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  1. Agustín Arrieta & M. J. García-Encinas (2001). André Gallois, Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 21 (1):39-41.
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  2. Ralf M. Bader (2012). The Non-Transitivity of the Contingent and Occasional Identity Relations. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):141-152.
    This paper establishes that the occasional identity relation and the contingent identity relation are both non-transitive and as such are not properly classified as identity relations. This is achieved by appealing to cases where multiple fissions and fusions occur simultaneously. These cases show that the contingent and occasional identity relations do not even satisfy the time-indexed and world-indexed versions of the transitivity requirement and hence are non-transitive relations.
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). The Ontological Status of Persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll (...)
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):144–165.
    relation between, say, a lump of clay and a statue that it makes up, or between a red and white piece of metal and a stop sign, or between a person and her body? Assuming that there is a single relation between members of each of these pairs, is the relation “strict” identity, “contingent” identity or something else?1 Although this question has generated substantial controversy recently,2 I believe that there is philo- sophical gain to be had from thinking through the (...)
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  5. Andrew Brennan (1986). Best Candidates and Theories of Identity. Inquiry 29 (1-4):423-438.
    Attacks on ?closest continuer? and ?best candidate? theories of identity have something correct in them while still failing to discredit the theories they oppose. What follows from Noonan's and Wiggins's objections to such theories is that they need to be so formulated as not to deny the necessity of identity. The best metaphysics for best?candidate theories to adopt is one in which everyday objects are taken to transcend, in a certain sense, their life histories in given worlds. This metaphysics also (...)
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  6. W. R. Carter (1982). On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms. Philosophical Studies 41 (2):213 - 230.
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  7. William R. Carter (1987). Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation. Mind 96 (382):250-255.
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  8. Albert Casullo (1984). The Contingent Identity of Particulars and Universals. Mind 93 (372):527-541.
    The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that particulars in the actual world are nothing but complexes of universals. I begin by briefly presenting bertrand russell's version of this view and exposing its primary difficulty. I then examine the key assumption which leads russell to difficulty and show that it is mistaken. The rejection of this assumption forms the basis of an alternative version of the view which is articulated and defended.
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  9. Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij (2013). Identity, Leibniz's Law and Non-Transitive Reasoning. Metaphysica 14 (2):253-264.
    Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.
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  10. B. Jack Copeland (2000). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity, and Property Identity, Aristotelian-Style. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):11-25.
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  11. Andre Gallois (1988). Carter on Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation. Mind 97 (386):273-278.
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  12. André Gallois (1986). Rigid Designation and the Contingency of Identity. Mind 95 (377):57-76.
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  13. Allan Gibbard (1997). Contingent Identity1. In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Journal of Philosophical Logic. Rowman & Littlefield 93.
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  14. Allan Gibbard (1975). Contingent Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.
    Identities formed with proper names may be contingent. this claim is made first through an example. the paper then develops a theory of the semantics of concrete things, with contingent identity as a consequence. this general theory lets concrete things be made up canonically from fundamental physical entities. it includes theories of proper names, variables, cross-world identity with respect to a sortal, and modal and dispositional properties. the theory, it is argued, is coherent and superior to its rivals, in that (...)
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  15. Irwin Goldstein (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  16. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2011). Can Persistence Be a Matter of Convention? Axiomathes 21 (4):507-529.
    This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic (...)
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  17. Claus Janew (2011). Laws of Form: Why Spencer-Brown is Missing the Point. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):885-886.
    What George Spencer-Brown wants to rationalize out of existence is alternation itself – the prerequisite of his whole operation. By that he simplifies (identifies) more than he says. And he does not say all that is important.
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  18. Toomas Karmo (1983). Contingent Non-Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):185 – 187.
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  19. Rosanna Keefe (1995). Contingent Identity and Vague Identity. Analysis 55 (3):183 - 190.
    Evan's influential argument against vague objects (_Analysis, 1978) has a parallel directed against contingent identity. I argue that Noonan failed in his attempt to accept Evans's argument but save contingent identity by establishing a disanalogy between the two arguments (in The Philosophical Quarterly 1991). Instead, I suggest an alternative way to block the argument against contingent identity and argue that its analogue provides a satisfactory response to Evans's original argument.
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  20. John L. King (1978). Chandler on Contingent Identity. Analysis 38 (3):135 - 136.
    In his article "rigid designation" ("journal of philosophy", Volume lxxii, Pages 363-9) hugh s chandler presents an alleged counterexample to the principles that proper names are rigid designators and that identity statements using proper names as designators are non-Contingent. In the present paper this counterexample is shown to rest on a tacit assumption which the principles' proponents need not accept. Chandler's example is redescribed in a way which is both plausible and compatible with the two principles.
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  21. Kathrin Koslicki (2005). Almost Indiscernible Objects and the Suspect Strategy. Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):55 - 77.
    This paper examines a variety of contexts in metaphysics which employ a strategy I consider to be suspect. In each of these contexts, ‘The Suspect Strategy’ (TSS) aims at excluding a series of troublesome contexts from a general principle whose truth the philosopher in question wishes to preserve. We see (TSS) implemented with respect to Leibniz’s Law (LL) in the context of Gibbard’s defense of contingent identity, Myro and Gallois’ defense of temporary identity, as well as Terence Parsons’ defense of (...)
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  22. Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
  23. Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press 135-164.
    are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In both cases, i~thas usually been t'aken for granted in fife one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgements were possible, and in the other case in contemporary,'d-". philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are ppss. ible. I do not intend to deal with the Kantian question except to mention:ssj~".
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  24. Jerrold Levinson (1988). A Note on Categorical Properties and Contingent Identity. Journal of Philosophy 85 (12):718-722.
    Stephen Yablo has attempted recently to revive the notion of contingent identity, identifying this with a relation of L coincidence between objects that are "distinct by nature but the same in the circumstances" (296). Yablo argues convincingly for the need of essentialist metaphysics to recognize some relation of this sort, a relation of "intimate identity-like connections between things" (296) if it is to acknowledge properly the intuitive difference between (i) the nonidentity of a bust B and a hunk of wax (...)
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  25. David Lewis (1971). Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies. Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):203-211.
  26. Ofra Magidor (2011). Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):180-195.
    Leibniz’s Law (or as it sometimes called, ‘the Indiscerniblity of Identicals’) is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz’s Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article (...)
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  27. Don A. Merrell (2011). Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
    Thomas Polger has argued in favour of the mind-brain type-identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type-identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type-materialist must respond to Kripke's modal anti-materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke's argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non-identical when one knows the identity conditions for both x and y. Replace x and (...)
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  28. George Myro (1997). Identity and Time. In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution. Rowman & Littlefield 148.
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  29. Harold W. Noonan (1991). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):183-193.
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  30. Harold Noonan & Benjamin L. Curtis (2014). Identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time, but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have also attracted attention. Various interrelated problems have been at the centre of discussion, but it is fair to say that recent work has focussed particularly on the following areas: the notion of a criterion of identity; the correct analysis of identity over time, and, in particular, the disagreement (...)
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  31. E. T. Olson (2002). The Ontology of Material Objects. Philosophical Books 43 (4):292-299.
    [First paragraph] For a long time philosophers thought material objects were unproblematic. Or nearly so. There may have been a problem about what a material object is: a substance, a bundle of tropes, a compound of substratum and universals, a collection of sense-data, or what have you. But once that was settled there were supposed to be no further metaphysical problems about material objects. This illusion has now largely been dispelled. No one can get a Ph.D. in philosophy nowadays without (...)
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  32. Zane Parks (1974). Semantics for Contingent Identity Systems. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (2):333-334.
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  33. Martin Pickup (2016). A Situationalist Solution to the Ship of Theseus Puzzle. Erkenntnis 81 (5):973-992.
    This paper outlines a novel solution to the Ship of Theseus puzzle. The solution relies on situations, a philosophical tool used in natural language semantics among other places. The core idea is that what is true is always relative to the situation under consideration. I begin by outlining the problem before briefly introducing situations. I then present the solution: in smaller situations the candidate is identical to Theseus’s ship. But in larger situations containing both candidates these identities are neither true (...)
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  34. Thomas W. Polger, Kripke and the Illusion of Contingent Identity.
    Saul Kripke’s modal essentialist argument against materialism remains an obstacle to any prospective Identity Theorist. This paper is an attempt to make room for an Identity Theory without dismissing Kripke’s analytic tools or essentialist intuitions. I propose an explanatory model that can make room for the Identity Theory within the constraints of Kripke’s view; the model is based on ideas from Alan Sidelle’s, “Identity and Identity-like” . My model explains the apparent contingency of some scientific identities by appealing to our (...)
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  35. Murali Ramachandran (2008). Kripkean Counterpart Theory. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):89-106.
    David Lewis’s counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic is motivated originally by worries about identifying objects across possible worlds; the counterpart relation is grounded more cautiously on comparative similarity. The possibility of contingent identity is an unsought -- and in some eyes, unwelcome -- consequence of this approach. In this paper I motivate a Kripkean counterpart theory by way of defending the prior, pre-theoretical, coherence of contingent directness. Contingent identity follows for free. The theory is Kripkean in that the counterpart (...)
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  36. Murali Ramachandran (1990). Contingent Identity in Counterpart Theory. Analysis 50 (3):163-166.
    A slight modification to the translation scheme for David Lewis's counterpart theory I put forward in 'An Alternative Translation Scheme for Counterpart Theory' (Analysis 49.3 (1989)) is proposed. The motivation for this change is that it makes for a more plausible account of contingent identity. In particular, contingent identity is accommodated without admitting the contingency of self-identity.
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  37. Kripke Saul (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York,New York University Press
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  38. Marcus Schultz-Bergin (2012). Aristotle's Intermittently Existing Masked Man. American Dialectic 2 (1):1-22.
  39. Wolfgang Schwarz (2013). Contingent Identity. Philosophy Compass 8 (5):486-495.
    It is widely held that if an object a is identical (or non-identical) to an object b, then it is necessary that a is identical (non-identical) to b. This view is supported an argument from Leibniz's Law and a popular conception of de re modality. On the other hand, there are good reasons to allow for contingent identity. Various alternative accounts of de re modality have been developed to achieve this kind of generality, and to explain what is wrong with (...)
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  40. A. Sidelle (2000). Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness, by Andre Gallois. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 109 (3):469-471.
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  41. R. Stanton, M. Ezcurdia & C. Viger (eds.) (2004). New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30. University of Calgary Press.
  42. Jim Stone (2009). Moderate Monism: Reply to Noonan and Mackie. Analysis 69 (1):91-95.
    Moderate Monism is the position that permanent, but not temporary, coincidence entails identity. Harold Noonan writes: " According to the moderate monist if God creates ex nihilo a bronze statue and later annihilates it, destroying both the statue and the bronze of which it is composed , the statue and the bronze are identical. If, however, God simply radically reshapes the bronze at t10 the statue ceases to exist and the piece of bronze survives, so despite their coincidence up to (...)
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  43. Norman M. Swartz (1974). Can the Theory of Contingent Identity Between Sensation-States and Brain-States Be Made Empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (March):405-17.
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  44. Norman Manuel Swartz (1971). Contingent Identity. Dissertation, Indiana University
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  45. J. Teichmann (1967). The Contingent Identity of Minds and Brains. Mind 76 (July):404-15.
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  46. Achille C. Varzi (2001). Review of André Gallois, Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):291–295.
    Book Information: Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. By André Gallois. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1998. Pp. xiii + 296. Hardback, £35.00.
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  47. Alberto Voltolini (2014). Contingent Sameness and Necessary Identity. In Adriano Palma (ed.), Castañeda and His Guises: Essays on the Work of Hector-Neri Castañeda. De Gruyter 187-206.
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  48. Alberto Voltolini (1997). Contingent and Necessary Identities. Acta Analytica 19:73-98.
    A new theory of identity statements is put forward which appeals to a basic distinction between two notions of identity, i.e. strict and loose identity. The former is the traditional necessary relation of an object with the object itself, whereas the latter is a contingent relation of reduction of some (at least two) possible unactual objects to a possible actual object. By appealing to strict identity, one can maintain that some tokenings of identity sentences express a semantic content which is (...)
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  49. Wahlberg Tobias Hansson (2009). 4-D Objects and Disposition Ascriptions. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):35-72.
    Disposition ascription has been discussed a good deal over the last few decades, as has the revisionary metaphysical view of ordinary, persisting objects known as 'fourdimensionalism'. However, philosophers have not merged these topics and asked whether four-dimensional objects can be proper subjects of dispositional predicates. This paper seeks to remedy this oversight. It argues that, by and large, four-dimensional objects are not suited to take dispositional predicates.
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  50. Wahlberg Tobias Hansson (2008). Can I Be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time? Metaphysica 9 (2):235-239.
    An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz's Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold (...)
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