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  1. Claudio Almeida (2012). Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility. Synthese 188 (2):197-215.
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  2. Kent Bach, Knowledge in and Out of Context.
    We can be willing in one context to attribute a bit of knowledge that we wouldn’t attribute and might even deny in another, especially a context in which we’re stumped by a skeptical argument. Apparently, our standards for knowledge sometimes go up, sometimes way up. How can this be? By claiming that the very contents of knowledge ascribing sentences vary with contexts of use, epistemic contextualism offers one explanation. I will offer another. According to contextualism, variation in standards is built (...)
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  3. Peter Baumann (2010). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. I – Keith DeRose. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):424-427.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  4. Alexander Bird (2001). Scepticism and Contrast Classes. Analysis 61 (2):97–107.
    1. Contextualism seeks to acknowledge the power of sceptical arguments while permitting to be true at least some of the assertions of knowledge and justification we commonly make. It seems to me now just as if I am in an office in Edinburgh. According to the sceptic the claim that I am in fact in an office in Edinburgh is unjustified, since there is no reason I can give for this belief that is not also consistent with (or undermined by) (...)
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  5. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2007). Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):387-394.
    Epistemic contextualism (EC) is primarily a semantic view, viz. the view that ‘knowledge’-ascriptions can change their contents with the conversational context. To be more precise, EC is the view that the predicate ‘know’ has an unstable Kaplan character, i.e. a character that does not map all contexts on the same content. According to EC, ‘know’ is thus an indexical expression. Notwithstanding this purely linguistic characterisation of EC, contextualists have traditionally argued that their views have considerable philosophical impact, this being due (...)
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  6. Evelyn Brister (2009). Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 40 (5):671-688.
    Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned (...)
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  7. B. Brogaard (2004). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 139 (3):367 - 386.
    The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge. Lewis has suggestedthat contextualism so construed can be used both to ward off the skeptic and tosolve the Gettier problem. A person knows P, he says, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the domain of (...)
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  8. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):733–736.
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  9. Otávio Bueno, Book Symposium.
    Relativism and scepticism are often taken to be incompatible doctrines. After all, the relativist typically attempts to argue that there are no universal standards of assessment between different conceptual schemes – hence the slogan: everything is relative. The sceptic, in turn, is often portrayed as defending the view according to which knowledge is impossible – and thus we cannot even know that the relativist’s claim is true. Despite their incompatibility, both views are taken to be wrong, and for similar self-refuting (...)
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  10. H. G. Callaway (2008). Cultural Pluralism and the Virtues of Hypotheses. la Torre Del Virrey, Revista de Estudios Culturales:33-38.
    This paper focuses on the preliminary evaluation of expressions of moral sentiment under conditions of cultural pluralism. The advance of science and technology puts ever new power over nature in human hands, and if this new power is to more fully serve human ends, then it must become the means or material of human virtue. This prospect poses the question of the relationship between power and virtue, and equally, the question of how scientific advances may be understood to enter into (...)
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  11. H. G. Callaway (2008). The Meaning of Pluralism. In H. G. Callaway (ed.), William James, A Pluralistic Universe, A New Reading.
    This paper is the expository and evaluative introduction to my new edition of James' 1909 book, A Pluralistic Universe.
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  12. H. G. Callaway (ed.) (2008). William James, A Pluralistic Universe: A New Philosophical Reading. Cambridge Scholars.
    This book is my new scholarly edition of William James, A Pluralistic Universe. The original text has been recovered, annotations to the text added to identify James' authors and events of interest, there is a new bibliography chiefly based on James' sources, a brief chronology of James' career, and I have added an expository and critical Introduction and a comprehensive analytical index.
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  13. Leonard S. Carrier (2011). The Essential Tie Between Knowing and Believing: A Causal Account of Knowledge and Epistemic Reasons. Edwin Mellen Press.
    This book offers a causal-explanatory account of knowledge as true belief caused by the worldly state of affairs that explains its existence. It also defends a contextual account of epistemic reasons, arguing that both foundationalism and coherentism cannot provide a satisfactory account of such reasons. Skeptical arguments are answered against a historical background from Plato to the present day.
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  14. Stewart Cohen (2008). Ascriber Contextualism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
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  15. Stewart Cohen (2001). Contextualism Defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):87 - 98.
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  16. Stewart Cohen (2000). Contextualism and Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):94-107.
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  17. Stewart Cohen (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
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  18. Stewart Cohen (1998). Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):289 – 306.
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  19. Troy Cross (2010). Skeptical Success. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:35-62.
    The following is not a successful skeptical scenario: you think you know you have hands, but maybe you don't! Why is that a failure, when it's far more likely than, say, the evil genius hypothesis? That's the question.<br><br>This is an earlier draft.
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  20. Arnold Cusmariu (2012). Toward a Semantic Approach in Epistemology. Logos and Episteme (4):531-543.
    Philosophers have recognized for some time the usefulness of semantic conceptions of truth and belief. That the third member of the knowledge triad, evidence, might also have a useful semantic version seems to have been overlooked. This paper corrects that omission by defining a semantic conception of evidence for science and mathematics and then developing a semantic conception of knowledge for these fields, arguably mankind’s most important knowledge repository. The goal is to demonstrate the advantages of having an answer to (...)
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  21. Nancy Daukas (2002). Skepticism, Contextualism, and the Epistemic "Ordinary". Philosophical Forum 33 (1):63–79.
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  22. W. A. Davis (2011). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1, by Keith DeRose. Mind 119 (476):1152-1157.
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  23. Keith DeRose, Externalism and Skepticism.
    A few years back, I participated in the Spindell Conference in Memphis, and gave a paper, “How Can We Know That We’re Not Brains in Vats?” (available on-line at: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/Spindell.htm). The bulk of that paper concerned responses to skepticism. I pursued an unusually radical criticism of the often-criticized “Putnam-style” responses to skepticism. To put it rather enigmatically, I argued that such responses don’t work even if they work! And I compared such responses with the type of response I favor – (...)
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  24. Keith DeRose, Responding to Skepticism.
    exactly as the essay appears in Skepticism. It's pretty close, though. In the version that appears in the book, page references to other essays in Skepticism refer to page numbers in the book, while below page references are, for the most part, to the original place of publication of the essays referred to. Also, I below make one correction (in red) of a factual error..
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  25. Keith Derose (2012). Précis of The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):675-677.
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  26. Keith DeRose (2009). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. OUP Oxford.
    It's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we'll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute (...)
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  27. Keith DeRose (2004). Single Scoreboard Semantics. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):1-21.
    What happens to the "conversational score" when speakers in a conversation push the score for a context-sensitive term in different directions? In epistemology, contextualists are often construed as holding that both the skeptic ("You don't know!") and her opponent ("Oh, yes I do!") speak truthfully when they debate. This assumes a "multiple scoreboards" version of contextualism. But contextualists themselves typically opt for "single scoreboard" views on which such apparently competing claims really do conflict. This paper explores several single scoreboard options (...)
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  28. Keith DeRose (2004). Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses. In J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Blackwell.
    Fortunately for those of us who work on the topic, Ernie Sosa has devoted much of his (seemingly inexhaustible) intellectual energy to the problem of philosophical skepticism. And to great effect. With the three exceptions of Peter Unger, whose 1975 Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism is a grossly under-appreciated classic of epistemology; Timothy Williamson, whose 2000 Knowledge and its Limits is, I hope, on its way to being a less underappreciated classic; and Thomas Reid, I have benefitted more from Sosa’s (...)
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  29. Keith DeRose (1999). Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell Publishers.
    In epistemology, “contextualism” denotes a wide variety of more-or-less closely related positions according to which the issues of knowledge or justification are somehow relative to context. I will proceed by first explicating the position I call contextualism, and distinguishing that position from some closely related positions in epistemology, some of which sometimes also go by the name of “contextualism”. I’ll then present and answer what seems to many the most pressing of the objections to contextualism as I construe it, and (...)
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  30. Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
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  31. Dylan Dodd (2012). Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries. Erkenntnis 77 (1):95-120.
    Abstract Several philosophers have claimed that S knows p only if S’ s belief is safe, where S's belief is safe iff (roughly) in nearby possible worlds in which S believes p, p is true. One widely held intuition many people have is that one cannot know that one's lottery ticket will lose a fair lottery prior to an announcement of the winner, regardless of how probable it is that it will lose. Duncan Pritchard has claimed that a chief advantage (...)
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  32. Yuval Dolev (2008). Semantic Externalism and Presentism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):533 – 557.
    In this paper I discuss an unconventional form of presentism which, I claim, captures better than all other versions of the doctrine the fundamental notion underpinning it, namely, the notion that 'only what is present is real'. My proposal is to take this maxim as stating, not the rather uncontroversial view that past things are not real now, but the more radical idea that they never were. This rendition of presentism is, I argue, the only one that is neither trivial (...)
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  33. Fred Dretske (2006). Information and Closure. Erkenntnis 64 (3):409 - 413.
    Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an (...)
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  34. William A. Edmundson (2002). Contextualist Answers to Skepticism, and What a Lawyer Cannot Know. Florida State University Law Review 30:1-23.
    Contextualism answers skepticism by proposing a variable standard of justification, keyed to the context of utterance. A lawyer's situation with respect to a criminal defendant's factual guilt is a special one. The argument here is that in this special context an especially high standard of epistemic justification applies. The standard is even more exacting than the proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt standard that juries are sworn to follow. The upshot is that criminal defense lawyers normally cannot know that a client is factually guilt.
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  35. Mylan Engel (2004). What's Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3).
    Skeptics try to persuade us of our ignorance with arguments like the following: 1. I dont know that I am not a handless brain-in-a-vat [BIV]. 2. If I dont know that I am not a handless BIV, then I dont know that I have hands. Therefore, 3. I dont know that I have hands. The BIV argument is valid, its premises are intuitively compelling, and yet, its conclusion strikes us as absurd. Something has to go, but what? Contextualists contend that (...)
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  36. Theodore J. Everett (2006). Antiskeptical Conditionals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):505–536.
    Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals, which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely (...)
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  37. Richard Feldman (2001). Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):61 - 85.
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  38. Richard Feldman (1999). Contextualism and Skepticism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):91-114.
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  39. Robert J. Fogelin (2000). Contextualism and Externalism: Trading in One Form of Skepticism for Another. Noûs 34 (s1):43 - 57.
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  40. Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2005). Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field.
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  41. John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.) (1999). The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell.
    Written by an international assembly of leading philosophers, this volume includes seventeen newly-commissioned full-length survey articles on the central ...
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  42. Thomas Grundmann (2004). Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):345 - 352.
    In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in order to provide a successful diagnosis (...)
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  43. Lars Bo Gundersen (2009). Disjunctivism, Contextualism and the Sceptical Aporia. Synthese 171 (3).
    We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
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  44. Michael Hannon (forthcoming). The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism. Erkenntnis.
    This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for the emergence of a particular brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I also (...)
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  45. Alexander S. Harper (2010). Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism. Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains-in-vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge-claims is much (...)
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  46. Robert Howell (2011). The Skeptic, the Content Externalist, and the Theist. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):173-180.
    Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is that such a strong consequence is not desirable for the content-externalists, and that the availability of this argument therefore casts doubt on the anti-skeptical position. I argue that all content externalists should be troubled by (...)
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  47. Robert J. Howell (2005). A Puzzle for Pragmatism. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):131-136.
    It is an intuitively attractive view that the importance of a proposition affects the amount of evidence a subject needs in order to know that proposition—the more important the proposition is to the subject, the more evidence the subject must have in order for her to count as knowing the proposition. This paper argues that because unimportant propositions entail the falsity of very important propositions this position either results in the lack of closure of knowledge under known implication, or it (...)
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  48. David Hunter (2007). Contextualism, Skepticism and Objectivity. In R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), Compositionality. Context, and Semantic Values.
    In this paper, I try to make sense of the idea that true knowledge attributions characterize something that is more valuable than true belief and that survives even if, as Contextualism implies, contextual changes make it no longer identifiable by a knowledge attribution. I begin by sketching a familiar, pragmatic picture of assertion that helps us to understand and predict how the words “S knows that P” can be used to draw different epistemic distinctions in different contexts. I then argue (...)
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  49. Jonathan Ichikawa (2011). Quantifiers and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398.
    I defend a neo-Lewisean form of contextualism about knowledge attributions. Understanding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions in terms of the context-sensitivity of universal quantifiers provides an appealing approach to knowledge. Among the virtues of this approach are solutions to the skeptical paradox and the Gettier problem. I respond to influential objections to Lewis’s account.
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  50. Jonathan Ichikawa (2009). Review of Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (12).
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  51. Christoph Jäger (2012). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. Analysis 72 (3):491-498.
    Keith DeRose has argued that ‘the knowledge account of assertion – according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows – ... provides a ... powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism’ (2009: 80). The truth is that it yields a powerful argument against contextualism, at least against its most popular, anti-sceptical versions. The following argument shows that, if we conjoin (such versions of) epistemic contextualism with an appropriate meta-linguistic formulation of the knowledge account (...)
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  52. Mikael Janvid (2008). Defeaters and Rising Standards of Justification. Acta Analytica 23 (1):45-54.
    The purpose of this paper is to refute the widespread view that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification–a view often associated with contextualism. To that purpose the distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters will be used. Three kinds of challenges will be considered that differ in their degree of specification. In all three kinds of challenges, the rising standards of justification model fails to capture the dialectic of justification in the case of undermining defeaters. At the (...)
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  53. Mikael Janvid (2006). Contextualism and the Structure of Skeptical Arguments. Dialectica 60 (1):63–77.
    In this paper a candidate for a rational reconstruction of skeptical arguments is presented and defended against a competitor called ‘The Argument from Ignorance’. On the basis of this defense, Michael Williams’ claims that foundationalism and epistemological realism serve as presuppositions for skepticism are criticized. It is argued that rejecting these two theses, as his version of contextualism does, is not sufficient for answering the skeptical challenge.
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  54. Bredo C. Johnsen (2001). Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):385-406.
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  55. Bredo C. Johnsen (2001). Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):385 - 406.
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  56. Jesper Kallestrup (2005). Contextualism Between Scepticism and Common-Sense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):247-266.
    This paper examines two recent objections against contextualism. The first is that contextualists are unable to assert their own position, and the second is that contextualists are forced to side with common-sense against scepticism. It is argued that once we get clear on the commitments of contextualism, neither objection succeeds in what it aims to show.
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  57. Peter D. Klein (2000). Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
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  58. Chandran Kukathas (2004). Contextualism Reconsidered: Some Skeptical Reflections. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (2):215-225.
    A number of theorists have touted the merits of the contextual approach to political theory, arguing that a close examination of real-world cases is more likely to yield both theoretical insight and practical solutions to pressing problems. This is particularly evident, it is argued, in the field of multiculturalism in political theory. The present paper offers some skeptical reflections on this view, arguing the merits of a view of political theory which sees the contextual approach as less distinctive than its (...)
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  59. Rae Langton (2004). Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):129 – 136.
    Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in 'Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of (...)
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  60. Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
    Epistemic closure, the idea that knowledge is closed under known implication, plays a central role in current discussions of skepticism and the semantics of knowledge reports. Contextualists in particular rely heavily on the truth of epistemic closure in staking out their distinctive response to the so-called "skeptical paradox." I argue that contextualists should re-think their commitment to closure. Closure principles strong enough to force the skeptical paradox on us are too strong, and closure principles weak enough to express unobjectionable epistemic (...)
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  61. Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton (2010). The Argumentative Uses of Emotive Language . Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación 1:1-37.
  62. Farid Masrour (2011). In Defense of Epistemic Modesty. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331.
    My friend responds: “How do you know? Maybe we are brains in vats, hooked to a supercomputer that creates a grand illusion for us. Maybe in the real world there are no bottles and fridges!” But I’m not moved by my friend’s words. In fact, I am indifferent. It would have made a difference if he had said: “Did you look carefully? Jack (the host) sometimes puts a few bottles in the vegetable drawer. Maybe you didn’t notice them.” Being indifferent (...)
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  63. R. McKenna & D. Pritchard (2011). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context. Philosophical Review 120 (3):455-460.
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  64. Robin McKenna (2011). Interests Contextualism. Philosophia 39 (4):741-750.
    In this paper I develop a version of contextualism that I call interests contextualism. Interests contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing and denying sentences are partly determined by the ascriber’s interests and purposes. It therefore stands in opposition to the usual view on which the truth-conditions are partly determined by the ascriber’s conversational context. I give an argument against one particular implementation of the usual view, differentiate interests contextualism from other prominent versions of contextualism and argue (...)
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  65. Guido Melchior (forthcoming). Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts. Erkenntnis.
    Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them. The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge. This (...)
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  66. Martin Montminy (2008). Can Contextualists Maintain Neutrality? Philosophers' Imprint 8 (7):1-13.
    Abstract: Several critics of contextualism claim that this view cannot consistently maintain its advertised neutrality between skepticism and anti-skepticism. Some critics contend that contextualists are forced to side with the skeptic, since any defense of contextualism unavoidably puts in place the skeptic's high requirements for knowledge; others hold that the contextualists' claim to have knowledge of what their own view entails forces them to reject the skeptic's knowledge denial. I show that these arguments misconstrue the role of context in contextualism, (...)
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  67. Peter Murphy (2005). A Sceptical Rejoinder to Sensitivity-Contextualism. Dialogue 44 (4):693-706.
    This article offers a novel sceptical argument that the sensitivity-contextualist must say is sound; moreover, she must say that the conclusion of thisargument is true at ordinary standards. The view under scrutiny has it that in different contexts knowledge-attributing sentences express different propositions, propositions which differ in the stretch of worlds across which the subject is required to track the truth. I identify the underlying reason for the sceptical result and argue that it makes sensitivity-contextualism irremediably flawed. Contextualists, I conclude, (...)
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  68. Ram Neta (2007). Contextualism and a Puzzle About Seeing. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):53-63.
    Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection prominently pressed by Stanley 2000. According to Stanley, contextualism in epistemology advances an empirically implausible hypothesis about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions in natural language. It is empirically implausible because it attributes to knowledge ascriptions a kind of semantic context-sensitivity that is wholly unlike any well- established type of semantic context-sensitivity in natural language.
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  69. Ram Neta (2003). Contextualism and the Problem of the External World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):1–31.
    A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs about the external (...)
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  70. Ram Neta (2003). Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):396–411.
    Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible "error theory" concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self-knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self-knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self-knowledge that we can plausibly be thought to possess.
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  71. Jay Newhard (2012). The Argument From Skepticism for Contextualism. Philosophia 40 (3):563-575.
    Epistemic contextualism was originally motivated and supported by the response it provides to skeptical paradox. Although there has been much discussion of the contextualist response to skeptical paradox, not much attention has been paid to the argument from skepticism for contextualism. Contextualists argue that contextualism accounts for the plausibility and apparent inconsistency of a set of paradoxical claims better than any classical invariantist theory. In this paper I focus on and carefully examine the argument from skepticism for contextualism. I argue (...)
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  72. Anne Newstead, Showing Certainty: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Response to Scepticism.
    Coping with everyday life limits the extent of one’s scepticism. It is practically impossible to doubt the existence of the things with which one is immediately engaged and interacting. To doubt that, say, a door exists, is to step back from merely using the door (opening it) and to reflect on it in a detached, theoretical way. It is impossible to simultaneously act and live immersed in situation S while doubting that one is in S. Sceptical doubts—such as ‘Is this (...)
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  73. Bernhard Nickel (2010). How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? Noûs 44 (2):305-328.
    Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue (...)
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  74. I. T. Oakley (2001). A Skeptic's Reply to Lewisian Contextualism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):309-332.
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  75. Josep L. Prades (2000). Scepticism, Contextualism and Closure. Noûs 34 (s1):121 - 131.
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  76. Duncan Pritchard, Published in Dialectica 55 (2001), 327-49.
    Perhaps the most dominant anti-sceptical proposal in the recent literatureadvanced by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewisis the contextualist response to radical scepticism. Central to the contextualist thesis is the claim that, unlike other non-contextualist anti-sceptical theories, contextualism offers a dissolution of the sceptical paradox that respects our common sense epistemological intuitions. Taking DeRose’s view as representative of the contextualist position, it is argued that instead of offering us an intuitive response to scepticism, contextualism is actually (...)
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  77. Duncan Pritchard, Contextualism, Scepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.
    Attributer contextualists maintain that the verb 'knows' is context-sensitive in the sense that the truth conditions of a sentence of the form "S knows that p" can be dependent upon the ascriber's context. One natural objection against attributer contextualism is that it confuses the impropriety of certain assertions which ascribe knowledge to agents with the falsity of those assertions. In an influential article, Keith DeRose has defended attributer contextualism against this charge by proposing constraints on what he calls "warranted assertibility (...)
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  78. Duncan Pritchard (2005). Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism. Acta Analytica 20 (2):3-25.
    Two of the main forms of anti-scepticism in the contemporary literature—namely, neo-Mooreanism and attributer contextualism—share a common claim, which is that we are, contra the sceptic, able to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses. This paper begins by surveying the relative merits of these views when it comes to dealing with the standard closure-based formulation of the sceptical problem that is focussed on the possession of knowledge. It is argued, however, that it is not enough to simply deal with this (...)
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  79. Duncan Pritchard (2005). Neo-Mooreanism Versus Contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):1-24.
    Attributer contextualism has undoubtedly been the dominant anti-sceptical theory in the recent literature. Nevertheless, this view does face some fairly serious problems, and it is argued that when the contextualist position is compared to a refined version of the much derided 'Moorean' response to scepticism, then it becomes clear that there are distinct advantages to being a neo-Moorean rather than a contextualist.
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  80. Duncan Pritchard (2001). Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent. Dialectica 55 (4):327–349.
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  81. Hilary Putnam (2001). Skepticism, Stroud and the Contextuality of Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):2 – 16.
    This paper responds to Stroud's important The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. The author defends a view in which statements in a natural language have truth-evaluable content only in concrete contexts. It is argued that just what counts as a concrete possibility that must be defeated before one can say that one knows something is a highly context-sensitive matter, and that Stroud's alternative to this context-sensitive account of the way the verb "know" functions seems to be either a semantics in which (...)
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  82. Brian Ribeiro (2002). Cartesian Skepticism and the Epistemic Priority Thesis. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):573-586.
    In ' Unnatural Doubts' Michael Williams argues that Cartesian skepticism is not truly an "intuitive problem" (that is, one which we can state with little or no appeal to contentious theories) at all. According to Williams, the skeptic has rich theoretical commitments all his own, prominent among which is the epistemic priority thesis. I argue, however, that Williams's diagnostic critique of the epistemic priority thesis fails on his own conception of what is required for success. Furthermore, in a brief "Afterword" (...)
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  83. Bruce Russell (2005). Contextualism on a Pragmatic, Not a Skeptical, Footing. Acta Analytica 20 (2):26-37.
    Contextualism is supposed to explain why the following argument for skepticism seems plausible: (1) I don’t know that I am not a bodiless brain-in-a-vat (BIV); (2) If I know I have hands, then I know I am not a bodiless BIV; (3) Therefore, I do not know I have hands. Keith DeRose claims that (1) and (2) are “initially plausible.” I claim that (1) is initially plausible only because of an implicit argument that stands behind it; it is not intuitively (...)
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  84. Bruce Russell (2004). How to Be an Anti-Skeptic and a Noncontextualist. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):245 - 255.
    Contextualists often argue from examples where it seems true to say in one context that a person knows something but not true to say that in another context where skeptical hypotheses have been introduced. The skeptical hypotheses can be moderate, simply mentioning what might be the case or raising questions about what a person is certain of, or radical, where scenarios about demon worlds, brains in vats, The Matrix, etc., are introduced. I argue that the introduction of these skeptical hypotheses (...)
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  85. Jonathan Schaffer (2005). What Shifts? : Thresholds, Standards, or Alternatives? In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press.
    Much of the extant discussion focuses on the question of whether contextualism resolves skeptical paradoxes. Understandably. Yet there has been less discussion as to the internal structure of contextualist theories. Regrettably. Here, for instance, are two questions that could stand further discussion: (i) what is the linguistic basis for contextualism and (ii) what is the parameter that shifts with context?
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  86. Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Contrastive Knowledge. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Oxford University Press.
    Does G. E. Moore know that he has hands? Yes, says the dogmatist: Moore’s hands are right before his eyes. No, says the skeptic: for all Moore knows he could be a brain-in-a-vat. Yes and no, says the contrastivist: yes, Moore knows that he has hands rather than stumps; but no, Moore does not know that he has hands rather than vat-images of hands. The dogmatist and the skeptic suppose that knowledge is a binary, categorical relation: s knows that p. (...)
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  87. Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):138–155.
    The skeptic says that "knowledge" is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that "knowledge" is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about "knowledge"? And what implications do these hypotheses about "knowledge" have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about "knowledge", but that both hypotheses about "knowledge" have deeply anti-skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.
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  88. Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):138 - 155.
    The skeptic says that "knowledge" is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that 'knowledge" is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about "knowledge"? And what implications do these hypotheses about "knowledge" have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about "knowledge", but that both hypotheses about "knowledge" have deeply anti-skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.
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  89. Gilbert Scharifi (2004). Contextualism and the Skeptic: Comments on Engel. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):233 - 244.
    Mylan Engels paper (2004) is divided into two parts: a negative part, criticizing the costs of contextualism and a constructive part proposing a noncontextualist resolution of the skeptical problem. I will only address the constructive part here. The constructive part is composed of three elements: (i) a reconstruction or reformulation of the original skeptical argument, which draws on the notion of epistemic possibility (e-possibility), (ii) a distinction between two senses of knowledge (and two corresponding kinds of e-possibility): fallibilistic and infallibilistic, (...)
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  90. Stephen Schiffer (1996). Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:317-333.
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  91. Basil Smith (2006). Epistemic Luck, by Duncan Pritchard. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (2):291-295.
  92. Ernest Sosa (2011). Replies. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):341 - 358.
    Philosophical Papers, Volume 40, Issue 3, Page 341-358, November 2011.
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  93. Ernest Sosa (2000). Skepticism and Contextualism. Noûs 34 (s1):1-18.
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  94. Ernest Sosa (1988). Knowledge in Context, Skepticism in Doubt: The Virtue of Our Faculties. Philosophical Perspectives 2:139-155.
  95. Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (2000). Editorial Preface. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):i-i.
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  96. Finn Spicer (2006). Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):366-385.
    In this paper I examine the way appeals to pretheoretic intuition are used to support epistemological theses in general and the thesis of epistemic contextualism in particular. After outlining the sceptical puzzle and the contextualist's resolution of that puzzle, I explore the question of whether this solution fits better with our intuitive take on the puzzle than its invariantist rivals. I distinguish two kinds of fit a theory might have with pretheoretic intuitions-accommodation and explanation, and consider whether achieving either kind (...)
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  97. Jason Stanley (2005). Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Analysis 65 (286):126–131.
    Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism.
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  98. Matthias Steup (2005). Contextualism and Conceptual Disambiguation. Acta Analytica 20 (1):3-15.
    I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version of contextualism.
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  99. Leslie Stevenson (1993). Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism By Michael Williams (Oxford: Blackwell 1991) Xxiii + 386pp., £40.00. [REVIEW] Philosophy 68 (263):110-.
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  100. Ronald Suter (1986). Saul Wittgenstein's Skeptical Paradox. Philosophical Research Archives 12:183-193.
    Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein’s nor his own. I call this new skeptic “Saul Wittgenstein”. SW’s conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the Investigations when he says it offers a “skeptical solution” to SW’s paradox. Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW’s writing contains an implicit dissolution (...)
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