This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
8 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Daniel Cohnitz & Teresa Marques (2014). Disagreements. Erkenntnis 79 (1):1-10.
    This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view. In this introduction we sketch the background to the recent philosophical discussions of these questions, and the location occupied therein by the articles (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Marian David (2008). Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Richard Dietz & Julien Murzi (2013). Coming True: A Note on Truth and Actuality. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):403-427.
    John MacFarlane has recently presented a novel argument in support of truth- relativism. According to this, contextualists fail to accommodate retrospective reassessments of propositional contents, when it comes to languages which are rich enough to express actuality. The aim of this note is twofold. First, it is to argue that the argument can be effectively rejected, since it rests on an inadequate conception of actuality. Second, it is to offer a more plausible account of actuality in branching time, along the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes (2012). Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167 - 181.
    Predicates of taste, such as ?fun? and ?tasty?, have received considerable attention in recent debates between contextualists and relativists, with considerations involving disagreement playing a central role. Considerations involving disagreement have been taken to present a problem for contextualist treatments of predicates of taste. My goal is to argue that considerations involving disagreement do not undermine contextualism. To the extent that relativism was supposed to be motivated by contextualists being unable to deal with disagreement, this motivation is lacking. The argument (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Andrea Iacona (2008). Faultless or Disagreeement. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kolbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 287.
    Among the various motivations that may lead to the idea that truth is relative in some non-conventional sense, one is that the idea helps explain how there can be ‘‘faultless disagreements’’, that is, situations in which a person A judges that p, a person B judges that not-p, but neither A nor B is at fault. The line of argument goes as follows. It seems that there are faultless disagreements. For example, A and B may disagree on culinary matters without (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Teresa Marques (2014). Doxastic Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79 (1):121-142.
    This paper explores some alternative accounts of doxastic disagreement, and shows what problems each faces. It offers an account of doxastic disagreement that results from the incompatibility of the content of doxastic attitudes, even when that content’s truth is relativized. On the best definition possible, it is argued, neither non-indexical contextualism nor assessment-relativism have an advantage over contextualism. The conclusion is that conflicts that arise from the incompatibility (at the same world) of the content of given doxastic attitudes cannot be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Teresa Marques (2014). Relative Correctness. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373.
    John MacFarlane defends a radical form of truth relativism that makes the truth of assertions relative not only to contexts of utterance but also to contexts of assessment, or perspectives. Making sense of assessment-sensitive truth is a matter of making sense of the normative commitments undertaken by speakers in using assessment sensitive sentences. This paper argues against the possibility of making sense of such a practice. Evans raised a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero (2014). Disagreement About Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-25.
    The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation