This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
81 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 81
  1. Chrisoula Andreou (2013). Agency and Awareness. Ratio 26 (2):117-133.
    I focus on the idea that if, as a result of lacking any conscious goal related to X-ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X-ing, one could sincerely reply to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’ with ‘I didn't realize I was doing that,’ then one's X-ing is not intentional. My interest is in the idea interpreted as philosophically substantial (rather than merely stipulative) and as linked to the familiar view that there is a major difference, relative to the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. A. D. Baddeley & Lawrence Weiskrantz (eds.) (1993). Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control. Oxford University Press.
  3. John A. Bargh (ed.) (2007). Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Psychology Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. John A. Bargh (2005). Bypassing the Will: Toward Demystifying the Nonconscious Control of Social Behavior. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 37-58.
  5. John A. Bargh (1996). Automaticity in Social Psychology. In E. E. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Guilford.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. John A. Bargh (1994). The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  7. G. H. Bayles & P. J. Cleary (1986). The Role of Awareness in the Control of Frontalis Muscle Activity. Biological Psychology 22:23-35.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ralf-Peter Behrendt (2004). A Neuroanatomical Model of Passivity Phenomena. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):579-609.
  9. Robert Briscoe (2011). The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Richard A. Carlson (2002). Conscious Intentions in the Control of Skilled Mental Activity. In Brian H. Ross (ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, Vol. 41. Academic Press. 191-228.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. T. H. Carr, C. McCauley, R. D. Sperber & C. M. Parmelee (1982). Words, Pictures, and Priming: On Semantic Activation, Conscious Identification, and the Automaticity of Information Processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology 8:757-777.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Tanya L. Chartrand (2005). The Role of Conscious Awareness in Consumer Behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology 15 (3):203-210.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Andy Clark (2007). What Reaching Teaches: Consciousness, Control, and the Inner Zombie. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):563 - 594.
    What is the role of conscious visual experience in the control and guidance of human behaviour? According to some recent treatments, the role is surprisingly indirect. Conscious visual experience, on these accounts, serves the formation of plans and the selection of action types and targets, while the control of 'online' visually guided action proceeds via a quasi-independent non-conscious route. In response to such claims, critics such as (Wallhagen [2007], pp. 539-61) have suggested that the notions of control and guidance invoked (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Andy Clark (2001). Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight? Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.
    How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (16 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Marion Cranacvonh (2000). Freedom of the Will--The Basis of Control. In Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.), Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Erlbaum. 59-69.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Judy S. DeLoache (2004). Scale Errors by Very Young Children: A Dissociation Between Action Planning and Control. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):32-33.
    Very young children occasionally commit scale errors, which involve a dramatic dissociation between planning and control: A child's visual representation of the size of a miniature object is not used in planning an action on it, but is used in the control of the action. Glover's planning–control model offers a very useful framework for analyzing this newly documented phenomenon.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Iraj Derakhshan (2003). The Preservation of Consciousness, Automatism, and Movement Control. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 15 (4):456.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Edmond M. Dewan (1976). Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent in the Context of Control System Theory. In Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.), Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Ezio Di Nucci & Filippo Santoni de Sio (forthcoming). Who’s Afraid of Robots? Fear of Automation and the Ideal of Direct Control. In Fiorella Battaglia & Natalie Weidenfeld (eds.), Roboethics in Film. Pisa University Press.
    We argue that lack of direct and conscious control is not, in principle, a reason to be afraid of machines in general and robots in particular: in order to articulate the ethical and political risks of increasing automation one must, therefore, tackle the difficult task of precisely delineating the theoretical and practical limits of sustainable delegation to robots.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Ap Dijksterhuis & Henk Aarts (2012). Control, Consciousness, and Agency. In Henk Aarts & Andrew J. Elliot (eds.), Goal-Directed Behavior. Psychology Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jack Glaser & John F. Kihlstrom (2005). Compensatory Automaticity: Unconscious Volition is Not an Oxymoron. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 171-195.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. A. M. Gordon & D. A. Rosenbaum (1984). Conscious and Subconscious Arm Movements: Application of Signal Detection Theory to Motor Control. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 22 (3):214-216.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. P. S. Gott, E. C. Hughes & K. Whipple (1984). Voluntary Control of Two Lateralized Conscious States: Validation of Electrical and Behavioral Studies. Neuropsychologia 22:65-72.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Jeffrey A. Gray (1998). Abnormal Contents of Consciousness: The Transition From Automatic to Controlled Processing. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Ran R. Hassin (2005). Nonconscious Control and Implicit Working Memory. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 196-222.
  26. Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.) (2005). The New Unconscious. Oxford University Press.
    Over the past two decades, a new picture of the unconscious has emerged from a variety of disciplines that are broadly part of cognitive science. According to this picture, unconscious processes seem to be capable of doing many things that were thought to require intention, deliberation, and conscious awareness. Moreover, they accomplish these things without the conflict and drama of the psychoanalytic unconscious. These processes range from complex information processing, through goal pursuit and emotions, to cognitive control and self-regulation. This (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.) (2005). The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    Over the past two decades, a new picture of the unconscious has emerged from a variety of disciplines that are broadly part of cognitive science. According to this picture, unconscious processes seem to be capable of doing many things that were thought to require intention, deliberation, and conscious awareness. Moreover, they accomplish these things without the conflict and drama of the psychoanalytic unconscious. These processes range from complex information processing, through goal pursuit and emotions, to cognitive control and self-regulation. This (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. E. E. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (eds.) (1996). Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Guilford.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Bernhard Hommel (2007). Consciousness and Control: Not Identical Twins. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):155-176.
    Human cognition and action are intentional and goal-directed, and explaining how they are controlled is one of the most important tasks of the cognitive sciences. After half a century of benign neglect this task is enjoying increased attention. Unfortunately, however, current theorizing about control in general, and the role of consciousness for/in control in particular, suffers from major conceptual flaws that lead to confusion regarding the following distinctions: (i) automatic and unintentional processes, (ii) exogenous control and disturbance (in a control-theoretical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. M. J. Horowitz & C. H. Stinson (1995). Consciousness and Processes of Control. Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research 4:123-139.
  31. Susan L. Hurley (2006). Bypassing Conscious Control: Media Violence, Unconscious Imitation, and Freedom of Speech. In S. Pockett, W. Banks & S. Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.
    Why does it matter whether and how individuals consciously control their behavior? It matters for many reasons. Here I focus on concerns about social influences of which agents are typically unaware on aggressive behavior.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.) (1997). Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  33. Larry L. Jacoby, D. Ste-Marie & J. P. Toth (1993). Redefining Automaticity: Unconscious Influences, Awareness, and Control. In A. D. Baddeley & Lawrence Weiskrantz (eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness,and Control. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin (2007). The Role of Control in a Science of Consciousness: Causality, Regulation and Self-Sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):177-197.
    There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that addresses these (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. J. Kamiya (1968). Conscious Control of Brain Waves. Psychology Today 1:56-60.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. G. Knoblich & T. T. J. Kircher (2004). Deceiving Oneself About Being in Control: Conscious Detection of Changes in Visuomotor Coupling. Journal of Experimental Psychology - Human Perception and Performance 30 (4):657-66.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. E. J. Langer (1992). Matters of Mind: Mindfulness/Mindlessness in Perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 1 (3):289-305.
  38. Neil Levy & Timothy J. Bayne (2004). A Will of One's Own: Consciousness, Control, and Character. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):459-470.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Katrin Linser & Thomas Goschke (2007). Unconscious Modulation of the Conscious Experience of Voluntary Control. Cognition 104 (3):459-475.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Pete Mandik (2010). Control Consciousness. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
    Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. In such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Hamish J. McLeod, Mitchell K. Byrne & Rachel Aitken (2004). Automatism and Dissociation: Disturbances of Consciousness and Volition From a Psychological Perspective. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):471-487.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Christopher Mole (2013). Embodied Demonstratives: A Reply to Wu. Mind 122 (485):231-239.
    Although Wayne Wu correctly identifies a flaw in the way in which my 2009 article frames the debate about ‘zombie action’, he fails in his attempts to strengthen the case for thinking that our actions are under less conscious control than we usually imagine. His argument, like the arguments that my earlier paper addressed, can be blocked by allowing that an embodied demonstrative concept can contribute contents to a visual experience.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Christopher Mole (2009). Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis. Mind 118 (472):995-1011.
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, and the many psychologists and philosophers who have been influenced by their work, claim that ‘the visual system that gives us our visual experience of the world is not the same system that guides our movements in the world’. The arguments that have been offered for this surprising claim place considerable weight on two sources of evidence — visual form agnosia and the reaching behaviour of normal subjects when picking up objects that induce visual illusions. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Agnes Moors & Jan De Houwer (2007). What is Automaticity? An Analysis of its Component Features and Their Interrelations. In Bargh, John A. (2007). Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Frontiers of Social Psychology. (Pp. 11-50). New York, Ny, Us: Psychology Press. X, 341 Pp.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Agnes Moors & Jan Houweder (2007). Bargh, John A. (2007). Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Frontiers of Social Psychology. (Pp. 11-50). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press. X, 341 Pp. [REVIEW]
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Lionel Naccache, Stanislas Dehaene, L. Jonathan Cohen, Marie-Odile Habert, Elodie Guichart-Gomez, Damien Galanaud & Jean-Claude Willer (2005). Effortless Control: Executive Attention and Conscious Feeling of Mental Effort Are Dissociable. Neuropsychologia 43 (9):1318-1328.
  47. Masanori Oikawa (2004). Moderation of Automatic Achievement Goals by Conscious Monitoring. Psychological Reports 95 (3):975-980.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. M. Oswald & Volker Gadenne (2000). Are Controlled Processes Conscious? In Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.), Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 87--101.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. B. Keith Payne, Larry L. Jacoby & Alan J. Lambert (2005). Attitudes as Accessibility Bias: Dissociating Automatic and Controlled Processes. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford University Press. 393-420.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.) (2000). Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Erlbaum.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 81