This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
15 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Juan José Colomina Almiñana (2007). El papel del significado en una noción pragmática de la verdad. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 32 (1):85-108.
    In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Causal Idealism. In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford
    This paper argues that causal idealism, the view that causation is a product of mental activity, should be considered a competetitor to contemporary views that incorporate human thought and agency into the causal relation. Weighing contextualism, contrastivism, or pragmatism about causation against causal idealism results in at least a tie with respect to the virtues of these theories.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Mihnea Capraru, Unintended Constituents and the Sundial Tribe.
    This article describes and advocates ‘mindless’ contextualism, a view that casts semantic rules in a wider, more externalist theoretical role than is customary. On this view we ought to posit semantic rules not only to explain interpretation, but also to explain communication directly. The article argues that sometimes we can explain communication without interpretation, because sometimes utterances can semantically encode unintended constituents---i. e., constituents of semantic content that are unknown as such to their speakers. This occurs when the speakers are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Daniel Cohnitz & Teresa Marques (2014). Disagreements. Erkenntnis 79 (1):1-10.
    This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view. In this introduction we sketch the background to the recent philosophical discussions of these questions, and the location occupied therein by the articles (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Marian David (2008). Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Alex Davies (forthcoming). Elaboration and Intuitions of Disagreement. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Mark Richard argues for truth-relativism about claims made using gradable adjectives. He argues that truth-relativism is the best explanation of two kinds of linguistic data, which I call: true cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. Richard claims that such data are generated by an example that he discusses at length. However, the consensus is that these linguistic data are illusory because they vanish when elaborations are added to examples of the same kind as Richard's original. In this paper I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Dan López de Sa (2014). Audience in Context. Erkenntnis 79 (1):241-253.
    In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Richard Dietz & Julien Murzi (2013). Coming True: A Note on Truth and Actuality. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):403-427.
    John MacFarlane has recently presented a novel argument in support of truth- relativism. According to this, contextualists fail to accommodate retrospective reassessments of propositional contents, when it comes to languages which are rich enough to express actuality. The aim of this note is twofold. First, it is to argue that the argument can be effectively rejected, since it rests on an inadequate conception of actuality. Second, it is to offer a more plausible account of actuality in branching time, along the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Gertrude Ezorsky (1963). Truth in Context. Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):113-135.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes (2012). Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.
    Predicates of taste, such as?fun? and?tasty?, have received considerable attention in recent debates between contextualists and relativists, with considerations involving disagreement playing a central role. Considerations involving disagreement have been taken to present a problem for contextualist treatments of predicates of taste. My goal is to argue that considerations involving disagreement do not undermine contextualism. To the extent that relativism was supposed to be motivated by contextualists being unable to deal with disagreement, this motivation is lacking. The argument against contextualism (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   33 citations  
  11. Andrea Iacona (2008). Faultless or Disagreeement. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kolbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press 287.
    Among the various motivations that may lead to the idea that truth is relative in some non-conventional sense, one is that the idea helps explain how there can be ‘‘ faultless disagreements’’, that is, situations in which a person A judges that p, a person B judges that not-p, but neither A nor B is at fault. The line of argument goes as follows. It seems that there are faultless disagreements. For example, A and B may disagree on culinary matters (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Teresa Marques (2014). Doxastic Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79 (1):121-142.
    This paper explores some alternative accounts of doxastic disagreement, and shows what problems each faces. It offers an account of doxastic disagreement that results from the incompatibility of the content of doxastic attitudes, even when that content’s truth is relativized. On the best definition possible, it is argued, neither non-indexical contextualism nor assessment-relativism have an advantage over contextualism. The conclusion is that conflicts that arise from the incompatibility (at the same world) of the content of given doxastic attitudes cannot be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  13. Teresa Marques (2014). Relative Correctness. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373.
    John MacFarlane defends a radical form of truth relativism that makes the truth of assertions relative not only to contexts of utterance but also to contexts of assessment, or perspectives. Making sense of assessment-sensitive truth is a matter of making sense of the normative commitments undertaken by speakers in using assessment sensitive sentences. This paper argues against the possibility of making sense of such a practice. Evans raised a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  14. Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero (2014). Disagreement About Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):701-723.
    The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  15. Jay Newhard (2009). The Chrysippus Intuition and Contextual Theories of Truth. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345-352.
    Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude that the philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography