in cultural products which (...)
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  45. Paul Boghossian (2014). Reply to Otero's “Boghossian's Inference Argument Against Content Externalism Reversed”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):182-184.
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  46. Paul A. Boghossian (1991). Naturalizing Content. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
  47. Ivan A. Boldyrev & Carsten Herrmann-Pillath (2013). Hegel's “Objective Spirit”, Extended Mind, and the Institutional Nature of Economic Action. Mind and Society 12 (2):177-202.
    This paper explores the implications of the recent revival of Hegel studies for the philosophy of economics. We argue that Hegel’s theory of Objective Spirit anticipates many elements of modern approaches in cognitive sciences and of the philosophy of mind, which adopt an externalist framework. In particular, Hegel pre-empts the theories of social and distributed cognition. The pivotal elements of Hegelian social ontology are the continuity thesis, the performativity thesis, and the recognition thesis, which, when taken together, imply that all (...)
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  48. Laurence BonJour (2002). Internalism and Externalism. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 234--264.
  49. Richard Boyd (2013). Semantic Externalism and Knowing Our Own Minds: Ignoring Twin‐Earth and Doing Naturalistic Philosophy. Theoria 79 (3):204-228.
    In this article I offer a naturalistic defence of semantic externalism. I argue against the following: (1) arguments for externalism rest mainly on conceptual analysis; (2) the community conceptual norms relevant to individuation of propositional attitudes are quasi-analytic; (3) externalism raises serious questions about knowledge of propositional attitudes; and (4) externalism might be OK for “folk psychology” but not for cognitive science. The naturalist alternatives are as follows. (1) Community norms are not anything like a priori; sometimes they are incoherent. (...)
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  50. V. Bozickovic (1995). Review of Edwards, S., Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):637-9.
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